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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE TELEOLOGY OF POETICS IN MEDIEVAL KASHMIR

VOLUME ONE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES
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DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH ASIAN LANGUAGES AND CIVILIZATIONS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME ONE

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION....................................1

II. EARLY ALAṂKĀRAŚĀSTRA AND THE PROBLEM OF **RASA**..36

III. MĪMĀṂSĀ AND THE TELEOLOGY OF LANGUAGE.........66

IV. ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S DHVANYĀLOKA AND THE TELEOLOGY OF POETIC LANGUAGE.................119

V. ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S POETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE........................194

VOLUME TWO

VI. THEORY AND CRITICISM IN THE DHVANYĀLOKA......258

VII. MUKULABHAṬṬA AND PRATĪHĀRENDURĀJA............304

VIII. KUNTAKA'S VAKROKTIJĪVITA....................390

IX. ABHINAVAGUPTA............................431

X. MAHIMABHAṬṬA'S VYAKTIVIVEKA..................471

EPILOGUE..521

BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................531

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

It has long been recognized that the *Dhvanyāloka* of the ninth-century Kashmiri Ānandavardhana marks a crucial turning point in the development of Sanskrit literary theory (Alaṃkāraśāstra). Ānandavardhana's view of **dhvani** (suggestion), and particularly suggested **rasa** (aestheticized emotion), as centrally important in the composition of effective poetry comes ultimately to gain near-universal acceptance among the practitioners of Alaṃkāraśāstra. The great seventeenth-century poet and literary theorist Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja speaks for most of the later Ālaṃkārikas when he declares Ānandavardhana to have been "the establisher of the course for Ālaṃkārikas" (**ālaṃkārika-saraṇi-vyavasthāpaka**).[1]

Modern scholars have likewise recognized the commanding role played by the *Dhvanyāloka* in the development of Alaṃkāraśāstra. P.V. Kane hails it as "an epoch making work in the history of Alaṃkāra Literature" which "occupies the same position in the Alaṃkāraśāstra as Pāṇini's sūtras in Grammar and the Vedāntasūtras in Vedānta."[2] According to S.K. De,

No other work on Sanskrit Poetics has indeed exerted so

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[1]Jaggannātha Paṇḍitarāja, *Rasagaṅgādhara*, ed. Kedāranātha Ojhā, Sarasvatī Bhavana Granthamālā 113, Varanasi, 1981, Vol. II, p. 559.

[2]P.V. Kane, *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1971 [fourth ed.], p. 161.

> much influence as the *Dhvanyāloka*, which brought to a focus the tentative efforts of earlier thinkers, and by its thoroughness and masterly exposition eclipsed all its predecessors, dominating, as it did, thoughts of generations of theorists even down to the present time.[3]

K. Krishnamoorthy proclaims Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory to be "the most perfect literary theory"[4] and "the highest point reached by Sanskrit literary criticism."[5]

Yet I will argue that, despite the widespread recognition of the crucial importance of Ānandavardhana's work in the development of Sanskrit literary theory and the attention that has been lavished upon it, the transformation brought about in the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra by the Dhvanyāloka has so far been poorly understood. There are, as I see it, two main factors which have impaired most previous efforts at assessing Ānandavardhana's role in the history of Alaṃkāraśāstra. The first is the largely unqualified adulation with which Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory has generally been viewed; this has led most scholars of Alaṃkāraśāstra to denigrate and downplay the significance of alternative theories of literary aesthetics (both those of Ānandavardhana's predecessors and those of later theorists).

It is certainly true that Ānandavardhana's theory

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[3]S.K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Calcutta, Firma KLM Private Ltd., 1976, Vol. II, p. 175.

[4]Krishnamoorthy, The **Dhvanyāloka** and its Critics, Mysore, Kavyalaya Publishers, 1968, p. 45.

[5]Krishnamoorthy, Essays in Sanskrit Criticism, Dharwar, Karnatak University, 1964, p. 62.

ultimately came to exercise virtually universal sway in the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra, superseding all rivals, and an important part of the task facing the historian is to explain why Ānandavardhana's theory was found preferable in comparison with others. Nevertheless, the history of Alaṃkāraśāstra is far from a one-sided story of the **dhvani**-theory's triumph. The earlier Ālaṃkārikas whose theories Ānandavardhana sought to displace exercised great care and sophistication in their study of literary language; the issues raised by their analysis of the formal components of poetry remain central for all later Ālaṃkārikas, including Ānandavardhana and his followers. Powerful critiques were raised against Ānandavardhana by rival Ālaṃārikas, particularly in tenth and eleventh century Kashmir (as we shall see).[6] The **dhvani**-theory gained general acceptance only after a long struggle with proponents of these rival theories, and was shaped in important ways by the need to effectively counter the anti-**dhvani** arguments raised by these opponents. Devotion to the

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[6]In addition, outside of Kashmir, alternative traditions of literary analysis persisted for some time after Ānandavardhana's views gained supremacy among the Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas, most notably that pioneered by Bhoja (c. 1050 AD) in his Śṛṅgāraprakāśa and Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa. Later works which carry on more or less in the tradition of Bhoja's work include the anonymous Sāhityamīmāṃsā (not to be confused with Ruyyaka's lost work of the same name-- cf. Raghavan, Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa [Madras: Punarvasu, 1978, third ed., pp. 92-96, 683-686]), the Rasārṇavālaṃkāra (ascribed to Prakāśavarṣa-- cf. ibid., pp. 365-366, 387), and, to some extent, Siṃhabhūpāla's (c. 1330 AD) Rasārṇavasudhākara (cf. ibid., pp. 696-698 and De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., pp. 239-241).

dhvani-theory has made it difficult for many modern scholars to take these rival theories seriously as alternatives to Ānandavardhana's, and their accounts of the **dhvani**-theory's struggle for supremacy suffer as a result.

A second and perhaps more important factor hindering the construction of a meaningful historical account of the development of the **dhvani** theory, and of Alaṃkāraśāstra generally, has been the general tendency among modern scholars to explain and evaluate the aesthetic views of Ānandavardhana and the other Ālaṃkārikas almost solely in terms of what each took to be the fundamental principle of poetic beauty-- the essence or "soul" (**ātman**) of poetry. It is on the basis of their views (or their presumed views) regarding the "soul" of poetry that the various Ālaṃkārikas have been categorized and grouped into "schools".[7] Those who emphasize the importance of figures of speech (**alaṃkāras**) in poetry are labelled the "Alaṃkāra School", Ānandavardhana and his followers are called the "Dhvani School", and so on. The grouping of Ālaṃkārikas into "schools" on this basis is arbitrary and rather crude; it serves to mask important disagreements between members of the same so called "school", and important areas of agreement between members of rival "schools". The Ālaṃkārikas in

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[7]Cf. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., pp. 352-355; De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 322-323, Vol. II, pp. 32ff, 75ff, 139ff; Krishnamoorthy, op. cit., pp. 11, 17; and Mukunda Madhava Sharma, The Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies LXIII, Varanasi, 1968), pp. 6ff.

question do not group themselves into schools on this basis. It is simply assumed that what really counts in any Ālaṃkārika's system is what he believes to be the essence or soul of poetry, and that Ālaṃkārikas who are agreed on this point are on the same team, regardless of their differences on other matters.

This rather single-minded focus on the general question of the essence or central principle of poetic beauty is not at all characteristic of the Alaṃkāraśāstra tradition itself. Throughout its long history, Alaṃkāraśāstra has always remained firmly grounded in the detailed and precise analysis of specific literary features. A great many Ālaṃkārikas do not discuss the "soul" of poetry at all. Even for those (such Vāmana and Ānandavardhana) who do single out a particular element or group of elements as the soul of poetry, discussion of this central principle does not displace detailed formal analysis; the element which serves as the soul of poetry must itself be divided into types and subtypes (each of which must be defined and exemplified), secondary poetic features must likewise be categorized, defined, and exemplified, and their relations with this "essential" element must be specified.

This pervasive and relentless engagement with the specifics of poetic expression is so much at odds with the general predilection of modern scholars for discussions of general principles that it sometimes (most notably in S.K. De's works) seems to provoke a certain hostility toward the

entire field of Alaṃkāraśāstra. According to De, "Sanskrit Poetics, attempting to solve the riddle of Poetry, did hardly solve it, but delighted itself with the pleasure of abstract thought and formal calculation."[8] And again,

> We have now surveyed what, from the viewpoint of aesthetic, is worth while [sic.] in the speculations of Sanskrit poetics. We cannot but be struck by the smallness of the number of theorists who have seen the nature of the theoretic problem clearly. The majority hardly take poetry as a living discourse, in itself indivisible, among expressive organisms, but consider it as a series of dead abstractions capable of scientific dissection. They demonstrate, in short, a curious confusion of the artistic process with that of natural science. Many incidentally had a flash of the truth and offered just remarks; made conscientious collections and useful analyses of empirical canons. But the main problem is approached from a restricted angle, and has not been formulated clearly or in its entirety.[9]

For De, the essence or fundamental principle of poetic expression is "*the* theoretic problem", and consequently the persistent refusal of the Ālaṃkārikas to focus on this problem, and their preference for "formal calculation" and the "dissection" of poetic language, are baffling and frustrating.

Even Ānandavardhana is not left entirely free from criticism on these grounds. Krishnamoorthy, troubled by the attention Ānandavardhana devotes to what he sees as insignificant minutiae, offers the following apologia:

> We, who study the Dhvanyāloka at this distant date, separated by more than a thousand years from its author, are apt to take objection to one feature in which the

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[8]De, Some Problems in Sanskrit Poetics, Calcutta, Firma KLM, 1959, p. 52.

[9]De, Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetic, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1963, p. 47.

> work abounds, viz., the preponderance of minute classification, subtle hair-splitting and at times even logic-chopping; It may rightly appear to us so much waste of energy on matters insignificant in respect of literary criticism. But while making such an estimate we should not blind ourselves to the fact that Ānandavardhana is an ancient writer living in an age when the whole atmosphere was permeated with a love for philosophical argument and logical subtlety; and if Ānandavardhana errs, sometimes on the side of too much brevity and at other times on the side of over-subtlety, it is because he was a typical product of that age and he was merely following the *zeit geist*.[10]

Ānandavardhana's work devotes inordinate attention to "minute classification", "subtle hair-splitting"-- matters of little or no aesthetic importance. The only justification Krishnamoorthy has to offer is that Ānandavardhana can't really help it; the intellectual climate in which he works forces him to waste his effort on trivial matters.

Yet such "minute classification" and "subtle hair-splitting" is the mainstay of Sanskrit literary theory throughout its history. The view of Sanskrit poetics represented by De and Krishnamoorthy is one which treats what all Ālaṃkārikas do most of the time as marginal to the "real" or "proper" concerns of Alaṃkāraśāstra. Not surprisingly, this marginalization of the most persistent concerns of actual Ālaṃkārikas results in a rather reductive account of the history of Alaṃkāraśāstra.

Indeed, the belief that the proper concern of poetics is to explain in general terms the fundamental principle of

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[10]Krishnamoorthy, The Dhvanyāloka and its Critics, Mysore, Kavyalaya, 1968, p. 214.

poetic beauty, along with the favoritism most modern scholars hold for Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory, tends to promote a view of the history of the discipline in which there is only one really significant event: Ānandavardhana's discovery of **dhvani**, the real "soul" of poetry. The general view of earlier authors is that they are excessively concerned with the detailed analysis of specific formal features, and therefore overlook or talk around the fundamental question of Alaṃkāraśāstra-- that of the essence or soul of poetry. Vāmana, as the only one of these authors to take an explicit stand on the soul of poetry, is singled out for some praise; however, his claim that the soul of poetry is **rīti**[11] is still dismissed as inadequate and obviously inferior in comparison with Ānandavardhana's view. For P.V. Kane, "The *rīti* school marks a very real advance over the *alaṃkāra* school. Though it did not reach the real essence of poetry, it approached very near it." Nevertheless, he argues that the **rīti** school "had only a glimmering or hazy notion about the real essence of poetry."[12] De takes a similar view:

> To Vāmana belongs the credit of being the first writer on Poetics who, before the Dhvanikāra[13] and Ānandavardhana,

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[11]"Style", understood as a constellation of particular qualities [**guṇas**]-- "sweetness", "strength", etc.); cf. below, Chapter Two, pp. 44-45 and Chapter Four, pp. 144-146.

[12]Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., p. 381.

[13]De is among those who hold that Ānandavardhana composed only the prose **vṛtti** portion of the Dhvanyāloka; "the Dhvanikāra" is his name for the supposed anonymous author of the **kārikā** verses of the Dhvanyāloka-- cf. below, Chapter

> gave us a well thought-out and carefully outlined scheme of Poetics, no longer naive or tentative, which in spite of its theoretic defects, is in some respects unique and valuable. The enquiry as to what is the "soul" or essence of poetry is for the first time definitely posed and systematically worked out by Vāmana; his predecessors, to whom the "body" of poetry was more important, never having troubled themselves with this question.[14]

But,

> ... it is obvious that the fundamental doctrine of the Rīti school could not have been accepted in its entirety. Nor could it have competed against that of the Dhvanikāra, because Vāmana comprehended poetry only from the formal point of view, whereas the former showed a deeper insight into its inner nature. The more or less objective definition of the Rīti, given by this school, was hardly enough to satisfy the search for ultimate principles.[15]

For these authors, "the real essence of poetry" is **dhvani**, and the theories of the early Ālaṃkārikas, because they overlook this fact (either setting up something else as the essence of poetry or neglecting the question of poetry's essence altogether) cannot but be seen as insufficient.

The general view of the post-Ānandavardhana period in the history of Alaṃkāraśāstra has been similarly reductive. Once the "real essence of poetry" has been discovered by

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Four, p. 120.

[14]De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 89-90. Vāmana's treatment of poetic topics is not notably more systematic or logical than those of his predecessors. It would appear that for De, it is the discussion of the "soul" of poetry itself which makes Vāmana's theory "well thought-out and carefully outlined" (and that it is the failure to discuss this "soul" which makes the theories of Vāmana's predecessor "naive" and "tentative").

[15]Ibid., p. 106.

Ānandavardhana (or, at any rate, once Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory has been defended against its critics and authoritatively systematized by his followers Abhinavagupta [c. 1000 AD] and Mammaṭa [c. 1100 AD]), there is little opportunity for significant contributions from later Ālaṃkārikas. These Ālaṃkārikas must either reject Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory, or accept Ānandavardhana's general view of the soul of poetry and direct their attention toward matters of detail. Commenting on the predominance of the **dhvani**-theory, S.K. De says, "Here and there an isolated theorist arose who dared to question the general creed, but he was at once put down as a heretic and condemned to neglect and oblivion."[16] De labels those Ālaṃkārikas who challenge the **dhvani**-theory as "reactionary" theorists "whose feeble opposition languished for want of support even in the time of Mammaṭa."[17] If Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** is seen as the "real" soul of poetry, then any attack on the **dhvani**-theory can only be viewed as the result of the stubborn refusal to see the light.

Yet those later Ālaṃkārikas who accept Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory are likewise looked down on. They can make no further contribution to the "fundamental problem" of poetics--that of the soul of poetry. We have seen that detailed

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[16]De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 175.

[17]De, ibid., Vol. I, p. 325; cf. also Vol. II, pp. 179ff.

analysis and classification of the features of poetic language-- the mainstay of Alaṃkāraśāstra from its origins-- has generally been viewed as a distraction from the proper concern of literary aesthetics; yet, once the problem of the "soul" of poetry has been definitively settled, matters of detail are all that remain to be discussed. Consequently, the works of the later pro-**dhvani** theorists are generally stigmatized. As usual, De is most sweeping in his condemnation:

> With regard to matters of general theory and the main problems, the decadent Post-dhvani writers as a rule thought that there was nothing new to set forth; they consequently fell back on matters of detail which helped to satisfy their growing speculative passion for fine distinctions and their scholastic bent for controversy. It would be tedious, as well as useless, therefore, to treat them here at any great length, for they repeat more or less the same idea in their own way, sometimes in the same stock manner and phraseology, and differ from each other only in matters of no great theoretic importance.[18]

Krishnamoorthy likewise finds little of value in the works of the later Ālaṃkārikas. He argues that once the **dhvani**-theory has gained widespread acceptance, "original and creative criticism is at an end; the earlier ideas are re-interpreted in a consolidated form."[19] Like De, Krishnamoorthy sees these authors as overly concerned with the analysis and classification of formal features:

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[18]De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 216.

[19]Krishnamoorthy, The Dhvanyāloka and its Critics, op. cit., p. 298.

> ... it is significant to note that all these later writers swear to the all important nature of Dhvani in theory though in practice they indulge only in the classification, distinction, and illustration of the alaṃkāras. Thus the mighty stream of Dhvani which started with Ānandavardhana was made to run in a narrow channel prescribed by Mammaṭa, and the channel went on becoming narrower and narrower until at last the waters almost dried up in the sands of endless alaṃkāras.[20]

On this view, the post-**dhvani** Ālaṃkārika is placed in a seemingly inescapable bind; if he challenges the existence of **dhvani** or its status as the soul of poetry he is labelled as a reactionary, but if he accepts Ānandavardhana's argument for **dhvani** as the soul of poetry and turns his attention to other matters his work is seen as unoriginal, overly scholastic, and essentially trivial. If, as most sholarship on Alaṃkāraśāstra tends to assume, Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** is the "real" soul of poetry, then once this truth has been discovered there is no real opportunity for further meaningful contributions to what is widely seen as the fundamental problem of poetics. It would seem that once the **dhvani**-theory has been propounded, reaction and decadence are the only options available to an Ālaṃkārika.

It should be clear from the foregoing that a rigid notion of what should count as "properly aesthetic" concerns has tended to produce a distorted and reductive account of the history of Alaṃkāraśāstra. For the most part, scholars have posed only one major question to the tradition-- What is the "soul" of poetry?-- and have been inclined to accept only one

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[20]Ibid., p. 303.

answer-- **dhvani**. That most works of Alaṃkāraśāstra do not in fact concern themselves with this question, or do so only in passing, has been seen not as evidence for the need to reevaluate the questions we pose to the tradition, but as a sign of the primitive, inadequate, or decadent nature of these works. If we wish to produce a serious account of the history of Alaṃkāraśāstra, we must allow the Alaṃkāraśāstra texts themselves to tell us what the main concerns of Alaṃkāraśāstra are. The works produced in the tradition of Alaṃkāraśāstra do not simply provide various answers to a fixed question or set of questions. The questions Ālaṃkārikas pose in their analyses of literature, as well as the tools and methods they deploy in these analyses, develop significantly over time, and any meaningful history of Alaṃkāraśāstra must attempt to chart these developments and offer some explanation for them.

An important challenge to the dominant, monolithic, **dhvani**-centered view of the history of Alaṃkāraśāstra has been offered by Edwin Gerow.[21] Gerow's primary concern is to relegitimate the formalist aesthetic of the pre-Ānandavardhana Ālaṃkārikas. He sees the mode of analysis practiced by these Ālaṃkārikas as particularly appropriate to the classical Sanskrit poetry with which it was designed to deal, and argues that it has been unfairly denigrated by modern scholars

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[21]Primarily in his Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech (The Hague: Mouton, 1971) and his Indian Poetics (Vol. V, fasc. 3 in A History of Indian Literature, ed. Jan Gonda, Otto Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden, 1977).

partial to the later **dhvani**-theory (cf. below, Chapter Two, pp. 39ff).

Certainly Gerow is right that the works of these Ālaṃkārikas ought to be be viewed on their own terms and not as more or less defectively approximating (or more or less egregiously removed from) the later **dhvani**-theory; and Gerow has made important strides in recovering the distinctive understanding of literary analysis found in the works of these early Ālaṃkārikas. Nevertheless, Gerow's account of the rise of Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory and the displacement of this earlier mode of literary analysis is no more satisfying than that offered by proponents of a **dhvani**-centered view of the history of the discipline.

Because Gerow is arguing for the "adequacy" of pre-Ānandavardhana Alaṃkāraśāstra to the analysis of classical Sanskrit poetry, he is reluctant to acknowledge that the approach of the early Ālaṃkārikas was ultimately found wanting in comparison with that of Ānandavardhana and his followers. For Gerow, the **dhvani**-theory comes to displace this earlier poetic not because it provides what comes to be seen as a more satisfying analysis of existing poetry, but because it follows the rise of a *new kind of poetry*-- devotional poetry or "the religious lyric"-- to which the new poetic is specifically appropriate (as the earlier poetic was to the poetry of the classical era).

Gerow observes (rightly) that Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-

theory combines existing poetic theory (Alaṃkāraśāstra) with elements drawn from the historically distinct but related discipline of dramaturgy (Nāṭyaśāstra); he assumes that this convergence between poetic and dramaturgical *theory* necessarily implies a collapse *in practice* of the distinction between drama and poetry (which he sees as merging to form a new kind of "dramatic" devotional poetry).

> But the theory does not develop in a vacuum. The interest in elaborating a theory whereby one can unify the arts (or at least drama and strophic poetry) *should presuppose* some strategic event occurring in the arts themselves which at least suggests the opportunity for such rapprochement. It is not difficult to link what we know to have happened to Sanskrit letters in the post-Gupta and pre-Islamic period with the theoretical reevaluation that we find full-blown in Ānandavardhana. With the collapse of the stable, wealthy and sophisticated Gupta monarchy, and the time of troubles that ensued, Sanskrit drama lost both its audience (never more than the society of sophisticates attracted to the imperial courts and cities) and its means of support (what *we presume* to have been societies of wealthy literati-- and of course the king himself)... Dramas continued to be written, but *we presume*, were rarely performed... But oddly enough, as drama ceased to be a living art form, and was brought more and more into conformity with the rather academic style of the non-sophisticate[?] pundit, its distinctive principle[22] was being used as the basis for explaining the growing rapprochement of genres...
>
> On the side of strophic poetry, changes too were taking place, reflecting the new contexts in which poetry was used. We see growing devotionalism, and the employment of song, and also music, even marked shifts away from Sanskrit to various vernaculars. Poetry was becoming de-sophisticated (though poetry on classical lines continues to be written in an increasingly academic and un-

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[22]I.e. **rasa** (aestheticized emotion), which was first discussed in the field of dramaturgy, and which Ānandavardhana takes to be the primary determinant of poetic excellence.

'courtly'[23] vein, paralleling the drama); its socially alive forms did move with the times, and came under the sway of social, inevitably popular religious, movements that were seeking new ways to express their needs. [emphasis mine][24]

As Gerow sees it, it is this new "de-sophisticated" poetry which is the appropriate subject matter for **dhvani**-based poetics and which accounts for the rise of the **dhvani** theory.

> It is our view that this marriage of two distinct traditions[25] *would not have been possible, even as a theoretical exercise*, if the genres to which they referred had not in fact largely lost their respective identities. *Poetics, in India as anywhere else, follows poetry*... There was no genre in early classical times which corresponded to that implied by the **dhvani** theory...
>
> The poetic form properly corresponding to the **dhvani** theory is a genre which developed slowly in the late classical period and later became the only really viable literary art in India, the renascent lyric (older **stotras**, as those of Bāṇa or Mayūra, are definitely within the classical **kāvya** style). The lyric devotional poem is best epitomized in the marvelous Gītagovinda of Jayadeva, but is more voluminously represented in the several vernacular literatures. This genre is in fact dramatic poetry; poetry with a narrative basis in the divine event and intended to convey the emotional fervor of the **bhakta**... The poetry itself begins and ends in the service of an increasingly religious ideal: devotion to a personal God... The poetics of devotional poetry has never been more profoundly explored than in the **dhvani** school which continues today to dominate Indian

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[23]In what sense un-'courtly'? Royal patronage of Sanskrit poetry "along classical lines" continues unabated throughout the medieval period; this remains the primary basis of support for the producers of "academic", "sophisticated" poetry.

[24]Gerow, Indian Poetics, op. cit., pp. 251-252.

[25]I.e. Alamkāraśāstra and Nāṭyaśāstra, elements of which are mingled in the **dhvani**-theory.

thinking on poetics. [emphasis mine][26]

Because Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory (unlike the formalist aesthetic of his predecessors) lays special emphasis on the emotional content of poetry, Gerow sees it as particularly apprpriate to the analysis of poetry designed to portray and evoke the emotion of religious devotion (**bhakti**). His assumption that any significant alteration in poetic theory necessarily presupposes some transformation in poetry itself leads him to believe that it is the rise of devotional poetry which explains the genesis of the **dhvani**-theory and its displacement of the figure-centered poetic of the early Ālaṃkārikas.

Gerow's account of the rise of the **dhvani**-theory is untenable on several grounds. First and foremost, in the world of Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa literature-- that literature with which all Sanskrit Alaṃkāraśāstra is exclusively concerned-- the shift in literary practice which Gerow sees as explaining this theoretical transformation simply does not occur. Gerow mentions only one Sanskrit example of a "lyric devotional poem", the (twelfth century) Gītagovinda. While this work (which, of course, post-dates Ānandavardhana by several hundred years) certainly proved to be important and popular, it is far from a typical representative of Sanskrit poetry of its own period or of any

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[26]Gerow, A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech, op. cit., p. 80.

other; indeed, apart from a few later imitative works,[27] it is virtually in a class by itself. The overwhelming preponderance of later Sanskrit poetry is, in Gerow's phrase, "poetry on classical lines" and "within the classical **kāvya** style", and it is this poetry (and not Gerow's "socially alive" and "really viable" devotional lyrics) which continues to absorb the attention of the Ālaṃkārikas (including Ānandavardhana and his followers).

As Gerow himself rightly notes, the kind of "devotional lyric" he sees as the appropriate object of **dhvani**-based literary analysis is typical not of Sanskrit poetry, but of the poetry of the various regional vernaculars. Yet this regional vernacular poetry is wholly ignored by Ānandavardhana, and, in fact, by all Sanskrit Ālaṃkārikas. It is hard to see how one can reasonably argue that Ānandavardhana's reformulation of poetic theory was shaped by a body of literature of which he displays no awareness whatsoever.

There is no evidence in the Dhvanyāloka itself that the question of religious devotion (**bhakti**) plays any special role in Ānandavardhana's poetics (and Gerow makes no attempt to find any). Certainly there are among the many poetic examples cited in the Dhvanyāloka several benedictory or other verses dedicated to the praise of one god or another (which might

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[27]Cf. M. Krishnamachariar, History of Classical Sanskrit Literature, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989 [reprint], pp. 343-4.

therefore reasonably be described as "devotional"). But this is true of the works of Ānandavardhana's predecessors as well; there is nothing in Ānandavardhana's selection of examples to suggest that he sees "devotional" poetry as an especially important type of poetry, or as an especially appropriate test case for his aesthetic theory.

While Ānandavardhana's poetic theory, with its emphasis on **rasa**, does give greater prominence to the emotional content of poetry than those of earlier Ālaṃkārikas, there is nothing in Ānandavardhana's presentation of this theory to indicate that religious devotion is in any way privileged over other forms of emotional content; quite the contrary. Ānandavardhana's acceptance of Udbhaṭa's typology of **rasas** and **rasa**-like phenomena[28] would seem to indicate that for him, as for Udbhaṭa, religious devotion is not a **rasa** at all; on this view love for a god, like all forms of non-sexual love (e.g. love for a parent, child, or teacher) is a manifestation of the **bhāva rati** ("attraction") which, not being directed toward an appropriate sexual partner, cannot develop into full-fledged **śṛṅgāra-** ("erotic") **rasa**.[29] Of course, this

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[28]I.e. **rasa**, **bhāva**, **rasa-** and **bhāva-ābhāsa**, and **rasa-**, **bhāva-** and **ābhāsa-praśama**; cf. below, Chapter Two, pp. 52-58 and Chapter Four, p. 133.

[29]Certainly this is the view of Ānandavardhana's most important followers, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa (cf. Locana on Dhvanyāloka 2.5 [ed. Pattābhirāma Śāstrī, Kashi Sanskrit Series 135, Benares, 1940], pp. 191-2], and Kāvyaprakāśa, Mysore: Oriental Research Institute Series 120, 1974, Vol. I, pp. 284-5).

conclusion regarding Ānandavardhana's view of religious devotion is necessarily hypothetical, since Ānandavardhana nowhere explicitly discusses such devotion or its role in poetry.

The term **bhakti**, in its sense of religious devotion, occurs only once in the Dhvanyāloka, in a verse of his own which Ānandavardhana cites as an example of the merging (**saṃkara**) of an expressed **alaṃkāra** with a type of **dhvani**;[30] the devotional character of the verse has no bearing on its exemplary function, and Ānandavardhana allows it to pass without comment. It seems clear, then, that there is nothing in Ānandavardhana's selection of literary examples, or in his presentation of his aesthetic theory, to suggest that the role of devotionalism in poetry concerned him at all, let alone that it was a major driving force in his formulation of this theory.

Furthermore, Gerow's claim that Ānandavardhana's transformation of literary theory is driven by changes in literature itself completely ignores, and flies in the face of, Ānandavardhana's own explanation of the significance of his theory and its relation to literary practice. Ānandavardhana defends his theoretically novel concept of **dhvani** not with reference to some new body of **dhvani**-centered poetry, but by attempting to demonstrate the pervasive presence of **dhvani** in the recognized classics of Sanskrit

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[30] Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 508-9.

literature-- the very same literature with which earlier Ālaṃkārikas were most centrally concerned. Ānandavardhana repeatedly argues that **dhvani** has played a central role in poetry from its very origins.[31] By his account, previous Ālaṃkārikas failed to discuss **dhvani** not because they dealt with an earlier literature in which **dhvani** played little or no role, but because their analysis focussed on the directly expressed level of meaning in poetry, rather than its implicit, suggested meaning (conveyed by **dhvani**).[32]

So, Ānandavardhana's own account of his theory stresses its applicability to just that literature for which Gerow finds it to be inappropriate. There is nothing in Ānandavardhana's explanation of **dhvani**, or in his selection of verses which exemplify it, to indicate that his innovations in aesthetic theory are prompted by the rise of a new kind of "devotional lyric" poetry. It is hard to see anything in Ānandavardhana's aesthetic theory or analytic practice which would support Gerow's account of the rise of **dhvani**-based poetics. What really drives this account is not a close analysis of the works of Ānandavardhana and his followers, or of the development of Sanskrit literature during this period, but an unquestioned assumption about the relationship between poetic theory and practice.

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[31]Cf. Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 84-93, 364-5, 529ff. and below, Chapter Four, p. 132.

[32]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 47-49.

It is Gerow's contention that "Poetics, in India as anywhere else, follows poetry"; for him, a major shift in poetic theory necessarily presupposes, and can only be explained by, a change in poetic practice. Ānandavardhana's work certainly represents such a theoretical shift, so some such change in literary practice *must* have taken place. Devotional fervor is an emotional state, and Ānandavardhana's theory gives greater prominence to the emotional content of poetry than its predecessors, so the rise of the "devotional lyric" (though evident primarily in the vernacular literatures-- ignored by the Ālaṃkārikas-- and certainly not typical even of late Sanskrit poetry) seems a likely candidate for such a theory-transforming change. The assumption that changes in literary theory necessarily derive from changes in literary practice forecloses another possibility: that a shift in theory may be prompted by developments within the community of theoreticians. As we shall see, this possibility opens a far more promising avenue for explaining the rise of the **dhvani**-theory and the eventual displacement of the formalist poetic of the early Ālaṃkārikas-- one which certainly finds far more support in the works of Ānandavardhana, his critics, and his followers.

A useful model for analyzing the theoretical transformation in ninth-century Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra can be found in the works of the historian and philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn. In his The Structure of Scientific

Revolutions, Kuhn outlines a pattern of historical development he finds to be typical of the sciences. Kuhn argues that, contrary to the stereoptypical view, scientific knowledge does not advance through a steady process of cumulative discovery. Rather, an examination of the history of scientific knowledge in any field reveals a discontinuous pattern of development: long periods of theoretical and methodological stability punctuated by occasional crises in which new theories and modes of scientific practice displace existing ones-- what Kuhn calls scientific revolutions. I would argue that the rise of the **dhvani**-theory and its displacement of the formalist mode of aesthetic analysis practiced by the early Ālaṃkārikas may profitably be viewed as something very like a Kuhnian "scientific revolution".[33]

For Kuhn, the discontinuous, non-cumulative development of scientific knowledge is explained by nature of scientific

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[33]Whether or not we would wish to describe Alaṃkāraśāstra as a science, the community of Ālaṃkārikas possesses many of the features Kuhn sees as typical of scientific communities, and as crucially relevant to the pattern of development they display (cf. Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 162ff). Alaṃkāraśāstra is practiced by a small community of highly trained specialists; the primary audience for Alaṃkāra works (or at least the audience whose judgement seems to count most in determining the success or failure of such works) is the Ālamārika community itself. For long periods of time, members of the community operate under conditions of general agreement regarding the nature of their subject matter and the methods appropriate to their field. Kuhn himself observes that the kind of community structure he sees as typical of the sciences may sometimes be observed in other fields; for example, in Western painting during the period when realistic representation was presumed to be its proper goal (ibid., p. 161).

communities and of the "paradigms" which guide their researches. For Kuhn, what defines a mature scientific community is its operation in accordance with a particular paradigm-- a body of theoretical and methodological premises, largely tacit, which regulate the activities of members of the communities. The paradigm is a "constellation of group commitments" which not only shapes a scientific community's view of the world, but provides criteria for deciding what problems constitute the legitimate concerns of scientific research and what kinds of explanations may be countenanced as solutions to such problems.[34]

A scientific community whose activities are governed by a stable paradigm is practicing what Kuhn calls "normal science". During periods of normal science the currently reigning paradigm is assumed without question to be adequate to the task of explaining those phenomena with which the scientific community in question is concerned. Normal scientific activity is not designed in any way to test the validity of the paradigm or to seek alternatives to it; as Kuhn says, "Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none."[35] Rather, taking the validity of the paradigm for granted, members of the scientific community seek, through their researches, to

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[34]Cf. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press [second enlarged ed.], 1970], pp. 40-42, 181-187.

[35]Ibid., p. 52.

extend the application of the paradigm to previously unexplained phenomena, to derive more precise predictions from existing theory (and to produce more precise experimental data to confirm these predictions), and to show how any apparently anomalous data can be adequately accounted for in terms of existing theory.[36]

It is precisely because they accept the validity of their paradigm without question that normal scientific communities are so successful in producing detailed and specific explanations of the phenomena with which they deal. According to Kuhn,

> once the reception of a common paradigm has freed the scientific community from the need constantly to re-examine its first principles, the members of that community can concentrate exclusively upon the subtlest and most esoteric of the phenomena that concern it. Inevitably that does increase both the effectiveness and the efficiency with which the group as a whole solves new problems.[37]

And,

> By focusing attention on a small range of relatively esoteric problems, the paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of nature in a detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable.[38]

The existence of a shared paradigm allows for a concentration of professional attention and investigative effort which would not otherwise be possible, and thereby greatly enhances the problem-solving ability of the community for which the

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[36]Ibid., pp. 23ff.

[37]Ibid., pp. 163-4.

[38]Ibid., p. 24.

paradigm is operative.

Yet a shared paradigm will not always guide research effectively. The paradigm creates a set of expectations, often very specific, regarding experimental results: when observed data fail to conform to these expectations, they represent an anomaly which poses a problem for scientists. All scientific theories are regularly confronted by such anomalies, but these do not ordinarily threaten the stability of the dominant paradigm; it is assumed that they will eventually be resolved by further research or by elaboration of the theory in question. However, if such anomalies prove to be sufficiently numerous or intractable, they create a sense of crisis in the field, possibly paving the way for the rise of a new paradigm.[39]

It is only when the dominant paradigm is faltering in this way that the opportunity for radical innovation arises; as long as the current paradigm serves as an effective guide for research, there is nothing to prompt a search for alternatives.[40] Under such conditions of crisis, a new theory may be propounded-- one under which the anomalies confronting existing theory are satisfactorily accounted for. If the new theory is able to gain even a few converts, and if it proves for them to be an effective guide for further research, it will gradually come to be seen as an attractive

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[39]Cf. ibid., pp. 66ff. and pp. 77-80.

[40]Cf. ibid., p. 76.

alternative to the currently dominant theory. The new theory (and, with it, a new set of research practices and methodological commitments) will gain more and more adherents, especially among new entrants to the field, and eventually will come to dominate the field. Adherents of older theories or modes of practice will fade from relevance and eventually die off, and the community will embark on a new period of normal scientific research, under the guidance of a new paradigm.

This kind of shift in group commitments, in which one paradigm is abandoned in favor of another, is what Kuhn calls a "scientific revolution". The shift to a new paradigm entails not merely an addition to or expansion of existing scientific knowledge, but rather a fundamental transformation and reconfiguration of it. Indeed, as Kuhn sees it, the transformation of existing knowledge brought on by a paradigm shift is so radical that, in a very real sense, scientists operating under a new paradigm are living in a new and different world.[41]

Seen in the light of the Kuhnian model of paradigm-guided research, the development of Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra and Ānandavardhana's role within it become more readily explicable. Those features of pre-Ānandavardhana and of post-Mammaṭa Alaṃkāraśāstra which have so troubled and even repelled modern scholars-- its persistent focus on matters of

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[41]Ibid., pp. 111ff.

detail and its near total unconcern with fundamental aesthetic questions-- become not merely understandable but entirely predictable. During these periods, the behavior of Ālaṃkārikas is precisely what one would expect of a research community engaged in "normal science". As long as the formalist paradigm governing the researches of the early Ālaṃkārikas was functioning effectively, they might be expected to ignore fundamental questions and concentrate their attention on more specific and esoteric problems.[42] It is only when the dominant paradigm is faltering and a new paradigm candidate is struggling for acceptance that one would expect consideration of fundamental theoretical issues to come

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[42]Given the tendency to divide the early Ālaṃkārikas into rival schools (the **alaṃkāra**-, **rīti**- and **rasa**-schools-- cf. above, pp. 36-37), one could argue that the history of the field before Ānandavardhana might more appropriately be viewed as its "pre-paradigm period"-- a time when research is carried on under multiple, incompatible theories, and their is as yet no single dominant paradigm (ibid., pp. 10ff). I will argue, however (below, Chapter Two, pp. 45-47), that the grouping of the early Ālaṃkārikas into "schools" is superficial and masks a basic agreement among them regarding the nature of poetic beauty and the proper methods of poetic analysis. In any case, significant deviation from an **alaṃkāra**-based poetic emerges only in the works of Vāmana (c. 800 AD) and Rudraṭa (c. 825 AD)-- Daṇḍin [c. 750 AD], often classified with Vāmana as a member of the "**rīti**-school", states clearly that all elements which beautify poetic language, including **guṇas**, *are* **alaṃkāras** (cf. Kāvyādarśa 2.1-3). Both Vāmana and Rudraṭa incorporate thorough analyses of the **alaṃkāras** in their work, but give prominence to other poetic elements which they treat as distinct from the **alaṃkāras**: **guṇas** ("qualities", the formal constituents of **rītis**) in Vāmana's case, **rasa** in Rudraṭa's. Both these authors are near predecessors of Ānandavardhana, and the deviations from **alaṃkāra**-based analysis in their works may be seen as a preliminary indication of breakdown in the dominant paradigm; as Kuhn says, "proliferation of versions of a theory is a very usual symptom of crisis" (Ibid., p. 71).

to the fore-- exactly what happened in Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra beginning in the mid-ninth century. When, in the wake of Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa, controversy over Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** subsides and the new paradigm reigns unchallenged, questions regarding the fundamental bases of the field recede from prominence and attention is once again directed toward more specialized problems.

The transformation of Alaṃkāraśāstra initiated by Ānandavardhana also resembles a scientific revolution in that it totally reconfigures existing knowledge in the field, rather than merely adding something to it. Ānandavardhana's work does not simply add a previously unrecognized poetic element-- **dhvani**-- to those already dealt with by earlier theorists; rather, it develops a completely new understanding of the nature of poetic beauty and of the kind of question with which literary analysis must deal.

For the early Ālaṃkārikas, poetry is language rendered beautiful by the incorporation within it of a variety of individually beautiful formal components (figures of speech, etc.); these beautifying components function independently, and without regard to the contexts in which they are employed. The role of literary analysis, as these early theorists see it, is to provide a catalogue, as exhaustive as possible, of the formal elements which poets have employed or may employ to beautify their works (and of those features [**doṣas**-- "poetic defects"] which detract from the beauty of a work and should

be avoided).

Ānandavardhana completely overturns this particularistic understanding of literary beauty. For him, the formal components of a poetic work do not operate independently; rather, they are part of a hierarchically ordered and functionally unified whole. Any coherent literary work must be directed toward a single, overriding goal-- typically, the communication of a single, dominant **rasa**-- to which all the component elements of the work must be directly or indirectly subordinated. Hence, the **alaṃkāras** and other formal poetic features analyzed by previous Ālaṃkārikas are to be valued not for their intrinsic beauty, but for their ability to contribute to the overall goals of the particular works in which they are employed. Questions of context, wholly irrelevant to earlier literary analysis, suddenly assume tremendous importance. Features which are aesthetically valuable in one setting may be detrimental in another, depending on the larger aesthetic goals of the works or passages in which they are introduced. Obviously, literary analysis can no longer limit itself to the cataloguing of discrete formal features. These features must be considered not in isolation, but with a view toward their functional relationships with each other and with the larger textual units in which they are embedded. One must always ask not only whether a particular element is beautiful in and of itself, but whether it is appropriate to the aesthetic

objective of the work viewed as a whole. By shifting the focus of attention from the isolated components of poetic language to the complete, functionally unified text, Ānandavardhana opens up new possibilities in the area of literary criticism; literary analysis demands, in addition to the study of generalized and repeatable poetic features, the examination of particular existing literary compositions, viewed as wholes. Thus Ānandavardhana's revolutionary transformation of poetic theory entails a completely new understanding of the nature of literary beauty and of the proper task of literary analysis.

In his application of Kuhnian paradigm-analysis to the history of political theory, J.G.A. Pocock introduces several notions which would seem to shed a useful light on the development of Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra from the ninth to the eleventh century. One is the idea that paradigms may sometimes be transferred from one discipline to another; he argues that the paradigms of legal, theological, or economic theory have at times been brought into play in the realm of political thought, shaping its development in important ways. Another is the idea that paradigm transference of this kind may have consequences unforeseen and unintended by those who bring it about. For Pocock, the paradigms governing political theory are "languages", sets of conceptual terms and categories through which discussion is conducted; when a new "language" is introduced, it brings with it a new set of

presuppositions and implications, foregrounding certain issues and marginalizing others. By applying a new conceptual vocabulary within an existing field, one alters the possibilities of expression within that field in ways one cannot control.[43]

The transformation of Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra in the ninth century involves a paradigm transfer of this kind. As we shall see, the hierarchical model of textual organization on which Ānandavardhana bases his approach to literary analysis is not original to him. It is rather the application, within the realm of Alaṃkāraśāstra, of a model first developed in the field of Mīmāṃsā (Vedic exegesis). For the Mīmāṃsakas any coherent text (Vedic or otherwise) must be functionally unified; the text must have a single, overriding purpose, and all its component elements must ultimately subserve this purpose. Interpretation must proceed teleologically: the significance of every sentence, every word, every morpheme in a text must be assessed in terms of its relation to some single, ultimate goal. The need to maintain the functional unity of complete texts guides the

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[43]Cf. J.G.A. Pocock, <u>Politics, Language and Time</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989 [second ed.]), pp. 3-41 (especially pp. 21-26). The usefulness of Pocock's paradigm analysis for the history of political theory is best displayed in his <u>The Macchiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), which carefully charts the deployment of the conceptual vocabulary of Italian renaissance republicanism in seventeenth century English constitutional theory and its effects on the subsequent development of British and early American political thought.

Mīmāṃsakas at every turn in their interpretation of particular Vedic words and sentences. Ānandavardhana applies the same understanding of textual coherence to the analysis of literary works and, with it, many of the specific interpretive concepts and techniques devised by the Mīmāṃsakas. The language of Mīmāṃsā interpretive theory suddenly assumes a major role in the discussion of literary texts, a role which it continues to bear in the works of later Ālaṃkārikas.

However, the adoption of the Mīmāṃsakas' mode of talking and thinking about texts pushes Alaṃkāraśāstra in directions seemingly unintended by Ānandavardhana himself. Ānandavardhana's interest in teleological text analysis of the kind practiced by the Mīmāṃsakas stems primarily from its usefulness as an evaluative tool. It provides a reliable criterion for literary criticism-- one may judge existing literary works in terms of the effectiveness with which their individual components work together to convey a single, predominant **rasa**-- and a basis for the formulation of rules to guide future poets in composing aesthetically effective works-- certain features of composition may be shown to be appropriate for works intended to convey one **rasa** but inappropriate for works intended to convey another. But the adoption of the Mīmāṃsā interpretive paradigm raises new theoretical questions which increasingly absorb the attention of the Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas, and which serve ultimately to marginalize considerations of literary criticism and

compositional rules.[44] Discussion comes to focus more and more on the cognitive process by which poetic meaning is understood, and less and less on the requirements of poetic composition; Alaṃkāraśāstra becomes something like an epistemology of poetic comprehension, just as Mīmāṃsā serves, in effect, as an epistemology of Vedic comprehension.[45]

Chapter Two of this dissertation will examine the paradigm guiding the analyses of Ānandavardhana's predecessors in the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra, and the anomalies which faced these authors in their efforts to explain the role of **rasa** in poetry-- anomalies which paved the way for Ānandavardhana's theoretical innovations. Chapter Three will briefly examine the Mīmāṃsakas' approach to textual analysis. Chapters Four through Six will deal with Ānandavardhana's application of this teleological mode of analysis to the study of poetic

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[44]The one major exception to this tendency is Kuntaka (c. 975 AD) who, in his Vakroktijīvita, follows up on Ānandavardhana's pioneering efforts in the area of literary criticism and for the most part sidesteps the questions of semantic theory with which his contemporaries concern themselves. But, as we shall see (cf. below, Chapter Eight), Kuntaka's avoidance of these questions is coupled with a general rejection of Ānandavardhana's teleological, Mīmāṃsā-derived model of textual coherence. Precisely because he rejects the Mīmāṃsā paradigm and avoids the semantic questions it raises, Kuntaka's work, whatever its intrinsic merits, is largely irrelevant to what have by his time become the central questions of Alaṃkāraśāstra, and is generally ignored by later Ālaṃkārikas.

[45]The real mission of Mīmāṃsā is not to discover the proper procedure for particular rituals enjoined in the Veda-- this is already common knowledge-- but to show how exactly we can know that the Vedic text authorizes just this procedure and no other.

language, the encounter with extra-poetic language philosophy precipitated by his new theory of literary semantics, and his efforts in the area of literary criticism. Chapters Seven through Ten will examine the response to Ānandavardhana's theoretical innovations in the works of the major Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas up to the end of the eleventh century (after which time the controversy raised by Ānandavardhana's work subsides and the **dhvani**-theory gains more or less universal acceptance).[46]

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[46]The confinement of attention to Kashmir is justifiable. During this period Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra is entirely self-contained; while literary and dramatic theorists working outside Kashmir (e.g. Rājaśekhara [c. 900], Dhanika [c. 1000], and Bhoja [c. 1050]) are well aware of recent developments in Kashmiri aesthetic theory and respond to them in their works, the Kashmiri theorists wholly ignore these non-Kashmiri works. This intellectual isolation is not general: while the Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas pay no attention to non-Kashmiri works on aesthetic theory, they quickly become aware of, and draw examples from, new literary works from outside Kashmir-- e.g., while Rājaśekhara's work on poetics is entirely overlooked, his plays, especially his Bālarāmāyana, are among the most frequently quoted texts in late-tenth and eleventh century Kashmiri works on aesthetic theory.

CHAPTER TWO
EARLY ALAṂKĀRAŚĀSTRA AND THE PROBLEM OF RASA

The Ālaṃkārikas who predate Ānandavardhana have, by and large, fared poorly at the hands of modern scholars. Because Ānandavardhana's theory of **rasa-dhvani** has been so widely seen as the crowning triumph of Indian aesthetic theory, the works of earlier Ālaṃkārikas have tended to be viewed almost exclusively through the lens of this later development. These works have been scoured for any stray observations which may be seen as anticipations or primitive formulations of elements of the **dhvani** theory, while the task which absorbs most of the attention of these Ālaṃkārikas-- the definition, exemplification, and categorization of those phonetic and semantic features which add beauty to poetic language and of those features which detract from it (and are thus to be avoided)-- has been for the most part denigrated and seen as marginal to the "real" concerns of aesthetic theory.

There are five pre-Ānandavardhana Ālaṃkārikas whose works survive: Bhāmaha (c. 700 AD), Daṇḍin (c. 750 AD), Udbhaṭa (c. 800 AD), Vāmana (c. 800 AD), and Rudraṭa (c. 825 AD). Of these, Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, and Rudraṭa are usually labelled as "The Alaṃkāra School" (because they are thought to regard figures of speech [**alaṃkāras**] as the primary determinant of beauty in poetic language)[1], and Daṇḍin and Vāmana as "The

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[1]Cf. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., pp. 372ff, and De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 32ff.

Rīti School" (because they are thought to ascribe a central role in creating poetic beauty to **rīti** ["style", understood as a particular constellation of poetic qualities (**guṇas**)--tenderness, strength, clarity, and so on]).[2]

Although these writers are rigidly divided into "schools" based on what each appears to regard as the fundamental principle of poetic beauty (**alaṃkāra** or **rīti**), they are generally seen as paying insufficient attention to these fundamental principles, and as overly concerned with the minutiae of definition and classification, to the exclusion of properly aesthetic or poetic questions (in contrast to Ānandavardhana, who is seen as showing a proper concern for his central aesthetic principle, **dhvani**, and as relatively unconcerned with such "external" features as **alaṃkāras**). Krishnamoorthy sums up the conventional appraisal of these authors quite well:

> Most of these early theorists are fond of formalism and attention to minute details. In their treatment of individual excellences we miss a philosophical approach. They are content with enunciating rules of rhetoric and illustrating them with examples taken at random... Their tone smacks of dogmatism while their discussion is scholastic, aesthetic analysis remaining perfunctory...

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[2]Cf. Kane, ibid., pp. 378ff, and De, ibid., pp. 75ff. All these authors deal with many factors in poetry and, with the exception of Vāmana, do not explicitly declare any one of these elements to be the "soul" or essence of poetry, so there is some disagreement regarding the "schools" to which certain authors should be assigned; Daṇḍin is sometimes said to belong to the "Alaṃkāra-" rather than the "Rīti-school" (cf. Kane, op. cit., pp. 373-374), and Rudraṭa is sometimes grouped with Bharata (reputed author of the dramaturgical Nāṭyaśāstra) as a member of the "Rasa-school" (cf. Sharma, op. cit., pp. 10-11).

> Though we cannot say that they lacked in literary insight, we feel the lack of depth in their formal categories. The value of these theories is in the good promise they held out for a future writer, the author of the Dhvanyāloka, to rise on their shoulders and perfect a theory free from their drawbacks."[3]

The effort these authors devote to the careful differentiation and definition of figures of speech (**alaṃkāras**) and poetic qualities (**guṇas**) is seen as marginal to those questions which ought to be of most concern to literary aestheticians.[4] It is recognized that these authors' approach to poetic analysis differs markedly from that of Ānandavardhana and his followers, but this approach is not considered as a serious

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[3]Krishnamoorthy, <u>The **Dhvanyāloka** and its Critics</u>, op. cit., pp. 21-22. Cf. also De on Bhāmaha (<u>History of Sanskrit Poetics</u>, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 38-9), "We must not yet look to his work, nor to that of his follower Udbhaṭa, for a thoroughly critical system. We can deduce certain broad conceptions, but the practical object, underlying the speculation of this school in general, and its more or less normative character did not allow sufficient scope for purely theoretic treatment"; and on Rudraṭa (Ibid., p. 66), "Indeed, the practical nature and scope of his work, like that of Udbhaṭa's, leave hardly any room for discussion of general principles or of speculative aspects of the questions involved. Rhetoric rather than Poetics appears to be his principle theme, as it is of most writers of this system who concern themselves entirely with the elaboration of rhetorical categories in which they suppose the whole charm of poetry lies."

[4]The occasional observations these authors make in passing on what appear to be fundamental aesthetic principles are sometimes treated as their most important contributions to the development of Alaṃkāraśāstra. E.g. Bhāmaha's mention (in <u>Kāvyālaṃkāra</u> 2.85) of **vakrokti** ("oblique expression") as an element common to all figures (cf. De, <u>History of Sanskrit Poetics</u>, op. cit., pp. 47ff, 102, and below, Chapter Six, pp. 276-277) and Vāmana's description (<u>Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra</u> 1.2.6) of **rīti** as the "soul" (**ātman**) of poetry (cf. Kane, <u>History of Sanskrit Poetics</u>, op. cit., pp. 380-381 , De, <u>History of Sanskrit Poetics</u>, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 102-3; also above, Chapter One, pp. 7-9 and below, Chapter Four, pp. 144-146).

alternative. It is treated only as a failure to hit on the "right" approach-- i.e. Ānandavardhana's approach.

One of the few serious attempts to circumvent this tendency can be seen in the works of Edwin Gerow.[5] Gerow sees the formalist poetic of the early Ālaṃkārikas as a useful and viable approach to literary analysis, one that he argues is entirely appropriate to the stanzaic poetry typical of classical Sanskrit. He criticizes the standard view of the early Ālaṃkārikas as skewed by a focus on later developments:

> Contemporary critics have too long been dependent on the reformulation of the *alamkāra* theory proposed by the *dhvani* writers, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, for whom the *ālamkārika*[6] viewpoint is deprived of its independent status and reduced to a moment in a more all-embracing view. Histories of Indian poetics have been little more than attempts to justify this *ex post facto* subordination. The theory should be considered in its own terms and not for what defects may be predicated of it in terms of another aesthetic.[7]

Gerow argues, rightly, that if we wish to fully understand the works of these Ālaṃkārikas we must make an effort to view them in their own terms, not in those of later theorists; I will

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[5]Chiefly in his Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech (The Hague: Mouton, 1971) and Indian Poetics (Vol. V, fasc. 3 in A History of Indian Literature [ed. Jan Gonda], Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1977).

[6]Gerow generally uses the term **ālaṃkārika** to refer only to the pre-Ānandavardhana aestheticians (because, in comparison with later authors, they stress the importance of figures of speech-- **alaṃkāras**-- in poetry). But this restricted usage has no precedent in the Sanskrit tradition, in which the term Ālaṃkārika refers to any practitioner of Alaṃkāraśāstra, regardless of his views on the relative importance of **alaṃkāras** in poetry.

[7]Gerow, A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech, op. cit., p. 70.

argue further that we cannot properly make sense of the radical transformation of Alaṃkāraśāstra brought about by Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka unless we understand the internal logic of his predecessors' approach to poetic analysis. These early Ālaṃkārikas were not misguided or ineffective practitioners of a discipline later perfected by Ānandavardhana; they were engaged in a quite different enterprise.

The Formalist Paradigm of Literary Aesthetics

The early Ālaṃkārikas were not striving for, and failing to achieve, a holistic theory of poetic beauty; their understanding of the nature of poetic language made the articulation of general or underlying principles largely superfluous to the business of literary analysis. Again, Gerow is instructive:

> Indeed, if the older *ālamkārika* poetic is, as we assert, a study of the capacities of poetic diction, little purpose would be served in expounding a universal theory, (such as "ambiguity,") for it is only in variety that figuration constitutes a "universe" of discourse. Bhāmaha's mention of *vakrokti* is a summation, not a 'theory'... Put in another way, telling a poet he must speak "deviously" does not help us understand what in fact he says. The interest, both for poet and for audience, is in how he does it in practice, not in his intention.[8]

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[8]Gerow, Indian Poetics, op. cit., p. 235. Yet even Gerow cannot resist the temptation to see in these authors' works a more "general" concern than the definition and exemplification of particular figures and qualities. He sees the analysis of these particular elements as driven by the need to find criteria for the differentiation of poetic from non-poetic discourse: "Having situated the poetic problem in a formalistic context, we must now pose the question (following the Indian tradition): What is the specific characteristic of poetic usage, its **viśeṣaṇa**?... Indian writers, from the

It is with the analysis of specific features of poetic language that these Ālaṃkārikas are concerned; their interest is in specifics as specifics, not as instances of some more general phenomenon. Subsuming these particular formal features of poetic language under some general label (such as **vakrokti** ["oblique expression"]) contributes nothing useful to the enterprise of defining and categorizing them. Thus, when these Ālaṃkārikas do refer to more general principles, they tend to do so only in passing, quickly returning to the analysis of specifics.

Underlying this particularistic approach to poetic analysis is a certain understanding of literary aesthetics--one which differs markedly from that of Ānandavardhana and most of the later Ālaṃkārikas and which has been poorly articulated by modern scholars. This aesthetic is revealed in the basic metaphor in terms of which the early Ālaṃkārikas

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beginning, conceived their problem as that of 'poetic differentia', the **viśeṣaṇa**, which both establishes the poetic genre as a proper subject matter and which, by normative application, distinguishes the finest examples of poetry." (A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech, op. cit., p. 16-- cf. also Indian Poetics, op. cit., pp. 223-4, 233). Gerow provides no textual backing for this claim, and I can see nothing in the works of any Ālaṃkārikas (pre- or post-Ānandavardhana) to justify it. The differentiation of poetic from non-poetic discourse is treated as unproblematic, certainly by the early Ālaṃkārikas; to describe it as what the Ālaṃkārikas "from the beginning, conceived as their problem" seems bizarre. The task to which these authors apply themselves is not to develop criteria for determining what is poetry and what is not but, taking this distinction for granted, to determine what specific, isolable linguistic features add to the beauty of poetic texts, and what features detract from it.

describe the relation between the poem and those linguistic features which render it beautiful: that of bodily ornamentation. The words and meanings which make up a poem are described as its "body" (**śarīra**)[9], while those phonetic and semantic factors which, when introduced into poetic language, render it more beautiful are called "ornaments" (**alaṃkāras**).[10] Discussions of the "body" of poetry are, for the most part, perfunctory;[11] for all of these Ālaṃkārikas attention is focussed primarily on those formal features which ornament and beautify this "body". A poem, for them, is a set of words and meanings, a text, into which have been introduced certain phonetic and semantic patterns each of which adds some element of beauty to this text; poetry is languge made beautiful by the inclusion within it of a variety of individually beautiful elements. The object of their poetic analysis, therefore, is to isolate, define, classify, and exemplify as many such elements as possible, thus providing

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[9]Cf. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṃkāra 1.23; Daṇḍin, Kāvyādarśa 1.10; Vāmana, Kāvyālaṃkārasūtravṛtti on 1.2.6 and 2.1.1.

[10]The treatment of **alaṃkāras** and **guṇas** as separate classes of beautifying elements does not really disrupt this metaphor. The only one of the early Ālaṃkārikas to draw a definite categorical distinction between the two is Vāmana (Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra 3.1.1-3), and even he allows that all beautifying elements (both figures and qualities) may be covered by the general label "ornamentation" (**alaṃkāra**) (Ibid., 1.1.1-3). Daṇḍin, who lays great emphasis on **guṇas** as the basis for differentiating poetic styles, and has often on those grounds been seen as a forerunner of Vāmana's, indicates unambiguously that **guṇas** are a kind of **alaṃkāra**-- cf. Kāvyādarśa 2.1-3.

[11]Cf. Bhāmaha 1.16-30; Daṇḍin 1.10-39; Vāmana 1.3.21-32.

something approaching a complete inventory of those concrete linguistic devices by which poets make their poetry beautiful and hence desirable.

Once it is understood that for these Ālaṃkārikas the beauty of a whole text is a function of the individual beauty of its component elements, their approach to literary analysis makes perfect sense. It explains the relentless "formalism and attention to minute details" which has so troubled modern analysts of their works. If it is the addition to it of beautiful phonetic and semantic elements which makes a literary text beautiful, then it is on the analysis of these individual elements that literary analysis must concentrate. There is no need to dwell on the analysis of literary compositions as wholes; only take care of the details, and the whole will take care of itself.

What really separates this kind of aesthetic analysis from that of Ānandavardhana and those who come after him is the total irrelevance of contextual considerations within it. Ānandavardhana, drawing (as we shall see) on a Mīmāṃsā-derived understanding of the nature of textual coherence, formulates a model of literary aesthetics according to which the individual elements of a poem are valuable only insofar as they subserve a single, overriding purpose: ideally, the communication of some particular **rasa** (aestheticized emotion--cf. below, Chapter Four, pp. 140ff). Thus, for him, the value of **alaṃkāras** and other formal elements of a poem is not

intrinsic; it is context dependent. Where a particular figure would enhance the capacity of the whole text to convey its intended **rasa**, it should be used. Where it would detract from this capacity, it should be avoided. For the early Ālaṃkārikas, however, **alaṃkāras** and **guṇas** are intrinsically valuable. A properly constructed metaphor is beautiful in and of itself. It will add to the beauty of a text whenever and wherever it is used. Its context has no bearing whatsoever on its aesthetic value. Thus for them the core of literary analysis is the precise analysis of individual figures and qualities, rather than of the higher order textual units in which they are employed.

This particularistic, formalist aesthetic, with its consequent de-emphasis of context, is common to all the pre-Ānandavardhana Ālaṃkārikas. In this respect, the tendency of modern scholars to divide these authors into the **alaṃkāra** and **rīti** "schools" has obscured the basic unity of their understanding of the nature of poetic beauty and of the imperatives of aesthetic analysis. The "Rīti School", especially as exemplified in the work of Vāmana, is generally portrayed as a decisive "advance" over the "Alaṃkāra School", because Vāmana speaks of **rīti** ("style") as the "soul of poetry" (thus foreshadowing Ānandavardhana's use of the same phrase to describe his **dhvani**), and because he regards certain poetic features (**guṇas** ["qualities"], the constituent elements of **rīti** ["style"]) as essential to good poetry, and others

(**alaṃkāras**) as inessential.[12]

Yet what is really striking about Vāmana's categorical distinction between **guṇas** and **alaṃkāras** is that it has no real effect on his analyses of elements of either category. In his examination of both **guṇas** and **alaṃkāras** Vāmana follows exactly the same procedure as his predecessors. His analysis of each consists of the same three components: definition, classification, and exemplification. The labeling of elements of the first category as "essential" and those of the second as "inessential" produces no noticeable alteration in the treatment of either. Both are beautiful and hence desirable in poetry, and both are so intrinsically. There is still no hint of context as a factor governing the value of particular features in particular settings. The "inessential" status of **alaṃkāras** does not necessitate that their selection be in any way guided by their appropriateness to particular **guṇas** or **rītis**, or to anything else. They are still treated as elements aesthetically valuable in and of themselves.

Thus Vāmana's emphasis on **guṇa** and **rīti** does not really entail any significant departure from the formalist aesthetic of "The Alaṃkāra School". Whatever their differences with one another on matters of detail, all of the pre-Ānandavardhana Ālaṃkārikas are basically at one in their understanding of the nature of literary aesthetics and in their approach to

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[12]Cf. Vāmana, Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra, 3.1.1-3; also below, Chapter Four, pp. 144-146.

literary analysis. For all of them, poetic language is beautiful because it incorporates a series of individually beautiful phonetic and semantic elements and the primary object of poetic analysis is to isolate, classify, and exemplify as many such elements as possible.

This particularistic model of literary aesthetics leads naturally to the view that where **alaṃkāras** and other beautifying elements of poetic language are concerned, more is better. If such elements are to be valued for their intrinsic beauty, rather than for their appropriateness to particular contexts, then one should incorporate as many such elements as one can into one's poetry. This attitude can be seen in Bhāmaha's discussion of **saṃsṛṣṭi**, the combination of multiple **alaṃkāras** in a single verse: "The best ornament [**vibhūṣā**] is **saṃsṛṣṭi**, because of its combination of many **alaṃkāras**; thus it is said to be constructed like a string of gems."[13] If each **alaṃkāra** is desirable in and of itself, then the combination of several of them will be preferable to any one singly. The same idea can be seen in Daṇḍin's and Vāmana's comparative evaluation of regional styles of poetry; for both, the Vaidarbhī style is superior to all others because it is characterized by a greater number of **guṇas**.[14] This attitude is the logical outcome of these Ālaṃkārikas' model of literary

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[13]Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṃkāra 3.49.

[14]Cf. Daṇḍin, Kāvyādarśa 1.40ff and Vāmana, Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra 1.2.9-14.

aesthetics. If each **guṇa** or **alaṃkāra** has a certain intrinsic beauty which it imparts to those compositions in which it is employed, then the way to maximize the beauty of any composition is to maximize the concentration of **guṇas** and **alaṃkāras** within it.

The Problem of Rasa

That feature of literature to which Ānandavardhana would later assign a preeminent role, **rasa** (aestheticized emotion), receives comparatively scant attention from Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Vāmana. It is given somewhat greater prominence by Udbhaṭa and becomes a major topic in Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṃkāra. Yet, for all of these authors, **rasa** poses something of a theoretical problem. It represents a particular kind of thematic content, and cannot easily be dealt with in terms of the formalist aesthetic of these Ālaṃkārikas. The anomalous status of **rasa** becomes increasingly evident in their works, culminating in that of Rudraṭa who effectively abandons the effort to present an integrated poetic; Rudraṭa elaborates two separate modes of literary analysis, one formalist and **alaṃkāra**-based and one based on **rasa**, and makes no attempt whatsoever to relate the one to the other. As we shall see, one of the great strengths of Ānandavardhana's reconceptualization of Alaṃkāraśāstra is that it succeeds in integrating a **rasa**-based approach to literary aesthetics with the formal categories of the early Ālaṃkārikas.

The idea of **rasa** did not originate in the realm of

Alaṃkāraśāstra. It was first developed in the field of dramaturgy, specifically in the Nāṭyaśāstra (ascribed to Bharata).[15] According to the Nāṭyaśāstra, there are eight basic emotions (**sthāyibhāvas**)[16] which may be presented in drama and, corresponding to them, eight **rasas**[17] (literally, "flavors"; aesthetic moods or aestheticized emotional states)[18] which may be created by a performance. The concept of **rasa** plays a central role in the dramatic theory developed in the Nāṭyaśāstra, and comes ultimately to play a pivotal role in Alaṃkāraśāstra as well.

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[15]The work is encyclopaedic, and is presumably a compilation rather than the work of a single author. It is impossible to date it with any precision, but the text probably took on something like its present form in the mid-first millennium AD. The earliest known commentator on the Nāṭyaśāstra is Udbhaṭa (c. 800 AD-- although there are stray references in the works of Abhinavagupta and others to early writers on dramaturgy who may have commented on it: cf. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., pp. 48ff. and De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 31ff. The earliest extant commentary is the Abhinavabhāratī of Abhinavagupta (c. 1000 AD).

[16]Desire (**rati**), humor (**hāsa**), grief (**śoka**), anger (**krodha**), daring (**utsāha**), fear (**bhaya**), disgust (**jugupsā**), and astonishment (**vismaya**)-- cf. Nāṭyaśāstra 6.17, 7.8ff (ed. M. Ramakrishna Kavi, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 36 [Vol. I], 1956 [second ed.], pp. 267, 350ff.).

[17]Erotic (**śṛṅgāra**), comic (**hāsya**), pathetic (**karuṇa**), furious (**raudra**), heroic (**vīra**), frightful (**bhayānaka**), disgusting (**bībhatsa**), and wondrous (**adbhuta**)-- cf. Nāṭyaśāstra 6.15, 6.45ff. (ibid., pp. 266, 299ff.).

[18]The exact nature of **rasa**, as well as its locus (i.e., whether the term designates an emotional experience of the character portrayed, the actor, or the spectator), were topics hotly debated by later writers on dramaturgy; the most important such views are summed up by Abhinavagupta in his Abhinavabhāratī (ibid., pp. 272-286). Also cf. below, Chapter Nine, pp. 455ff.

Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin are aware of the Nāṭyaśāstra (or, at least, of the discipline of dramaturgy) and refer to it in passing, but neither seems to see it as especially relevant to poetic analysis or devotes any significant attention to it. Having mentioned drama (**nāṭaka**) as part of his list of literary genres, Bhāmaha says, "This is said to be [a work] whose meaning is to be enacted [**abhineyārtha**]; a full analysis [**vistara**] of this has been made by others."[19] Daṇḍin refers on one occasion to several of the elements of drama discussed in the Nāṭyaśāstra (**sandhis** ["plot junctures"] and so on); he states that these "have been explained in another text" and notes, without further elaboration, that they should all be regarded as **alaṃkāras**.[20] Thus, while both are aware of the dramaturgical tradition and its potential bearing on literary analysis, neither wishes to devote much attention to it; they seem content to allow for a division of labor, referring readers to the Nāṭyaśāstra itself for a detailed discussion of dramaturgical questions. Both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin find a place for **rasa** in their taxonomy of poetic figures, yet both seem to have difficulty explaining **rasa** in formalist terms, and their **rasa**-based **alaṃkāras** occupy an anomalous position in their systems.

Most of the meaning-based **alaṃkāras** dealt with by Bhāmaha and the other early Ālaṃkārikas consist of the use of

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[19] Kāvyālaṃkāra 1.24.

[20] Kāvyādarśa 2.364.

particular propositional structures: e.g. **upamā** ("simile"-- in which one entity is compared with another on the basis of shared properties), **rūpaka** ("metaphorical identification"-- in which one entity is identified with another on the basis of shared properties), or **samāsokti** ("condensed expression"-- in which the attributes ascribed to one entity bring to mind a second which is not explicitly mentioned).[21] These propositional structures impose no restriction on content; in principle, anything at all may be made the subject of a comparison or a metaphorical identification. However, in the beginning of the third chapter of his Kāvyālaṃkāra, Bhāmaha deals with a small group of figures which do not conform to this pattern: figures which consist not in the relation of unspecified entities in a particular propositional structure, but in the selection of a particular kind of subject matter-- which specify not the manner, but the content, of expression.

These figures are **preyas** ("affectionate"), **rasavat** ("possessing **rasa**"), **ūrjasvin** ("forceful" or "haughty"), and **samāhita** ("completed" or "brought together").[22] The problematic status of these figures can be seen in Bhāmaha's atypical (and rather cryptic) treatment of them. Departing from his usual procedure, Bhāmaha provides no definition at all for three of these figures (**preyas**, **ūrjasvin**, and

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[21]Cf. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṃkāra, 2.30, 2.21, 2.79.

[22]Ibid., 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.10. All four **alaṃkāras** are explained in terms of **rasa** and its permutations by Udbhaṭa and by the later Alaṃkāra tradition-- cf. below, pp. 52-58.

samāhita); in each case, we are given only the name of the **alaṃkāra** and a brief example.[23] For the fourth figure, **rasavat**, the definition he provides is purely tautologous ("**rasavat** is that in which the **rasas**, **śṛṅgāra** etc., are clearly shown"). Bhāmaha's treatment of all these figures is extremely terse and opaque, but it is clear that each involves a particular kind of emotional or dramatic content (e.g. the presentation of affection, of haughtiness, or of one of Bharata's eight **rasas**).

In Daṇḍin's treatment of the same four **alaṃkāras**, their anomalous, content-based character is likewise apparent. Daṇḍin treats three of these figures (**preyas**, **rasavat**, and **ūrjasvin**) as a group, defining them in a single verse. The definitions he provides for these figures are (like Bhāmaha's definition of **rasavat**) purely tautologous: "**Preyas** ['affectionate'] is a very affectionate statement; **rasavat**

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[23]This creates interpretive problems for later Ālaṃkārikas who base their treatment of these figures on that of Bhāmaha. In at least one case, that of **samāhita**, it is not at all clear what Bhāmaha's understanding of the **alaṃkāra** is. Bhāmaha's example of the figure is as follows: "Nārada appeared before the kṣatriya-women going to be united with Rāma" (in the absence of context, the point of the example is not entirely clear, but it would appear that Nārada is to take or direct the women to Rāma's location). Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa have very different definitions of **samāhita**, but both seem designed to fit this example. Daṇḍin (2.296) takes **samāhita** to mean "serendipity"-- the fortuitous "coming together" of several factors so as to produce a desired result; Udbhaṭa (4.7) understands **samāhita** as the "completion", i.e. the subsidence, of some **rasa** or **rasa**-like emotional state. Bhāmaha's example can be seen as meeting both definitions: the meeting of the kṣatriya women with Nārada is fortuitous for them, and puts an end to their anxiety to find Rāma.

['possessing **rasa**'] is adorned with **rasa**; **ūrjasvin** ['haughty'] is that in which there is strong pride-- and these three are joined with intensity."[24] All three **alaṃkāras** consist in the depiction of a particular emotional content. As Daṇḍin explains it, the figure **samāhita** is not specifically concerned with the emotional content of a verse, but is nevertheless content-based: "For a person undertaking some task, the attainment of the means [to achieve] that [task], by the power of fate-- that is what they [the Ālaṃkārikas] call **samāhita** ['coming together']."[25] This **alaṃkāra**, then, consists in the depiction of a particular kind of narrative event; the fortuitous achievement, by some character, of the means to a desired end.

It is Udbhaṭa, in his Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha,[26] who first explicitly explains all four of these **alaṃkāras** in connection with the dramaturgical concept of **rasa**. The end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth century saw the beginning of a renaissance in Kashmir, in both Alaṃkāraśāstra

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[24]preyaḥ priyatarākhyānaṃ rasavad rasapeśalam/
ūrjasvi rūḍhāhaṃkāraṃ yuktotkarṣaṃ ca tat trayam//
Daṇḍin, Kāvyādarśa, 2.273 (unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own).

[25]Kāvyādarśa 2.296.

[26]Udbhaṭa's only other known work on Alaṃkāraśāstra, his commentary on Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṃkāra, survives only in a single, extremely fragmentary, manuscript (cf. Raniero Gnoli ed., Udbhaṭa's Commentary on the **Kāvyālaṃkāra** of Bhāmaha, Rome, Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1962). That portion of the commentary which would have dealt with this group of **alaṃkāras** (on Bhāmaha 3.5-10) is, unfortunately, lost.

and Naṭyaśāstra, and Udbhaṭa played an important role in both areas; he was, as far as is known, the first person to write on both Alaṃkāraśāstra and Nāṭyaśāstra.[27] In his work, and in those of the later Ālaṃkārikas of Kashmir, we see an increasing erosion of the distinction between poetic and dramaturgical theory; questions originally raised in the realm of dramaturgy, particularly the question of **rasa**, come to play an increasingly prominent role in Alaṃkāraśāstra during this period.

Udbhaṭa's analysis of **preyas** (which he calls **preyasvat**, "possessing affection"), **rasavat**, **ūrjasvin**, and **samāhita** represents the most sophisticated attempt to "formalize" these apparently content-based (and therefore anomalous) figures. As he explains them, each of these figures entails not the depiction of a particular emotional content, but a particular mode or aspect in which any emotional state may be presented. He defines **preyasvat** as follows: "The wise call that poem

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[27]Udbhaṭa was a major figure (**sabhāpati**-- leader of the royal assembly of scholars) in the court of Jayāpīḍa of Kashmir (r. c. 776-807 AD)-- cf. Rājataraṅgiṇī 4.495 (on Jayāpīḍa's date, see Stein's translation of Rājataraṅgiṇī, Introduction, pp. 94-96). Udbhaṭa's dramaturgical work, a commentary on Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, is lost, but is known from references in Abhinavagupta's commentary on the same work (cf. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., p. 49). He appears to have written on Cārvāka (Materialism) as well; he is presumably the same Udbhaṭa mentioned by Cakradhara (in his commentary [Granthibhaṅga] on Jayantabhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī) and in Devasūri's Syādvādaratnākara as the author of a commentary on Bṛhaspati's (lost) Lokāyatasūtra-- cf. Nyāyamañjarī ed. Gaurinath Sastri, Śivakumāraśāstrigranthamālā 5, Vol. 1, p. 100, Vol. 2, pp. 195, 257, and 262; also, Nyāmañjarīgranthibhaṅga (ed. Nagin J. Shah, L.D. Oriental Series 35, Ahmedabad, 1972), Introduction, pp. 5-7.

preyasvat which is composed with [aesthetic factors] such as **anubhāvas**,[28] which are indicative of the emotions [**bhāvas**], attraction [**rati**] etc."[29] The dramaturgical tradition distinguishes between **bhāvas**, emotional states, and **rasas**, the aesthetic "moods" developed from them in a dramatic performance, and Udbhaṭa explains the relation between **rasavat** and **preyasvat** in terms of this distinction.

In the figure **rasavat**, one of the nine[30] possible aesthetic moods (**rasas**) is fully developed by means of the appropriate factors (**vibhāvas** and so on);[31] in the figure **preyasvat**, an emotion (*any* emotion) is depicted, but not developed into a full-fledged **rasa**. Udbhaṭa does not explain

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[28]**anubhāvas** are those visible symptoms (crying, laughter, etc.) which are indicative of particular emotional states. The other major factors recognized by the dramaturgical tradition as involved in the portrayal of emotional states are **vibhāvas** ("stimulants", factors which are understood to create an emotional response in a character-- e.g. a beloved person [in the case of love] or a dangerous animal [in the case of fear]) and **vyabhicāribhāvas** ("variable emotions", those transient emotional states associated with a more persistent underlying emotion-- e.g. [in the case of love] eagerness, anxiety, and so on).

[29]ratyādikānāṃ bhāvānāṃ anubhavādisūcanaiḥ/
yat kāvyaṃ badhyate sadbhis tat preyasvad udāhṛtam//
Udbhaṭa, Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha, 4.2 (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No. LXXIX, ed. N.D. Banhatti, Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1982 [reprint], p. 50).

[30]To the eight **rasas** listed by Bharata (above, p. 44), Udbhaṭa adds a ninth, **śānta** ("quiescence"). This ninth **rasa** is accepted by most of the later Ālaṃkārikas.

[31]Ibid., p. 52.

the basis for differentiation,[32] but his examples for these **alaṃkāras** make the nature of the distinction clear, at least as applied to **śṛṅgāra-** ("erotic") **rasa** and its underlying emotional state, **rati** ("attraction"). Udbhaṭa's example of **rasavat**[33] depicts Śiva's love for Pārvatī-- a clear case of **śṛṅgāra-rasa**; his example of **preyasvat**[34] describes Pārvatī affectionately playing with a young deer, treating it as if it were her own child. The latter example depicts attraction, but attraction which, unlike that in the example of **rasavat**, is not directed toward an appropriate sexual partner, and thus cannot manifest itself as full-fledged **śṛṅgāra**.[35] Thus the **bhāva rati** is conveyed without developing into a **rasa**. As Udbhaṭa's commentators explain, his definition of the figure

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[32]His commentator Pratīhārendurāja explains that only when there is "full development" or "ripening" (**paripoṣa**) of **rati** and other **bhāvas** do they become **rasas**-- ibid., p. 52.

[33]Ibid., p. 53.

[34]Ibid., p. 52.

[35]This explanation of the relationship between sexual and non-sexual love is accepted by Mammaṭa and, following him, most of the later Ālaṃkārikas. According to Mammaṭa, when love is directed toward such objects as a god, a king, a parent, or a child, the **bhāva rati** will be suggested; only when love is directed toward a "beloved" (**kāntā**)-- i.e. an appropriate sexual partner-- is the **rasa śṛṅgāra** suggested (cf. Kāvyaprakāśa, Mysore: Oriental Research Institute Series 120, Vol. I, pp. 284-5). A few Ālaṃkārikas, most notably Rudraṭa and Bhoja, take a different approach, making **preyas** ("affection") a full-fledged **rasa** in its own right, rather than simply a permutation of **śṛṅgāra** (cf. Rudraṭa, Kāvyālaṃkāra 12.3, 15.17-19 and V. Raghavan, Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa [Madras, Punarvasu, 1978 (third ed.)], pp. 402ff; also V. Raghavan, The Number of Rasa-s [Madras, Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1975 (third ed.)], pp. 119ff.).

preyasvat demands that we understand the word **preyas** ("affection") in the figure's name as an indicator (**upalakṣaṇa**) of emotional states in general.[36] Any **bhāva** which, for whatever reason, fails to develop into a **rasa**, will fall within the scope of this figure.

Similarly, Udbhaṭa's treatment of **ūrjasvin** makes this figure consist not of the introduction of a specific emotional content, but of a particular mode in which any emotion at all may be presented. He defines the figure as follows: "The composition of **rasas** or **bhāvas** which are manifested inappropriately due to some cause such as desire or anger is called **ūrjasvin**."[37] His example of the figure describes the love-struck Śiva's momentary impulse to seize Pārvatī by force. **Ūrjasvin**, then, entails the presentation, not of any particular emotional state (such as pride), but rather of any kind of emotional excess; any **rasa** or **bhāva**, if manifested in defiance of accepted norms and limits, will constitute a case of **ūrjasvin**.

Udbhaṭa explains **samāhita** too as an aspect in which any

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[36]Cf. Pratīhārendurāja's Laghuvṛtti (ibid., pp. 51-2) and Udbhaṭālaṃkāravivṛti (printed in Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha, ed. K.S. Rāmaswāmi Śāstri, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 55, Baroda, 1931), p. 32. The latter commentary is anonymous but, as Ramaswami Sastri demonstrates (ibid., intro., pp. 34-38), it is almost certainly the work of Ruyyaka's father Tilaka (occasionally referred to in Jayaratha's commentary on Ruyyaka's Alaṃkārasarvasva).

[37]Anaucityapravṛttānāṃ kāmakrodhādikāraṇāt/
bhāvānāṃ ca rasānāṃ ca bandha ūrjasvi kathyate//
Udbhaṭa, Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha 4.5 (op. cit., p. 54).

emotional state may be presented: "**Samāhita** is the composition of the cessation of the operation of **rasa**, **bhāva**, or the semblance of these [**tadābhāsa**], in a form devoid of the **anubhāvas** of any other [**rasa**, **bhāva**, or **ābhāsa**]."[38] The portrayal of the subsidence of an emotional state of any sort, if it is not accompanied by the depiction of conditions which indicate the arising of some new emotional state, will fall within the scope of this **alaṃkāra**. Udbhaṭa's example describes Śiva's casting off of the disguise he had taken on while observing Pārvatī; as the commentator Pratīhārendurāja explains, this verse shows the subsidence of "concealment" (**avahittha**), one of the variable emotional states (**vyabhicāri-bhāvas**) associated with **śṛṅgāra-rasa**.[39]

So, Udbhaṭa explains all four of these **alaṃkāras** in terms of **rasa** and other closely related emotional phenomena. Yet he clearly tries to avoid tying any of these figures to a specific emotional content-- **preyasvat** consists not specifically in the depiction of "affection" (**preyas**), but in the depiction of any **bhāva** at all in such a way that it does not give rise to **rasa**; likewise **ūrjasvin** and **samāhita** consist

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[38]rasabhāvatadābhāsavṛtteḥ praśamabandhanam/
anyānubhāvaniḥśūnyarūpaṃ yat tat samāhitam//
Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha 4.7 (ibid., p. 56). The "semblances" or **ābhāsas** of **rasas** or **bhāvas** are those **rasas** or **bhāvas** which are inappropriately manifested, as in the **alaṃkāra ūrjasvin**. The categories of **rasa**- and **bhāva-ābhāsa** play an important role in the **rasa** theory of the later Ālaṃkārikas; both the term and the concept seem to have been coined by Udbhaṭa in his explanation of **ūrjasvin**.

[39]Laghuvṛtti, ibid., p. 56.

in the depiction of the inappropriate manifestation and the cessation (respectively) of any emotional state at all. However, even as they are explained by Udbhaṭa, these **alaṃkāras** are still content based; Udbhaṭa greatly expands the scope of these **alaṃkāras**, but each still consists of a statement about something in particular (e.g. an inappropriately manifested emotion, the cessation of an emotion), rather than a particular kind of statement (e.g. a simile) which may be used to describe anything at all.

The categories of emotional experience Udbhaṭa elaborates in connection with these **alaṃkāras** (**rasa**, **bhāva**, **rasābhāsa** and **bhāvābhāsa**, **rasa-**, **bhāva-**, and **ābhāsa-praśama**) are adopted by Ānandavardhana and subsequent Ālaṃkārikas,[40] but Vāmana and Rudraṭa, Udbhaṭa's successors among the pre-Ānandavardhana Ālaṃkārikas, do not accept his treatment of these **alaṃkāras**--both abandon altogether the attempt to account for **rasa** and related emotional phenomena within the framework of the **alaṃkāras**.

Vāmana (c. 800 AD) was, like Udbhaṭa, active at the court

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[40]Cf. Dhvanyāloka 2.3 (Kashi ed., pp. 175ff). Abhinavagupta expands the list of categories to include the "arising" (**udaya**), the "mixing" (**sandhi**), and the "juxtaposition" (**śabalatā**) of emotional states; some later **alaṃkāra**-theorists introduce new figures corresponding to these additional categories (cf. Ruyyaka, Alaṃkārasarvasva, Kāvyamālā 35, pp. 190ff; Viśvanātha, Sāhityadarpana, ed. Śālagrāmaśāstrī, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1982 [reprint], pp. 367-368; Appayadīksita, Kuvalayānanda 105-107 (Vidyābhavana Saṃskṛta Granthamālā 24, pp. 272-274).

of Jayāpīḍa of Kashmir,[41] so the two must have been at least roughly contemporary. Unlike Udbhaṭa, Vāmana has very little to say regarding **rasa**. In his taxonomy of the poetic figures, Vāmana simply omits **rasavat**, **preyasvat**, **ūrjasvin**, and **samāhita**. Rather than treating **rasa** and other varieties of emotional content as figures of speech, Vāmana incorporates them in his scheme of semantic qualities (**artha-guṇas**). Vāmana defines the semantic quality of **kānti** ("splendour") as "possession of resplendent **rasas**" (**dīptarasatvam**).[42] He has nothing more to say regarding **rasa**, and nothing at all to say regarding those **rasa**-related phenomena (**bhāva**, **rasābhāsa**, etc.) described by Udbhaṭa.

While Vāmana shows little interest in the role of **rasa** in poetry, his work serves in one important respect to make the status of **rasa**-theory in Alaṃkāraśāstra a more pressing question-- Vāmana essentially obliterates the categorical distinction between drama and poetry. We have seen that Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, while they acknowledge in passing the literary status of drama, allow for a division of labor between poetic and dramatic theory, and recognize the analysis of drama as the proper domain of Nāṭyaśāstra, rather than Alaṃkāraśāstra. While Udbhaṭa, in his commentary on Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṃkāra, quotes many example verses from existing poetic

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[41]Cf. Rājataraṅgiṇī 4.497.

[42]Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra 3.2.15 (Kashi Sanskrit Series 209, Varanasi, Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, 1989 [fourth ed.]), p. 116.

works, he cites no verses from drama. Vāmana, by contrast, draws freely from plays[43] as well as non-dramatic poetry to find examples for the poetic features he explores. For Vāmana, drama is not merely one type of poetry among others; it is, in fact, the very best kind of poetry.[44] By breaking down the genre distinction between dramatic and non-dramatic poetry, Vāmana helps to erode the basis for the separation between the two modes of critical analysis devised to explain them; if there is no fundamental distinction between dramatic and non-dramatic poetry, there is no reason why the role of **rasa** should be any less significant in the latter than in the former. Vāmana's practice of freely mixing examples drawn from dramatic and non-dramatic poetry is adopted by Ānandavardhana and most of the later Ālaṃkārikas; for these authors, **rasa**-based analysis is no less relevant to non-dramatic poetry than to drama, and **alaṃkāra**- and **guṇa**-based analysis is no less relevant to drama than to non-dramatic poetry.

The increasing prominence of **rasa** in the analysis of non-dramatic poetry can be seen clearly in the work of Vāmana's nearest successor, Rudraṭa (c. 825 AD).[45] Rudraṭa is the

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[43]E.g. Kālidāsa's Abhijñānaśākuntala (1.2.11, 3.2.6, 4.2.14) and Vikramorvaśīyam (3.1.10, 4.3.29), Bhavabhūti's Mahāvīracarita (1.2.12) and Uttararāmacarita (4.3.6).

[44]Cf. Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra 1.3.30.

[45]Rudraṭa gives no information on the time and place in which he was writing, but he is generally thought to have been a Kashmiri, largely because of his name (the suffix -**ṭa** being

first of the Ālaṃkārikas to make **rasa** a primary category of analysis (rather than incorporating it within the framework of **alaṃkāras** or **guṇas**). Like Vāmana, he omits the **alaṃkāras rasavat, preyasvat, ūrjasvin** and **samāhita** from his discussion of the figures. The first eleven chapters of Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṃkāra deal with **alaṃkāras**, poetic flaws (**doṣas**) and other formal aspects of poetry, very much in the manner of earlier works on poetics. Having concluded his discussion of these matters, he introduces **rasa** as an altogether separate topic. The remaining portion of his work (apart from a brief concluding discussion of genre-typology) deals with the role of **rasa** in poetry, along with related questions of plot and characterization, largely (thought not exclusively) modelled on the treatment of the same topics in the Nāṭyaśāstra.

Rudraṭa makes no attempt of any kind to connect his analysis of **rasa** and related factors with his earlier discussion of **alaṃkāras** and other formal poetic features. The disjunction between these two sections of Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṃkāra is absolute; so much so that if its first eleven

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most common in Kashmiri names)-- cf. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., p. 153, De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 85, and Gerow, Indian Poetics, op. cit., p. 239). In any case, he seems to have been known to Ānandavardhana. In the **vṛtti** on Dhvanyāloka 2.21 (Kashi ed., p. 239), Ānandavardhana refers in passing to **vakrokti** as an **alaṃkāra** involving the use of punning expression; Rudrata was the only one of the early Ālamkārikas to define the figure **vakrokti** in this way (cf. Rudraṭa, Kāvyālamkāra 2.14-17). Thus it would appear that Ānandavardhana was familiar with Rudraṭa's treatment of this figure (contra De-- cf. History of Sanskrit Poetics, Vol. I, p. 85).

chapters were severed from its last five, there would be nothing to indicate that either segment was part of a larger work. What Rudraṭa presents, then, are two entirely separate schemata in terms of which poetry may be analyzed; one dealing with **alaṃkāras** and other formal aspects of poetry and modelled on the work of Bhāmaha and the other early Ālaṃkārikas, and one dealing with **rasa** and related elements of narrative content and drawing largely on the dramaturgical theory embodied in Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra. Faced with the problem of integrating content-based **rasa**-analysis with formal **alaṃkāra**- and **guṇa**- analysis, Rudraṭa simply abandons any effort at such integration. In this way he avoids the difficulties faced by the early Ālaṃkārikas in their attempts to explain **rasa** in terms of **guṇas** and **alaṃkāras**, but only at the expense of introducing a certain incoherence; he delineates two distinct modes of poetic analysis, and gives absolutely no indication as to how, if at all, these two can be related to one another.

Conclusion

Even in the earliest works of Alaṃkāraśāstra, the status of **rasa** is already problematic; this can be seen in Bhāmaha's anomalous treatment of **rasavat** and the other emotional-content-based **alaṃkāras**. The problems associated with the attempt to treat **rasa** in formalist terms become more pronounced in the works of the early ninth-century Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas, as the division between poetic and dramaturgical theory begins to erode and the question of **rasa**'s role in non-

dramatic poetry becomes more pressing. This trend reaches its height in the work of Rudraṭa, who altogether abandons the attempt to formulate an integrated approach to poetics, leaving formalist and **rasa**-based analysis as two separate and unrelated analytic modes.

It is against this background that Ānandavardhana's revolutionary reconceptualization of Alaṃkāraśāstra must be viewed. The most obvious strength of Ānandavardhana's approach to literary theory in comparison with that of his predecessors is that it successfully integrates formalist and **rasa**-based analysis in a single, coherent framework. It does this by abandoning the particularistic aesthetic which had informed the work of the early Ālaṃkārikas. For Ānandavardhana, poetry is not simply a text made beautiful by the incorporation within it of a variety of individually beautiful elements. The individual phonetic and semantic components which make up a poem are to be valued not for their intrinsic beauty, but for their ability to contribute to the overall purpose of the text of which they form a part; this overall purpose, at least ideally, will be the effective communication of some particular **rasa**. Thus, in Ānandavardhana's work, **rasa** is not simply one more poetic element among others; the need to convey **rasa** becomes the central organizing principle which guides (or ought to guide) poets in their selection and deployment of **alaṃkāras** and other formal poetic elements, and provides a clear criterion in

terms of which the aesthetic usefulness of the specific features of any poetic work may be judged.

This re-envisioning of the poem as a functionally unified text with the communication of **rasa** as its overriding goal does not merely provide a useful means of integrating **rasa**-based poetic analysis with the analysis of **alaṃkāras** and **guṇas** which had so far been the primary focus of interest in Alaṃkāraśāstra. It demands an entirely new understanding of the nature of poetic texts and of the imperatives facing practitioners of Alamkāraśāstra. If poems are to be seen not as texts made beautiful by the incorporation within them of individually beautiful phonetic and semantic features, but as functionally unified wholes in which all elements operate together to achieve single, coherent aesthetic effect, then poetic analysis cannot limit itself to the study of particular, isolable, linguistic elements employed in poetic texts, but must concern itself with the functional relations between these individual poetic components, and the factors which govern their ability to further (or detract from) the overall aesthetic objectives of the works in which they are employed.

As has already been noted, Ānandavardhana's view of unifunctionality as the basis of textual coherence, while new to Alaṃkāraśāstra, is not without precedent in the world of Sanskrit linguistic theory. The practitioners of Mīmāṃsā (a school of textual exegesis concerned chiefly with the

interpretation of the Vedas) had long before developed a system of textual interpretation which took unity of function as the principle which integrates the individual elements of any meaningful text into a coherent whole. As we shall see, Ānandavardhana brings into the realm of literary analysis the Mīmāṃsakas' general understanding of textual coherence, along with many of the specific interpretive techniques and concepts they derive from it. Before we turn to examine Ānandavardhana's work and its impact on the subsequent development of Alaṃkāraśāstra in Kashmir, we must briefly explore the interpretive theory and method of the Mīmāṃsakas.

CHAPTER THREE
MĪMĀṂSĀ AND THE TELEOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

The most detailed and sophisticated theory of non-poetic language interpretation in pre-modern South Asia is that devised by the Mīmāṃsakas in their exegesis of Vedic texts. Many of the rival schools of Sanskrit philosophical and scientific thought formulated their own theories of language. But the Mīmāṃsakas, because their *raison d'etre* was to provide a thorough exegesis of a substantial body of existing texts, had to do more than provide an account of the general principles by which language operates; they were forced to confront a vast array of specific interpretive problems, and to devise a system of hermeneutical procedures complex and precise enough to resolve all such problems. In consequence, the semantic and interpretive theory they created is, in its sophistication and subtlety, unequalled in South Asian intellectual history. While the primary focus of attention in Mīmāṃsā is on Vedic texts, the hermeneutical principles developed in the course of analyzing these texts are formulated so as to be applicable to language in general, and are recognized as such by scholars in other fields. For this reason, Mīmāṃsā is frequently designated as **vākya-śāstra** ("the science of sentences").

As we shall see, Ānandavardhana's radical reconfiguration of literary theory and of the process of poetic analysis draws, in many crucial respects, on the hermeneutical theory and practice of the Mīmāṃsakas. We shall therefore, before

embarking on a detailed analysis of Ānandavardhana's work, examine briefly the Mīmāṃsā approach to textual analysis.

The oldest surviving Mīmāṃsā text is the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini (c. 200 BC?). The work is a collection of brief, often cryptic, aphorisms arranged in twelve **adhyāyas**, each dealing with a different issue in the interpretation of ritual texts, and each further subdivided into four or eight **pādas**. The Śābarabhāṣya of Śabara (c. 400 AD) is an extensive commentary on Jaimini's aphorisms, and serves as the basis for all later work in the field of Mīmāṃsā. The seventh century produced two important commentators on Śabara's work: Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Prabhākara, founders of the two major schools of Mīmāṃsā (called Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara, respectively).[1] Kumārilabhaṭṭa was author of the Ślokavārttika (on the first **pāda** of the first **adhyāya**), the Tantravārttika (on the remaining **pādas** of the first **adhyāya** along with the second and third **adhyāyas**), the Tuptīkā (on **adhyāyas** four through twelve), and the Bṛhaṭṭīkā.[2] Prabhākara

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[1]The two authors are at least roughly contemporary; Prabhākara is traditionally believed to have been a pupil of Kumārila, and was probably a junior contemporary of his, although some modern scholars (most notably Ganganath Jha) have argued, on doctrinal and stylistic grounds, that Prabhākara was the earlier of the two (cf. Jha, The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978 [reprint], pp. 11-17, and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, Varanasi, Benaras Hindu University, 1964 [second ed.], pp. 13-17).

[2]The last work is not extant, but is frequently cited by later authors both within and outside the field of Mīmāṃsā (for a survey of citations from this work in later Buddhist philosophical literature, cf. Erich Frauwallner, "Kumārila's

wrote two complete commentaries on Śabara's Bhāṣya, called the Nibandhana and the Vivaraṇa, but more popularly known as the Bṛhatī (the "great" commentary) and the Laghvī (the "light" commentary).[3] Nearly all later Mīmāṃsakas identify themselves as followers of one or the other of these two. While there are important differences between these two schools of Mīmāṃsa on certain matters of epistemological and cognitive theory, they are largely in agreement on questions of textual interpretation.

Mīmāṃsā, perhaps because it deals so intimately and exhaustively with the arcane details of Vedic ritual, has received comparatively little attention from modern scholars of Indian philosophy, and what little attention it has received has focussed almost exclusively on matters dealt with in the first **pāda** of the first **adhyāya** of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (the so-called **tarka-** ["reasoning"] **pāda**), in which the epistemological and ontological views which form the groundwork of the system are explained and defended. The standard practice in general surveys of Mīmāṃsā[4] (and in the

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Bṛhaṭṭīkā," Wiener Zeischrift für die Kunde des Süd- und Ostasiens 6 (1962), pp. 78-90).

[3]The Bṛhatī is only partly extant (up to the first **pāda** of the sixth **adhyāya**), and the Laghvī is altogether lost (although the last six **adhyāyas** of Śālikanāthamiśra's (c. 800 AD) commentary on it [called Dīpaśikhā], containing substantial quotations from the Prabhākara's text, survives).

[4]E.g. A.B. Keith, The Karma-Mīmāṃsā, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1978 [second ed.]; Pashupatinath Shastri, Introduction to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Chaukhambha Oriental Research Studies 19, Varanasi, 1980 [second ed.]; G.P. Bhatt,

summaries of Mīmāṃsā views included in most histories of Indian Philosophy) has been to draw a sharp distinction between "philosophical topics" (i.e. topics dealt with in the **tarka-pāda**) and "Mīmāṃsā topics proper" (i.e. the interpretive questions dealt with in the remaining fifty-nine **pādas** of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra), and to treat the latter topics as of minor importance or to ignore them altogether. Even those authors (Jha, Keith) who include a cursory survey of these "Mīmāṃsā topics proper" usually provide only a summary of the conclusions reached by the Mīmāṃsakas on various points of Vedic interpretation, rather than a serious examination of the interpretive principles and methods by which they arrive at these conclusions.[5]

This narrow focus on the **tarka-pāda** is perhaps understandable; commentaries on this section of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra tend to engage and counter the views of rival schools of thought more explicitly than those dealing with the main body of Jaimini's rules. It is nonetheless unfortunate;

Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies XVII, Varanasi, 1962; Ganganath Jha, The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, op. cit. and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, op. cit.

[5]A rare exception is G.V. Devasthali's Mīmāṃsā: The Ancient Indian Science of Sentence Interpretation (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991 [second revised ed.]). Devasthali's study rightly treats Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics as a general theory of textual interpretation, rather than merely a collection of ad hoc observations on Vedic ritual procedure, and assembles and correlates discussions of various interpretive concepts found throughout the twelve **adhyāyas** of the Mīmāṃsā system.

the epistemological and ontological postulates defended in the **tarka-pāda**, while certainly not unimportant, are little more than a necessary prolegomenon to the real business of Mīmāṃsā. The most distinctive and ultimately the most influential contribution of the Mīmāṃsakas to Sanskrit philosophical and linguistic thought, their theory of textual interpretation, has been largely overlooked by modern scholars. A thorough investigation of the principles and methods of text interpretation devised by the Mīmāṃsakas would be the work not of one book but of many-- obviously well beyond the scope of the present study. The most that can be attempted here is a general examination of some of the interpretive problems posed by the Mīmāṃsakas and the key concepts and techniques they devise for dealing with them, focussing particularly on those elements of Mīmāṃsā interpretive theory which come to play a significant role in the development of Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra.

The Movement from Universal to Particular

One of the key tenets of Mīmāṃsakas is that the Vedas are eternal and authorless. It is on the basis of their authorless character that the absolute inerrancy of the Vedas is asserted. The accuracy of texts composed by authors is limited by the knowledge and trustworthiness of those authors. By contrast, statements made in the Vedas are not made *by* anyone (who might potentially be mistaken or deceitful) -- they simply are. Thus there is nothing which would allow us to

call into question the truthfulness of these statements.[6] If the Vedic texts are eternal (and hence authorless), then the words of which they are composed, and the meanings conveyed by these words, must likewise be eternal. It is for this reason that the Mīmāṃsakas must argue that the meaning conveyed by any word is a universal (**ākṛti**, **jāti**), rather than a particular (**vyakti**).[7]

The actual referent of a word such as "cow" must be not any particular cow or group of cows, but rather the universal class-property "cow-ness". If, in learning the proper use of the word "cow", we came to associate it with one or more individual cows known to us, we could not use or understand the word to refer to other, previously unknown, cows. If the word were taken to be associated with *all* particular cows (past, present and future), no one could ever understand its meaning (since no one could ever apprehend all cows for the purpose of learning this association). The word must, then, refer to whatever it is that all cows, and only cows, have in common-- by definition, the universal class-property "cow-

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[6]The epistemological presuppositions of this argument are most clearly articulated and ably defended by Kumārila in his development of the theory of **svataḥprāmāṇya**, the intrinsic validity of all cognitions (cf. Ślokavārttika, Codanāsūtra 33ff. [Prācyabhāratī ed., pp. 41ff.]). The best English exposition of the theory is found in Bhatt, Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, op. cit., pp. 73-111.

[7]Cf. Ślokavārttika, Ākṛtivāda 1 (op. cit., p. 385).

ness".[8] The meanings conveyed by words can only be universal class-properties, which are unitary and eternal, rather than particulars, which are multiple and ephemeral.

But this creates an interpretive problem. Sentences (Vedic or otherwise) describe or enjoin *particular* entities or actions, rather than universal class-properties. When a person says, "The cow is white," it is a particular cow (rather than the universal "cow-ness") to which the quality of whiteness is ascribed; when one person orders another to "Bring the cow!", it is a particular act of bringing and a particular cow that are intended; it would be impossible for anyone to bring the universal "cow-ness". So, while words can denote only universals, sentences, at least typically, refer to particulars.[9] How can this be so?

The particularity of sentence meaning can be explained as follows. Sentence meaning is not directly conveyed by the words which make up a sentence. As Śabara explains, "Words, having denoted their respective word-meanings, cease functioning; then the word-meanings, once they have been understood, cause one to understand the sentence meaning."[10] Words can convey only those universal meanings with which they

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[8]Cf. Śābarabhāṣya on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.30-35, with Tantravārttika (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97, 1970 [second ed.], Vol. II, pp. 229ff.) and Bṛhatī (Madras University Sanskrit Series 24, 1962, pp. 146ff.).

[9]Śābarabhāṣya on 1.1.24 (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97 [second ed.], Vol. I, p. 111-112).

[10]Ibid., p. 116.

are eternally linked; they cannot function collectively to convey a connected sentence meaning. It is the individual word-meanings which cause us, by a further mental operation, to understand the meaning of the sentence as a whole.

Taken separately, individual words convey no useful information; they can only produce mental impressions of eternal and ubiquitous class-properties. However, these universal word-meanings, construed with one another, can, by a process of mutual specification, cause one to understand some particular entity in which these universals are instantiated. For example: having heard the words "cow" (**gauḥ**) and "white" (**śuklaḥ**) juxtaposed with one another, we understand that the speaker is referring to a particular entity possessing both "cow-ness" and "whiteness", i.e. a white cow. Similarly, having heard the words "bring!" (**ānaya**) and "cow" and understood their individual meanings, we understand that the speaker is issuing a command for a particular act of bringing, having a particular cow as its object. Thus, while individual words can have only universals as their meanings, these word-meanings can, in conjunction with one another, designate particular entities and actions. To quote Śabara again, "A word designates a universal; a sentence designates a particular. The sentence-meaning is the fixing of word-meanings, which function generally, in some particular... Word-meaning is apprehended directly, but

sentence-meaning is inferential [**ānumānika**]."[11] It is our mental reflection on and association of the individual word meanings, rather than the words themselves, which create an awareness of the (particular) sentence meaning.

This mental progression from universal to particular meanings through mutual specification is basic to linguistic comprehension as the Mīmāṃsakas understand it. It is not only basic to the process of sentence comprehension, but recurs at other levels of language as well-- both within the words that make up sentences and between multiple sentences within a text. While morphologically simple words such as "cow" can have only universals as their meanings, it is argued that morphologically complex words (**yaugika-śabdas**-- that is, words whose meanings can be derived etymologically from the meanings of their parts) can, like sentences, refer to particulars.[12] For example: the word **gomān** ("cow-possessor") is composed of two meaningful parts, the word **go** ("cow") and the possessive suffix **-mān**. The first can directly convey only the universal "cow-ness", and the second only "possessor-ness", but because these two component meanings delimit one another (just as the individual word-meanings which make up a sentence do), the word can refer to a particular possessor of particular cows. As we shall see (below, pp. 106ff), the individual meanings of the sentences which make up a particular Vedic text delimit

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[11]Śābarabhāṣya on 3.1.12 (op. cit, Vol. IV, p. 53).

[12]Cf. Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 35ff.

one another in much the same manner; one and the same sentence can convey any of a number of significantly different meanings, and the precise meaning it conveys in any given instance (what the Mīmāṃsakas call **vacana-vyakti**, the "sentence-particular") can be ascertained only with reference to its context (**prakaraṇa**)-- that is, to the surrounding sentences. So, the progression from morpheme- to word-meaning, from word- to sentence-meaning, and from sentence- to text-meaning consists of a succession of stages in which groups of linguistic elements specify and delimit each others' meanings so as to produce a single, unified sense.

Unity of Purpose as the Basis for Mutual Specification

Thus it is established that it is only through the interaction and mutual delimitation of individual semantic components that language can convey specific sentential and textual meanings. But what governs this interaction? Just what is it that leads us to construe a group of word meanings with one another, and how are we to know which semantic elements specify which? For the Mīmāṃsakas, that factor which connects the individual meanings of words and other linguistic elements is unity of *purpose*. Unless the individual meanings of the words in an utterance are linked to some common goal, there will be nothing to induce the hearers of the utterance to construe these separate meanings into a connected whole; only the unrelated word-meanings would be understood. As Kumārila says, "As long as unity of purpose [**prayojana**] is not

relied upon, the independent word-meanings will not be able to attain unity."[13]

It is an important tenet of the Mīmāṃsakas that every sentence must be interpreted so as to convey a functionally unified and coherent meaning. Any interpretation which fails to maintain the unity of the sentence (**ekavākyatā**) will be vitiated by the flaw of **vākyabheda**, "the splitting of the sentence".[14] In fact, this unity is for them constitutive of the sentence. Jaimini characterizes the sentence as follows: "A single sentence [exists] because of unity of purpose; it would stand in need [**ākāṅkṣā**] if there were a division [of its parts]."[15] So it is functional unity that determines the unity of the sentence. The individual parts of the sentence connect with the whole because they subserve the overall purpose of the sentence and are thus "needed" by it. It is only in response to this "need" (**ākāṅkṣā**) that any expressive element of language can associate itself with any other; according to Kumārila, "Connection is, in every case, dependent upon need."[16]

Because this need is always driven by some purpose (since

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[13]Tantravārttika on 2.1.46 (op. cit., Vol. II, p. 467).

[14]For a summary of these two key Mīmāṃsā interpretive concepts, see Devasthali, op. cit., pp. 163-180; also, below, pp. 79ff.

[15]Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.46 [Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97, Vol. II, p. 431).

[16]Tantravārttika on 2.2.3 (op. cit., Vol. III, p. 24).

anything that is needed is always needed *for* something), connections between words or other linguistic elements are, by necessity, hierarchical. The point is made concisely by Śālikanāthamiśra (in his commentary on Prabhākara's Bṛhatī), "No connection is possible without a relation of primacy and subordination."[17] Whenever two or more linguistic elements combine with one another to produce a connected meaning, one of these elements will be predominant and the others subordinate to it; the former will be that which stands in need and the latter the element or elements capable of filling this need. Elements of equal predominance cannot be connected with one another, because that need which is the driving force behind the connection of all linguistic elements does not hold between them.[18]

The hierarchical character of all linguistic relations, coupled with the required functional unity of sentences (**ekavākyatā**), makes it necessary that in every sentence there should be one predominant element, to which all others are subordinate. As Kumārila puts it, "This being the case [i.e. the functional unity of the sentence being established], only one word-meaning will be predominant, and the others will be

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[17]Ṛjuvimalapañcikā on 3.1.1 (in Bṛhatī, Madras University Sanskrit Series 25, 1964, p. 628).

[18]Cf. Śābarabhāṣya and Tantravārttika (op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 11-113) and Bṛhatī (Madras University Sanskrit Series 25, op. cit., pp. 698-701) on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 3.1.22.

mentioned as qualifiers [**viśeṣaṇas**] [of that]."[19] This conclusion, of course, raises the further question: in a given sentence, which element will be predominant?

The Mīmāṃsakas argue that in any sentence it is the element of "becoming" or "bringing into being" (**bhāva** or **bhāvanā**) expressed by the verb (or, more precisely, the verbal suffix) which is predominant; all other word- or morpheme-meanings serve, directly or indirectly, to qualify this element, and are hence subordinate to it.[20] It is from this element of **bhāvanā** that that "need" which determines the functional unity of the sentence and causes a hearer to connect the individual meanings of its component words arises. The "event" expressed by the verb can transpire only through the working of those already existing entities connected with it. For example, in the sentence, "Devadatta cooks rice in a pot by means of fire," the act of cooking expressed by the verb is made possible only through the interaction of Devadatta, the rice, the pot, and the fire;[21] by contrast, these four elements, expressed by nouns, do not depend on the

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[19] Tantravārttika on 2.1.46 (op. cit., vol. II, p. 437).

[20] Cf. Śābarabhāṣya on 2.1.1-4 [Bhāvārthādhikaraṇa] (op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 333-358, especially pp. 340-341 and 355-358); also Ślokavārttika, Vākyādhikaraṇa 330ff. (op. cit., pp. 661ff.).

[21] Because it is only through the interaction of such existing elements that the action expressed by the verb can come into being, these elements are referred to in Sanskrit grammatical and linguistic theory as productive or active factors (**kārakas**).

act of cooking, or on each other, for their very existence. They are already established (**siddha**), while the action is "to be established" (**sādhya**). Thus it is the verbal element that stands in need of the others, and they aid in, and hence are subordinate to, that "coming into being" which is expressed by the verb. This reasoning is summed up in the often-cited **bhūta-bhavya-nyāya** ("principle of that which exists and that which must be brought into being"): "When something which exists and something which must be brought into being are mentioned together, that which exists is pointed out for the sake of that which is to be brought into being."[22]

The "need" generated by the **bhāvanā**, the "bringing into being" expressed by the verbal suffix, is threefold. When we hear such a suffix it raises the following questions: What is to be brought into being, by what means is it to be brought into being, and how (that is, by what specific procedures) is it to be brought into being?[23] The answers to these questions are not provided by the verbal suffix itself and must be sought in the surrounding words of the same sentence and, if necessary, in surrounding sentences; it is in this way that the need arising from the **bhāvanā** unites disparate words

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[22]**bhūtabhavyasamuccāraṇe bhūtaṃ bhavyāyopadiśyate**; cf. Śābarabhāṣya on 3.4.40 (op. cit., Vol IV, p. 423). For a collection of citations and references in Mīmāṃsā works, see Kevalānandasarasvatī's Mīmāṃsākośa (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992 [reprint]), Vol. 6, pp. 3063-4.

[23]Śābarabhāṣya, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 341 and Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 350ff.

and sentences into functionally unified wholes.

Consider, for example, a typical Vedic injunction: "One who desires heaven should sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma" (**jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta**).[24] What is it that is to be brought into being by the action enjoined in this sentence? It might at first seem as if it is only the sacrificial performance that is to be brought into being; it is, after all, the verbal root denoting sacrifice (**√yaj**) to which the optative (injunctive) suffix **-eta**, the element expressive of **bhāvanā**, is appended. But this will not do. If the injunction is to function properly (i.e. if it is to motivate its hearers to action), then the ultimate object to be achieved by its performance must be something desirable in itself. The only element in the sentence suitable for this role is heaven (**svarga-**); thus we must understand attainment heaven to be the ultimate result of this sacrificial performance.[25] People will undertake sacrificial action (or

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[24]Cited in <u>Śābarabhāṣya</u> on 6.1.1 (op. cit., Vol. V, p. 173).

[25]<u>Śābarabhāṣya</u>, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 340 and <u>Tantravārttika</u>, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 350. Prabhākara's view of the sacrificer's motivation is more complex; he agrees that the expectation of some desirable result (**phala**) is necessary to prompt one to undertake a sacrificial action enjoined by the Veda, but nevertheless argues that it is primarily the sense of obligatoriness created by the injunctive verbal suffix, rather than the ultimate result, which motivates the sacrificer. Some Western scholars (beginning with Stcherbatsky) have seen this notion of obligatoriness as analogous to Kant's categorical imperative. This discussion of motivation is one of the few points of Prabhākara's system to have received serious attention from modern scholars; cf., for example, Hajime Nakamura, "Problem of the Categorical

any action at all, for that matter), only if they can expect to accomplish some desirable result by doing so. If the thing to be brought into being by the performance of this Vedic injunction were merely the sacrificial act itself, no one would be prompted to action by it; the injunction would then serve no purpose whatsoever. The injunction will be purposeful only if we understand the sacrifice to be capable of satisfying the stated desire of the sacrificer; thus in the sentence, "One who desires heaven should sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma," the object of the bhāvanā, the thing to be brought into being, must be heaven, understood as the ultimate result of the sacrifice here enjoined.

The sacrificial performance itself, expressed by both the verbal root **√yaj** ("sacrifice") and the word **jyotiṣṭoma** (the proper name of a particular sacrifice), must be understood as fulfilling the second "need" generated by the **bhāvanā**, that of a means or instrument by which the result can be brought into being.[26] Thus the injunction, "One who desires heaven should

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Imperative in the Philosophy of Prabhākara School: A Brief Note," in R.C. Dwivedi ed., Studies in Mīmāṃsā (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994), pp. 169-183 (itself a summary and critique of Th. Stcherbatsky, "Über die Nyāyakanikā des Vācaspatimiśra und die Indische Lehre vom kategorischen Imperativ," in Beitrage zur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Bonn: Kommissionsverlag Fritz Klopp, 1926, pp. 369-80), and Irene Wicher, "Svargakāma," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 38 (1994), pp. 509-522. Prabhākara's main discussion of the question is found in Bṛhatī on **sūtras** 6.1.1-3 (Madras University Sanskrit Series 26), pp. 1-54.

[26]Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 351-352. Because the intended result does not appear immediately at the conclusion of the sacrificial performance, the sacrifice

sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma," properly analyzed, can be restated as follows, "One should bring heaven into being by means of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice" (**jyotiṣṭomena yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet**).

There is nothing in the sentence itself to fulfill the third need generated by the **bhāvanā**, that of a specific set of procedures to be followed in order to bring about the intended result. We know that we are to perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice in order to attain heaven, but we do not know yet precisely what is entailed by the performance of this sacrifice. For this information, we must turn to the sentences surrounding this primary injunction, sentences which will specify the preparation and offering of various sacrificial materials, the deities to which these materials are to be offered, the ritual formulas (**mantras**) to be recited in the course of these offerings, and so on. It is only when all three "needs" of the **bhāvanā** have been filled in this way that the Vedic injunction becomes fully comprehensible and, thus, performable.

Since the complete understanding of the **bhāvanā** generated by a single Vedic injunction requires the hearer to draw on information from multiple surrounding sentences, it should be

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cannot be regarded as the immediate cause of the result. Thus the Mīmāṃsakas postulate, as the immediate result of the sacrifice, an imperceptible force which they call **apūrva** (the "new thing" created by the sacrifice); the sacrifice produces the **apūrva**, and the **apūrva**, at some time in the future, produces the desired result. Cf. Śābarabhāṣya, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 340 and pp. 358ff.

obvious that all **bhāvanās** do not operate equally and independently. All of the sentences which surround a primary injunction, and from which the specific procedures of the rite it enjoins are arrived at, must have some **bhāvanā** of their own; however, these differ from the **bhāvanā** conveyed by the primary injunction in that they are ultimately subordinated to it. On this basis the Mīmāṃsakas divide the verbs contained in the Veda, which express **bhāvanā**, into two main classes, primary (**pradhāna**) and secondary (**guṇa**).[27] Verbs expressive of actions which entail the modification or preparation of materials[28] to be used in other actions are regarded as secondary. Such actions do not in and of themselves produce any beneficial sacrificial result (**phala**) for their performers; they are to be performed because they make possible (by providing suitable materials) other, primary, actions which do produce such results.

As with the connection of elements within a single sentence, connections between multiple sentences are ultimately determined by unity of purpose within a given text. The actions enjoined by secondary injunctions have the production or modification of substances as their immediate object but, as these substances themselves play an essential

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[27]Śābarabhāṣya on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.6-8, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 379ff.

[28]Including preparation by the recitation of appropriate **mantras** or by the mental dedication of substances to particular deities.

role in the action enjoined by some primary injunction, the secondary injunctions ultimately subserve the purpose of the primary injunction with which they are connected (i.e., the production of a particular result for the sacrificer). And, once again, we see that the connections between sacrificial elements (and, thereby, between the texts which enjoin them)[29] are necessarily hierarchical. A secondary action is subordinate to the substance it modifies, the substance is subordinate to the primary action in which it is used, and the primary action is subordinate to the sacrificial result it is meant to produce.[30] Multiple *actions* may be seen as constituting a single, complex, ritual performance only insofar as they all, directly or indirectly, subserve a single ultimate purpose; likewise, multiple *sentences* may be seen as constituting a single, coherent text only insofar as they all ultimately subserve a single ultimate purpose (i.e., the injunction of a complex ritual performance which will produce a particular sacrificial result for its performer).

So, the process by which individual sentence meanings combine to form a functionally unified text parallels that by

[29]In Mīmāmsā text analysis, there is always a parallelism between the hierarchical organization of the elements of a ritual action and that of the textual elements by which they are described or enjoined: if action A is subordinate to action B, then the sentence or sentences enjoining action A are subordinate to those enjoining action B.

[30]The chain of subordination may be extended indefinitely; the performance of any secondary action may require materials which may themselves require ritual preparation by further secondary actions.

which individual word meanings combine to form functionally unified sentence meanings. This parallelism is highlighted by the Mīmāṃsakas' use of the term **mahā-vākya** ("great-sentence") to designate a collection of sentences which form a functionally unified text. At all levels of language, it is only subservience to a single purpose which allows disparate semantic units to combine into coherent wholes.

Sentential Coherence and the Splitting of Sentences

The need to read sentences as functionally coherent wholes plays a central role in Mīmāṃsā text analysis. Any interpretation which requires a sentence to serve multiple injunctive functions will be vitiated by the flaw of **vākya-bheda** ("splitting of the sentence"), and hence must be rejected as untenable. As we shall see, determining the precise nature of the unity required of sentences is a complex matter which requires careful analysis; nevertheless, the requirement of functional unity within sentences provides one of the most basic tools the Mīmāṃsakas bring to bear in the resolution of particular interpretive problems.

One of the seminal treatments of **vākya-bheda** in the Mīmāṃsā system is found in the Vājapeyādhikaraṇa (Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.4.6-8).[31] The example under discussion is the following sentence: **vājapeyena svārājyakāmo yajeta** ("One who desires sovereignty should sacrifice with **vājapeya**"). The word

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[31]Śābarabhāṣya and Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 290-294, and Bṛhatī, Madras University Sanskrit Series 24, pp. 222-228.

vājapeya ordinarily signifies a kind of gruel made from rice or other grains; can we understand it here as enjoining the use of this substance in some sacrifice, or must we take the word **vājapeya** to be the proper name of a sacrifice? At first glance, the answer seems obvious. Sacrifice, by definition, entails the offering of some substance to some deity. The word **vājapeya** denotes a substance suitable for such an offering. The sentence, then, may be interpreted as enjoining a sacrifice, having sovereignty as its result, and in which **vājapeya** is the substance to be offered.

But this will not do. If the sentence were interpreted in this way, it would suffer from the flaw of **vākya-bheda**. This reading requires the sentence to enjoin two quite separate things: the performance of the sacrifice for the sake of sovereignty, and the use of **vājapeya** as the offering-material in this sacrifice. In effect, it treats the utterance as if it were made up of two separate sentences: "One who desires sovereignty should sacrifice" (**svārājykāmo yajeta**), and "One should sacrifice by means of **vājapeya**" (**vājapeyena yajeta**).[32]

It would not be possible to understand the word **yajeta** ("One should sacrifice"), uttered only once, as construing with both **svārājyakāma** and **vājapeya**, as the word would be called upon to play different and mutually exclusive functional roles in connection with these two; it would

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[32]Śābarabhāṣya, ibid., p. 292.

function as a predicate (**vidhi**) in the first sentence, and as a subject of predication (**anuvāda**-- i.e. that in connection with which something is predicated) in the second.

Kumārila explains the problem as follows: in the expression, "One who desires sovereignty should sacrifice," the act of sacrifice is predicated (**vidheya**) and presented as something to be taken up (**upādeya**) as the means to a particular result (i.e. sovereignty), and is therefore subordinate (**guṇabhūta**) with respect to that result; the result (sovereignty), by contrast, is made the subject of predication (**anūdya** or **anuvādya**) and presented as the point of reference (**uddeśya**) with a view toward which the sacrifice is taken up, and is therefore predominant (**pradhānabhūta**) with respect to the sacrifice.[33] On the other hand, in the expression, "One should sacrifice by means of **vājapeya**," it is the **vājapeya** that is predicated, that is to be taken up (as a means to accomplishing the sacrifice), and is therefore subordinate; the sacrifice expressed by the word **yajeta** is the subject of this predication, the point of reference with a view toward which the **vājapeya** is taken up, and is therefore predominant with respect to it.

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[33]Tantravārttika, ibid., p. 292. These two incompatible sets of semantic roles come to be known in the later Mīmāṃsā literature as the **viruddha-trikas**, the "contradictory triads"; cf., for example, (on 1.4.8) Someśvarabhaṭṭa's Nyāyasudhā (in Mīmāṃsādarśanam, Prācyabhāratī Granthamālā 22, Vol. II [1986]), p. 103, Mādhava's Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara (Vrajajīvan Prācyabhāratī Granthamālā 35, 1989 [reprint]), pp. 55-56, and Bhavanātha's Mīmāṃsānayaviveka (New Delhi: Rāṣṭrīya Saṃskṛta Saṃsthānam, 1977), p. 201.

Thus, if, in the sentence **vājapeyena svārājykāmo yajeta** ("One who desires sovereignty should sacrifice with **vājapeya**"), the word **vājapeya** were taken to denote the substance by means of which the sacrifice is to be performed, then the word **yajeta** ("One should sacrifice") would be called upon to play two contradictory semantic roles within one and the same sentence. The requirement of sentential unity would thereby be violated, and the sentence would suffer from the flaw of **vākya-bheda**. This interpretation is therefore dismissed as unacceptable; we must find a way to make sense of the terms of the sentence without forcing a sentential split.

If the word **vājapeya** is understood to be the proper name of a sacrifice, rather than to designate a particular sacrificial material, the difficulty will vanish. One will recall that for the Mīmāṃsakas a sentence such as "One who desires heaven should sacrifice" (**svargakāmo yajeta**), properly analyzed, can be restated as "One should bring heaven into being by means of sacrifice" (**yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet**). Analogously, "One who desires sovereignty should sacrifice with the Vājapeya" (**vājapeyena svārājyakāmo yajeta**) can be reformulated as "One should bring sovereignty into being by means of the sacrifice [named] Vājapeya" (**vājapeyena yāgena svārājyaṃ bhāvayet**). On this reading, the term **vājapeya** and the verbal root **√yaj** ("sacrifice"), despite their disparate syntactical treatment in the Vedic injunction, are co-

referential (**samānādhikaraṇa**).[34] Thus, the sentence enjoins a single **bhāvanā** with a single result (sovereignty) and a single means (the sacrifice called Vājapeya)-- hence, no **vākya-bheda**.[35]

Thus any given sentence can contain only a single injunction directed toward a single result. But what exactly constitutes a "single injunction"? Need the "single thing" enjoined by a sentence be confined to a single word (such as **yajeta**, "One should sacrifice") or a set of co-referential elements (such as the name **vājapeya** and the verbal root **√yaj**)? The answer is no. Only a single action can be enjoined by a given Vedic sentence, but such an action may sometimes be enjoined along with one or more of those productive factors (**kārakas**-- cf. above, p. 78) which are directly linked with it, and subordinate to it. This is known in Mīmāṃsā parlance as **viśiṣṭa-vidhāna** ("qualified injunction").

As an example, consider the following sentence: "One

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[34]On the co-referentiality of sacrificial names with the verbal root **√yaj**, see especially the Udbhidadhikarana (1.4.1-2)-- <u>Śābarabhāṣya</u> and <u>Tantravārttika</u>, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 268-277, and <u>Bṛhatī</u> (Madras University Sanskrit Series 24), pp. 180-196. Sacrificial names are not, properly speaking, injunctive. They (typically, at least) convey no new information about the actions they designate; they perform a referential function within Vedic texts, serving to link sentences connecting a sacrifice with a particular result (as here) with others which specify materials or procedures for the same sacrifice.

[35]By contrast, if the word **vājapeya** were taken to denote a substance, the sentence would express two separate **bhāvanās**, one with sovereignty as its result and sacrifice as its means, and another with sacrifice as its result and **vājapeya** as its means.

purchases the soma with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]" (**aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā somaṃ krīṇāti**).[36] Here, it is argued, "One purchases with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]" forms a single, complex predicate, enjoined in relation to the soma, a substance to be used as a sacrificial offering as part of the Jyotiṣṭoma (the sacrifice being described in the passage in which the foregoing sentence is found). It might be objected that accepting such a complex predicate would expose one's interpretation to the same flaw of **vākya-bheda** discussed above. The act of purchasing would be predicated (**vidheya**) with respect to the soma, but would serve as the subject of predication (**anuvāda**) in relation to which its qualifiers (the pink-eyed, one-year-old cow and the redness of the cow) are enjoined;[37] it would thus be forced to play contradictory semantic roles, just like the word "sacrifice" in "One who desires sovereignty should sacrifice with **vājapeya**." How can this or any sentence be interpreted as a "qualified injunction" without destroying the unity of the sentence meaning?

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[36]The sentence is analyzed in one of the most important and most frequently cited sections of the Mīmāṃsā system, the Aruṇādhikaraṇa (3.1.12)-- cf. Śābarabhāṣya and Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 33-65, and Bṛhatī, Madras University Sanskrit Series 25, pp. 658-668; cf. also Mīmāṃsākośa, op. cit., pp. 529-622. Other important discussions of **viśiṣṭa-vidhāna** are found in the Paurṇamāsyadhikaraṇa (2.2.3-8-- cf. Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 32-27) and the Paśusomādhikaraṇa (2.2.17-20-- cf. Tantravārttika, ibid., pp. 74ff).

[37]Cf. Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 55 (on 3.1.12).

The avoidance of **vākya-bheda** in cases of qualified injunction is explained as follows: while, properly speaking, only a single element can be enjoined by a single sentence, that element which is enjoined (in this sentence, the act of purchase), is qualified (**viśiṣṭa**) by several subordinate elements. The qualified action can be enjoined only if its qualifiers (**viśeṣaṇas**-- e.g. the one-year-old cow, the redness, etc.) are likewise understood to be enjoined. Thereby, a sentence containing a qualified injunction, even if it can (in accordance with the principle of **ekavākyatā**) explicitly enjoin only a single element, can cause one to understand, by implication, the injunction of those qualifiers connected with it. As Kumārila explains, "This [i.e. the injunctive word in a qualified injunction], having enjoined once and ceased functioning, because its own meaning would otherwise be incompatible, gives rise [by implication][38] to other injunctions bearing on each of the qualifiers; thereby, without abandoning the unified form understood from the Vedic

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[38]This kind of implication is what the Mīmāṃsakas call **arthāpatti**-- the necessary presumption of something otherwise unknown. When one knows of the existence or occurrence of something which would not be possible without the existence or occurrence of a second, unknown, thing, one may legitimately presume that this thing exists or has occurred. For example, if we are told that "Fat Devadatta doesn't eat by day," we may legetimately presume that he does eat at night-- otherwise his fatness would be inexplicable (cf. Ślokavārttika, Arthāpatti 51ff). The Mīmāṃsakas argue that **arthāpatti** is a means of valid knowledge in its own right, and must be recognized as something distinct from inference (**anumāna**)-- cf. Ślokavārttika, Arthāpatti 10-35 and Śālikanāthamiśra's Prakaraṇapañcikā (Benares Hindu University Darśana Series 4), pp. 273-278.

recitation, it is able to achieve the same result as if it were repeated [in connection with each of these qualifiers]."[39] Thus, the sentence, "One purchases the soma with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]" is able to enjoin the act of purchase, the pink-eyed, one-year-old cow, and the redness of the cow, without violating the requirement of sentential unity.

This theory of **viśiṣṭa-vidhāna** obviously provides a powerful interpretive tool for dealing with complex injunctions without violating the requirement of **ekavākyatā**; indeed, it might at first seem, too powerful. What is to prevent one from interpreting a sentence such as "One who desires sovereignty should sacrifice with **vājapeya**" as a case of "qualified injunction"? On this interpretation, a single element (sacrifice), qualified by a particular offering material (**vājapeya**), would be enjoined with a view toward a single result (sovereignty). Hence there would be no splitting of the sentence, and no reason to interpret the word **vājapeya** as the name of a sacrifice, rather than as designating a substance to be used in the sacrifice-- the accepted interpretation of this and similar sentences, and the argument for the very existence of sacrificial names, would collapse.

Obviously, such an interpretation cannot be accepted; but

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[39]Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 33; cf. also Tantravārttika, Vol. IV, pp. 95-96 (on 3.1.15).

how can one justify the disparate treatment of sentences such as "One purchases the soma with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]" (where **viśiṣṭa-vidhāna** is allowed) from those such as "One who desires sovereignty should sacrifice with **vājapeya**" (where it is not)? The question is not dealt with as clearly as one might wish in the Mīmāṃsā literature, but the crucial difference would seem to be this: In the sentence "One purchases the soma with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]", despite the complex, multi-partite predicate, there is only a single thing which must be brought into being (i.e., the act of purchasing) and, consequently, a single **bhāvanā**. This purchasing is performed for the sake of the soma (i.e., in order to make it available for later sacrificial use), and is hence subordinate to it, but the soma itself is not produced by this action; the only new thing brought into being by the performance here enjoined is the act of purchase itself. By contrast, in the sentence "One who desires sovereignty should sacrifice with **vājapeya**," (if **vājapeya** is taken to denote a substance) there are two distinct things to be brought into being, sacrifice (by means of **vājapeya**) and sovereignty (by means of sacrifice): there is no way these two products can be connected with a single **bhāvanā**, and hence no way to arrive at a unitary sentence meaning. It is the impossibility of arriving at a single **bhāvanā** with a single result which prevents one from interpreting this and similar sentences as

cases of qualified injunction.[40]

To return to the example in question: in the sentence "One purchases the soma with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]," the ability of "One purchases with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]" to operate as a single, complex predicate depends on its having a functionally unified, hierarchical structure of its own (just as complete sentences and higher order textual units must be hierarchically ordered towards a single purpose if they are to convey a coherent sense). The complex predicate must contain a single predominant element, to which all its other components are subordinated. As before, it is the active, verbal element which assumes the predominant role. It is primarily the act of purchase which is predicated here; the other elements of the complex predicate serve only as qualifiers of this action, and are hence subordinate to it.

This understanding of the structure of complex predicates forces the Mīmāṃsakas to challenge and ultimately reject some of our more basic intuitions regarding the relationship between words in a sentence. Consider the three subordinate terms in "One purchases with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]" (**aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā krīṇāti**). Two of these

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[40]At any rate, this is the explanation given by Bhavanātha, in the only explicit discussion of the question I have been able to find. Bhavanātha explains the distinction between the two sentences in his commentary on the Aruṇādhikaraṇa (3.1.12)-- cf. Bhavanātha, Mīmāṃsānayaviveka, unpublished manuscript, Adyar Library 1.A.27, Vol. II, pp. 506-7.

terms, pink-eyed (**piṅgākṣyā**) and one-year-old (**ekahāyanyā**), are morphologically complex and are therefore to be interpreted, for reasons already discussed,[41] as referring to a particular substance (here understood, by context or implication, to be a cow), qualified by the attributes denoted by the components of these words (pink eyes and one year of age). Both words are marked with the instrumental case-ending, indicating that they denote the means by which the action of purchasing is to be performed. The substance they denote can be exchanged for the soma to be purchased, and is thereby able to perform the role assigned it by the instrumental case-marking; thus there is no difficulty in connecting these terms with the verb "One purchases" (**krīṇāti**) as subordinate elements.

But consider the remaining term in the predicate, "red" (**aruṇayā**). This word denotes not a substance but a quality, a color. At first, it seems natural to assume that "red" is a qualifier of the pink-eyed, one-year-old cow; color is, after all, a property of substances. But the Mīmāṃsakas' analysis of the structure of complex predicates does not allow for such an interpretation. If "red" is to form part of a single, functionally unified predicate, it must be interpreted as a qualifier not of the cow, but of the primary element of the predicate, the act of purchase. If one were to interpret the word "red" as a qualifier of the cow, rather than of the

[41]Cf. above, p. 74.

act of purchase, a splitting of the sentence would result; the cow would be enjoined in connection with the act of purchase, yet would serve as the subject of predication (**anuvāda**) in connection with which the quality of redness is enjoined.[42] The cow cannot serve as qualifier and qualified in the same sentence without creating a **vākya-bheda**. Furthermore, the word "red", like "pink-eyed" and "one-year-old", is marked with the instrumental case-ending; thus its referent, like theirs, must be directly connected with the act of purchase and must serve as a means toward the accomplishment of this action.[43]

But against this interpretation the following objection can be raised. Redness is a property which can belong only to substances; it is, in and of itself, formless (**amūrta**). It would not be possible for such a formless, insubstantial property to serve as a means of purchasing, or of any other action.[44] Given this impossibility, the fact that the word "red" is marked with the instrumental suffix cannot be regarded as significant-- as Śabara's hypothetical opponent puts it, "An unperformable thing cannot be enjoined even by a hundred sentences."[45] "Redness" can in no way be used as a means of purchase; if it is to convey any useful meaning

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[42]Cf. Śābarabhāṣya, op. cit., pp. 51, 55, and 62.

[43]Cf. Śābarabhāṣya (on 3.1.12), op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 50.

[44]Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[45]Ibid., p. 43; cf. also p. 50.

(which, as part of the uniformly authoritative Veda, it must) it must be connected with some substance-- either with the cow mentioned here, or with other substances mentioned in the same context (**prakaraṇa**).

Śabara answers the objection as follows: It is true that qualities such as color must always qualify some substance or other. But this connection between quality and substance is not what the Vedic injunction expresses. The word "red" (**aruṇayā**), like the words "pink-eyed" (**piṅgākṣyā**) and "one-year-old" (**ekahāyanyā**) (which refer directly to the cow), is marked with the instrumental case-ending, indicating that it is a means for the act of purchasing. This is a direct, explicit statement of the Veda, and cannot simply be set aside; we must find some way to make sense of this overt declaration.

> The meaning conveyed by the Veda is such: "One should accomplish purchasing by means of the quality of redness." One must try to find a way so that [purchasing] can be accomplished by this [redness]. And a quality cannot accomplish any action except by qualifying some [material] means [**sādhana**]-- thus, *by implication*, [redness] becomes a qualifier of the [material] means [i.e. the cow].[46]

All the Vedic injunction tells us is that the act of purchasing the soma is to be performed by means of a pink-eyed, one-year-old cow, and by means of the quality of redness. Our own understanding of the nature of qualities leads us to understand that the redness mentioned must belong

[46]Ibid., p. 62.

to some substance and thence to connect the redness with the pink-eyed, one-year-old cow mentioned in proximity to it; but this connection is not directly conveyed by the Vedic injunction itself. What is here enjoined is a single action (purchase), qualified by a set of subordinate factors which serve as a means to this action; thus "One purchases with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]" can be understood as a single, complex, but functionally unified, predicate, enjoined in relation to the soma. Again, it is the need to understand all units of language as hierarchically ordered toward a single purpose which governs interpretation.

Any meaning-elements which cannot be integrated into such a functionally unified structure must be considered incidental to the actual purport of the Vedic text which conveys them, and must consequently be disregarded. Such elements, although they are actually expressed (**vācya**) by the Vedic text in question, are not part of what is "intended to be expressed" (**vivakṣita**) by it.

Consider the following example. In a passage describing the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, this sentence is found: "One wipes the spoon with a woolen strainer" (**daśāpavitreṇa grahaṃ saṃmārṣṭi**).[47] Here the following question is raised: Should

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[47]The example is discussed at length in the Grahaikatvādhi-karaṇa (Mīmāṃsāsūtra 3.1.13-15)-- cf. Śābarabhṣya and Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 65-96, and Bṛhatī, Madras University Sanskrit Series 25, pp. 668-686. The discussion immediately follows that of "One purchases the soma with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]," to which it provides a counter-example.

one wipe one and only one spoon, or all of those spoons to be used in the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice? The answer may seem obvious at first. The word spoon (**graha-**) is marked with the accusative singular case-ending (**-m**); part of what this suffix conveys is that the noun to which it is attached refers to a single entity; hence only one spoon should be wiped.[48] But the Mīmāṃsakas argue that, in spite of the use of the singular suffix, all spoons connected with the Jyotiṣṭoma should be wiped; the singleness expressed by the suffix is not "intended to be expressed" (**vivakṣita**) by the Vedic injunction, and hence must be dismissed as insignificant.[49]

In defense of this conclusion the Mīmāṃsakas turn, once again, to the notion of **vākya-bheda**. The sentence in question enjoins the act of wiping in connection with the spoon or spoons designated by the word **graha-**; if the singleness

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[48]*Śābarabhāṣya*, ibid., pp. 70-71.

[49]But what does it even mean to speak of expressive intent (**vivakṣā**) in connection with the eternal, authorless Vedic texts? Śabara does not directly address the question, but Kumārila considers the problem in some detail, and offers several possible explanations (cf. *Tantravārttika* on 3.1.13--op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 65-70). The ascription of intentionality to the Vedas may be metaphorical; just as we may say of a river bank which is on the verge of collapse, "It wants to fall" (**pipatiṣati**), likewise we may say of a particular Vedic text that it "wants" or "does not want" to express some particular component of its expressed meaning, depending on whether or not this component can or cannot form part of a coherent injunction, without literally ascribing consciousness of desire to the text. Alternatively, the intentionality referred to may be that of competent Mīmāṃsakas and ritualists, who have transmitted and interpreted the Vedas from time immemorial. Or, one might even suppose that the Vedic texts are themselves conscious beings capable of literally holding intentions.

expressed by the nominal suffix were enjoined in connection either with the act of wiping or with the spoon/s, a splitting of the sentence would result. As Śabara explains, if this singleness were enjoined in connection with the act of wiping, it would have to be either predominant or subordinate with respect to that action.[50] The former would be impossible. There is no way in which the act of wiping could assist or modify "singleness" at all. And even if there were, this "singleness" itself could serve no useful purpose here or elsewhere.[51] The spoons in connection with which the act of wiping is enjoined are used as sacrificial implements in the performance of the Jyotiṣṭoma, a rite which has heaven as its result; thus, via its role in preparing these spoons for ritual use, the act of wiping ultimately assists in the achievement of a desirable result. The "singleness" expressed here, unlike the spoons, does not aid in the performance of any fruitful ritual act, so, if the act of wiping were enjoined with respect to it, this act, too, would be ultimately useless.

Nor, Śabara argues, can this "singleness" be enjoined as a subordinate element in connection with the act of wiping. "Singleness" is a formless (**amūrta**) quality, and thus cannot assist in accomplishing the act of wiping. Here, an obvious

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[50]In accordance with the principle that relations between elements of a text are invariably hierarchical-- cf. above, pp. 76-77.

[51]Śābarabhāṣya, ibid., pp. 84-85.

objection arises: it has just been established, in the discussion of "One purchases the soma with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]," that even a formless quality such as redness can (indirectly) assist in the accomplishing of an action, by qualifying some substance to be used in that action. Śabara responds as follows:

> Even if [in other sentences] some other formless [quality] accomplishes an action by qualifying its means [**sādhana**], nevertheless, this is not possible [here]. For here the spoon is not [enjoined] for the sake of wiping; here wiping is enjoined for the sake of the spoon. For the spoon has a purpose [in the larger ritual context]. One would have to postulate a purpose for the wiping [if it were not performed for the sake of the spoon]. If the spoon assisted the act of wiping, then [the singleness] would assist [the wiping] by means of assisting this [spoon]; thus the singleness would be an assistor of the act of wiping. But this is not the case. Therefore there is no connection between singleness and wiping.[52]

The crucial difference between this case and that of the red cow lies in the inversion of the hierarchical relationship between substance and action.

In the case of the red cow, the insubstantial quality redness can be understood to assist in the act of purchase because it qualifies the particular material to be used as the means of purchase (i.e. the cow). In this sentence, the spoon is not enjoined as a means for accomplishing the act of wiping-- rather, the wiping is to be performed for the sake of the spoon (or spoons). Other sentences in the passage describing the Jyotiṣṭoma enjoin the use of the spoons to pour

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[52]Ibid., p. 85.

liquid sacrificial offerings-- thus they serve a known purpose in the larger ritual context. The same cannot be said for the act of wiping. No result is mentioned in connection with this action; if it were not presumed to be performed in order to prepare the spoons for use elsewhere in the Jyotiṣṭoma, one would have to postulate for it some unspecified transcendent result. In accordance with the principle of economy of hypothesis (**kalpanā-lāghava**), one ought to avoid postulating such unstated results wherever possible. Thus one must conclude that the wiping is to be performed for the sake of the spoon/s. Furthermore, the word spoon (**graha-**) is marked with an accusative case ending, indicating that it is not a means for act of wiping, but rather its direct object-- that toward which the act of wiping is directed.[53] Since the

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[53]The Sanskrit grammarians define the direct object as "that which is most desired by the actor" (**kartur īpsitatamam**-- cf. Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.4.49). Nevertheless, it is the usefulness of the spoons in the larger ritual context, rather than the accusative case ending, which ultimately determines its predominance with respect to the act of wiping. When there is no such usefulness in the larger context, even a substance expressed by a word in the accusative case will, perforce, be understood as a means for the action expressed in the sentence, and hence as subordinate to it; in such cases, the accusative case-ending must be interpreted figuratively as expressing not predominance with respect to the action, but relation to the action in general (**kāraka-sāmānya**-- cf. below, pp. 114-115). Hence any qualities associated with this substance (number, gender, color, etc.) will likewise be subordinate to the action, and will consequently be "intended to be expressed" (**vivakṣita**). E.g. in the sentence "One should sacrifice a domestic animal (**paśum ālabheta**) the word for "domestic animal" (**paśu**) is marked with the masculine, singular, accustive case-ending **-m**. The animal in question is not used elsewhere in the ritual context (such that the act of sacrifice could be understood as a preparation of the substance for subsequent ritual use);

spoon or spoons are not subordinate to the act of wiping, the singleness expressed by the nominal suffix cannot, by qualifying this spoon/s, indirectly subserve the act of wiping (as redness can subserve the act of purchase by qualifying the cow). Hence singleness cannot be enjoined in connection with the act of wiping.

Nor can it be enjoined in connection with the spoon/s. If the act of wiping and the quality of singleness, unconnected with one another, were both enjoined in connection with the spoon/s, another splitting of the sentence would result. One cannot argue that the spoon/s is/are enjoined in connection with two subordinate elements, forming a case of qualified injunction (**viśiṣṭa-vidhāna**); here, the spoons are not enjoined at all. The spoons are enjoined in other sentences describing the procedures of the Jyotiṣṭoma, as a means for pouring liquid offerings. In this sentence the spoons, a known element, are not part of what is predicated; rather they serve as the subject of predication (**anuvāda**), that in relation to which the act of wiping is predicated

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here, the animal is the material offering which makes the act of sacrifice possible, and therefore must be understood, despite the use of the accusative case, as a means for the act of sacrifice. Hence those qualities mentioned in connection with it (i.e. the singleness and masculine gender expressed by the suffix) are intended to be expressed, and one must sacrifice a single, male animal. The sentence is discussed as a counter-example to "One wipes the spoon" (under Mīmāṃsāsūtra 3.1.15-- cf. Śābarabhāṣya and Tantravārttika, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 95-96) and at more length in the Paśvekatvādhikaraṇa (Mīmāṃsāsūtra 4.1.11-16-- cf. Śābarabhāṣya and Tuptīkā, op. cit., Vol. V, pp. 12-16 and Bṛhatī, Madras Sanskrit Series 25, op. cit., pp. 971-974).

(**vidheya**) and enjoined as something to be performed. If, in this single sentence, the act of wiping and the quality of singleness were each predicated in relation to a single subject of predication, the requirement of sentential unity would be violated.

Thus there is no way to interpret this sentence such that the quality of singleness can be integrated with the other elements of the sentence to form a functionally unified whole. As Śabara says, "[Here], taking the spoon as its point of reference, the act of wiping is enjoined in connection with it. If, in addition, connection with singleness were enjoined with respect to either the substance [i.e. the spoon/s] or the act of wiping, then, because two connections would be enjoined, the sentence would be split... Thus this singleness is unconnected with either."[54] Since it cannot be integrated into the sentence meaning without producing a **vākya-bheda**, we must understand that singleness, although it is expressed by the nominal suffix, is "not meant to be expressed" (**avivakṣita**);[55] it is incidental to the overall purport of

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[54] Śābarabhāṣya, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 86.

[55] The concept of **vivakṣā** ("expressive intent") plays an important role in the Sanskrit grammatical tradition as well as in Mīmāmsa. It is important, for our purposes, to note the very different uses to which the notion of **vivakṣā** is typically put in these two traditions. The grammarians' primary task is to explain the derivation of proper morphological and syntactic structures, and they are consequently interested in the role of **vivakṣā** as a determinant of grammatical form-- in certain cases, the presence of a specific expressive intent determines the selection of one possible form, which expresses the intended

the sentence, and so must be disregarded. Hence all the spoons employed in connection with the Jyotiṣṭoma are to be wiped.

The Ultimate Meaning of a Text

As we can see, it is only in terms of the larger purposive structure of an entire text that the exact significance of, and the precise relations between, the various elements expressed by the individual words and morphemes of a given sentence can be determined. Considered in isolation from its context, even a comparatively simple sentence such as "One wipes the spoon," could bear any of a wide range of possible significations-- the act of wiping, qualified by the spoon/s and/or the singleness expressed by the nominal suffix, could be enjoined as a single complex predicate; either the wiping, or the singleness, or both, could be predicated and enjoined in connection with the spoon/s; the wiping, qualified by singleness, could be enjoined in connection with the spoon/s, or, qualified by the

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sense, over another, which does not (cf., for example, Patañjali's <u>Mahābhāṣya</u> on Pāṇini 1.2.69, where the role of **vivakṣā** in determining the formation of **ekaśeṣa** compounds is discussed). By contrast the Mīmāṃsakas, being primarily concerned with the interpretation of existing texts, use the notion of **vivakṣā** to differentiate between the relevant and irrelevant meanings of a particular expression in a specific context-- of the many possible senses an expression actually does convey, some are "meant to be expressed" [**vivakṣita**] and some are not (and may hence be disregarded). It is in the latter, Mīmāṃsā-derived, sense that Ānandavardhana applies the notion of **vivakṣā** to poetic analysis, using it to classify the meanings conveyed by particular verses as either intended or unintended-- cf. below, Chapter Five, pp. 198-203 and Chapter Six, pp. 285-286.

spoon/s, could be enjoined in connection with singleness. Kumārila lists dozens of possible variations in the precise injunctive meaning which might be understood from this single sentence.[56]

The job of the Mīmāṃsaka is, by a careful analysis of the functional connections between such a sentence and other surrounding ones, to settle upon one of these many possible meanings as contextually appropriate; one must determine which elements of the sentence are predicated (**vidhi**) and which form the subject of predication (**anuvāda**), which are primary and which are subordinate, which are qualified and which are qualifiers, which are "intended to be expressed" (**vivakṣita**) and which, if any, are "not intended to be expressed" (**avivakṣita**). The specific meaning arrived at when all of these variables have been fixed for a particular sentence in a given context is called by the Mīmāṃsakas the "sentence particular" (**vacana-vyakti**). As the term itself would suggest, the process by which sentence-meanings mutually specify one another to produce a specific textual meaning is analogous to that by which individual word meanings within a sentence mutually specify one another so as to refer to particular entities.

As we have seen, according to the Mīmāṃsakas' understanding of verbal signification, an individual word can refer only to a universal class property (**jāti**, **ākṛti**), never

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[56]Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 75-76.

to a particular (**vyakti**); however, the several class properties denoted by the individual words of a sentence can, by specifying and delimiting one another, designate one or more particulars in which these class properties are instantiated. Similarly, a text consists of a collection of sentences, each of which, taken individually, could convey any of a wide range of meanings; functioning collectively, specifying and delimiting one another, the general meaning conveyed by each can be reduced to a particular sentence meaning (**vacana-vyakti**), in which the relations of subject and predicate, primary and subordinate, etc. are definitely fixed.

The determination of the precise **vacana-vyaktis** of particular sentences in particular contexts is fundamental to the Mīmāṃsa project of Vedic interpretation. As Kumārila says,

> In a single sentence, out of the many meanings understood from the hearing of stems, suffixes, and words, which is comprised in the injunction or useful [in connection with what is enjoined], and which is not?-- in considering this, because all [of these meanings] are seen [in the sentence], it is only by the differentiation of **vacana-vyaktis** that one can determine which is enjoined [**vihita**] or used [**viniyukta**], and which is not.[57]

Thus it is only by determining the **vacana-vyaktis** of the sentences that make up a Vedic text that one can ascertain definitely what is to be done and what is not to be done in

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[57]Tantravārttika, ibid., p. 74. For more on **vacana-vyakti** cf., for example, Śābarabhāṣya on 1.1.1 (op. cit., pp. 5-6), 3.1.12 (Vol. IV, p. 55), and 6.1.1 (Vol. V, p. 174); Tantravārttika on 1.3.7 (op. cit., Vol. II, p. 135), 1.4.10 (p. 299), 2.2.6 (Vol. III, p. 36), 2.2.10 (p. 46), 2.2.16 (p. 54-55), and 3.1.8 (Vol. IV, p. 26).

performing the ritual enjoined by that text.

So, in the comprehension of any complete, coherent text (Vedic or otherwise)-- that is, a text whose parts are hierarchically ordered toward a single ultimate goal-- the hearer or reader of the text must pass through a series of interpretive stages. One first comprehends the universal meanings of individual words and morphemes. Certain of these meanings (i.e. the **bhāvanās** expressed by verbal suffixes-- cf. above, pp. 78ff) generate a psychological expectancy which one seeks to fill by connecting these meanings with those of surrounding words or morphemes. Groups of words, united by their capacity to fulfill this expectancy generated by **bhāvanā**, specify one another and form particular, coherent sentence-meanings. These sentence meanings are likewise joined with one another by their capacity to fulfill the expectancy generated by some **bhāvanā** (since, if the three "needs" generated by a **bhāvanā** cannot be filled by the words within a sentence, one must look to surrounding sentences for the requisite information-- cf. above, p. 82), and further specify one another so as to convey particular **vacana-vyaktis**. At this point all semantic components of the text are integrated into a single, functionally unified structure, organized toward a single end (in the case of a Vedic text, the injunction of a complex ritual act which will produce a particular sacrificial result for its performer).

This final stage of textual comprehension, in which the

precise, hierarchical relations of all semantic components of a text, both within and between sentences, have been definitely ascertained, the Mīmāṃsakas call **paryavasāna**[58] ("completion"-- as opposed to **avāntara-vākyārtha,**[59] "intermediate sentence meaning", a meaning understood from a part of a text which must ultimately be revised or restricted in the light of context). **Paryavasāna** is the end point of the hermeneutical process, the point at which all interpretive questions have been settled and the ultimate, functionally integrated meaning of the entire text becomes clear.

Figurative Expression[60]

It is only in connection with the need to arrive at a single, functionally unified, textual meaning that the question of figurative or non-literal expression (**lakṣaṇā** or **guṇavṛtti**)[61] arises. Each of the individual words and

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[58]Cf., for example, Śābarabhsya on 3.1.12 (op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 56); Ślokavārttika, Vākyādhikaraṇa 342 (op. cit., p. 664); Tantravārttika on 1.4.24 (op. cit., Vol. II, p. 328), 2.1.1 (pp. 334, 338, 342, 349), 2.2.6 (Vol. III, p. 33), 2.2.18 (p. 72), 2.2.19 (p. 79), 2.2.21 (p. 83), and 3.1.14 (Vol. IV, p. 84); Bṛhatī on 1.3.33 (pp. 168, 171).

[59]Cf., for example, Tantravārttika on 1.2.7 (op. cit., Vol. II, p. 16) and 1.3.7 (p. 135).

[60]The most important discussions of figurative expression can be found under Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.4.23 (cf. Śābarabhāṣya and Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 113-127 and Bṛhatī, Madras University Sanskrit Series 24, pp. 255-267) and Mīmāṃsāsūtra 3.2.1 (cf. Śābarabhāṣya and Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 123-130, and Bṛhatī, Madras University Sanskrit Series 25, pp. 707-716).

[61]The Mīmāṃsakas (especially Kumārilabhaṭṭa and his followers) draw a distinction between **guṇavṛtti** (metaphorical expression) and **lakṣaṇā** (non-metaphorical figurative

morphemes of which any given text is composed will express a single literal meaning-- that meaning with which it is eternally and invariably connected. As we have seen, these meanings, mutually specifying one another, combine to form coherent (that is, uni-functional) sentential and textual meanings. Any meaningful component of a sentence or text which, interpreted literally, could not be satisfactorily integrated within the overall meaning of that sentence or text, must be interpreted as conveying some secondary or figurative meaning which can be integrated within that overall meaning. Thus, figurative interpretation is always a last resort-- whenever it is possible to do so, one must interpret

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expression-- metonymy, synecdoche, etc.); nevertheless, the processes of **guṇavṛtti** and **lakṣaṇā** are basically the same and are governed by the same contextual conditions. Kumārila explains the distinction as follows: "The use [of a word] in a meaning necessarily connected with its literal meaning is called figurative expression [**lakṣaṇā**]; but usage arising from contact with qualities [**guṇas**] which are figuratively indicated [**lakṣyamāṇa**] is metaphorical [**gauṇa**]" (Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 313). Metaphorical expression involves a two-stage figurative process. In the sentence "Devadatta is a lion" (**siṃho devadattaḥ**) the word "lion" first figuratively indicates the qualities associated with a lion (fierceness, bravery, etc.); the word "lion", indicating these qualities, refers, by a further figurative indication, to Devadatta (understood as the possessor of these qualities). Thus we understand the sentence to mean "Devadatta is fierce, brave, etc." So, while metaphorical usage is a multi-stage process and is thus somewhat more complex than metonymical or other figurative expression, it involves the same basic operation-- the replacement of a contextually inapplicable literal sense with a closely connected meaning which is suitable to the context.

literally.[62]

There are three conditions which must be met if one is to interpret any word or expression figuratively. First, as just discussed, there must be no possibility of understanding the word or expression in its literal sense (**mukhyārthāsaṃbhava**).[63] Second, there must be some connection (**saṃbandha**-- e.g. physical proximity, similarity, cause/effect relation)[64] between the literal meaning of the word or expression and the figurative meaning to be understood from it-- otherwise any word could figuratively convey any meaning at all, and there would be no way of settling on a particular meaning as the correct one. Third, the meaning to be understood figuratively must have some purpose (**prayojana**)-- that is to say, it must, unlike the primary meaning of the expression in question, connect usefully with the overall meaning of the text in question and thus form part

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[62]Thus, the process by which one moves from literal to figurative interpretation is one of **arthāpatti** (cf. above, p. 91). Where an expression, interpreted literally, would make no sense, one must assume that some figurative meaning is intended-- otherwise, the use of words or expressions which can convey no contextually appropriate literal meaning would not be explicable. Cf. K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1977 [second ed.]), pp. 258-9.

[63]Cf. Devasthali, Mīmāṃsā: The Ancient Indian Science of Sentence Interpretation, op. cit., pp. 58-59 and K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, op. cit., pp. 258ff.

[64]Cf. Śābarabhāṣya (on 1.4.23), op. cit., Vol. II, p. 316. Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.4.23 provides a list of possible connections which may hold between literal and figurative meanings. Similar lists may be found in Nyāyasūtra 2.2.62 and in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini 4.1.48.

of a functionally integrated, coherent text.[65] So the literal meaning, which cannot connect with the overall purposive structure of the text, is replaced by a second, related, meaning which can connect with it.

For example, consider the sentence, "The grass-bundle is the sacrificer" (**yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ**).[66] If both words in this sentence were interpreted literally, we would have to understand the sentence either as assigning the role of the grass-bundle to the sacrificer, or as assigning the role of the sacrificer to the grass-bundle. The grass-bundle is used to form a bed on which the sacrificial spoons are placed when not in use; if the sacrificer were used as a bed for the spoons, he would be unable to perform the actions required of him in the course of the ritual performance. The grass-bundle is insentient, and incapable of performing the actions required of the sacrificer. Thus, considered in the light of the larger ritual context, there is no way to derive an acceptable meaning from the sentence if both its component words are understood literally.

However, if the word "sacrificer" is interpreted figuratively, the interpretive problem can be resolved. The

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[65]Cf. Śābarabhāṣya on 6.4.43 (op. cit., Vol. V, p. 297) and Devasthali, op. cit., p. 66. The same three conditions for figurative expression are recognized by Ānandavardhana and the later Ālamkārikas but, as Devasthali notes, their understanding of **prayojana** differs markedly from that of the Mīmāṃsakas (cf. below, Chapter Five, p. 228).

[66]Śābarabhāṣya, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 113ff.

grass-bundle assists in the accomplishment of the sacrificer's purpose (the performance of the sacrifice and the enjoyment of the appropriate sacrificial result), and may on this ground be metaphorically described as "the sacrificer". The identification of the grass bundle with the sacrificer emphasizes the importance of its role in the sacrifice and may thus serve as a form of praise; this praise helps to motivate the sacrificer to use the grass-bundle as part of the sacrificial performance. Thus, if the word "sacrificer" is interpreted figuratively, the sentence can be seen as serving a useful function and subserving the overall purpose of the text.[67]

This replacement of a figurative meaning for an unconstruable literal one can occur at any level of language. Words, whole sentences, or even individual morphemes may, if their literal meaning cannot be integrated with those of surrounding elements, be understood as conveying a secondary or figurative sense. Figurative expression at the word level

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[67]The interpretation of this and similar sentences as praising elements of the sacrifice is a crucial element of the Mīmāṃsā approach to Vedic exegesis. The Mīmāṃsakas' understanding of the nature of the Veda demands that any element of any Vedic text subserve, directly or indirectly, the injunction of one sacrificial action or another. Yet many Vedic sentences do not directly enjoin anything-- e.g. statements of fact, narratives of the acts of the gods, etc. Such statements, it is argued, must be interpreted figuratively and understood as praising particular sacrificial acts or substances (or as dispraising acts or substances to be avoided), and thus indirectly subserving one sacrificial injunction or another. Such passages are known as **arthavādas**. Cf. Śābarabhāṣya on 1.2.1-18 (op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1-32); also Jha, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources, op. cit, pp. 177-182.

is seen in the sentence just discussed. The figurative interpretation of whole sentences must often be resorted to in the interpretation of **arthavāda** passages-- passages which consist of merely declarative statements, and thus, interpreted literally, could not be seen as subserving the overall purpose of the text in which they occur (namely, the injunction of some particular sacrificial action); such statements are to be understood as figuratively conveying praise for those elements of the sacrifice with which they are connected and hence indirectly subserving the overall purpose of the texts to which they belong.[68]

For figurative expression at the morpheme level, consider the sentence "One offers the grains as an oblation" (**saktūñ juhoti**).[69] Here the word "grains" is marked with the accusative case-ending. The accusative case ordinarily indicates that the referent of the word marked by it is predominant with respect to the action expressed by the verb (cf. above, pp. 102-103). But here the accusative ending cannot be interpreted literally. The grains mentioned in this sentence serve no purpose in the larger ritual context; if the offering as an oblation were performed for their sake, it too would fail to connect usefully with the larger ritual context, and the sentence as a whole would be purposeless (**anarthaka**).

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[68]Cf. Kunjunni Raja, op. cit., p. 269.

[69]Cf. Śābarabhāṣya on 2.1.11-12 (op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 384-389).

Thus, the grains cannot be predominant with respect to the act of offering, and the literal interpretation of the accusative case-ending must be rejected as untenable. We must interpret the case-ending as figuratively conveying general connection with the action (**kāraka-sāmānya**), rather than the specific connection with the action literally expressed by the accusative.[70]

So, figurative signification may operate at any level of textual organization, but the resort to figurative interpretation is always driven by the same basic need-- the need to integrate all the components of a given text into a hierarchically ordered unit directed toward a single ultimate purpose. It is only when the literal meaning of any component cannot be fitted into such a framework that the device of figurative interpretation is acceptable.

However while, in theory, figurative interpretation may be resorted to only when absolutely necessary, in practice, the need to resort to it proves to be pervasive. As we have seen (above, pp. 70ff), the Mīmāṃsakas argue that individual words can directly refer only to universal class-properties; it is only through the interaction and mutual specification of these universal meanings that words, construed in functionally unified sentences, can designate particulars. Śabara takes this process to be one of figurative signification. Words can literally express only universals; when they are used to refer

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[70]Cf. Tantravārttika, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 386-387.

to particulars (as they generally are) they are being used figuratively. As he says, "People figuratively employ [**upacaranti**] the word domestic-animal [**paśu**], which expresses a class-property [**ākṛti**], with reference to a particular substance having horns, a tail, hair, and four feet."[71] Kumārila and the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas, following this line of reasoning, argue that *all* sentence-meanings are conveyed figuratively.[72] The construing of word-meanings into a unified sentence-meaning always involves the replacement of unconnected, universal meanings with particularized and contextually delimited meanings connected with these universals-- hence sentence meanings are invariably conveyed

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[71] Śābarabhāṣya (on 2.2.17), op. cit., Vol. III, p. 68.

[72] However, Prabhākara and his followers do not agree that all sentence meaning is conveyed figuratively. The Prābhākaras' understanding of the nature sentence-meaning differs markedly from that of the Bhāṭṭas. Prabhākara held the view that the words of a sentence express their meanings already construed with one another (**anvitābhidhāna-vāda**). This is contrasted with the Bhāṭṭa view that the words of a sentence express their individual meanings, which are only subsequently construed into a coherent sentence-meaning (**abhihitānvaya-vāda**). Thus for Prabhākara the understanding of the sentence-meaning does not arise, by a process of figurative expression, after the individual word-meanings have been understood: the complete, construed sentence-meaning is conveyed directly and immediately by the words themselves. It is hard to see how this theory can be squared with statements of Śabara such as that quoted above, and with the Mīmāṃsā view that individual words can have only universal class-properties as their meanings; nevertheless, the theory has been vigorously defended by the later Prābhākaras, most notably by Śālikanāthamiśra in his Vākyārthamātṛkāvṛtti (in Prakaraṇapañcikā, ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri, Benares Hindu University Darśana Series 4, 1961, pp. 376-450). On **abhihitānvaya-vāda** and **anvitābhidhāna-vāda**, cf. also Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, op. cit., pp. 193-213.

by a process of **lakṣaṇā**.[73] One may resort to figurative interpretation only when forced to do so, but, in practice, one is *always* forced to do so. Thus the device of figurative interpretation is basic to all language exegesis. And, like all Mīmāṃsā exegetical techniques, it is guided in every case by the need to integrate all elements of a text into a single, uni-functional whole.

Prospectus

As we shall see, the Mīmāṃakas' teleological, goal-oriented method of textual interpretation serves as a model for Ānandavardhana in his radical approach to the analysis and criticism of literary texts. Ānandavardhana adopts the Mīmāṃsā view that any coherent text must be understood as directed toward a single, ultimate goal; for him, all the components of a work poetry (ranging from the individual phonemes to the overall plot-structure) ought to be selected and designed so as aid in the conveying of some particular **rasa**.

In connection with his incorporation of the central, teleological principle of Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics into Alaṃkāraśāstra, Ānandavardhana applies many of the fundamental interpretive concepts and devices of Mīmāṃsā in the realm of literary analysis. Beginning with his work, the paired terms

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[73]Cf. Vācaspatimiśra, Tattvabindu (ed. V. Ramaswami Sastri, Annamalai University Sanskrit Series 3, 1936), pp. 131, 153 (where he quotes a statement of Kumārila to this effect), 156-7, 161; cf. also Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, op. cit., pp. 218-219.

of primary and subordinate (**guṇa/pradhāna, aṅga/aṅgin**), predicate and subject of predication (**vidhi/anuvāda**), intended and unintended meanings (**vivakṣita-/avivakṣita- artha**) become part of the basic conceptual vocabulary of Alaṃkāraśāstra. One of the most striking aspects of Ānandavardhana's reformulation of Alaṃkāraśāstra (albeit one which has drawn little notice from modern scholars) is the sudden transformation in the idiom of literary analysis ushered in by his work. Ānandavardhana not only introduces a new aesthetic theory and a new approach to literary analysis, he does so in what is, for the Ālaṃkārikas, a new language-- that is, by and large, the language of Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics.

ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S DHVANYĀLOKA AND THE TELEOLOGY OF POETIC LANGUAGE

We have seen that growing recognition of the importance of **rasa** in poetry becomes problematic for the Ālaṃkārikas of early ninth century Kashmir. The anomalous status of **rasa** in poetic theory reaches its apex in the work of Rudraṭa (c. 825). Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṃkāra presents two separate schemata of literary aesthetics, one based on the formal analysis of poetic language in the tradition of such earlier authors as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, and Udbhaṭa, and the other based on the analysis of **rasa** (and those aspects of plot and characterization connected with it) deriving primarily from the tradition of Nāṭyaśāstra (dramaturgy). These two modes of analysis are presented independently, and no attempt whatsoever is made to relate them to one another. It is in the Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana that these two modes are for the first time successfully integrated.

Ānandavardhana is mentioned in Kalhaṇa's Rājataraṅgiṇī as one of the court poets of Avantivarman of Kashmir (r. 855-883),[1] and his literary activity can thus be dated from mid to late ninth century. His known poetic works are Arjunacarita (a Sanskrit mahākāvya), Viṣamabāṇalīlā (a Prakrit poem), and Devīśataka (one hundred Sanskrit verses dedicated

[1]Rājataraṅgiṇī 5.34.

to the goddess Durgā), of which only the last is extant.[2] He was also the author of several philosophical works: the Tattvāloka,[3] and a commentary on Dharmottara's Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā. The Dhvanyāloka is his only known work in the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra. The Dhvanyāloka consists of a series of mnemonic verses (**kārikās**) with a running prose commentary (**vṛtti**).[4]

Ānandavardhana integrates formalist and **rasa**-based modes of literary analysis by viewing each literary work as a functionally unified whole directed toward a single goal, the conveying of a particular **rasa** to the readers or hearers of a poem. Rather than attempt to treat **rasa** within the framework

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[2]Published in Kāvyamālāgucchaka 9, Nirnayasagar Press, 1893. Interestingly, the work is a **citra-kāvya** ("picture poem", one which depends on complex verbal tricks for its effect), a genre which Ānandavardhana himself dismisses as mere "imitation of poetry" (**kāvyānukāra**).

[3]The work is mentioned by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the Dhvanyāloka, but little is known of its contents.

[4]There is a long running controversy regarding the authorship of these **kārikās**. Bühler, Jacobi, De and Kane, among others, contend that the verse portion of the Dhvanyāloka is a self-sufficient work (of unknown authorship), and that Ānandavardhana is the author of only the prose commentary. The claim is based on the terminological distinction drawn by Abhinavagupta between **kārikā-kāra** ("author of the **kārikā**") and **vṛtti-kāra** ("author of the commentary") in his own commentary on the Dhvanyaloka (despite the fact that Abhinavagupta himself cites both **kārikā** and **vṛtti** as Ānandavardhana's work in his commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra). A detailed discussion of the arguments surrounding this issue is beyond the scope of the present work. Krishnamoorthy (Dhvanyāloka and its Critics, Kavyalaya Publishers, 1968, pp. 46-95) provides the best available survey of the controversy, and capably argues for Ānandavardhana's authorship of both **kārikā** and **vṛtti**.

of **alaṃkāra**-analysis, as earlier theorists had attempted to do, he sees it as the outcome of a previously unrecognized process of suggestion (**dhvani**). Although it plays a pivotal role in all great literature, suggested meaning has, according to Ānandavardhana, been entirely overlooked by previous theorists. He proceeds to demonstrate not only that this suggested meaning is pervasively present in the classics of Sanskrit and Prakrit literature, but that the entire array of formal elements meticulously defined and described by his predecessors becomes aesthetically effective only insofar as it aids in the conveying of this suggested meaning.

By establishing suggested meaning generally, and **rasa** in particular, as the ultimate goal of all aesthetically effective literature, Ānandavardhana departs radically from pre-existing modes of literary analysis. Prior Ālaṃkārikas approached the analysis of literary language by attempting to isolate those discrete elements which give beauty to particular verses or expressions, and to describe and categorize these elements as exhaustively as possible. Ānandavardhana's teleological model of literary aesthetics necessitates a complete re-configuration of the descriptive categories and analytic methods of his predecessors. If poetry is geared solely toward the communication of **rasa**, then the discrete, isolable elements of poetic language described by earlier Ālaṃkarikas are to be employed not for any intrinsic beauty they possess, but only for their ability to

contribute toward this overriding goal.

In this chapter I will examine Ānandavardhana's departure from earlier modes of analysis and his attempt to revalue existing poetic categories by integrating them into a unifocal, **rasa**-centered model of literary aesthetics. His arguments for the existence of a realm of suggested meaning unrecognized by earlier critics, and for the treatment of **rasa** as a type of suggested meaning, will be briefly surveyed. I will then discuss his application of the Mīmāṃsakas' teleological approach to text-analysis in the realm of poetry, his establishment of the communication of a single **rasa** as the goal which determines the unity and aesthetic coherence of a particular literary work, and the mechanisms by which the many **rasas** existing in such a work are subordinated to a single overriding **rasa**. We will consider Ānandavardhana's use of hierarchical methods of text-analysis to differentiate the various types of suggested meaning from the **alaṃkāras** (figures of speech) described by previous theorists. The subordination of **alaṃkāras** and other recognized features of literary language to the communication of **rasa** will then be considered in detail.

Proof of the Existence of Dhvani ("Suggestion") in Poetry

Ānandavardhana's first order of business, as he commences the Dhvanyāloka, is to establish that the poetic phenomena he analyzes and shows to be central in both the production and appreciation of great poetry are totally distinct from the

features of poetic language treated of by his predecessors in the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra. A radical departure is made from the field as it has so far been known, and it is essential that Ānandavardhana demonstrate that the categories and methods of previous Ālaṃkārikas are inadequate to the kind of analysis pursued here. He argues that the most crucial feature of great literature is **dhvani**, the suggestion or revelation of some meaning which is not directly stated, and that this mode of expression, despite its centrality, has been entirely overlooked by earlier poetic theorists.

In the **vṛtti** on the first verse of the Dhvanyāloka, Ānandavardhana examines three possible arguments against the existence of **dhvani**, all of them designed to uphold the adequacy of earlier aesthetic categories. First, it may be argued that poetics has already provided an exhaustive characterization of the possible features of poetic language. Poetry consists of words and their meanings. Factors which lend beauty to these words and meanings (**śabdālaṃkāras** and **arthālaṃkāras**, respectively), have been defined and illustrated. The arrangement of phonemes and words for aesthetic effect (**vṛttis** and **guṇas**) and the differences of style that depend upon them (**rītis**) have likewise been thoroughly analyzed. This characterization of the linguistic features operative in poetry is total, and there is simply no scope for the introduction of any additional concepts such as

"**dhvani**".[5]

The second argument, while closely related to the first, attempts to preclude the possibility of dhvani on definitional and sociological grounds. The categories outlined by the Ālaṃkārikas are constitutive of poetry; anything which falls outside their scope would be excluded *by definition* from the realm of poetry. "The defining property of poetry is that it consists of words and meanings which are pleasing to the hearts of connoisseurs (**sahṛdayas**). This is not possible for any mode of composition apart from the procedures already described (by the Ālaṃkārikas)."[6] The **dhvani**-theorist may stipulate that only those who accept his view can truly be called connoisseurs, but this will not render his view acceptable to the general community of cultured persons.

The third argument would seem to follow from the first two. "It is not possible that this **dhvani** could be anything new, since anything which does not fall outside the realm of beauty will be included in the causes of poetic beauty already described. If, on the other hand, you are merely giving a new name to one of these recognized causes of beauty, there is no significance in this."[7] The **dhvani**-theorist is placed on the horns of a dilemma. Existing poetic categories (**alaṃkāras**,

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[5]Dhvanyāloka [ed. Pattābhairāma Śāstrī, Kashi Sanskrit Series 135, Benares, 1940], pp. 16ff.

[6]Ibid., p. 22.

[7]Ibid, pp. 24-25.

guṇas, etc.), construed broadly, will encompass any feature of sound or meaning which gives beauty to a poem. To place **dhvani** outside these categories is to deprive it altogether of aesthetic significance. To accept its inclusion within these categories is to render it superfluous-- no more than a re-designation of what has already be described. At best, **dhvani** can be seen as a heretofore undescribed sub-type within one or another of these categories. "Even if, given the infinite variety of modes of expression, there is some minor type that has not been described by the well-known definers of poetry, we see no reason for people to dance about, saying '**Dhvani, dhvani**', closing their eyes in the false belief that they are connoisseurs. Varieties of **alaṃkara** by the thousands have been and continue to be shown by great people, and we do not hear of them behaving in this way."[8]

These arguments all serve to render the formalist paradigm of previous Alaṃkarikas immune to any fundamental revision. Theoretical innovation and progress are possible, but only at the level of detail: existing categories may be more precisely defined, recognized figures of speech may be analyzed into subdivisions, and so on. Any challenge to the basic principles and methods of aesthetic analysis, however, is summarily ruled out. This form of analysis and its object, poetry itself, are well-known and established forms of discourse, and anything falling outside their recognized

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[8]Ibid, pp. 25-26.

confines will be of no significance for the production or appreciation of aesthetically effective literature.

Ānandavardhana's primary defense against this line of criticism hinges on a re-examination of poetic practice. **Dhvani**, it is claimed, does not emerge from the re-interpretation of the concepts and categories of earlier Ālaṃkārikas, but is concerned with a realm of poetic meaning which, although deeply ingrained in the works of the greatest poets, has heretofore remained totally unknown to the "definers of poetry" (**kāvyalakṣaṇavidhāyinaḥ**-- the term by which Ānandavardhana generally refers to his formalist predecessors).

> [**Kārikā**:] That meaning, honored by connoisseurs, which is established as the soul of poetry[9], is regarded as having two types, called "expressed" [**vācya**] and "understood" [**pratīyamāna**]... Of these two, expressed meaning, which is well-known, has been analyzed in many ways, by means of sub-divisions-- simile, etc.-- by others. [**Vṛtti**:] By the definers of poetry. [**Kārikā**:] Therefore it will not be dealt with extensively here. [**Vṛtti**:] It will only be reviewed insofar as this is useful. [**Kārikā**:] But the "understood" is a distinct element in the language of great poets, which appears separately from the well-known parts [of a poem], like beauty [**lāvaṇya**] in women.[10]

Prior analysts of meaning in poetry have focussed on that

[9]Ānandavardhana's description of both **vācya** and **pratīyamāna artha** as the "soul" of poetry has been severely criticized, and created difficulties for his defenders. It is in apparent contradiction with his frequent description of **dhvani** alone (i.e. **pratīyamāna artha**) as the soul of poetry. In his commentary on the passage Abhinavagupta attempts, through a convoluted interpretation, to show that here also only the **pratīyamāna artha** is taken as the soul-- cf. below, Chapter Nine, pp. 443-444.

[10]<u>Dhvanyāloka</u>, op. cit., pp. 42ff.

which is directly stated-- the realm of **dhvani**, of suggested meaning, has not been misunderstood by them, but has rather remained beyond their notice.[11] This point is underlined by the analogy of female beauty. It is impossible to give a satisfactory account of personal beauty by even the most detailed description of physical features. There is always a certain quality which will elude this sort of analysis. Similarly, in poetry, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The analysis and description of the formal features of a poem, however precise, will not provide a full account of its aesthetic effect.

Ānandavardhana sets himself the task of showing that this suggested meaning is pervasively present in the recognized classics of Sanskrit and Prakrit literature and, furthermore, that it is the predominant feature of these works, playing a central role in their aesthetic effectiveness. In the light of this task, exemplification takes on a prominence it has not held in previous Alaṃkāra works. Earlier Ālaṃkārikas such as Bhāmaha (occasionally), Vāmana and Udbhaṭa (in the Bhāmahavivaraṇa) quote example verses from existing literature rather than compose examples of their own, but these citations are employed as illustration, rather than evidence. Given

[11]This, as we shall see, is something of an overstatement, and will be substantially qualified in Ānandavardhana's subsequent analysis. The three varieties of suggested meaning recognized by Ānandavardhana (**vastu**, **alaṃkāra**, and **rasa**) are all dealt with here and there by earlier **alaṃkāra**-theorists. They are not, however, grouped together and recognized as constituting a separate realm of meaning, as they are here.

Ānandavardhana's radical departure from existing categories, the example verses he cites become vitally important for his argument. The proof of the existence of **dhvani**, and thus the overall legitimacy of this inquiry, depends upon them.

Thus, even before providing a definition of **dhvani**, Ānandavardhana gives a variety of examples to establish the existence of the realm of suggested meaning with which his analysis will be concerned. Ānandavardhana identifies and exemplifies three possible varieties of suggested meaning: **vastu** (narrative element), **alaṃkāra** (figure of speech), and **rasa** (aestheticized emotion). The following Prakrit verse is given as an example of the first variety:

> Wander confidently, Monk; that dog [which frightened you] has been killed today by the lion who dwells in the creeper-bower on the banks of the Godāvarī.[12]

Here, a woman wishing to meet her lover in secret, fearing that they will be interrupted, addresses a wandering mendicant. Although the literal meaning of the sentence is a command that the monk should wander, its actual intent is to magnify his fear and prevent him from wandering near her trysting place. The actual intent of her statement is thus the opposite of its explicit intent. Therefore, the expressed and suggested senses of the verse are clearly distinct.

Figures of speech can likewise be understood from a verse

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[12]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., p.52.
bhama dhammia vīsattho so sunao ajja mārio deṇa/
golāṇaikacchakuḍaṅgavāsiṇā dariasīheṇa//
(Hāla, Sattasaī 2.75)

without being directly stated:

> "Having already obtained Śrī, why would he again produce in me the pain of churning? I cannot imagine for him, his mind free of lassitude, his former sleep. Why should he build a bridge again, being attended by the lords of all the islands?" The ocean, when you approach, appears to tremble, as if entertaining such doubts.[13]

The churning of the ocean from which Śrī (the goddess who personifies royal prosperity) emerges; sleeping afloat on the ocean (during the time of **pralaya**, when the worlds are dissolved); the construction of a bridge over the ocean to Lankā-- are all well known feats of the god Viṣṇu. From the ocean's imagined doubts we understand that he mistakes the king eulogized in the verse for Viṣṇu, and from this we understand a metaphorical identification (**rūpaka**) of the king with the god. As Viṣṇu is not even mentioned explicitly, the **rūpaka** cannot be said to be directly expressed.

The third and most important variety of suggested meaning, **rasa**, differs from the first two types in that it can never be directly expressed. In **vastu-** and **alaṃkāra-dhvani**, a narrative element or verbal figure which could have been

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[13]Ibid., p. 261.
Prāptaśrīr eṣa kasmāt punarapi mayi taṃ manthakhedaṃ vidadhyā-
nnidrām apy asya purvām analasamanaso naiva saṃbhāvayāmi/
setuṃ badhnāti bhūyaḥ kimiti ca sakaladvīpanāthānuyāta-
stvayy āyāte vitarkān iti dadhata ivābhāti kampaḥ payodheḥ//
Ānandavardhana does not cite an example of suggested **alaṃkāra** when proving the existence of **dhvani** in the first chapter, but refers the reader to a later portion of the work ("**agre darśayiṣyate**" p. 78), referring to the extended discussion of **alaṃkāra-dhvani** in chapter two (2.20-30). The verse quoted above is the first example given of **alaṃkāra-dhvani** based on the power of meaning (**arthaśaktimūla**), and becomes a stock example of suggested **alaṃkāra** for later authors.

stated directly is expressed only by implication. **Rasa**, however, constitutes a realm of "meaning" which is necessarily suggested. For example:

> Śiva, his composure somewhat disturbed, like the ocean when the moon begins to rise, cast his eyes on the face of Umā [Parvatī], whose lower lip was [red and round] like a bimba-fruit.[14]

Here Śiva's growing love for Pārvatī and the **śṛṅgāra-rasa** which depends upon it are not explicitly mentioned. According to the principles of dramaturgy, each **rasa** is conveyed by a particular set of aesthetic factors (**vibhāvas**, **anubhāvas**, **vyabhicāribhāvas** and **sthāyibhāva**[15]). In the above example, the presence of Parvatī and the beauty of her lip are **vibhāvas**, Śiva's gazing at her face is an **anubhāva**, and his loss of composure a **vyabhicāribhāva**, all of which, in combination, serve to convey **śṛṅgāra-rasa**.

In claiming that **rasa** is necessarily suggested, Ānandavardhana challenges the view of Udbhaṭa (the most prominent of Ānandavardhana's predecessors in Kashmiri

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[14]Ibid., p. 249.
haras tu kiṃcitparivṛttadhairyaś candrodayārambha ivāmburāśiḥ/
umāmukhe bimbaphalādharoṣṭhe vyāpārayām āsa vilocanāni//
(Kālidāsa, Kumārasaṃbhava 3.67)

[15]**Vibhāvas** are those factors which cause an emotion in a character, either serving as the object of this emotion (in the case of love, one's beloved), or heightening it (a moonlit night, a secluded garden, etc.). **Anubhāvas** are the visible symptoms of such an emotion. **Vyabhicāribhāvas** are those transient emotional states which accompany a more abiding emotion (in the case of love: anxiety, expectancy, embarrassment, etc.). The **sthāyibhāva** is the basic emotional state of the character on which the **rasa** is based (e.g. desire in the case of **śṛṅgāra** ["love"] or grief in the case of **karuṇa** ["pity"]).

Alaṃkāraśāstra), according to whom a **rasa** may be conveyed in poetry by the mention of its own name (**svaśabda**), as well as by the aesthetic factors appropriate to that **rasa**.[16] It is not invariably the case, argues Ānandavardhana, that a verse in which the name of a **rasa** or of the emotion it is based upon will convey that **rasa**.[17] Where such words are used in a verse conveying **rasa**, they are invariably found to be accompanied by the factors appropriate to that **rasa**. Even without such explicit mention, the **rasa** will be communicated by the same factors. It follows therefore that it is these factors, rather than the designation of the **rasa** by name, that convey this **rasa**, even where such designation is present.

The concept of **rasa** originated in the realm of dramatic analysis, where it is seen to be conveyed not merely by the text of a play, but by the full range of performance elements (gesture, costume, etc.). Because Ānandavardhana's concern is with poetry, which depends on words alone for its aesthetic effect, his analysis problematizes for the first time the nature of **rasa** as a purely linguistic product. "Meaning" is that understanding which follows from a particular set of words. If, upon hearing or reading a passage of poetry, we become aware of a particular **rasa**, this must be considered a part of the meaning of the text, albeit one which can never be stated explicitly.

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[16] Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha 4.3, ed. N.D. Banhatti, p. 52.

[17] Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 81ff.

Ānandavardhana sets out to show that this **rasa** is pervasively present in, and is in fact the essential characteristic of, great poetry. He traces the centrality of **rasa** to the very origin of poetry itself.

> This very [suggested] meaning is the essence of poetry, although it [poetry] may be beautified through the various arrangement of words and meanings of many sorts. And thus the grief of the first poet, Vālmīki, arising from the cry of a heron [**krauñca**] distraught through separation from its dead mate, was transformed into verse. For grief [**śoka**] is the emotion which serves as a basis for **karuṇa rasa** [pathos]. Although other varieties of understood meaning [besides **rasa**] are shown [elsewhere], they are indicated here by means of **rasa** and **bhāva** alone, because these are most important.[18]

Poetry is thus born from emotional experience. Both of the Sanskrit epics are seen by Ānandavardhana as primarily intended to convey a single **rasa**.

> In the <u>Rāmāyaṇa</u> **karuṇa rasa** has been mentioned by the **Ādikavi** [the "first poet", Vālmīki] himself, saying "grief became verse" [**śokaḥ ślokatvam āgataḥ**]. And this [**karuṇa rasa**] has been carried to its fulfillment by him, constructing his work so as to end with [Rāma's] final separation from Sītā. Likewise in the <u>Mahābhārata</u>, which bears the appearance of both a **śāstra** and a **kāvya**, the **puruṣārtha** ["human aim"] liberation and **śānta rasa** [quiescence] have been shown as the primary things intended to be communicated by the great sage [Vyāsa], by composing a conclusion which produces despair through the distasteful end of the Pāṇḍavas and the Vṛṣṇis [Kṛṣṇa's clan], and [thereby] showing the production of **vairāgya** [dispassion, the emotion on which **śānta rasa** is based] to be the primary intent of his composition.[19]

In order to establish **rasa** as a variety of meaning, it is necessary to demonstrate that it exists as something distinct from the expressed meaning which gives rise to it. Although

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[18]Ibid., pp. 87-90.

[19]Ibid., pp. 529-30.

the precise mechanism by which **rasa** is conveyed to an audience is a major focus of dispute in the tradition of Nāṭyaśāstra, it is universally agreed that the **rasa** experience depends on the presentation (visually or verbally) of **vibhāvas**, **anubhāvas**, and **vyabhicāribhāvas**.[20]

Some would argue that **rasa** is not itself a variety of meaning, but is a property of expressed meanings which convey the proper **vibhāvas**, etc. "The expressed meaning appears as *consisting* of **rasa**, etc.[21], not as something separate along with **rasa**, etc."[22] If this were the case, Ānandavardhana retorts, then the **rasa** conveyed by a verse would be apparent to all who understand its expressed meaning. He resorts to a visual analogy: a white body appears as consisting of whiteness. One cannot see the body without seeing its whiteness. However, in poetry, this is not the case. The appreciation of **rasa** requires an aesthetic sensitivity (**sahṛdayatva**) not common to all people, and may not be possible even for one who understands the literal meaning of a verse. The opponent counters with a further analogy: genuineness is a property of gemstones, but one that is

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[20]In accord with Bharata's dictum: **vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicārisamyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ** (Gaekwad Oriental Series 36, Vol. I, p. 272).

[21]The "etc." is meant to include **bhāva**, **rasābhāsa** and **bhāvābhāsa**, **rasapraśama** and **bhāvapraśama**, those **rasa**-like or **rasa**-based features employed by Udbhaṭa to explain the **alaṃkāras preyasvat** (<u>Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha</u> 4.2), **ūrjasvin** (4.5), and **samāhita** (4.7)-- cf. above, Chapter Two, pp. 52-58.

[22]Ibid., p. 402.

apparent only to specially trained perceivers. Likewise, **rasa** may be a property of the expressed meaning of a poem which is apparent only to the cultivated listener.

In the opponent's example, says Anandavardhana, the genuineness of the gem does not appear as anything apart from its nature. This analogy does not hold for **rasa**, which is apprehended as something separate from the **vibhāvas**, **anubhāvas**, and **vyabhicāribhāvas** which give rise to it.

> For no one believes that the **vibhāvas**, **anubhāvas**, and **vyabhicāribhāvas** themselves are **rasas**. Therefore awareness of **rasa**, etc. is invariably connected with [but not identical with] awareness of the **vibhāvas**, etc. Because these two awarenesses are established as effect and cause, sequence must necessarily exist between them, but this is not apparent, because of its brevity. Thus it has been said [in 2.3] that **rasas**, etc. are suggested without *apparent* sequence.[23]

It is this rapid succession between the expressed meaning and the **rasa** derived from it which leads to the misapprehension that there is no distinction between them. The separate existence of **rasa** is confirmed, however, by the fact that it may be conveyed even by wordless songs or gestures, where there is no expressed meaning whatsoever.[24]

In the case of other types of **dhvani**, such as the example of **vastu-dhvani** quoted above ("Wander confidently..."), the

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[23]Ibid., p. 404. There is no reason to suppose, as Ingalls (<u>The **Dhvanyāloka** of Ānandavardhana</u>, p. 540) and the editors of the Kashi text do, that the words "**ity alakṣyakramā eva santo vyaṅgyā rasādayaḥ**" are a citation from some earlier work; they appear to be nothing more than a parapharase of Ānandavardhana's own earlier remarks.

[24]Ibid., p. 417.

suggested meaning contradicts the literal sense of the verse, and the succession between the two is easily apparent. As Abhinavagupta rightly points out, it was for precisely this reason that this type of **dhvani** was considered first, as the distinctness of the two meanings cannot be questioned in such an instance.[25] In the case of **rasa-dhvani**, however, the second meaning does not displace the first, and hence the distinction between the two may not be immediately noticeable. The case for this unnoticed succession is bolstered by analogy with more commonplace modes of verbal comprehension: "Just as word meaning, conveying a sentence meaning by its own capacity, is not separately perceived when it has fulfilled its function... Likewise, this suggested meaning appears immediately in the truly-seeing [**tattvārthadarśinī**] minds of the aesthetically sensitive, who turn their attention from the directly expressed meaning."[26] Communication takes place through sentence meaning, and the meanings of individual words are merely a means through which such meaning is conveyed. When the sentence is understood, they have no further role to perform, and are no longer perceived as distinct from their product. Likewise, the expressed meaning which conveys **rasa** is only a means to this end. The minds of aesthetically competent listeners (or readers) will proceed rapidly to the appreciation of the suggested **rasa**, and the expressed meanings

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[25]Ibid., p. 53.

[26]Ibid., pp. 101-2.

which convey this **rasa** will no longer be apparent as something distinct.

As we have already seen, this notion of aesthetic competence plays an important role in Ānandavardhana's understanding of poetry. Previous theorists devoted considerable attention to the qualifications required for the composition of poetry, but Ānandavardhana is the first to seriously examine the requirements for the audience of poetry. His term for the aesthetically competent audience member is **sahṛdaya** (literally, "having the same heart"-- i.e. capable of sharing the aesthetic experience crafted by the poet). The word is employed by Vāmana[27] and Udbhaṭa[28] in the general sense of a cultured or sensitive listener, and was therefore in current use well before Ānandavardhana's time. However, the existence of a select group of qualified listeners and the nature of these qualifications assume an unprecedented importance in the Dhvanyāloka.

One of the proofs given for a separate realm of suggested meaning in poetry is the existence of a select group capable of appreciating it fully. If poetry depended only on direct expression for its effect, then anyone sufficiently acquainted with the rules of language and the meanings of words would be capable of understanding poetry. But, mere study of grammar

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[27]cf. Kāvyālaṃkārasūtravṛtti, Kashi Sanskrit Series 209, fourth ed., 1989, p. 25.

[28]cf. Gnoli ed., Udbhaṭa's Commentary on Bhāmaha, Istituto Italian per il Media ed Estremo Oriente, 1962, pp. 20, 39.

and dictionaries is not adequate to provide a student with the capacity to appreciate poetry.[29] If it were, the entire enterprise of Alaṃkaraśāstra would clearly be unnecessary. The fact that such training is inadequate makes it clear that there must be something to be known from poetry other than words and the meanings they directly express, and this something is nothing other than suggested meaning.

There is a certain circularity involved in this notion: only those capable of understanding suggested meaning are admitted as an aesthetically competent audience for poetry, while the existence of such a community is cited as evidence for the existence of suggested meaning. Ānandavardhana is alive to the possibility that this attempt to delineate a distinct class of **sahṛdayas** will be seen as arbitrary. The second of the three arguments against the existence of **dhvani** discussed above makes just such a charge. In attempting to show that this group of **sahṛdayas** is more than an arbitrarily stipulated subset of the community of cultured persons, Ānandavardhana describes and attacks a rival conception of both **dhvani** and **sahṛdaya**.

> "The term **dhvani** is applied to that poem in which an indefinable beauty of certain words and meanings appears, understood in dependence on some special quality of the perceiver, like the genuineness of certain gems."-- This definition of **dhvani** which someone has given is incorrect and should not be so stated.[30]

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[29] Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., p. 93.

[30] Ibid., pp. 517-18.

If this indefinability (**anākhyeyatva**) of **dhvani** is accepted, there will be no way to escape the charge of arbitrariness. The fact that certain features of both gems and poetry are apparent only to a class of specialists does not in and of itself establish that these features are indefinable. Gems are recognized and their value appraised through the recognition and analysis of certain repeatable properties (**sāmānya**). Similarly, the words and meanings of a poem can be analyzed in terms of such properties. Apart from ease of articulation (**akliṣṭatva**) and clarity, the only property such words and meanings possess relevant to poetic appreciation is their capacity to convey a further suggested meaning. These properties can be and have been defined and analyzed. In effect, the entire Dhvanyāloka stands as a refutation of the view that **dhvani** is indefinable. "If, even when general and specific definitions of **dhvani** have been given in the manner already stated and to be stated subsequently, **dhvani** is said to be indefinable, then this indefinability would apply to all entities."[31] Ānandavardhana thus strenuously resists any mystification of the concept of **dhvani**, or of the **sahṛdaya** who is defined by his ability to recognize it.

Elsewhere an effort is made to show that sensitivity to those suggested meanings described in the Dhvanyāloka, particularly to **rasa**, provides the only non-arbitrary standard

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[31]Ibid., p. 163.

by which we can identify a class of listeners as **sahṛdayas**. It is accepted by earlier Ālaṃkārikas that certain words are more "beautiful" than their synonyms and consequently should be preferred by poets.[32] This "beauty" is nothing other than the capacity of these words to suggest **rasa**. If words such as **srak** ("garland") and **candana** ("sandal-paste"), typically employed in passages conveying **śṛṅgāra-rasa** (love), appear as particularly beautiful even when **śṛṅgāra-rasa** is not present, this can only be a residual effect of their having been seen many times previously in the context of **śṛṅgāra**. "Otherwise, given that they express the same meaning, what difference could there be among these words with respect to their beauty?"[33] To this point an objection is raised: This beauty could depend on some other (unspecified) property apprehensible only to **sahṛdayas**. Ānandavardhana retorts: What then does it mean to be a **sahṛdaya**? Is a **sahṛdaya** merely one familiar with the conventions of poetic usage, or one capable of apprehending the **rasa** conveyed by a work? In the first instance, the class of **sahṛdayas** is arbitrarily determined; it would be quite possible for others to write and appreciate poetry governed by contrary conventions, and to call themselves "**sahṛdayas**" with as much justification. If we accept the latter view, that to understand **rasa** is to be a

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[32]Ibid., pp. 358ff. Abhinavagupta identifies the source of this view as Udbhaṭa's Bhāmahavivaraṇa, but I can find no trace of it in the extant fragments of this text.

[33]Ibid., p. 359.

sahṛdaya, we provide a fixed and intelligible standard for the aesthetic competence of the audience. **Sahṛdayas** do find certain words more beautiful than their synonyms, not arbitrarily, but for a sound reason: that they more effectively foster the experience of a particular **rasa**. Ānandavardhana's analysis of poetry thus places not suggested meaning in general, but **rasa** in particular at the very heart of the aesthetic experience.

The Unifocality of Poetry and the Centrality of Rasa

It is in this centrality of **rasa**, and the explanation and evaluation of all other features of poetic language as subordinate to it, that we can most clearly see Ānandavardhana's deployment of Mīmāṃsā interpretive categories and techniques in the realm of aesthetic analysis. We have seen that, for the Mīmāṃsakas, the prerequisite of linguistic coherence at the level of either sentence or of higher order units of discourse is *unifocality*-- orientation toward a single overriding purpose. In the case of the Vedic texts which are the Mīmāṃsakas' chief concern, this purpose is **śabda-bhāvanā** or **niyoga**, that potency of the Vedic injunction which impels a qualified sacrificer to undertake a particular ritual act. Every sentence, every word of the Vedic text must, in one way or another, assist this injunction, specifying materials or procedures for the act enjoined, motivating the sacrificer through communicating the transcendental results to be obtained, etc. Any

interpretation of a Vedic text which renders a portion of it unconnected with this goal, and hence useless, is summarily rejected.

By establishing, for the first time in the history of Sanskrit literary theory, a unitary purpose around which all elements of a poem are seen to be organized, Ānandavardhana makes it possible to apply elements of the Mīmāṃsakas' technique of Vedic interpretation in the analysis of literature. While previous Ālaṃkārikas (e.g. Udbhaṭa and Vāmana) on a few occasions draw on the concepts and terminology of linguistic philosophy (chiefly grammar and Mīmāṃsā) in explaining the role of non-literal meaning in various **alaṃkaras**, these forays into the theory of non-literary language are for the most part incidental and do not play a major role in the aesthetic theory of these authors. Ānandavardhana's importation of Mīmāṃsā concepts and methods into the realm of literary analysis is central to his theoretical project and to his critique of earlier aesthetic theory, and initiates an encounter of unprecedented depth between Ālaṃkāraśāstra and general linguistic theory, one which, as we shall see, exerted a decisive influence on the development of literary thought in Kashmir over the next three centuries.

There is, nevertheless, a crucial difference between the two types of text dealt with in Mīmāṃsā and Ālaṃkāraśāstra in that the Veda, for the Mīmāṃsakas, is infallibly correct and

uniformly useful. There is no question of evaluating or criticizing the wording or organization of the Veda. The Veda is what it is (and has *always* been so), and there is no author who can be criticized for any apparent problems in its construction. As Śabara observes (in his Bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 3.1.13), the role of Mīmāṃsā is not to consider what the Veda should or should not say, but to consider, given that it says what it does, what meaning we should understand from it.[34]

Poetry, on the other hand, is the product of fallible human authors, and its unifocality is not a presumed reality which the Ālaṃkārika must discover, but rather an ideal against which poems are to be measured. The direction of all elements of a poem toward the communication of a single **rasa** is, Ānandavardhana would argue, generally found in the work of those poets recognized as truly great. We have already seen that showing the centrality of **rasa** in acknowledged classics, particularly in the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata, plays an important role for Ānandavardhana in justifying his overall approach to literary analysis. Even in such works, however, this unity of focus and intent is not a necessary feature. The greatest of poets may sometimes go astray. What Ānandavardhana's application of the standard of unifocality to poetry provides is a general evaluative criterion for literary

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[34]Mīmāṃsādarśana, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97, second ed., 1972, Vol. 4, p. 94.

criticism. If it is accepted that the production of **rasa** is the definitive, overriding goal of literary works, this will allow the critic to discuss the fitness of various recognized formal features of these works (**alaṃkāras**, **guṇas**, etc.) to their particular contexts.

Ānandavardhana expressly declares that the primary intent of his work is to establish the centrality of **rasa**.

> Being primarily intent upon suggested meaning consisting of **rasa**, etc. is the only appropriate attitude for these [poets]. It is for this reason [i.e. in order to show this] that we began our effort, not merely out of a desire to explain **dhvani**.[35]

Rasa, by itself, is sufficient to ensure the beauty of a poem, even in the absence of other "beautifying" features, such as **alaṃkāras**.[36] It is in fact a necessary condition for all good poetry.

> **Rasas**, etc. are the primary objects of the activity of good poets. They should always be introduced into their compositions by poets who are not careless [**apramādin**]. A composition devoid of **rasa** is a great failure of language [**apaśabda**] for a poet: by this he would be no poet at all, and his name will be forgotten by others. A wise person should not reject this method, relying on [the practice of] earlier poets of unfettered speech who have won fame; the principles we have shown are not foreign to the intentions of those famous master-poets, Vālmīki and Vyāsa foremost among them.[37]

The requirement that **rasa** play a primary role in literary works is not merely an arbitrary stipulation, but rather one that is derived from study of recognized classics. It is

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[35] Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 363-4.

[36] Ibid., p. 534.

[37] Ibid., pp. 364-5.

their capacity to convey **rasa** that makes the works of great poets great. The prescriptive rules laid down for contemporary poets are based upon a descriptive account of those who have gone before.

In isolating a particular feature of language as necessary and sufficient for poetic beauty and relegating others to a contingent status, Ānandavardhana is not on entirely new ground. This is basically the approach taken by Vāmana in his attempt to establish **rīti** (style) as the primary determinant of beauty in a poem and to marginalize **alaṃkāras** by comparison.

> 1.2.6 **Rīti** is the soul of poetry.
> 1.2.7 **Rīti** is a specialized arrangement of words.
> 1.2.8 Its speciality consists of **guṇas** ["qualities"].[38]
>
> 3.1.1 **Guṇas** are those properties which produce poetic beauty [**kāvyaśobhā**].
> [**Vṛtti**:] Those properties of word and meaning which produce poetic beauty are **guṇas**. They are strength [**ojas**], clarity [**prasāda**], etc., but not [**alaṃkāras** such as] rhyme [**yamaka**], simile [**upamā**], etc., since these do not by themselves produce poetic beauty. But strength, clarity, etc. do produce poetic beauty by themselves.
> 3.1.2 **Alaṃkāras** are those features which cause an intensification of that [poetic beauty].
> 3.1.3 The first of these are essential [**nitya**].
> [**Vṛtti**:] The first of these, i.e. **guṇas**, are essential, since poetic beauty would not be possible without them.[39]

Guṇas and **rītis** are, for Vāmana, necessary in all poetry, while **alaṃkāras** may be optionally included or omitted. Ānandavardhana stresses the necessity of **rasa**, and he

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[38]Vāmana, Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra, Kashi Sanskrit Series 209, pp. 14-15.

[39]Ibid., pp. 82-84.

describes **dhvani** as the soul of poetry (1.1)[40] and **rasa** as the soul of **dhvani** (2.3).[41] Much has been made of the fact that both apply the term "soul" (**ātman**) to the element they regard as essential in poetry, thus extending the root metaphor of Alaṃkāraśāstra, that of body and ornament (**alaṃkāra**).[42]

But these similarities mask major differences in the role this notion of "soul" plays in the aesthetic analyses of the two authors. By designating **rīti** as "soul", Vāmana sets it apart from **alaṃkāras** and marks it as something of special importance, but this in itself tells us nothing about the functional relationship, if any, between **rīti** and **alaṃkāra**. There is no indication of ways in which particular **alaṃkāras** in particular circumstances help or hinder the operation of **rīti**. A certain class of formal elements-- the phonetic, syntactic, and semantic features that distinguish one "style" from another-- are ascribed a fundamental role in making poetry beautiful, but these features do not provide any overall criterion by which one can evaluate the interaction of these central elements with poetic features of secondary

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[40]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., p. 9.

[41]Ibid., p. 175.

[42]Cf. for example Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., pp. 380ff., and De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., pp. 90, 102ff. Both see Vāmana's **rīti** theory, because of his mention of an "**ātman**" of poetry, as a precursor of Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**, and consequently as an advance over the thinking of the "Alaṃkāra School" (i.e. Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa).

importance. The most crucial departure from prior aesthetic thinking in Ānandavardhana's work is the attempt to provide just such a criterion.

Thus, **rasa** is established as the telos of poetry, the defining and overriding goal toward which all its elements, from its individual phonemes to its overall plot structure, are directed. This teleological model demands that every composition, from a single verse to a **mahākāvya**, must be directed toward the effective communication of a *single* predominant **rasa**. In this, Ānandavardhana departs dramatically even from those earlier writers who stressed the importance of **rasa** in drama and poetry. Bharata (6.119), Bhāmaha (1.21), Daṇḍin (1.18), and Rudraṭa (12.2) all prescribe the introduction of multiple **rasas** in a composition. For these earlier writers, given the desirability of **rasa**, the more **rasas** one can introduce into one's work, the better.

Although Ānandavardhana accepts the possibility of multiple **rasas** in a text, he insists that one and only one **rasa** must serve as the overriding goal of a work.

> Although it is well known that various **rasas** are introduced in poetic compositions, one **rasa** should be made superordinate [**aṅgin**] by a poet who wishes excellence for these [his compositions].[43]

If multiple **rasas** are fully developed in a text, how can we say that one is superordinate and the others subordinate? One test for the primacy of a **rasa** within a work is its

[43]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., p. 378.

persistence. An analogy is drawn with the rules of plot structure outlined by Bharata in the Nāṭyaśāstra. The plot of a drama, for Bharata, must move toward a single goal (**kārya**). The stages of plot development outlined in the Nāṭyaśāstra proceed toward and culminate in the hero's achievement of his aim.

> The action of causes toward reaching the final result to be achieved has five sequential stages which should be recognized by producers of dramas: the inception [**prārambha**], effort [**prayatna**], the possibility of attainment [**prāpteḥ sambhava**], the certain attainment of the result [**niyataphalaprāpti**], and reaching the result [**phalayoga**] as the fifth. (19.7-8)[44]

While various types of subplot (**patākā**, **prakarī**, etc.) are to be introduced in a drama, this movement toward an overriding goal characterizes the drama as a whole. Similarly, says Ānandavardhana, the main **rasa** will pervade an entire poetic composition through persistent and frequent recurrence.[45]

Rasas other than the primary, when they are introduced, should not be fully developed or extensively dwelt upon. This lack of development, it must be stressed, is only relative to the primary **rasa**. It is not that secondary **rasas** should not be clearly communicated through their appropriate **vibhāvas**, etc., but rather that this communication should not be so frequent or so intense as to overshadow the primary **rasa**.

If the entire composition has a single, primary **rasa** as

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[44]Nāṭyaśāstra, Parimal Sanskrit Series #4, Parimal Publications, 1983, Vol. III, p. 6.

[45]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 378ff.

its goal, why is there any need for secondary **rasas** at all? What assistance can the introduction of these secondary **rasas** give to the primary? First of all, there is the danger that a single **rasa**, if incessantly dwelt upon, will lose its impact upon the audience. "A **rasa** which has been experienced and reached full development through its own set of causes, reflected on again and again, becomes like a wilted flower."[46] A certain amount of variety is essential; to focus continually upon the main **rasa** will not heighten but rather impair its effectiveness.

One **rasa** may subserve another in ways more direct than this provision of a necessary degree of variety, however. Even **rasas** which are contradictory, such as heroism (**vīra**) and fear (**bhayānaka**) or love (**śṛṅgāra**) and quiescence (**śānta**), may serve to augment or intensify one another. **Rasas** which conflict with the primary **rasa**, or the **vibhāvas**, **anubhāvas**, and **vyabhicāribhāvas** associated with them, may be successfully introduced provided that they are either blocked by or subordinate to this primary **rasa**.[47] If conflicting emotional states in a character are blocked, that is overcome, by a single, overriding emotion, this emotion and the **rasa** which is based upon it, will thereby be heightened. For example:

How great is the disparity between this lunar dynasty [of

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[46]Ibid., p. 364.

[47]Ibid., pp. 365ff.

> mine] and any offense!... Would that I could see her again... My education has been such as to remove any flaws... Even when she's angry, her face is beautiful!... What will wise people, free of sin, say about this?... Even in dreams, she is unattainable... Be firm, my heart!... What lucky youth will taste her lip?[48]

The source of the verse is disputed by later authors, but in any case it depicts the internal conflict in some king of the lunar dynasty (probably Yayāti) upon seeing and falling in love with a woman he cannot legitimately obtain (in Yayāti's case, because the woman, Devayānī, is a brahman). Here, the king's anxiety and self-restraint are in conflict with his love, and are overcome by it. The fact that these secondary emotions are overwhelmed by the speaker's desire for the woman serves precisely to emphasize the intensity of his love, and thus heightens the **śṛṅgāra-rasa** conveyed by the verse.

Even where they are not overcome in this way, additional **rasas** which conflict with the primary **rasa** may be introduced provided they are subordinated to it. This subordination may be either natural (**svābhāvikī**) or imposed by the poet (**samāropita**). The following is given as an example of natural subordination.

> Confusion, despondency, downheartedness, fainting, stupefaction, darkness, bodily weakness, and death: the water/*poison* [**viṣa**] born of the cloud-serpents forcibly

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[48]Ibid., pp. 367.
kvākaryaḥ śaśalakṣmaṇaḥ kva ca kulaṃ bhūyo 'pi dṛśyeta sā
 doṣāṇāṃ praśamāya me śrutam aho kope 'pi kāntaṃ mukham/
kiṃ vakṣyanty apakalmāṣāḥ kṛtadhiyaḥ svapne 'pi sā durlabhā
 cetaḥ svāsthyam upaihi kaḥ khalu yuvā dhanyo 'dharaṃ pāsyati//

brings these to women separated from their lovers.[49] Such states, more typically evocative of **karuṇa-rasa** (pathos), are thought to actually occur in separated lovers during the rainy season (a period when feelings of love and longing are believed to become more intense), and their subordination to the communication of **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** (love in separation) is thus natural.

Imposed subordination is as follows:

> His beloved, having bound him firmly in anger with the fetter of her soft, tremulous, creeper-arm, having led him to the bed-chamber, before her troop of friends, making known his misdeed with sweet and trembling speech, saying "Never again", weeping, struck the lucky man as he laughed, intending to deny it.[50]

The metaphorical identification of the woman's arm with a fetter, and the punning use of the verbal root **√han** (meaning both "strike" and "kill"), suggest that the man is like a prisoner being brought for execution. This would tend to evoke **raudra-rasa** (fury), which has anger as its basic emotion. The anger and jealousy found in a lovers' quarrel, however, are ordinarily seen as manifestations of love rather than fury, and the overall **rasa** of the verse is **vipralambha-**

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[49]Ibid., p. 368.
bhramim aratim alasahṛdayatām
pralayaṃ mūrcchāṃ tamaḥ śarīrasādam/
maraṇaṃ ca jaladabhujagajam
prasahya kurute viṣaṃ viyoginīnām//

[50]Ibid., pp. 232 and 368.
kopāt komalalolabāhulatikāpāśena baddhvā dṛḍham
nītvā vāsaniketanaṃ dayitayā sāyaṃ sakhīnāṃ puraḥ/
bhūyo naivam iti skhalatkalagirā saṃsūcya duśceṣṭitaṃ
dhanyo hanyata eva nihnutiparaḥ preyān rudatyā hasan//
(Amaruśataka 9)

śṛṅgāra (love in separation). The factors suggestive of **raudra-rasa** have no real basis in the situation described, and are introduced only by the poet's use of metaphor and punning. Hence, their subordination to **śṛṅgāra** in this verse is imposed rather than natural.

The co-occurrence of apparently contradictory **rasas** may also be justified by resort to the analysis of verse meaning into **vidhi** (predicate) and **anuvāda** (subject of predication). This mode of interpretation is, as we have seen, the very cornerstone in the Mīmāṃsā technique of discourse analysis.[51] The introduction of conflicting **rasas**, provided both are part of the **anuvāda** of a verse, will not be problematic. For example:

> Thrown off, when clinging to their hands; struck forcefully, when clinging to their garments; pushed away, when grasping their hair; unnoticed, through their agitation, when fallen at their feet; rejected by the women of the Triple City, their lotus eyes full of tears, when embracing them; may that arrow-fire of Śiva, like a lover who has just given offense, burn away your sins.[52]

Here, the comparison of the fire burning the women of the Triple City with a rejected lover produces a combination of **karuṇa-rasa** (pathos) and **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** (love in separation). These two **rasas** would normally contradict one

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[51] Cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 85ff.

[52] Ibid., pp. 195-6, 369ff.
kṣipto hastāvalagnaḥ prasabham abhihato 'py ādadāno 'ṃśukāntam
gṛhṇan keśeṣv apāstas caraṇanipatito nekṣitaḥ saṃbhrameṇa/
āliṅgan yo 'vadhūtas tripurayuvatibhiḥ sāśrunetrotpalābhiḥ
kāmīvārdrāparādhaḥ sa dahatu duritaṃ śāmbhavo vaḥ śarāgniḥ//
(Amaruśataka 2)

another, but here, because both are subordinated to some further meaning, this contradiction is without consequence.

The overall purpose of the verse is not to provoke pity for the womens' suffering, but rather to emphasize the overwhelming power of Śiva. It is this, therefore, which is predicated (**vidheya**) by the poet. The **karuṇa-rasa** and the **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** conveyed by the verse are both significant only in relation to this primary sense, and are therefore considered **anuvāda**-- that in relation to which something else is predicated. Contradiction occurring in the **anuvāda** portion of a sentence is acceptable, as in the following verse:

> "Come! Go! Sit down! Stand up! Speak! Keep quiet!"-- Rich people play in this way with supplicants caught in the grip of their hopes.[53]

These contradictory commands all serve to show the capriciousness of the rich toward their dependents, which is predicated in this verse. Likewise, both **rasas** in the verse we are considering ("Thrown off, when clinging to their hands...) are subordinate to the demonstration of the overwhelming power of Śiva, which is the overall purport of the verse.

If it is accepted that **rasa** can be the meaning of a sentence, then one cannot argue that the categories of **vidhi** and **anuvada** are inapplicable to **rasas**.[54] If these categories

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[53]Ibid., p. 371.
ehi gaccha patottiṣṭha vada maunaṃ samācara/
evaṃ āśāgrahagrastaiḥ krīḍanti dhanino 'rthibhiḥ//

[54]Ibid., pp. 372ff.

are applied to the expressed meanings of sentences, then they must apply equally to any suggested meanings that arise from these expressed meanings, **rasas** included. Even if one does not accept that **rasa** can be the direct meaning of a verse (**sākṣātkāvyārtha**), one must at least admit that it is occasioned by this meaning. On this view, **rasas** occasioned by the **anuvāda** portions of a verse will be **anuvāda**, those occasioned by the **vidhi** portion, **vidhi**. In the example given above ("Thrown off, when clinging to their hands..."), the benediction ("May the arrow-fire of Śiva... burn away your sins") forms the **vidhi** of the verse. The punning comparison of the fire with a rejected lover and the description of its burning the women of the Triple City supports this benediction by emphasizing the power of this fire, so this portion of the verse, along with the **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra-** and **karuṇa-rasa** suggested by it, are regarded as **anuvāda**.

Contradictory **rasas** may sometimes subserve one another through their occurrence in separate characters. The depiction of fear in a hero's opponents will intensify the **vīra-rasa** (heroism) which his deeds convey to the audience.[55] Likewise, depicting the pitiable sufferings of a king's defeated enemies, and of their wives and other dependents, will heighten the audience's impression of the king's power and the **vīra-rasa** which depends upon it. For example:

"Why do you laugh? Seeing me again after so long will

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[55]Ibid., pp. 386-7.

> you not come to me? Pitiless man! Why this addiction to travel? Who has drawn you away?" Speaking thus in their dreams, firmly embracing the necks of their lovers, the women of your enemies, as they wake, weep loudly, [finding that] the circle of their arms is empty.[56]

Such verses, elaborately and often sadistically portraying the sufferings of enemy women after their husbands have been defeated or slain, constitute a rather substantial genre of Sanskrit **muktakas** (single verses which do not form a part of any larger work). In such cases the **karuṇa-rasa** evoked by the situation of the women will be subordinate to the overall object of the verse, the praise of the king's skill and power in the destruction of his enemies.

Even where **karuṇa-rasa** is the main meaning of a sentence (**vākyārthībhūta**), factors evocative of **śṛṅgāra** may be introduced in such a way as to heighten this primary **rasa**, rather than detract from it. For example:

> This is that hand that pulled at my belt, that pressed my swelling breast, that touched my navel and thighs and buttocks, that loosened the knot of my garment.[57]

The verse is from the Strīparva of the Mahābhārata, in which the Pāṇḍava and Kaurava women mourn the slain heroes and the funeral rites are performed for them. It is spoken by the

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[56]Ibid., p. 193.
kiṃ hāsyena na me prayāsyasi punaḥ prāptaś cirād darśanaṃ
keyaṃ niṣkaruṇa pravāsarucitā kenāsi dūrīkṛtaḥ/
svapnānteṣv iti te vadan priyatamavyāsaktakaṇṭhagrāho
buddhvā roditi riktabāhuvalayas tāraṃ ripustrījanaḥ//
(Subhāṣitāvalī 2570)

[57]Ibid., p. 377.
ayaṃ sa raśanotkarṣī pīnastanavimardanaḥ/
nābhyūrujaghanasparśī nīvīvisraṃsanaḥ karaḥ//
(Mahābhārata 11.24.17)

wife of Bhūriśravas, one of the heroes slain in the Bhārata war, upon finding his severed arm on the battlefield. Her erotic recollections serve only to intensify her grief at the death and mutilation of her husband, and thus heighten the **karuṇa-rasa** of the verse and the passage that contains it.

Thus, through careful analysis of a wide variety of examples, Ānandavardhana endeavors to show that the subservience of various, sometimes contradictory, **rasas** to a single primary **rasa** is already well established in poetic practice. He prescribes the centrality of a single **rasa** as a crucial feature of a poetic work, but makes every effort to ground this prescription in a detailed descriptive account of existing literary works.

Having concluded this intensive and sophisticated analysis of the interrelation and unifocality of multiple **rasas**, however, Ānandavardhana makes a significant qualification of this teleological principle of analysis:[58] the factors (**vibhāvas**, etc.) which convey **śṛṅgāra-rasa** are, generally speaking, pleasing, and may be introduced anywhere, even when they conflict with the main **rasa**, either to interest those to be instructed by a poem (**vineyas**)[59], or simply to

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[58]Ibid., pp. 397ff.

[59]Although it is generally acknowledged that poetry may provide moral instruction to its listeners, this function of poetry receives little explicit attention from most Ālaṃkārikas, who are more concerned with poetry's unique and definitive function, that of producing pleasure in an audience. Ānandavardhana deals with the question nowhere apart from the offhand reference we are now considering.

make the poem more beautiful. For example:

> True, beautiful women are pleasing; true, wealth is enjoyable; but life is unstable, like the wandering sidelong glance of a drunken woman.[60]

The main **rasa** of the verse is **śānta** (quiescence), but the sidelong glance is suggestive of **śṛṅgāra**. There is no apparent functional relationship between the two **rasas** here, and by the standards Ānandavardhana articulated earlier, the introduction of elements of **śṛṅgāra** would be pronounced defective, being not only irrelevant but in fact contradictory to the **śānta-rasa** which is primarily intended by the verse (given that **śānta-rasa** has as its emotional basis the cessation of all desires). Ānandavardhana accepts, however, that such comparisons add to, rather than detract from, the beauty of this and similar verses, and makes a special dispensation..

We shall see that this is not the only case in which Ānandavardhana resists the implications of his own model of aesthetic effectiveness. There are elements of literary and genre convention which are not explicable in terms of, and even conflict with, Ānandavardhana's general aesthetic criterion, but which he is nevertheless unwilling to dismiss

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Later Kashmiri authors such as Abhinavagupta and Kuntaka discuss the matter in somewhat more detail, but it remains essentially marginal to the central concerns of Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra.

[60]Ibid., p. 399.
satyaṃ manoramā ramāḥ satyaṃ ramyā vibhūtayaḥ/
kiṃtu mattāṅganāpāṅgabhaṅgalolaṃ hi jīvitam//
(Subhāṣitaratnakośa 1608)

as irrelevant to the composition of good poetry (cf. below, Chapter Six, pp. 292-300).

The Differentiation of Dhvani from Alaṃkāra

The introduction of the concepts of sub- and superordination enables Ānandavardhana to differentiate the phenomena he designates by the term **dhvani** from those dealt with by earlier Ālaṃkārikas in their efforts to explain the role of non-literal meanings (including **rasa**, although this was not discussed as a type of "meaning" before Ānandavardhana). Although these Ālaṃkārikas, in describing figures of speech which cause us to understand a fact or another figure not explicitly stated, or which communicate a particular **rasa** or **rasa**-like experience to an audience, were, without realizing it, dealing with all three varieties of suggested meaning, their analysis, according to Ānandavardhana, remains steadfastly focussed on the expressed meaning even when treating such figures, and in the examples they provide for such figures the suggested meaning is almost invariably subordinate to the expressed.[61]

Ānandavardhana argues that **alaṃkāras** must, by definition, be dependent and of only secondary importance. The root-metaphor of Alaṃkāraśāstra, as its name would suggest, is that of physical ornamentation. The words and meanings of a poem are regarded as its "body" (**śarīra**), and the **alaṃkāras** are ornaments which beautify it, as bracelets and other ornaments

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[61]Ibid., pp. 108ff.

beautify a body. An ornament must invariably ornament *something*, and is thus inherently other-directed. This fact alone excludes the **alaṃkāras** from the realm of **dhvani**. Ānandavardhana defines **dhvani** as follows:

> That type of poetry in which either a meaning or a word, subordinating itself or its own meaning [respectively], suggests that [non-expressed] meaning is called "**dhvani**" by wise people.[62]

The expression "subordinating itself or its own meaning" is, as Ānandavardhana himself explicitly points out,[63] intended precisely to exclude **alaṃkāras** which incorporate some suggested sense from the realm of **dhvani**.

Thus the root-metaphor of Alaṃkāraśāstra, that of ornamentation, plays a major role in Ānandavardhana's demonstration of the inadequacy of his predecessors' theories and defense of his radical departure from them. The differentiation, analysis, and illustration of the various **alaṃkāras** had been a primary focus of attention for all previous Ālaṃkārikas, even those (i.e. Vāmana and Rudraṭa) who had given prominence to other concepts (**guṇa** and **rasa**, respectively) in their analyses. By claiming that **alaṃkāras** are, necessarily and by definition, of only secondary importance, Ānandavardhana breaks decisively with literary theory as it has so far existed in India.

In Ānandavardhana's teleological, Mīmāṃsā-derived mode of

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[62]Ibid., p. 103.

[63]Ibid., p. 108.

text interpretation, the relative predominance among the verbal and semantic elements of a verse and the hierarchical relations between these elements are the primary focus of analysis. By contrast, earlier Ālaṃkārikas devote themselves primarily to the definition and categorization of these isolable elements without regard to the functional relationships between them in particular contexts. Consequently they show no interest in the primacy or subordination of the non-literal meanings found in the **alaṃkāras** they describe. Ānandavardhana's claim that their concern is solely with subordinate suggestion (rather than with genuine cases of **dhvani**, in which the suggested meaning predominates) rests on two pillars: the term "**alaṃkāra**" itself (which is taken to imply subordination), and the examples they provide for their **alaṃkāras**, in which, he claims, the expressed meaning is generally, if not invariably, predominant.

In order to make such an argument, of course, it is necessary to articulate some criteria on the basis of which we can distinguish a predominant meaning from a subordinate one. Ānandavardhana employs two such criteria, neither entirely unambiguous or unproblematic. The first is what he calls "being the [overall] meaning of a sentence" (**vākyārthībhāva** or **vākyārthatva**). The term is nowhere defined or explained, and we must examine its application to get some idea of the sense in which Ānandavardhana employs it.

The following verse is given as an example of the **alaṃkāra samāsokti** ("condensed expression"-- in which the explicit subject of a verse is described in terms equally applicable to a second, unstated, subject).

> The moon, becoming red/*passionate*, touched the face of night, with its twinkling stars/*trembling eyes*, so that her [i.e. the night's] cloak of darkness was condensed/*bunched up* [**samasta**] and fell away in the east/*in front*, unnoticed by her, because of her own redness/*passion*.[64]

The literal sense of the verse is simply a natural description of redness of the rising full moon and the reddening of the surrounding night sky. But, through punning use of the word **rāga** (redness/passion), the adjectives applied to the moon and the night are constructed so that they would apply equally well to a pair of lovers.

Ānandavardhana's comment on the verse is as follows: "In cases such as this the expressed meaning is understood to be predominant and is only accompanied by a suggested meaning, since the night and the moon alone-- on which the behavior of female and male protagonists have been superimposed-- are the meaning of the sentence."[65] Here the relevant distinction

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[64]Ibid., p. 109.
upoḍharāgeṇa vilolatārakaṃ
    tathā gṛhītaṃ śaśinā niśāmukham/
yathā samastaṃ timirāṃśukaṃ tayā
    puro 'pi rāgād galitaṃ na lakṣitam//
The verse, traditionally ascribed to Pāṇini (probably not the famous grammarian), is cited as an example in Udbhaṭa's Bhāmahavivaraṇa, in his commentary on Bhāmaha's explanation of **samāsokti** (2.79-80) (cf. Gnoli, op. cit., pp. 34-5).

[65]Ibid., pp. 109-11.

seems to be one of reference. The verse is *really* about the night and the moon; the suggestion that they are like a pair of lovers may add a certain beauty to an otherwise mundane description, but this does not affect their centrality as the referents of the verse.

Elsewhere the term **vākyārthībhāva** is employed more generally in the sense of the being the intent or purport of a sentence (what the Mīmāṃsakas would call **tātparya**). In commenting on the verse "**Kṣipto hastāvalagnaḥ**" ("Thrown off, when clinging to their hands..."-- cf. above, p. 151), for example, Ānandavardhana explains that it is the overwhelming power of Śiva that is the **vākyārtha**, rather than the **karuṇa-rasa** arising from the plight of the women of the Triple-city or the **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** introduced by the comparison of Śiva's arrow-fire with a rejected lover. Although the verse is primarily devoted to description of the pitiable plight of the women, its overall purport (as an invocation of Śiva's blessings) establishes praise of Śiva as the **vākyārtha**.

A second criterion applied in determining the relative predominance of meanings derives from their comparative beauty. "The intent to express either a literal or a suggested meaning as primary is dependent on its having a greater degree of beauty [**cārutvotkarṣa**]."[66] In **alaṃkāras** that convey some suggested meaning, it will, generally speaking, be the expressed meaning on which the beauty of the

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[66]Ibid., p. 114.

verse primarily depends. For example:

> Although he is called by his companions, although he has woken and said "All right", although he wants to get up, the traveller doesn't relax his contracted posture.[67]

This verse is given as an example of the **alaṃkāra viśeṣokti** (in which a complete set of causes fails to produce an expected effect).[68] There are two sub-varieties of this **alaṃkāra** as explained by Udbhaṭa (Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha, 5.5-6). In one variety the reason for the anomaly is explicitly stated, in the other it must be understood. In cases of the latter type, such as the verse quoted, there is thus (in Ānandavardhana's terminology) a suggested **vastu** (fact or narrative element). In this case, the reason for the traveller's failure to get up is not given, and must be surmised by the reader on contextual grounds. However, the beauty of the verse, according to Ānandavardhana, does not derive from this suggestion, but depends upon the expressed meaning itself.[69] Whatever we may imagine to be the cause

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[67]Ibid., p. 117.
āhūto 'pi sahāyair om ity uktvā vimuktanidro 'pi/
gantumanā api pathikaḥ saṅkocaṃ naiva śithilayati//
The verse is attributed in several anthologies to one Bharścu (sometimes Bharvu or Bhaścu), of whom only a few stray verses are known. Cf. Raghavan, Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, Madras, Punarvasu, 1963 [second ed.], pp. 817-18.

[68]A literal translation of the term **viśeṣokti** is difficult. It could perhaps be rendered as "the statement of special (or anomalous) case."

[69]It is not even clear what this suggested meaning is. Ānandavardhana does not explain his own understanding of the verse. Abhinavagupta, commenting on this passage (p. 117) explains that, according to Udbhaṭa, we should understand from the verse that it is the morning cold that prevents the

for the traveller's reluctance to rise, it is the (directly expressed) description of this reluctance which gives beauty to the verse.

Ānandavardhana is prepared to concede that among the multitude of **alaṃkāras** defined and described by Bhāmaha and others there may possibly be a few genuine examples of **dhvani**. In the **alaṃkāra paryāyokta** (oblique statement), a fact or event is hinted at without being explicitly mentioned. Bhāmaha gives the following example:

> Either in houses or on the road, we do not eat food which learned brahmans do not eat.[70]

The words are spoken by Kṛṣṇa to his cousin and arch-rival Śiśupāla in declining his offer of food, and we are to understand from this refusal that he knows the food to be poisoned. The definition of **paryāyokta** is general enough that

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traveller from getting up. Abhinavagupta finds this explanation unsatisfying and understands the suggestion of the verse to be that the traveller has been dreaming of his beloved and is thus reluctant to wake. He claims that this is Ānandavardhana's view of the verse also, but given his silence, it seems more likely that he accepted Udbhaṭa's interpretation as valid. Although there is no trace of this verse or any apparent comment upon it in Gnoli's reconstructed text, Udbhaṭa's explanation of the verse is presumably drawn from the Bhāmahavivaraṇa. The portion of the text where we would expect to find it (on Bhāmaha 3.23-24) is lost, and would occur somewhere between fragments 39 and 40 of Gnoli's edition.

[70]Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṃkāra, ed. and tr. P.V. Naganatha Shastry,
Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1970 [reprint], p. 57.
  gṛhesv adhvasu vā nānnam bhuñjmahe yad adhītinaḥ/
  na bhuñjate dvijāḥ... (3.9)
The verse fragment is, Bhāmaha tells us, from a work called Ratnāharaṇa, otherwise unknown.

it might include instances in which the suggested meaning is primary (although Ānandavardhana argues that in examples such as Bhāmaha's this is not so). If this is the case, Ānandavardhana contends, **paryāyokta** should be included in **dhvani** rather than **dhvani**, via **paryāyokta**, being subsumed under the **alaṃkāras**.[71] **Dhvani** has a much wider scope than **paryāyokta** which is, at best, equivalent to a particular variety of **vastu-dhvani**. If examples of this or any other known **alaṃkāra** are found in which the suggested meaning is predominant, these are not, properly speaking, **alaṃkāras** at all, and should be reinterpreted as instances of **dhvani**. Such cases are rare in any case, and cannot pose any serious threat to the case for **dhvani** as a distinct mode of poetry.

The cases we have been considering involve the suggestion of a fact (**vastu**). Suggested **alaṃkāras** and **rasas** have also been dealt with by previous Ālaṃkārikas, and these too must be carefully differentiated from true instances of **dhvani**. Virtually all **arthālaṃkāras** which can be directly expressed may be suggested as well.[72] Udbhaṭa and others have shown many cases in which one **alaṃkāra**, expressed directly, causes us to understand another. A great many of the recognized

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[71]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 118-19. Pratīhārendurāja (c. 950), in his commentary on Udbhaṭa's Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha, will argue that all instances of **dhvani** cited by Ānandavardhana can, in fact, be subsumed under one or another of the **alaṃkāras** described by Udbhaṭa, and that all instances of **vastu-dhvani** can be treated as cases of **paryāyokta** or **aprastutapraśaṃsā** (cf. below, Chapter 7, pp. 369ff).

[72]Ibid., p. 257ff.

alaṃkāras depend upon an understood simile (**upamā**)-- **rūpaka** ("metaphorical identification"), in which the **upameya** (the thing compared, e.g. a woman's face) is identified with the **upamāna** (the standard of comparison, e.g. the full moon); **sasaṃdeha** ("doubt"), in which the speaker implies a simile by pretending to confuse the **upameya** with the **upamāna**; **dīpaka** ("illuminator"), in which syntactic parallelism implies similitude between the **upamāna** and **upameya**. Vāmana even attempted to demonstrate that all **arthālaṃkāras** are ultimately permutations of the simile (**upamāprapañca**), and hence depend upon some implied comparison.[73] Bhāmaha indicates that the figure **atiśayokti** ("hyperbole") lies at the root of all **alaṃkāras**.[74]

As before, the crucial issue for Ānandavardhana is the relative primacy of the expressed and suggested meanings. **Alaṃkāra-dhvani** can be said to exist only where the expressed meaning is merely a vehicle to convey the understood **alaṃkāra**, on which the beauty of the verse primarily depends (as in the example "**Prāptaśrīr esa...**" ["Having already obtained Śrī..."] quoted above, p. 129). The suggested simile in **alaṃkāras** such as **rūpaka** and **sasaṃdeha** is invariably subordinate to the expressed meaning. The identification of distinct things with one another, or the confusion between them, is only

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[73]Vāmana, <u>Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra</u>, 4.3.1-33 (Kashi Sanskrit Series 209, pp. 157-187.

[74]Bhāmaha, op. cit., p. 45. Quoted by Ānandavardhana (p. 467)-- cf. below, Chapter Six, pp. 276-277.

comprehensible if based on some sort of similarity between the them. But this understood simile has no special beauty of its own, and is merely a necessary prerequisite for the understanding of the expressed **alaṃkāra**.

That latent element of hyperbole or exaggeration which Bhāmaha finds in all **alaṃkāras** is similarly subordinate. "That **alaṃkāra** in which hyperbole [**atiśayokti**] finds a place through the imaginative capacity [**pratibhā**] of the poet will attain great beauty; any other will be mere ornament [**alaṃkāramātra**]."[75] The understood hyperbole is thus necessary for the beauty of the expressed **alaṃkāra**, and is therefore subordinate to it.

Thus, just as in the case of suggested **vastus**, Ānandavardhana employs the concepts of primacy and subordination to differentiate cases of suggested **alaṃkāra** found here and there in the works of earlier Ālaṃkārikas from **alaṃkāra-dhvani**, which he claims to define and describe for the first time.

The case of **alaṃkāra-dhvani** is, however, in one important respect, considerably more problematic than that of **vastu-dhvani**. The suggestion of a **vastu** in a verse invariably depends on its expressed meaning. **Alaṃkāras** differ in that their suggestion may, accoring to Ānandavardhana, be either dependent on the power of the (expressed) meaning (**arthaśaktimūla**) or dependent on the power of word

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[75]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 467-68.

(**śabdaśaktimūla**). The category of **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani** presents special problems and remains an area of serious controversy (particularly in Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka-- cf. below, Chapter Ten, pp. 512ff).

The term **śabdaśaktimūla** ("rooted in the power of word") is explained as follows: "Although our understanding in such a case is concerned with meaning [**ārthī**], it is produced by the capacity [**sāmarthya**] of a word [or words] capable of connection with two meanings-- thus it is considered to be rooted in the power of word."[76] The function of polysemy and *double entendre* in poetry had already been extensively explored by previous Ālaṃkārikas, largely under the rubric of the **alaṃkāra śleṣa** ("pun"), but also in such figures as **yamaka**, **lāṭānuprāsa**, **punaruktavadābhāsa**, etc. It is not at all clear at first glance whether, in the case of a *double entendre*, one should regard both meanings as directly expressed (albeit by the same word or words), or one meaning (the one appropriate to the context) as expressed and the other as suggested by the same words. The differentiation between the figure **śleṣa** and **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani** thus becomes problematic and requires a careful analysis of the role of double meaning in both contexts.

Ānandavardhana begins the discussion of this question by considering a hypothetical objection which dismisses the category of **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani** as essentially redundant.

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[76]Ibid., p. 412.

"If, where a second meaning appears by the power of a word or words, this is described as a type of **dhvani**, then the figure **śleṣa** would lose all scope [**viṣaya**]."[77] The new category overlaps entirely with one already well established, and is hence superfluous.

Ānandavardhana, in response, argues that the two cannot be considered identical. In the first place, **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani** is restricted to cases in which it is an **alaṃkāra** which is suggested. Where the same words produce an understanding of two **vastus**-- two matters of fact-- this would be accepted as a case of **śleṣa**, and it cannot therefore be said that this **alaṃkāra** would be deprived of all scope.

This argument is, however, insufficient. It is an essential element of the theory of **śleṣa** as it has been developed by Bhāmaha and subsequent authors that a verse containing a **śleṣa** should make us understand not only two separate meanings, but some relationship between them, which will take the form of some other **alaṃkāra**. Bhāmaha (3.17) explains that **śleṣa** is of three types, because it indicates either **sahokti** ("statement together"-- a figure in which actions are simultaneously ascribed to two separate things by a single expression; cf. Bhāmaha 3.39ff), **upamā** ("simile"), or **hetu** ("cause"). Udbhaṭa (4.9-10), as is often the case, reduces Bhāmaha's observations to a more general principle, and states that the words employed in **śleṣa** produce an

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[77]Ibid., p. 235.

impression (**pratibhā**) of some other (unspecified) **alaṃkāra**.

Thus it is well established that some further **alaṃkāra** must always be understood in cases of **śleṣa**. Ānandavardhana, here as elsewhere, seems reluctant to disturb the recognized concepts and categories of earlier Alaṃkāraśāstra, preferring to see the phenomena he embraces under the concept of **dhvani** as entirely separate from the realm of surface features dealt with by his predecessors. It is thus essential for him to show that this well-known aspect of **śleṣa** is in some way insufficient to account for all instances where **alaṃkāras** are understood through *double entendre*.

It is Ānandavardhana's contention that in all instances of **śleṣa** both the *double entendre* and the **alaṃkāra** which depends upon it must, in spite of this dependence, be regarded as directly expressed. For example:

> Her breasts, even without a necklace [**hāra**], are naturally attractive/*necklaced* [**hārin**]: for whom would they not produce astonishment?[78]

Here we understand the figure **virodha** ("[apparent] contradiction"), and the understanding of this figure is clearly dependent on the polysemic word **hārin**. The literal sense of the word in this case is "attractive", but because the word also means "having a necklace [**hāra**]" there is an apparent verbal contradiction: the woman's breasts are both

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[78]Ibid., 236.
tasyā vinā 'pi hāreṇa nisargād eva hāriṇau/
janayām āsatuḥ kasyȧ vismayam na payodhȧrau//
(Subhāṣitāvalī 1534)

with and without a necklace. Our awareness of this **virodha alaṃkāra**, however, depends on the word **api** ("even"). As Abhinavagupta points out in his comment on the verse, if this word were removed, there would be no appearance of contradiction-- the breasts are beautiful, and they have no necklace. It is only the verbal cue provided by the concessive particle **api** that leads us to ascribe a second meaning of the word **hārin**. In all instances of expressed **śleṣa** there will an explicit verbal cue of some sort-- what Ānandavardhana calls a **nibandhana** (a "cause" or "basis")-- which leads us to understand the double meaning.

In true cases of **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani**, however, there will be no such cue. The presence of a polysemic word or words will, by itself, produce an awareness of a second (suggested) meaning. For example:

> At that time the great season/*Great Time [i.e. Śiva in his aspect of world-destroyer]* called summer, whose loud laughter appeared in the form of the white of its blooming jasmine/*whose high laughter*[79] *is white like blooming jasmine*, came forth, ending/*destroying* the two months/*cosmic age* of the season of flowers [spring].[80]

The literal sense of the verse can be understood without any difficulty, and there is no particle or other word which would prompt us to look for a double meaning. Nevertheless, the presence of so many attributes which would be applicable to

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[79]An attribute commonly ascribed to Śiva.

[80]Ibid., p. 241.
atrāntare kusumasamayayugam upasamharann ajrmbhata grīṣmābhidhānaḥ phullamallikādhavalāttahāso mahākālaḥ.
(Bāṇa, Harṣacarita [Kāṇe's ed., p. 21])

Śiva as well as to the summer suggests such a double meaning to us, on the basis of which we further understand a simile: the hot season, bringing an end to the flowers of spring, is like Śiva when he destroys the world.

Ānandavardhana explains the process by which we understand these meanings thus:

> In these examples, when a second, non-contextual meaning appears through the power of word, [one thinks] "A sentence should not express unconnected meanings": thus, on the basis of implication [**sāmarthya**], one concludes that the contextual and non-contextual meanings are related as **upameya** [thing compared] and **upamāna** [standard of comparison]. Thus this pun is hinted at by the meaning, not touched on by any word.[81]

Because a sentence must by definition express a single, unified meaning, the *double entendre*, once noticed, necessitates that we find some connection between the second meaning and the overall sense of the sentence.[82] This connection will take the form of some **alaṃkāra** (typically metaphor or simile, as above, but other **alaṃkāras** may also be suggested in this way-- cf. Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 245-7). Because our understanding of this **alaṃkāra** rests entirely on

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[81]Ibid., 244.

[82]Although Ānandavardhana here makes use of the Mīmāmsā notion of **ekavākyatā** ("sentential unity"-- cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 76, 85ff) to defend his explanation of **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani**, Mahimabhatta (c. 1050 AD) will later use the very same notion to show the complete impossibility of this variety of **dhvani**; precisely because there is no verbal cue which prompts the search for a double meaning in such expressions, there is nothing to connect their two possible meanings with one another, and hence no way to derive a propositionally unified sense from them-- cf. below, Chapter Ten, pp. 512-515.

our need to find coherence in the overall verse-meaning, rather than upon some specific verbal cue, instances of **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani** can be clearly differentiated from cases of expressed śleṣa.

Just as the suggested **vastus** and **alaṃkāras** dealt with by previous Ālaṃkārikas have been shown (because of their subordination to the expressed meanings which give rise to them) to lie outside the scope of **dhvani**, likewise the **rasas** and **rasa**-based phenomena these Ālaṃkārikas have shown to operate in figures such as **rasavat** ("possessing **rasa**")[83] can be differentiated from true cases of **rasa-dhvani** on the basis of their subordinate status. **Rasa-dhvani** is defined as follows:

> Where the various beautifying factors of word and meaning [**śabdālaṃkāras** and **arthālaṃkāras**, as well as other poetic features such as **guṇas**] have **rasa**, etc. as their goal, this will be a case of **dhvani** [**dhvaner viṣayaḥ**].[84]

Alaṃkāras such as **rasavat** are defined contrastively:

> But in a poem where, given the predominance of some other sentence meaning, **rasa**, etc. is subordinate, this **rasa**, etc. will be an **alaṃkāra**-- this is my view.[85]

This subordinated **rasa** may occur either by itself, as in the verse "**kiṃ hāsyena...**" ("Why do you laugh?...", cf. above, pp. 153-154) or in combination with some other **alaṃkāra**, as in the verse "**kṣipto hastāvalagnaḥ...**" ("Thrown off, when

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[83]Cf. above, Chapter Two, pp. 50ff.

[84]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., p. 180.

[85]Ibid., p. 191.

clinging to their hands... ", cf. above, p. 151), where the subordinate **rasa**, **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** (love in separation) appears by means of, and as intimately connected with, the *double entendre* through which the same attributes are ascribed to Śiva's arrow-fire and to the spurned lover with whom it is compared. In both these cases, the **rasas** conveyed are subordinated to the overall purport of the verse in question, namely the praise of some unnamed king and of Śiva, respectively. Where the **rasa** itself is the overall meaning or object of the sentence (**vākyārthībhūta**), however, it cannot be described as an **alaṃkāra**, an ornament. An ornament is, by definition, that which imparts beauty to something else; nothing can be said to ornament itself.[86] Where the **rasa** serves as the main meaning of a verse, any co-occurrent **alaṃkāras** will ornament it. Therefore the scope of **rasa-dhvani** is clearly demarcated from that of **alaṃkāras** such as **rasavat**.

The analysis of the subordinate/superordinate relationship (**aṅgāṅgibhāva**) between the parts of a verse or a composition thus becomes the basis for differentiating all three varieties of **dhvani** from related phenomena explored in the work of earlier Ālaṃkārikas. This reliance on the binary opposition of primacy and subordination to distinguish **dhvani** often produces a doubling of prior categories and subdivisions of **alaṃkāra** within the analysis of **dhvani**. For instance, the

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[86]Ibid., p. 197.

various modes of blending (**saṃkara**) and juxtaposition (**saṃsṛṣṭi**) by which multiple **alaṃkāras** combine in a single verse (as defined by Udbhaṭa, Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha 5.11-13 and 6.5)[87] are applied without alteration in Ānandavardhana's analysis of the combination of multiple varieties of **dhvani** (Dhvanyāloka, 3.43).[88] Ānandavardhana's subdivision of **rasa** and **rasa**-like phenomena into **rasa**, **bhāva**, **rasābhāsa**, and **rasa-praśānti** recapitulates the categories developed by Udbhaṭa (Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha 4.1-5 and 4.7) to explain the **alaṃkāras rasavat**, **preyas**, **ūrjasvin**, and **samāhita** (respectively) and their rootedness in **rasa**.[89]

The Subordination of Alaṃkāra to Rasa-dhvani

This careful demarcation of the realm of **alaṃkāra** from that of **dhvani** depends on the necessary subordination of any **alaṃkāra** to some **alaṃkārya**, some thing-to-be-ornamented, ideally **rasa**. Thus, the primacy of a single **rasa** in any composition can serve as a criterion for the evaluation of particular **alaṃkāras** in particular settings, just as it can serve for the evaluation of the interrelationship of **rasas** with one another.

The foremost requirement for any **alaṃkāra**, according to Ānandavardhana, is that it should not obstruct our

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[87]Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha, op. cit., pp. 67-71, 78-9.

[88]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 501-16.

[89]Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha, op. cit., pp. 50-56-- cf. above, Chapter Two, pp. 52-58.

appreciation of the **rasa** of a given verse or composition. **Alaṃkāras**, even if they are well constructed and beautiful in and of themselves, may easily serve as a distraction and thus impair the audience's appreciation of the primary **rasa**. This danger is especially acute in the case of **śṛṅgāra-rasa**, which is said to be more "tender" (**sukumāra**) than other **rasas**.

> For this [**śṛṅgāra**], because it consists of the full development of desire, and because desire can be interrupted even by some minor cause, is the tenderest of all **rasas**, and will not bear even for a moment the introduction of any contradictory factor.[90]

In accordance with this view Ānandavardhana severely restricts the application of the **śabdālaṃkāras** which have received such a great deal of attention from earlier authors (especially Daṇḍin and Rudraṭa). The persistent use of a single type of alliteration (**anuprāsa**), for instance, should be avoided in cases where **śṛṅgāra** is the predominant **rasa** (although it is acceptable where **śṛṅgāra** is subordinate).[91] Furthermore, alliteration, like other features of word and meaning, will be approved or rejected in a particular context on the basis of its appropriateness (**aucitya**) to the dominant **rasa** of the passage in question. Repetition of those phonemes or groups of phonemes described as "harsh" (**paruṣa**-- cf. Udbhaṭa, Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha, 1.4[92]) will be an obstacle in passages meant to convey **śṛṅgāra**, but the same sort of

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[90]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 396-7.

[91]Ibid., p. 218-19.

[92]Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha, op. cit., p. 5.

alliteration will be desirable when **rasas** such as **bībhatsā** (disgust) are meant to be conveyed.[93]

Yamaka (the repetition of a group of phonemes so as to give two separate meanings), difficult verbal puns (**duṣkara-śabda-śleṣa**), and other such complex verbal figures should be entirely avoided even by a skilled poet when **śṛṅgāra** is predominant. The reasoning for such specific prohibitions is explained by resort to a more general principle:

> Only an **alaṃkāra** achieved without a separate effort [**apṛthag-yatna-nirvartya**], whose composition can be effected through [the poet's] fixation on **rasa**, is acceptable in cases of **dhvani**.[94]

Difficult **śabdālaṃkāras** such as **yamaka** demand great effort from both poet and audience, and consequently do not allow one to appreciate the verse through a single cognitive effort. We must first "decode" the double meanings and other verbal puzzles involved in such figures, and can only subsequently savor the **rasa** conveyed by the verses containing them. In contrast, figures based on meaning (**arthālaṃkāras**), even complex ones, can emerge naturally in the work of a poet intent on **rasa**.

> This [distinction] is appropriate, since **rasas** are introduced by particular expressed meanings and the words that convey them. And **alaṃkāras** such as **rūpaka** [i.e. **arthālaṃkāras**] are the expressed meanings which reveal these [**rasas**]. Therefore these are not extrinsic [**bahiraṅga**] to the manifestation of **rasa**. But in the case of **yamakas** and other difficult **śabdālaṃkāras** this

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[93]<u>Dhvanyāloka</u>, op. cit., p. 303.

[94]Ibid., p. 219.

extrinsicality is established.[95]

Even where verses containing **yamaka** are found to evoke **rasa**, this **rasa** will invariably be subordinate, since the figure itself will demand the greater share of the listener's attention.

While all **arthālaṃkāras** may be employed in verses or passages primarily intended to evoke **rasa**, they too must conform to certain restrictions if they are to contribute effectively to this **rasa**, rather than constitute an obstacle (**rasa-vighna**). Firstly, the **alaṃkāra** must be intended as a subordinate element, rather than as the primary object of the verse. For example:

> Again and again you touch her trembling glance as it shifts to the corner of her eye; you sound sweetly, hovering near her ear, as if telling something in secret; although she strikes at you with her hands, you taste her lip, the essence of pleasure: we,[96] because we seek the truth, have failed, but you, O bee, are successful.[97]

The verse is spoken by King Duṣyanta, the hero of Kālidāsa's

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[95]Ibid, p. 222.

[96]The speaker, Duṣyanta, although referring to himself alone, uses the plural; this may be simply an instance of "the royal we"-- not uncommon in Sanskrit, and not restricted to royalty-- but Kuntaka feels that the use of the plural here emphasizes Duṣyanta's exclusion from imtimacy with Śakuntalā (in contrast to the intimate proximity of the bee). Cf. <u>Vakroktijīvita</u>, ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 117, and below, Chapter Eight, p. 406.

[97]Ibid., p. 224.

calāpāṅgaṃ dṛṣṭiṃ spṛśasi bahuśo vepathumatīm
    rahasyākhyāyīva svanasi mṛdu karṇāntikacaraḥ/
karau vyādhunvatyāḥ pibasi ratisarvasvam adharaṃ
    vayaṃ tattvānveṣān madhukara hatās tvaṃ khalu kṛtī//
(Kālidāsa, <u>Abhijñānaśākuntala</u> 1.21)

<u>Abhijñānaśākuntala</u>, as he covertly observes Śakuntalā. He has fallen in love but hesitates to speak to her, being unsure whether she is a kṣatriya or a brahman (and hence not legitimately accessible as a lover). He watches her fighting off an approaching bee, which he imagines as a rival for her affections. Hence the natural description (svabhāvokti)[98] of the bee is subordinate to the **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** conveyed by the verse.

The following is cited as a counter-example:

> ...[Viṣṇu], who, by a forceful command in the form of a blow from his discus, made the love-play of Rāhu's wives devoid of the unfettered play of embracing, so that only kissing remained [possible].[99]

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[98]Abhinavagupta (pp. 224-5) notes that earlier commentators have denied that the **alaṃkāra** in this verse is **svabhāvokti**, and have interpreted Ānandavardhana's comment on this so as to reflect this view. The compound **bhramarasvabhāvokti** ("natural description of the bee") is re-analyzed as a **bahuvrīhi**: **bhramarasvābhave uktir yasya** ("[an **alaṃkāra**] to which there belongs a statement regarding the nature of the bee"). This **alaṃkāra** is, in their view, **rūpakavyatireka** ("metaphor combined with contrast"); the bee is metaphorically identified with a rival lover, and the fourth **pāda** contrasts him (as successful in love) with Duṣyanta (as a failure). This interpretation of the compound is, however, extremely strained, and Ānandavardhana's comment can without serious difficulty be read in its more natural sense. The bee's actions are described literally. The metaphorical identification of the bee with a lover is not explicitly stated, and thus the **rūpaka** (and the **vyatireka** which depends upon it) must be regarded as suggested rather than expressed. The expressed **alaṃkāra** of the verse would thus be **svabhāvokti**.

[99]Ibid., p. 225.
cakrābhighātaprasabhājñayaiva cakāra yo rāhuvadhūjanasya/
āliṅganoddāmavilāsavandhyaṃ ratotsavaṃ cumbanamātraśeṣam//

Ruyyaka, in his commentary on the <u>Vyaktiviveka</u> (Kashi Sanskrit Series 121, p. 315), identifies the source of the verse as the (lost) <u>Hayagrīvavadha</u> of Bhartṛmeṇṭha. He gives the correct

Here the **alaṃkāra** is **paryāyokta** ("oblique statement"). When the **asura** Rāhu attempted to swallow the elixir of immortality (after the gods and **asuras** had churned it from the ocean), Viṣṇu decapitated him with his discus; because he had begun to swallow the elixir, he survived as a disembodied head. By referring to an effect (that Rāhu's wives can only kiss and never embrace him) the verse obliquely causes us to understand the cause (that Viṣṇu decapitated Rāhu). Although, via this **alaṃkāra**, the verse does convey **rasa** (**vīra-rasa**, based on Viṣṇu's heroic deed), the figure itself draws our attention, and the beauty of the verse is based primarily upon it, rather than on this **rasa**. Thus, the **alaṃkāra** in this case cannot be said to be subordinate.

A further condition for the subordination of **alaṃkāra** to **rasa** is that it must be taken up or abandoned in accordance with the requirements of this **rasa**, rather than simply for the sake of any intrinsic beauty. The taking up of an **alaṃkāra** on the proper occasion is illustrated as follows:

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reading of the verse as **ekābhighāta-** rather than **cakrābhighāta-**, and explains that the referent of the pronoun **yo** ("who, what" [masc.]) is Viṣṇu's discus Sudarśana rather than Viṣṇu himself; on this reading we would translate, "...[The discus Sudarśana] which, by a forceful command in the form of a single blow..." Given that Ruyyaka apparently had access to the full text of the work, we have no reason to doubt his correction. It is interesting, however, that the apparent misreading recurs consistently in the many citations of the verse in the works of later Ālaṃkārikas (Pratīhārendurāja, Kuntaka, Mahimabhaṭṭa), suggesting that they are citing Ānandavardhana's citation rather than the original work (Ruyyaka himself quotes the verse with Ānandavardhana's reading, without comment, in his Alaṃkārasarvasva [Kāvyamālā 35, p. 106]).

> Having blossoms/*longing* which are/*is* unrestrained, having a pale color/*complexion*, suddenly beginning to flower/*yawn*[100], showing its own motion by reason of the ceaseless rising of breezes/*revealing her own exhaustion by the ceaseless rising of her sighs*; by looking at this garden-creeper, twined round a madana-tree/*full of love*, which is like another woman, I will surely make the queen's face red with anger.[101]

The verse is spoken by Udayana, the hero of Harṣa's Ratnāvalī. Although the queen's jealousy is here only imagined, based on the punning comparison of a creeper with another woman, the verse foreshadows the queen's real jealousy when Udayana falls in love with the princess Ratnāvalī. The **śleṣa** and the simile that depends upon it are thus introduced not simply because they are beautiful in and of themselves but because their use at this juncture serves to magnify the **rasa** developed in the composition as a whole.

The fullest possible development of **rasa** may, in some cases, necessitate that one **alaṃkāra**, after it has been introduced, be abandoned in favor of another. For example:

> You are red/*passionate* because of your new shoots, I because of the valued qualities of my beloved; bees/*arrows* come to you, and, shot from the bow of the god of love, to me as well; a blow from the foot of a beautiful woman would delight you[102] and likewise me;

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[100]Yawning (**jṛmbhā**) is regarded as a symptom sexual longing.

[101]Ibid., p. 226.
uddāmotkalikāṃ vipāṇḍurarucaṃ prārabdhajṛmbhāṃ kṣaṇād
āyāsaṃ śvasanodgamair aviralair ātanvatīṃ ātmanaḥ/
adyodyānalatāṃ imāṃ samadanāṃ nārīṃ ivānyāṃ dhruvaṃ
paśyan kopavipāṭaladyuti mukhaṃ devyāḥ kariṣyāmy aham//
(Harṣa, Ratnāvalī 2.4)

[102]The aśoka tree is believed to burst into bloom when kicked by a young woman.

everything is the same for us, O **aśoka**, except that the creator has made me full of grief [**saśoka**].[103]

Aśoka is the name of a particular type of tree, but etymologically means "without grief"; the speaker, separated from his lover, contrasts his grieving state with that of the tree. The first three quarters of the verse contain a series of puns (**śleṣa**) through which we understand a simile (**upamā**) between the speaker and the tree, but in the fourth this **upamā-śleṣa** is abandoned in favor of the **alaṃkāra vyatireka** ("contrast") (this **vyatireka** is likewise based on **śleṣa**, arising from the punning use of the word **aśoka**, but Ānandavardhana does not remark on the point). The simile-based **śleṣa** conveys **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** by highlighting the speaker's feelings for his lover, but the abandonment of this **alaṃkāra** and the introduction of a new **alaṃkāra**, **vyatireka**, intensifies this **rasa** by emphasizing the wretched state of the speaker in her absence.

Another important condition for the subordination of an **alaṃkāra** to **rasa** is that the poet should not attempt to develop it too fully (**atinirvahaṇaiṣitā**). In the verse "**kopāt komalalola-**..." ("His beloved, having bound him firmly...",

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[103]Ibid., p. 227.

raktas tvam navapallavair aham api slāghyaiḥ priyāyā guṇais
    tvām āyānti śilīmukhāḥ smaradhanurmuktāś tathā mām api/
kāntāpādatalāhatis tava muḍe tadvan mamāpy āvayoḥ
    sarvaṃ tulyam aśoka kevalam ahaṃ dhātrā saśokaḥ kṛtaḥ//

The verse is taken from Yaśovarman's (lost) Rāmābhyudaya-- cf. V. Raghavan, Some Old Lost Rāma Plays (Annamalainagar: Annamalai University, 1961), pp. 21-22.

cf. above, p. 150), the metaphorical identification of the hero with a prisoner is not carried through to its fullest possible extent. As Abhinavagupta points out,[104] in addition to identifying the lover's arm with a fetter, the poet could have identified the lover with a huntress (**vyādhavadhū**), the bed-chamber with a jail or a cage, and so on. To fully develop the metaphor in this way would spoil the **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** which is the primary object of the verse.

If an **alaṃkāra** is developed fully, the poet must carefully ensure that it continues to serve the purpose of nourishing the main **rasa** throughout. For example:

> I see your limbs in the **śyāmā**-creepers, your gaze in the tremulous glance of the deer, the brightness of your cheek in the moon, your hair in the peacocks' masses of tail-feathers, the play of your eyebrows in the slender wave of the river; alas, shy one, there is no likeness of you in any one place.[105]

Here the figure[106] is carried through to its full extent, through the speaker's comparison/identification of a series of features of the natural environment with those of his absent lover. The likeness of these individual features is, however, used to heighten the **vipralambha-śṛṅgara** of the verse, through

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[104]Ibid., p. 232.

[105]Ibid., pp. 232-3.
śyāmāsv aṅgam cakitahariṇīprekṣaṇe dṛṣṭipātam
gaṇḍacchāyām śaśini śikhinām barhabhāreṣu keśān/
utpaśyāmi pratanuṣu nadīvīcisu bhrūvilāsān
hantaikastham kvacid api na te bhīru sādṛśyam asti//
(Kālidāsa, Meghadūta 101)

[106]According to Abhinavagupta, **utprekṣā** (in which attributes of one thing are ascribed to another), but one could also describe it as a suggested **upamā** or **rūpaka**.

its culmination in the speaker's lamenting the absence of the whole to which they belong.

Generally, then, the introduction, development, and termination of **alaṃkāras** should be contingent upon the requirements of the primary **rasa** of a verse or a larger work. Like the ornaments used to decorate the human body, the ornaments of a poem are to be valued not for their own beauty but for the potential they have to beautify something else. **Rasa**, as the ultimate goal of poetry, is the thing to be beautified by these ornaments. If poets employ **alaṃkāras** for their own intrinsic beauty, without regard for their ability to aid in the conveying of **rasa**, the aesthetic impact of their works will suffer as a consequence.

Deviation from the specific prescriptions made here for the use of **alaṃkāras**, or from the more general principle of subordination which underlies them, will produce the flaw of **rasa-bhaṅga** ("breaking of the **rasa**"). Ānandavardhana claims that examples of such misapplication of **alaṃkāras** can frequently be found even in the works of great poets, but declines, out of respect, to cite specific examples.[107]

The Subordination of Other Poetic Elements to Rasa-dhvani

Although they are not treated as extensively as **alaṃkāras**, other features of poetry examined by previous Ālaṃkārikas are similarly shown to be subordinate to or dependent upon **rasa**. **Guṇas** ("qualities") are, for

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[107]Ibid., p. 233.

Ānandavardhana, first and foremost qualities of **rasa**. These qualities can be said to belong to words and meanings only insofar as these words and meanings communicate particular **rasas**.

Like Bhāmaha before him, Ānandavardhana rejects the list of ten **guṇas** set forth in the Nāṭyaśāstra (and accepted by Daṇḍin and Vāmana) and limits the number of **guṇas** to three: **mādhurya** ("sweetness"), **ojas** ("strength"), and **prasāda** ("clarity"). **Mādhurya** is a quality of **śṛṅgāra-rasa**, especially of **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra**, and of **karuṇa-rasa**, because these **rasas** are especially delightful to the hearts of connoisseurs.[108] **Rasas** such as **raudra** ("fury") are characterized by **ojas**. **Prasāda** is a quality common to all **rasas**, and poetry is said to possess this quality insofar as it is able to clearly communicate **rasa**.

It is because **rasa** can be conveyed by both sound and sense that a division between qualities of word and meaning (such as that made by Vāmana) can be drawn. For example:

> O queen, Bhīma will bind up your hair, his hands red with the clumped and densely matted blood of Duryodhana, whose two thighs will have been crushed by a fierce club-blow propelled by his [i.e. Bhīma's] whirling arm.[109]

The phrases "his hands red with the clumped and densely matted

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[108]Ibid., pp. 205-208.

[109]Ibid., p. 210.
cañcadbhujabhramitacaṇḍagadābhighāta-
    saṃcūrṇitoruyugalasya suyodhanasya/
styānāvabaddhaghanaśoṇitaśoṇapāṇi-
    ruttaṃsiṣyati kacāṃs tava devi bhīmaḥ//
(Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, Veṇīsaṃhāra 1.23)

blood" and "his two thighs crushed by a fierce club blow propelled by his whirling arm" are each expressed by a single compound. The use of such lengthy compounds, quite independently of their meaning, heightens the **raudra-rasa** conveyed by the verse; hence the verse would be said to possess the **śabda-guṇa** ojas.

A verse may, on the basis of its meaning, convey **raudra**, even in the absence of the syntactic or phonological features which would normally convey such a **rasa**:

> Anyone among the armies of the Pāṇḍavas who, taking pride in the strength of his own arm, bears a weapon; anyone in the Pāñcāla clan, be he a child, an old man, or one still in the womb; anyone who witnessed this act; anyone who stands in my way while I am moving in battle; blind with rage, I will be the death of such a person, even if he himself is the death of all the world.[110]

This verse lacks the long compounds which characterized the previous verse, but its meaning still clearly conveys **raudra-rasa**. So such a verse possesses **ojas** as an **artha-guṇa**. Hence, **guṇas** can be shown to depend not merely on specific features of word and meaning but, ultimately, on the **rasa** evoked by a verse or composition.

It is only by virtue of this direct dependence on **rasa** that **guṇas** can be differentiated from **alaṃkāras**. Here again Ānandavardhana employs the basic metaphor of Alaṃkāraśāstra,

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[110]Ibid., p. 211.
yo yaḥ śastram bibharti svabhujagurumadaḥ pāṇḍavīnām camūnām
  yo yaḥ pāñcālagotre śiśur adhikavayā garbhaśayyām gato vā/
yo yas tatkarmasākṣī carati mayi raṇe yaś ca yaś ca pratīpaḥ
  krodhāndhas tasya tasya svayam api jagatām antakasyāntako
'ham//
(Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, Veṇīsaṃhāra 3.32)

that of body (**śarīra**) and ornamentation (**alaṃkāra**), as part of his argument for the necessity and centrality of **dhvani** in poetry.

> Those [features] which depend on this primary [**aṅgin**] meaning, i.e. **rasa** etc., are qualities [**guṇas**], just as heroism and so on [are qualities in a person]; those which depend on subordinate elements [**aṅga**-- lit. "limbs"], i.e. words and expressed meanings, are **alaṃkāras**, like bracelets and so on [which ornament the limbs of a person].[111]

As we have seen, **alaṃkāras**, although they may ultimately assist in conveying **rasa**, function primarily at the level of direct expression. Any suggested meaning they convey will necessarily be subordinate (otherwise they would not be **alaṃkāras** at all, but instances of one or another type of **dhvani**). They are thus analyzable as features of words and their expressed meanings. **Guṇas** are properties of **rasas** themselves; one may describe the words and meanings which convey a sweet **rasa** as "sweet", but this is to speak metaphorically. If **guṇas** were actually, like **alaṃkāras**, properties of words and their expressed meanings, there would be no reason to designate or treat them separately from **alaṃkāras**. The distinction between these two categories of aesthetic phenomena is explicable *only* on the basis of their relation to **rasa-dhvani**.

Ānandavardhana shows that other distinctions employed by previous Ālaṃkārikas are similarly explicable only in terms of his teleological, **rasa**-oriented model of poetic effect.

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[111]Ibid., p. 204.

Doṣas, flaws which impair the aesthetic effectiveness of a poem, are extensively analyzed by Ānandavardhana's predecessors in the field. For the most part these flaws are not context-dependent and are to be unconditionally avoided in composing poetry. Grammatical errors, metrical deviation, obscure or technical vocabulary, and so on, will always detract from the effectiveness of a poem. However Bhāmaha describes a sub-group of defects, involving harshness of sound or sense, which may be acceptable or even desirable in certain instances.[112] Bhāmaha gives examples of the unobjectionable use of words which would ordinarily be rejected as phonetically harsh (**śrutikaṣṭa**) or semantically objectionable (**śrutiduṣṭa**).

Because they possess such exceptions, Ānandavardhana designates this group of flaws as **anitya-doṣas** ("variable defects").[113] Bhāmaha gives no clear explanation for these exceptions, and no indication is given as to how one is to discriminate between acceptable and unacceptable uses of such

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[112]Cf. Kāvyālaṃkāra, 1.47-59. There are four defects dealt with here: **śrutiduṣṭa** ("objectionable to the ear"-- use of obscene, scatological, or otherwise objectionable words), **arthaduṣṭa** ("objectionable in meaning"-- conveying an obscene sense without the use of such words), **kalpanāduṣṭa** ("objectionable in construction"-- in which the juxtaposition of words reproduces the form of an obscene word), and **śrutikaṣṭa** ("harsh to the ear"-- use of words regarded as phonetically harsh or ugly).

[113]Dhvanyāloka op. cit., p. 214. While Bhāmaha gives no examples of acceptable instances of **arthaduṣṭa** or **kalpanāduṣṭa**, Ānandavardhana seems to refer to the entire group of defects as **anitya**.

words or constructions. For Ānandavardhana the explanation is simple: such phonetically or semantically harsh elements must be avoided when **śṛṅgāra** (or some similarly tender **rasa**) is to be conveyed. In verses conveying other **rasas**, such as **bībhatsā** ("disgust") or **raudra** ("fury"), such usages will not pose any aesthetic problem, and may even serve to intensify these **rasas**. The centrality of **rasa** provides the necessary criterion allowing one to determine the acceptability of such usages in particular contexts. Thus, like the distinction between **guṇa** and **alaṃkāra**, the distinction between variable and invariable defects (**anitya-** and **nitya-doṣas**) can be satisfactorily accounted for only if the centrality of **rasa-dhvani** is accepted.

Like **alaṃkāras** and **guṇas**, other aesthetically relevant features of poetic language dealt with by earlier theorists are shown to be either dependent on or reducible to **rasa-dhvani**. **Rītis** ("styles"), those particular constellations of **guṇas** which Vāmana regards as the essential factors in producing poetic beauty, represent for Ānandavardhana a confused and inadequate effort to theorize **dhvani** (specifically **rasa-dhvani**).

> The **rītis**-- **Vaidarbhī**, **Gauḍīyā**, and **Pāñcālī**-- have been introduced by those unable to explain the true nature of poetry-- explained here by the introduction of **dhvani**-- which appeared to them indistinctly [**asphuṭa**]. The true nature of poetry was only indistinctly, slightly apparent to the formulators of the definitions of **rītis**; here it is defined clearly: no purpose would be served by giving

a definition of **rīti** as well.[114]

We have already seen that **guṇas**, the constituent elements of Vāmana's **rītis**, are properties of **rasa** alone. For a poem to be endowed with a particular set of **guṇas** (and thus possess a particular **rīti**) is simply for it to convey a particular **rasa** endowed with these qualities. Thus **rīti** is merely a roundabout way of describing **rasa-dhvani**, and is entirely reducible to it. The concept of **rīti**, once the real nature of **rasa** and its central role in poetic enjoyment is understood, becomes superfluous.

Those aspects of poetry designated by the term **vṛtti** ("method, mode") in the works of earlier theorists are shown to function in subordination to the requirements of **rasa**. The term is applied by Udbhaṭa to the three varieties of alliteration (**paruṣā**, "harsh"; **upanāgarikā**, "sophisticated, urbane"; and **grāmyā**, "rustic");[115] Bharata describes four **vṛttis** (**kaiśikī**, **sāttvatī**, **ārabhaṭī**, and **bhāratī**), modes of presentation governing plot and language as well as gesture, costume, and a variety of other elements of dramatic performance.[116] There is no apparent historical connection between these two sets of categories, and the designation of both by the term **vṛtti** seems to be mere coincidence, but

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[114]Dhvanyāloka on 3.46 (op. cit., p. 517).

[115]Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha 1.4-7 (op. cit., pp. 4-6).

[116]Nāṭyaśāstra, 20.1ff, Vol. III, Parimal Sanskrit Series #4, Parimal Publications, 1983, pp. 80ff.

Ānandavardhana treats them collectively.

> **Vṛtti** is said to be a function. The **vṛttis kaiśikī**, etc. [described by Bharata] are a function residing in the expressed meaning [of a poem] which is appropriate and in conformity with **rasa**. **Upanāgarikā**, etc. [i.e. Udbhaṭa's **vṛttis**] reside in the words.[117]

Vṛtti is, generally speaking, the arrangement of elements in a poem in such as a way as to convey a particular **rasa**; Udbhaṭa's **vṛttis** do so phonetically and Bharata's semantically, but they are alike in their subordination to and dependence on the requirements of **rasa**. The employment of either sort of **vṛtti** in an improper context (that is, where it is not appropriate to the dominant **rasa**) is mentioned by Ānandavardhana as one of the factors which damages the capacity of a work to convey **rasa**.[118] Like **alaṃkāras**, then, **vṛttis** are to be employed not for any independent, intrinsic beauty but because of their capacity, in the proper context, to heighten the particular **rasa** conveyed by a passage.

The entire range of concepts and categories applied to literature by earlier practitioners of Alaṃkāraśāstra is thus integrated in a single, all encompassing model of aesthetic effect. **Rasa** is established as the overriding goal of literature in general, and the predominance of a single **rasa** as the standard for the aesthetic coherence of a particular literary work. The features of composition defined and described by previous Ālaṃkārikas are either shown to function

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[117]Dhvanyāloka on 3.33 (op. cit., p. 401).

[118]Dhvanyaloka on 2.18-19 (op. cit., p. 364).

as subordinate elements in the communication of **rasa** (**alaṃkāras** and **vṛttis**) or entirely absorbed into the description of **rasa-dhvani** and hence rendered superfluous (**guṇa** and **rīti**). As we have seen, this teleological model of literary aesthetics and the accompanying hierarchical analysis of the elements of poetic texts is without precedent in the area of Alaṃkāraśāstra, and has its roots in the Mīmāṃsā technique of Vedic text analysis. Ānandavardhana's importation of the key elements of Mīmāṃsā interpretive technique into Alaṃkāraśāstra leads to an increasingly detailed application of the terminology and methods of Mīmāṃsā to poetic analysis in the works of the Ālaṃkārikas of tenth and eleventh century Kashmir (both followers and opponents of Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** theory), and these developments will be examined in subsequent chapters.

Eager to deflect the charge that he is merely re-naming and re-describing the elements and categories outlined by earlier Ālaṃkārikas, Ānandavardhana tries to establish that **dhvani** depends on suggestion (**vyañjanā**) a mode of verbal meaning entirely distinct from the literal and metaphorical modes recognized and treated by previous language theorists. In doing so he challenges not only established poetic theory but the philosophy of language in general. Grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas, and logicians (Naiyāyikas as well as Buddhists such as Dharmakīrti), while they disagree violently on many aspects of language theory, uniformly accept only literal and

metaphorical modes of meaning. Hence Ānandavardhana must defend his theory of poetic language not only against the attacks of fellow aestheticians, but also against the views of the major schools of linguistic philosophy. Ānandavardhana's encounter with general linguistic theory, unprecedented in its depth and intensity, has important consequences for the future development of Alaṃkāraśāstra in Kashmir, and in Chapter Five we will examine this encounter in detail.

We have also seen that, in the light of Ānandavardhana's claim to have discovered a new variety of poetic meaning, the citation of example verses in the Dhvanyāloka takes on an evidential function it has not borne in earlier works on poetic theory. Ānandavardhana must not only illustrate the varieties of **dhvani** he defines, he must *prove* that **dhvani** is pervasively present in the recognized classics of Sanskrit literature, despite the failure of earlier poetic theorists to notice or describe it. This gives his work an empirical orientation, geared more toward the description of existing literature and analysis of its aesthetic effect than that of previous works of Alaṃkāraśāstra. This empirical approach opens up new possibilities in the area of literary criticism (possibilities which will be more fully exploited by Kuntaka in his Vakroktijīvita), but at the same time creates theoretical problems for Ānandavardhana, as he is forced to acknowledge that there exists a significant body of respected poetry in which **rasa** is *not* the overriding aesthetic goal.

Ānandavardhana is unwilling to deny all literary value to such works, yet has difficulties explaining them in terms of his teleological model of poetic language. The tension between theory and criticism in the Dhvanyāloka and the problems presented by poetry in which suggested meaning is subordinate (**guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya-kāvya**), or that in which it is altogether absent (**citra-kāvya**) will be examined in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER FIVE
ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S POETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

We have seen that Ānandavardhana justifies his radical departure from the methods and concepts of previous literary theory by appealing to bodies of thought and practice outside the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra. He resorts to the analysis of existing literary works to demonstrate that **dhvani**, although unrecognized by previous theorists, has played a central role in the works of great poets from the very origins of literary art (in Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa, the "first poem" [**ādi-kāvya**]). In addition, he draws on the concepts and methods of linguistic philosophy, principally on the teleological discourse analysis of the Mīmāṃsakas, in formulating and defending his innovative approach to literary analysis. Ānandavardhana's application of models drawn from linguistic philosophy in the realm of Alaṃkāraśāstra, while it gives him access to a sophisticated and ready-made set of tools for text-analysis and thus greatly expands the possibilities of literary criticism, also requires him to account for the phenomena of literary language in philosophical terms.

In the centuries preceding Ānandavardhana's work, Ālaṃkārikas had devised a detailed and sophisticated conceptual vocabulary for the description and analysis of the elements of literary language. This vocabulary of literary analysis had developed more or less independently of the system of concepts and terms deployed in the analysis of non-literary language by Mīmāṃsakas, grammarians, and logicians

(the major practitioners of linguistic philosophy in Sanskrit). Adherents of these schools of philosophical thought, while differing widely in their views on the nature of word- and sentence-meaning, had, through centuries of argument, developed in common a system of terms through which linguistic phenomena could be analyzed and discussed. The Ālaṃkārikas, taking a specialized variety of language as their object of study, had taken few pains to integrate their terminology and descriptive categories with those employed by philosophers of non-literary language. In effect, two distinct vocabularies had developed, one for the description and analysis of language in general, and another for the description and analysis of language crafted for aesthetic effect.

Applications of the terms of general linguistic philosophy in the works on Alaṃkāraśāstra prior to Ānandavardhana's time are rare, and do not play any major theoretical role for the authors of these works. Where there is a clear parallel between a particular figure of poetic language and some recognized feature of ordinary language, the terms of linguistic philosophy are occasionally employed by these authors. Udbhaṭa, for example, describes the figure **rūpaka** (metaphor) as a type of **guṇavṛtti** (secondary signification).[1] Vāmana explains that the figure **śleṣa**

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[1]Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha, 1.11, Banhatti's ed., p. 10. **Guṇavṛtti** is the term employed by philosophers to describe cases in which a word, when its literal referent is

(*double entendre*) occurs when a single word or set of words simultaneously describes two referents by a process of **tantra**,[2] and defines the figure **vakrokti** ("oblique expression") as "**lakṣaṇā** [figurative signification] based on similarity".[3] In discussing these **alaṃkāras**, the use of well-known philosophical terms is convenient for descriptive purposes. But, for the most part, the **alaṃkāras** and other aspects of poetic language dealt with by these authors have no obvious parallels in the philosophers' analysis of non-poetic language, and there is no systematic effort on the part of these Ālaṃkārikas to account for the poetic phenomena they describe in philosophic terms.

Ānandavardhana focusses his attention not on the typology of poetic features, as his predecessors had for the most part done, but on the processes by which the words of a poem convey to its readers or hearers a particular set of meanings, and on the hierarchical interrelations between these multiple

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contextually impossible, metaphorically ascribes qualities (**guṇas**) of its literal referent to its actual referent. For example, in the expression "That boy is a lion", the word "lion" causes us to understand that the boy being described has the qualities of a lion (fierceness, bravery, etc.). Cf. Śābarabhāṣya on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.4.23 and 3.2.1, and above, Chapter Three, pp. 109-110.

[2]Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra, 4.3.7, Kashi Sanskrit Series #209, pp. 162-3. **Tantra** is an interpretive principle employed by the Mīmāṃsakas to explain how a single act or material in a ritual, or a single word or passage in a text, may simultaneously perform two or more separate functions. Cf. Mīmāṃsāsūtra, 11.1.1ff.

[3]Ibid., pp. 164-5. Cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 109ff.

meanings. In doing so he applies the concepts and tools of philosophical language analysis to the phenomena of literary language in a more thoroughgoing and systematic fashion than did any of the Ālaṃkārikas who preceded him. This approach to the analysis of poetry requires him to bridge the aforementioned terminological and conceptual divide between the paradigms of literary and non-literary language theory. As we shall see, alongside the tripartite classification of **dhvani** into **vastu**, **alaṃkāra**, and **rasa** (categories derived from earlier literary analysis), Ānandavardhana provides a second typology of **dhvani** based on philosophically derived categories.

In addition, Ānandavardhana's contention that the realm of suggestion he examines has gone unnoticed by earlier theorists and must be distinguished from already recognized modes of verbal signification places him in conflict with all the major schools of Sanskrit linguistic philosophy, as they admit only two modes of signification, literal (**abhidhā**) and metaphorical/metonymical (**guṇavṛtti/lakṣaṇā**). Ānandavardhana's third mode of signification (**vyañjanā**--suggestion) must be defended against the objections (actual or hypothetical) of grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas, and logicians (both Naiyāyikas and Buddhists), all of whom wish either to incorporate it within one or both of the accepted modes of signification, or to exclude it altogether from the realm of verbal signification by explaining cases of "suggestion" as

inferences which operate after the meaning of a text has been understood. The defense of **vyañjanā** as an independent mode of signification becomes a major task for Ānandavardhana and his defenders in the ensuing centuries (chiefly Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa), and much of the criticism of the **dhvani**-theory in this period is focussed on this point (e.g. Mukulabhaṭṭa's Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā and Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka).

The Categorization of Dhvani in Philosophic Terms

In the Dhvanyāloka, Ānandavardhana presents two separate and unrelated typologies of **dhvani**. The first subdivides cases of **dhvani** on the basis of the type of meaning which is suggested. Verses or passages containing **dhvani** may suggest an unexpressed **vastu**, **alaṃkāra**, or **rasa**. These three categories of possible suggested meaning are drawn from within the tradition of Alaṃkāraśāstra.[4] The second typological schema classifies cases of **dhvani** based not on their suggested content, but rather on the process by which this suggested content is apprehended, and on the relationship, temporal as well as functional, between the literal and suggested contents of a passage.

In this second schema, instances of **dhvani** are first divided into two broad categories: those in which the directly expressed meaning of a verse, being contradicted or supplanted

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[4]Although the terms **rasa** and **vastu** ("plot" or "narrative content") are drawn originally from dramaturgy (Naṭyaśāstra) rather than Alaṃkāraśāstra, both had been introduced into the vocabulary of the Ālaṃkārikas well before Ānandavardhana's time.

by its suggested meaning, is not literally intended (**avivakṣita-vācya**), and those in which the expressed meaning, although subordinated to the suggested meaning, is literally intended (**vivakṣitānyapara-vācya**).[5]

Each of these categories is further subdivided. Cases of **dhvani** in which the expressed meaning is not literally intended (**avivakṣita**) may be divided into two subclasses: those in which the expressed meaning is totally displaced (**atyanta-tiraskṛta**), and those in which it is transformed into some other (suggested) meaning (**arthāntara-saṃkramita**). The following is given as an example of the first type:

> The moon, its disk obscured by frost and its beauty transferred to the sun, does not shine, like a mirror blinded by breath.[6]

Here the relevant expression is "blinded by breath" (**niḥśvāsāndha**). The use of the word here suggests the obscurity and inability to reflect images clearly of a mirror fogged by breath. A mirror is insentient by nature, and hence the word "blind" cannot be literally applied to it. The expressed meaning of the word is therefore totally displaced

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[5]All cases of **rasa-dhvani** fall into the latter class. In the verse "Śiva, his composure somewhat disturbed... " (quoted above, cf. Chapter Four, p. 130), the description of Śiva's agitation as he gazes at Pārvatī's face is meant to suggest **śṛṅgāra rasa** (which serves as the primary meaning of the verse), and is in no way falsified or contradicted by this suggested **rasa**.

[6]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., p. 172.
ravisaṃkrāntasaubhāgyas tuṣārāvṛtamaṇḍalaḥ/
niḥśvāsandha ivādarśaś candramā na prakāśate//
(Rāmāyaṇa, 3.15.13)

by its suggested sense.[7]

The second variety is exemplified by the following verse:

> The clouds, with cranes wheeling against them, smear the sky with dark, wet, splendor; the winds contain droplets of water; the joyful cries of the friends of the clouds [i.e. the peacocks] are sweet. All right, let them be so! I am Rāma, whose heart is very hard; I can endure all! But how will Sītā survive? Alas, my queen, be strong![8]

The clouds, the moist winds, and the cries of the peacocks are signs of the approaching rainy season, a time when travellers typically return home and separated lovers are reunited. For lovers who cannot be united, the onset of the rains intensifies their longing and heightens the pain of separation. In this verse Rāma laments his separation, during the rains, from Sītā, who has been abducted by Rāvaṇa. Here, the literal meaning of the statement "I am Rāma," although true, is not intended (**vivakṣita**). The intention of this expression is not to communicate the identity of the speaker (which is already known from context), but rather emphasize Rāma's capacity to endure intense suffering by reminding the audience of the many calamities he has endured in the past

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[7]Ānandavardhana's arguments for the distinction of such cases of **dhvani** from ordinary metaphor are examined below (pp. 226-230).

[8]Ibid., pp. 167-8.
snigdhaśyāmalakāntiliptaviyato velladbalākā ghanā
vātāḥ śīkariṇaḥ payodasuhṛdām ānandakekāḥ kalāḥ/
kāmaṃ santu dṛḍhaṃ kaṭhorahṛdayo rāmo 'smi sarvaṃ sahe
vaidehī tu kathaṃ bhaviṣyati hahāhā devi dhīrā bhava//
The source of the verse is not definitely known, but Raghavan suggests that it is probably from Act Two of Yaśovarman's Rāmābhyudaya (cf. Raghavan, Some Old Lost Rāma Plays, p. 20).

(his exile from his father's kingdom, the abduction of Sītā, the death of his father, and so on). Thus the literal meaning of the word "Rāma" is not totally displaced, but is transformed into a further suggested meaning (**arthāntara-saṃkramita**).

Like **avivakṣita-vācya dhvani**, the second major category of **dhvani**, **vivakṣitānyapara-vācya** (in which the literal meaning is intended, but subordinated to another, suggested, meaning) contains two subtypes. In this case, where both the literal and suggested meanings of a verse are intended, it is the apparent temporal relationship between these two meanings which serves as the basis for subdivision. When a particular **rasa** is suggested by a verse, it is not experienced by the reader or hearer as something separate from, and subsequent to, the directly expressed meaning of the verse. It may be shown by careful analysis that this **rasa** is a separate meaning occasioned by the presence, in the expressed meaning, of a particular set of aesthetic factors (**vibhāvas**, **anubhāvas**, and **vyabhicāribhāvas**), and that the audience's apprehension of **rasa** is therefore necessarily subsequent to its understanding of the expressed meaning of the verse.[9] However, for a sensitive observer, the sequence between the apprehension of the expressed meaning and the **rasa** it suggests will be so rapid as to go unnoticed. Instances of **dhvani** in which **rasa** is suggested are therefore termed **asaṃlakṣya-krama** ("in which

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[9]Cf. Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 403-413.

sequence is unnoticed").

Where the expressed meaning is intended, but subordinated to some suggested meaning other than **rasa** (i.e. a suggested **vastu** or **alaṃkāra**), the succession between the two meanings will necessarily be apparent. Such cases are therefore termed **saṃlakṣya-krama** ("in which sequence is noticed"). For example,

> While the divine sage [Nārada] was speaking thus, Pārvatī, at her father's side, with face downcast, counted the petals on her play-lotus.[10]

Nārada has come as an envoy to arrange Pārvatī's marriage with Śiva. The expression "counted the petals on her play-lotus" describes Pārvatī's actions, and thereby suggests that she is embarrassed by the discussion of her upcoming marriage. Here the suggested meaning is understood from conscious reflection on the literal meaning of the verse, and the sequential relationship between the two meanings is thus apparent. Because of the noticeable interval between our understanding of these two meanings, this type of **dhvani** is also described as **anuraṇana-rūpa** ("having the form of a reverberation").

Saṃlakṣya-krama dhvani is further subdivided into two classes depending on whether the suggested meaning depends on the suggestive power of a particular (expressed) meaning (**arthaśakti-mūla**) or depends on the suggestive power of a

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[10]Ibid., p. 248.
evaṃvādini devarṣau pārśve pitur adhomukhī/
līlākamalapattrāṇi gaṇayām āsa pārvatī//
(Kālidāsa, Kumārasaṃbhava 6.84)

particular word or set of words (**śabdaśaktimūla**). The verse just quoted is an example of the first type. The second type, in which the presence of polysemic words suggests a *double entendre*, is exemplified by the passage "At that time the great season..." (cf. above, Chapter Four, p. 170).

Ānandavardhana's second typology classifies **dhvani** on the basis of the process by which we apprehend suggested meaning, rather than the content of this suggested meaning. This emphasis on the processes of linguistic cognition is largely absent from earlier works on Alaṃkāraśāstra, and reflects an unprecedented effort on Ānandavardhana's part to give an account of the semantic functioning of poetry in philosophic terms. The distinction between meanings which are "meant to be expressed" (**vivakṣita**) and "not meant to be expressed" (**avivakṣita**), which serves as the primary basis of classification, plays a major role in the Mīmāṃsakas' system of textual interpretation, as we have seen.[11] The close attention devoted to the succession of multiple stages of meaning likewise shows a Mīmāṃsā influence.

Vyañjanā as a Distinct Mode of Verbal Signification

While this classificatory system thus applies the conceptual tools of linguistic philosophy, particularly Mīmāṃsā, to the analysis of meaning in poetry, it applies them to a variety of meaning hitherto unrecognized by philosophers of language. Ānandavardhana contends that **dhvani** depends on

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[11]Cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 98ff.

a mode of verbal signification distinct from those modes already known to philosophers of language, **abhidhā** (denotation, direct expression) and **guṇavṛtti** (secondary or figurative expression-- a category comprising both metaphor and metonymy). This third mode of signification he calls **vyañjanā** (suggestion, manifestation).[12]

Ānandavardhana's defense of this third mode against the attacks of the upholders of the various established schools of linguistic philosophy is two-pronged. He attempts to show that **vyañjanā**, because its importance is confined largely to poetic rather than ordinary language, lies properly outside the scope of general linguistic philosophy.[13] In addition, he attempts to show that the theory of **vyañjanā** does not truly

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[12]**Vyañjanā** is conventionally rendered as "suggestion" in secondary literature on Alaṃkāraśāstra in English. This translation, while it accords fairly well with Ānandavardhana's use of the term, fails to capture the more general meaning of the term as employed in other fields. As a technical term it appears to have its roots in Sāṃkhya (cf. Sāṃkhyakārikā 10 and Vācaspatimiśra's Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī thereon). It refers to the process by which a pre-existent but imperceptible entity becomes apparent; for example, when a lamp illuminates a pot placed in a previously darkened room. The term might be more accurately, albeit somewhat awkwardly, be translated as "revelation", or "manifestation". The conventional translation will be retained here, but these further connotations should be borne in mind. For a critique of Ānandavardhana's application of the term in the realm of linguistic comprehension cf. Mahimabhatta's Vyaktiviveka (Kashi Sanskrit Series 121, pp. 80ff) and below Chapter Ten (pp. 478-481).

[13]Although, as we shall see below (cf. pp. 216-221), **vyañjanā** plays a role in our understanding of expressions in ordinary language as well, Ānandavardhana argues that the meaning conveyed thereby is separately intended (**vivakṣita**) only in poetic contexts, and therefore tends to go unnoticed in ordinary language.

conflict with the theories of language advanced by the grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas, and logicians, and therefore can be accepted without any difficulty by adherents of any of these theories. These theorists, being concerned either with ordinary language or the language of the Veda, have made no serious attempt to account for those linguistic processes specific to poetry; the concept of **vyañjanā** is introduced only to explain these specifically poetic processes, and its adoption thus need not conflict with theories of ordinary or Vedic language offered previously.

The several varieties of suggestion manifested in literature and the other arts are part of they everyday experience of cultured persons (although they have not, before Ānandavardhana, been grouped together and described by a single term). The proper concern of philosophical speculation, Ānandavardhana contends, is that which lies beyond our ordinary experience.

> All the disputes of philosophers [**tārkikāṇām**] are concerned with something extraordinary, not with what is ordinary [**laukika**]. For they are not seen to disagree with one another about some entity which is perceptible to the whole world and which is uncontradicted [by any other perception], such as blueness, sweetness, etc. For, one who calls a blue thing "blue", when there is no conflicting perception, is not contradicted by another saying, "This isn't blue, this is yellow." In just the same way, the suggestiveness of all these-- of words, which convey an expressed meaning, of the sounds of a song, which convey no expressed meaning, and of gestures and so on, which do not consist of sounds at all-- is established by experience; who could reject this? Expressions and actions of various sorts which convey

> some beautiful, non-verbal[14] meaning, either in combination or separately, are seen in the assemblies of cultured people. What rational person, wishing to avoid ridicule for himself, would deny these things?[15]

The communication of unstated meanings plays an important role not only in poetry, but in music and dance as well. The capacity of words, sounds, and gestures to convey such meanings is well known to all cultured people, and should thus be accepted by adherents of all philosophical schools, just as, whatever their metaphysical views may be, they all accept the validity of ordinary perception.

This appeal to everyday experience, however, while it plainly establishes the reality of the communicative processes Ānandavardhana wishes to designate by the term **vyañjanā**, does not conclusively demonstrate the need to postulate **vyañjanā** as a separate mode of signification. The poetic processes referred to by the term **vyañjanā**, although they have been thus far neglected by philosophers of ordinary and Vedic language, could possibly be accounted for as instances of one or another of the well-known modes of signification dealt with by earlier language theorists. Ānandavardhana is forced to defend the independence of **vyañjanā** against the arguments of those who would explain cases of **dhvani** as instances of direct expression (**abhidhā, vācakatva**), of metaphorical/metonymical usage (**guṇavṛtti** or **lakṣaṇā**), or of inference which operates

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[14]That is, not directly stated.

[15]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 446-7.

subsequent to the understanding of the expressed meaning of the sentence in question.

The Differentiation of Suggestion from Direct Expression

It may seem paradoxical for an objector to assert that **dhvani** can be explained as a type of direct expression (**vācakatva**). The argument depends upon the view, common to the grammarians and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, that the complete sentence, rather than the individual word, is the basic unit of linguistic expression.[16]

For the grammarians (chiefly Bhartṛhari and his

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[16]Ānandvardhana seems to intend this argument to apply only to the Prābhākaras. At one point (pp. 443-4) he asserts that, since the concept of **dhvani** itself was drawn from the grammarians (who use the term to refer to speech sounds which manifest verbal meaning), there can be no question of a dispute with the grammarians over the existence of **dhvani**. But even Ānandavardhana's staunchest defender, Abhinavagupta, realizes that this view is untenable. Like the Prābhākaras, the grammarians believe that complete sentences express complete sentence meanings by a single semantic process; Ānandavardhana's theory of suggestion demands the existence of several distinct semantic processes, and so must be defended against the views of both grammarians and Prābhākaras. The arguments offered against the inclusion of suggestion within the scope of direct expression apply equally well to both--(cf. Abhinavagupta's commentary [Locana] on Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 16 and 415-416, and below, Chapter Nine, pp. 444-446). Abhinavagupta (Locana, p. 415) claims that this argument refutes the view of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas as well, but in this he is clearly mistaken: the Bhāṭṭas would not explain Ānandavardhana's suggestion as a type of direct expression and should be classified among those who would include suggestion within the scope of figurative expression (**lakṣaṇā**)-- cf. below, pp. 221ff). Abhinavagupta asserts (p. 416) that the Bhāṭṭas regard the overall meaning of a sentence meaning as something directly expressed (**vācya**), yet we have seen (above, Chapter Three, pp. 115-117) that they believe sentence meanings (and, indeed, all meanings apart from the universal class-properties denoted by individual words) to be conveyed by a process of figurative expression.

followers), the sentence and its meaning are indivisible, partless entities. The division of sentences into component words, like the division of words themselves into morphological components (stem, root, suffix, etc.), is merely an artificial construction of language theorists, an abstraction useful for purposes of grammatical analysis and instruction, but not corresponding to any real division in the sentence, which is conceived of as a metaphysical unity.

The Prābhākaras do not deny the metaphysical reality of individual words, but contend that words are able to express meanings only when construed in the form of sentences (the doctrine of **anvitābhidhāna-vāda**-- cf. above, Chapter Three, p. 116). Human discourse, through observation of which we acquire our understanding of language, is invariably conducted in the form of sentences. By observing the use of words in a variety of sentences we are able, by a process of abstraction, to understand the semantic function of specific words, and thereby to understand even previously unheard sentences. Nevertheless, in practice these words are invariably employed and understood as parts of complete sentences. It is therefore, properly speaking, the sentence itself, rather than the individual words, which expresses meaning (although the individual words play a causal role in producing our awareness of this sentence meaning).

Thus for both the Prābhākaras and the grammarians it is the sentence as a whole which expresses meaning. Given this

view, it becomes possible to explain even cases of **dhvani** through an all-encompassing expressive function (**vācakatva**). The opponent grants that Ānandavardhana has established that words may deviate from their ordinary meaning in certain contexts; it is only to the characterization of such meaning as suggested (**vyañgya**) that he objects.[17] If, as Ānandavardhana contends, the "suggested" meaning, in sentences containing **dhvani**, is invariably the predominant meaning, it is improper and indeed contradictory to describe this meaning as anything other than expressed (**vācya**). The defining characteristic of a sentence, as we have seen (cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 75ff), is that it is directed toward a single meaning or purpose (**artha**). If the meaning conveyed by **dhvani** is what the sentence as a whole is primarily meant to convey, it is, *ipso facto*, what is expressed by that sentence. The (hypothetical) proponent of this view argues as follows:

> Where this ["suggested"] meaning is established as primary, it may appropriately be termed **vācya** [expressed], since the sentence is primarily directed toward it. And therefore the semantic function of the sentence which reveals this meaning is only expressiveness. What need is there to postulate any other function [such as suggestion] for this sentence? Therefore, whatever meaning is the object of [the speaker's] intent, that is, primarily, what is expressed. Whatever intermediate understanding there may be of other expressed meanings in such a case is merely a means for the understanding of the primary meaning; just as the understanding of word meanings is merely a means for the understanding of sentence meaning.[18]

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[17]Dhvanyāloka, p. 414.

[18]Ibid., pp. 414-15.

Ānandavardhana himself earlier drew an analogy between the understanding of sentence meaning from word meanings and the understanding of suggested meaning from expressed meaning.[19] When the meaning of the sentence as a whole is understood, the meanings of its individual words are no longer separately apparent. Likewise, once we understand fully the intended meaning of a sentence, including any implied or "suggested" sense, any intermediate stages of awareness or "meaning" which have led to this understanding will be displaced by our awareness of the meaning of the whole. Any sentence must, by definition, convey a single, coherent meaning. However complex the series of cognitions by which we come to understand it, it is this final, complete, meaning which is "expressed" by a sentence. Because every coherent sentence, in poetry or in any other form of discourse, must convey one and only one meaning, and because all discourse is conducted in the form of sentences, we need speak only of one all-encompassing semantic function, namely "expressiveness" (**vācakatva**). There is consequently no need to postulate any additional mode of signification, such as **vyañjanā**, to account for those varieties of poetic meaning designated by the term **dhvani**.

This attempt to explain all semantic processes by a means of a single, "expressive" verbal function cannot,

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[19]Ibid., p. 100; cf. also above, Chapter Four, pp. 135-136.

Ānandavardhana contends, adequately account for the process of verbal understanding involved in cases of **dhvani**.[20] Given that there *are* intermediate stages of understanding, in cases of **dhvani**, between our hearing the words of a verse and our grasping of its full meaning (including any implied or suggested sense), one must necessarily accept that these words perform more than one semantic function. Wherever such multiple meaning-stages exist, some word (or group of words), having conveyed its own meaning, further causes us to understand some other meaning. For example, in the verse "The moon, its disk obscured by frost and its beauty transferred to the sun, does not shine, like a mirror blinded by breath," (cf. above, p. 199), the word "blinded" (**andha**), having conveyed its literal sense, causes us to understand that the mirror in question is clouded and non-reflective.

The communication of literal and non-literal meanings by the same word or words cannot be attributed to the operation of a single expressive function. In such cases we are aware of two distinct, successive semantic operations. These two operations differ both in their nature (**rūpa**) and in their semantic content (**viṣaya**), and hence cannot be identified with one another.[21] Expressiveness is a property of words and words alone, while even wordless songs and silent gestures may be suggestive of some meaning (i.e. **rasa**). Given the

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[20]Ibid., pp. 416ff.

[21]Ibid., p. 416.

possibility of suggestiveness even in the absence of any expressive content whatsoever, the difference in nature between these two operations is plainly apparent.

Even when these two operations do occur together, they differ in the content they convey. In the previous example, the word "**andha**" directly expresses only its own literal meaning, "blinded". That further meaning which we understand in this context, "clouded", is conveyed only by suggestion. The first of these meanings is understood directly from the word itself, the second only indirectly, depending on our understanding of the first meaning and on the limitations of context.

> The expressive capacity of a particular word is its fixed essence [**ātmā**], since it is seen to be invariably connected with that word beginning from the time that we learn it. But this [suggestiveness] is not fixed, since it depends on particular conditions. For this will be understood through the limitation imposed by factors such as context, and otherwise [i.e. in the absence of such factors] will not be understood.[22]

The word "**andha**" will always express its literal meaning, even in contexts where this meaning is subsequently displaced or supplemented by some further suggested meaning. Possible suggested meanings of the word will be understood only occasionally and in dependence on context, the presumed intent of the speaker, and other factors apart from the word

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[22]Ibid., pp. 436-7.

itself.[23] The fact that words convey two sorts of meanings (invariable and context-dependent) cannot be explained unless we postulate more than one semantic function. Thus the expressive and suggestive functions of words can be differentiated on the basis of the semantic content they convey, even in situations where both are operative.

The relationship between the expressed meaning of a sentence and the suggested meaning we understand from it is not, as the objector contends, fully analogous to that between the meanings of individual words and of the sentences they comprise.

> The analogy of word meaning and sentence meaning does not apply to expressed and suggested meanings, since some wise people [e.g. Bhartṛhari and the grammarians] contend that the understanding of word meaning is unreal, and since even those who do not admit its unreality [i.e. the Prābhākaras][24] must accept that the analogy of a pot and its material cause [i.e. clay] applies to sentence meanings and word meanings. For just as, when a pot has been formed, its material cause is not perceived as something separate from it, in the same way, when a sentence or its meaning is understood, the words and their meanings are not perceived as something separate. If they were perceived separately, the understanding of the sentence meaning itself would be displaced [given the requirement that a sentence convey a single, unitary meaning]. But this analogy does not apply to expressed and suggested meanings; for, when the suggested meaning is understood, understanding of the expressed meaning is not displaced, since the suggested meaning appears along with the expressed meaning.[25]

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[23]The argument is strongly reminiscent of Śabara's defense of the notion of secondary (metaphorical) signification-- cf. Bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 3.2.1.

[24]Abhinavagupta, as before, includes the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas as well-- cf. above, p. 207.

[25]Ibid., pp. 419-421.

Unlike word and sentence meanings, the expressed and suggested meanings of a verse may be simultaneously and distinctly cognized. When a verse, having communicated its literal meaning, suggests some **rasa**, for example, our understanding of this **rasa** does not in any way obstruct or supplant our understanding of the literal meaning. A proper analogy for the relationship between these two meanings would be not that of word- and sentence-meaning (or of a pot and the clay it consists of), but that of a lamp and an object illumined by it. When a lamp is lit in a darkened room it becomes visible, and further makes visible any other object in the room, without itself ceasing to be visible. Likewise, our understanding of the expressed meaning of a verse, even when some **rasa** is suggested by means of it, does not itself cease to be apparent.

This model of the suggestive process, however, raises a further objection; if the expressed meaning of a sentence does not recede from our awareness once its suggested meaning has been understood, and the two meanings are therefore simultaneously apparent, the sentence as a whole will be incoherent-- will, in fact, not be a sentence at all.

> The sentence would be simultaneously connected with two meanings, and if this were the case the sentence could not even be a sentence, since this has unity of meaning as its defining characteristic.[26]

We have seen that, for the Mīmāṃsakas, the necessary and

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[26]Ibid., p. 421.

defining characteristic of the sentence is that it convey a unitary sense. Any expression which fails to do so will suffer from the fault of **vākyabheda** ("splitting of the sentence"-- cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 85ff).

Ānandavardhana's response to this objection itself relies on Mīmāṃsā interpretive principles. The simultaneous awareness of the expressed and suggested meanings of a single sentence is acceptable so long as these two meanings are integrated in a single purposive framework.[27] When a sentence causes us to understand both an expressed and a suggested meaning, these two meanings will invariably be related as primary and subordinate meanings of the sentence in question.[28] If the suggested meaning is predominant and the expressed meaning is subordinated to it, the sentence in question will be described as an instance of **dhvani**. If the suggested meaning is subordinate and the expressed meaning predominant (as in the case of **alaṃkāras** such as **paryāyokta**, **dīpaka**, or **rasavat**-- cf. above, pp. 157ff), the sentence will be described as an instance of **guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya** ("[poetry] in which the suggested meaning is secondary").[29] Thus, the

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[27]Cf. the discussion of **viśiṣṭa-vidhāna** ("qualified injunction")-- above, Chapter Three, pp. 89ff.

[28]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 421-422.

[29]Ānandavardhana classifies **kāvya** (poetry) into three broad types, based on the status of suggested meaning within it-- **dhvani kāvya**, in which suggested meaning predominates, **guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya**, in which it is present but subordinate, and **citra kāvya**, in which there is no suggested meaning whatsoever. The first of these represents, for

simultaneous apprehension of expressed and suggested senses does not vitiate the unitary character required for a coherent sentence.

Ānandavardhana contends that the Mīmāṃsakas must accept suggestion as a distinct semantic function not only to account for the multiple non-literal meanings encountered in poetry, but even to explain the distinction between Vedic and human language.[30] The crucial property of Vedic language is its unfailing reliability, and the argument for the impossibility of error in the Veda depends on its being impersonal (**apauruṣeya**) and not the product of any author, either human or divine. Falsity is always a possibility in personal (**pauruṣeya**) language, due to some flaw in its author, such as error or deceit. If a text has no author, there is no possibility that it will be vitiated in this way.

We have seen that for the Mīmāṃsakas the connection of a word with its (expressed) meaning is necessarily eternal and uncreated. If words can express only these eternally fixed meanings, and if a sentence's meaning is purely a function of the expressed meanings of its component words, there can be no meaningful distinction between authored and authorless

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Ānandavardhana, the ideal to be striven for by contemporary poets as well as the norm in the works of the greatest poets in the past, and consequently receives the lion's share of his attention in the Dhvanyāloka. The latter two classes of poetry, because they diverge from this ideal, give rise to certain theoretical problems which will be considered in detail in Chapter Six.

[30]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 438ff.

sentences as regards their truth or falsity. If this distinction is to be maintained, it is essential to postulate some conditional (**aupādhika**), non-invariable semantic capacity in words when they are employed by speakers or authors.

> If this [conditional semantic function] is not accepted by the Mīmāṃsaka, given the eternality of the connection between word and meaning, there can be no distinction between impersonal and personal sentences in the communication of their meanings. However, if this [conditional function] is accepted, falseness will be possible for personal sentences, on which another, conditional semantic function has been superimposed in conformity with [the speaker's] personal intention, even without the deviation of the words from their expressed meanings.[31]

When we hear personal (i.e. non-Vedic, non-authorless) sentences, what we understand from them primarily is the intention of the speaker who employs them. In support of this claim Abhinavagupta (Locana, p. 440) cites a remark from Śabara's Bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.2 (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97 [second ed.], p. 18): "The understanding that arises from a personal utterance is 'This person believes thus', not 'This thing is so.'" Such statements inform us not about the true state of things, but about the state of mind of the speaker who makes them. Any conclusion we draw about the actual state of things based on such statements requires a further process of deduction based on our estimate of the reliability and competence of the speaker in question.

The speaker's expressive intent is not directly expressed by the words of the sentence, yet it is understood when we

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[31]Ibid., pp. 438-9.

hear these words and must therefore be regarded as part of their meaning. Thus, if the Mīmāṃsakas wish to maintain a distinction between infallible, impersonal, Vedic language and fallible human language, they must accept some context-dependent, conditional semantic function for words in addition to their expressive function. This conditional semantic capacity is nothing other than suggestiveness.

This argument, however, gives rise to a further difficulty.[32] If this suggestiveness is a feature necessarily belonging to all personal, non-Vedic utterances, it can no longer be considered a special feature of poetic language, as Ānandavardhana has so far presented it. *All* non-Vedic utterances would have to be regarded as instances of suggestion.

While admitting that suggestiveness is a property of all human language, Ānandavardhana contends that in poetry this function of language takes on a special and unique importance which distinguishes it from the suggestive aspect of non-poetic language. **Dhvani** is not coterminous with suggestiveness. The suggested meanings conveyed by everyday language, while they must necessarily exist, are not ordinarily recognized separately from the expressed meanings with which they co-occur. For example, if a speaker tells us "There are fruits on the river-bank" (to employ a common Mīmāṃsā example), we understand (by suggestion) that speaker's

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[32]Ibid., p. 441ff.

communicative intention (i.e. "This person believes that there are fruits on the river-bank," or "This person wishes me to believe there are fruits on the river-bank"). This kind of suggestion is so much a part of the ordinary process of understanding human language that it generally passes unnoticed.

However, this is not the case in poetry. As we have seen, the suggested meaning conveyed by a verse may actually contradict its expressed meaning. In the verse,

> Wander confidently, Monk; that dog [which frightened you] has been killed today by the lion who dwells in the creeper-bower on the banks of the Godāvarī,[33]

the expressed sense is a command that the monk should wander, while we understand by suggestion that the speaker intends to prevent him from so doing by frightening him. In such a case the expressed and suggested senses, because they stand in contradiction with one another, cannot but be recognized as distinct meanings. Even where there is no such contradiction, the suggested meanings conveyed by poetry are ordinarily apprehended separately from the expressed meanings with which they co-occur. Ānandavardhana has already stipulated that the term **dhvani** applies only to verses or works in which the suggested meaning is predominant and the expressed meaning of only secondary importance. This predominance in and of itself necessitates that the suggested meaning in such cases be apprehended as something distinct from what is directly

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[33]Cited above, Chapter Four, p. 128.

expressed and thus serves to differentiate suggestion as it functions in poetry from that type of suggestion which is necessarily a factor in all human discourse.

Ānandavardhana explains this differentiation between the role of suggestion in everyday and in poetic discourse in terms of the Mīmāṃsā concept of **vivakṣā**.[34] Sentences employed in everyday human discourse necessarily convey a suggested meaning, but this suggested meaning is not ordinarily what is meant to be expressed (**vivakṣita**) by such sentences. To return to our earlier example, when one states that "There are fruits on the river-bank," what one means to express is not that one believes or wishes one's hearers to believe that there are fruits on the river-bank, but rather that there are, in fact, fruits on the river-bank. One's belief that this is so and one's intention to convey this to one's hearers can be understood from the very nature of the communicative act, but are incidental to the meaning one wishes to express. Poets, by contrast, use the suggestive capacity of language consciously and deliberately. The suggested meanings they convey through their verses are part of what is meant to be expressed (**vivakṣita**) by these verses, and in cases of **dhvani**, are by definition what is meant to be expressed primarily.

This line of argument serves a dual function, defending

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[34]Ibid., pp. 441-443. For the role of **vivakṣā** in Mīmāṃsā, cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 98ff.

the autonomy of suggestion (**vyañjanā**) against the attacks (real or hypothetical) of those who would subsume it under an all-encompassing expressive (**vācaka**) function of language by showing it to play a necessary role in all human communication, while simultaneously maintaining that it is a function of language which becomes uniquely significant only in the language of poetry. Thus the existence of suggestion as a separate semantic function must be conceded by language-theorists in general, but the detailed study of its nature and function remains the special concern of poetic analysis.

The Differentiation of Suggestion from Figurative Expression

Ānandavardhana's attempt to formulate a clear distinction between suggested and figurative meaning is somewhat more problematic than his effort to differentiate suggestion from direct expression, and becomes a focus of considerable controversy among Ālaṃkārikas in the ensuing centuries. Indian linguistic philosophers had, for many hundreds of years before Ānandavardhana's time, accounted for the non-literal usage of words (in both Vedic and human discourse) under the general rubric of "metaphorical" or "figurative" language (**guṇavṛtti**, **upacāra**, **bhakti** and/or **lakṣaṇā**).[35] Suggestion, as conceived of by Ānandavardhana, bears certain obvious similarities to such figurative usage. In both, words are

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[35]Typically, the terms **upacāra** and **guṇavṛtti** specifically denote metaphorical usage, and **lakṣaṇā** non-metaphorical figurative usage (i.e. metonymy, synecdoche, irony), but all four terms are sometimes applied to figurative language in general.

employed so as to convey some meaning above and beyond the ordinary, literal meaning with which they are invariably associated. In both, the capacity of words to convey such non-literal meanings depends on the context in which they are used. Thus, an obvious course of argument for those objecting to the introduction of **vyañjanā** (suggestion) as a new semantic function is to account for the non-literal, context-dependent poetic meanings termed "suggested" by Ānandavardhana in terms of those concepts already developed in philosophical circles to explain non-literal, context-dependent meanings as they occur in non-poetic language.

Ānandavardhana, anxious as always to emphasize the novelty of his theory and sensitive, as we have seen (cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 122ff), to the charge that he is merely redescribing and renaming phenomena already known, rejects any effort to include either **dhvani** or, more generally, **vyañjanā** within the scope of figurative expression. The distinction between suggestive and figurative usage is discussed at length in two passages of the Dhvanyāloka. The first (**kārikās** 1.14-19 with **vṛtti** [pp. 141-164]) rejects the identification of **dhvani** in particular with figurative expression, and does so primarily on empirical grounds, citing illustrations of figurative expression which must be excluded from the realm of **dhvani** and vice-versa; the second (pp. 423-436-- part of the extremely long **vṛtti** on **kārikā** 3.33, which considers and rejects a long series of philosophical

objections to the existence of suggestion) argues for the differentiation of suggestion in general[36] from figurative usage, and examines in greater detail the mechanisms by which suggestive and figurative expressions convey their meanings. These two discussions, while they overlap to a certain extent, raise slightly different issues, and will be treated separately.

The argument for the differentiation of **dhvani** in particular from figurative expression proceeds as follows: **Dhvani** cannot be identified with figurative expression, nor can figurative expression be regarded as a defining feature (**lakṣaṇa**) of **dhvani**, as these two modes of expression are simply not co-extensive.[37] Any attempt to define **dhvani** by means of figurative expression will suffer from the flaws of over-extension (**ativyāpti**) and under-extension (**avyāpti**); that is to say, there are cases of figurative usage which cannot be designated as **dhvani** and cases of **dhvani** which cannot accepted as instances of figurative usage.

To illustrate the over-extended scope of figurative usage with respect to **dhvani**, Ānandavardhana cites numerous verses in which poets employ metaphors or other figurative expressions which, because they are thoroughly conventional and add no special beauty to the verses in question, cannot be

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[36]Of which, as we have already seen, **dhvani** is only a sub-type, albeit one of paramount importance for literary language as Ānandavardhana understands it.

[37]Ibid., pp. 141ff.

called **dhvani**. For example:

> Wilted on both ends by contact with her swelling breasts and hips; fresh in between, not having made contact with the middle of her body; disarranged by the flailing movements of her creeper-like arms-- this bed of lotus petals tells [**vadati**] of the affliction of this emaciated woman.[38]

Here, the word **vadati** ("tells") is employed metaphorically; the bed of lotus petals does not actually speak, but its wilting where it has been pressed by her body and its dishevelled condition make known to the observer the love-fever of the woman who has lain there, and it can thus be said, figuratively, to "speak". This metaphorical expression, however, is merely a conventional manner of speaking, and the beauty of the verse in no way derives from it.

Some figurative usage is so thoroughly conventionalized that it may not even be recognized as figurative. The word **lāvaṇya**, for example, is used very frequently in the sense of "beauty" or "charm", but its literal, etymologically derived meaning is "saltiness". In classical Sanskrit poetry, however, the word is employed almost exclusively in its metaphorical sense of "beauty", to such an extent that "beauty" becomes, for all practical purposes, the primary meaning of the word. Such "dead metaphors" obviously add no particular beauty to an expression, being, in effect, no

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[38]Ibid., p. 143.
parimlānaṃ pīnastanajaghanasaṅgād ubhayatas
    tanor madhyasyāntaḥ parimilanam aprāpya haritam/
idaṃ vyastanyāsaṃ ślathabhujalatākṣepavalanaiḥ
    kṛśāṅgyāḥ saṃtāpaṃ vadati bisinīpatraśayanam//
(Harṣa, Ratnāvalī 2.11)

different from literal usage.[39]

Ānandavardhana would restrict the application of the term **dhvani** to those non-literal forms of expression which lend some special beauty to a verse.

> A word which, functioning suggestively, reveals some beauty which could not be conveyed by any other mode of expression will fall within the scope of the term **dhvani**.[40]

Conventional and "dead" metaphors of the sort just exemplified are thus excluded from the realm of **dhvani**. The existence of figurative usage which cannot be included within the category of **dhvani** establishes the over-extensiveness (**ativyāpti**) of the former with respect to the latter.

The under-extensiveness (**avyāpti**) of figurative usage with respect to **dhvani** is explained as follows: It is an essential feature of all figurative expression that the literal meanings of words employed figuratively should be supplanted, rather than supplemented, by the figurative meanings they convey (cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 109ff and below, pp. 232-235). By this standard, the entire category of **vivakṣitānyapara-vācya dhvani** (cf. above, pp. 199ff) would be necessarily excluded from the realm of figurative expression.[41] As we have already seen in the discussion of the differentiation between suggestion and direct expression

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[39]As Kumārila explains-- cf. <u>Tantravārttika</u> (on 3.1.12), op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 46 (also below, Chapter Seven, p. 330).

[40]<u>Dhvanyāloka</u>, op. cit., p. 146.

[41]<u>Dhvanyāloka</u>, pp. 151-2.

(above, pp. 213-214), Ānandavardhana explains the relationship between literal meanings and the further suggested meanings that arise from them as analagous to that between a lamp and the objects illumined by it-- our awareness of the former is not displaced by our subsequent awareness of the latter; rather, we remain aware of both simultaneously. This in itself is enough to demonstrate that there are cases of **dhvani** which cannot be explained as instances of figurative usage, and thereby that the latter category is under-extensive with respect to the former.

Even where the two categories appear to overlap (as in instances of **avivakṣita-vācya dhvani**-- cf. above, pp. 199ff), they cannot be identified with one another. For figurative expression of any kind to take place it is necessary that there should be some obstacle to our understanding a word or phrase in its literal sense, as a word will always, insofar as this is possible, be understood literally. Words used figuratively, because they require some such obstacle to prevent their being understood literally, are said to be **skhaladgati** ("proceeding with a stumbling gait," i.e. conveying their meaning by an indirect path).[42]

In every case of figurative usage which is not purely

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[42]Ibid., p. 148. The term **skhaladgati** is applied to words conveying a figurative sense by Dharmakīrti (Pramāṇavārttika, 2.37 [ed. R.C. Pandeya, Motilal Barnarsidass, Delhi, 1989, p. 72]). I can find no other use of the term in this sense prior to Ānandavardhana.

conventionalized, there must be some motive (**prayojana**[43]) which justifies the application of words outside of their literal meanings. While our understanding of a secondary, non-literal meaning in such a case is arrived at through figurative expression, our understanding of the **prayojana** on which this figurative expression depends cannot be so.

> [**Kārikā**:] When a meaning is revealed by figurative expression [**guṇavṛtti**], bypassing the primary [i.e. literal] mode of expression, the word [employed figuratively] does not operate indirectly [**skhaladgati**] with respect to the result [**phala**] toward which the figurative usage is directed.

> [**Vṛtti**:] For, in such a case, if the word operated indirectly with respect to the purpose [**prayojana**] to be achieved-- namely, the revelation of some meaning such that it is characterized by a high degree of beauty-- then the use of the word would in fact be objectionable.[44]

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[43]**Prayojana** is understood here in a sense quite different from that in which the Mīmāṃsakas explain **prayojana** as a necessary condition of figurative usage (cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 111-112). For the Mīmāṃsakas, the figuratively expressed meaning must have some useful application (**prayojana**) in the appropriate (ritual) context. It is this criterion of usefulness that allows us to determine which of the many possible figurative senses of a term should be understood in any particular case. Ānandavardhana and the Ālaṃkārikas who come after him understand the need for a **prayojana** in cases of figurative usage not as the requirement that the particular meaning expressed figuratively should apply usefully in the relevant context (this seems to be taken for granted), but rather that the resort to figurative expression itself should serve some communicative purpose (i.e. that there should be some reason for describing something figuratively rather than by a term which literally denotes it). While I have not been able to trace its history in any detail, this different understanding of **prayojana** is not original to Ānandavardhana; Dharmakīrti (c. 650) uses the term in this sense in his own commentary on Pramāṇavārttika 3.1 (ibid., p. 170).

[44]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 149-50.

When metaphors or other figurative expressions are employed in poetry for aesthetic effect (and not purely through conventional usage, as in the examples given above), their purpose is to impart some special beauty which could not be achieved by literal usage.[45] The indirection which characterizes figurative expression depends on the existence of some obstacle preventing us from understanding a word literally, and on our circumvention of this obstacle by concluding that the word in question is being applied to some referent other than its literal one. Once we have understood this figurative application, our further apprehension of the **prayojana** of this usage, the beauty it imparts to the verse or sentence in which it is employed, does not arise in a

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[45]It is clear from the remarks just cited as well as from his later comments on the role of suggestion in poetically effective metaphors (pp. 432-436) that, for Ānandavardhana, the **prayojana** involved in such figurative expressions is nothing more nor less than the beauty (**cārutva**) they impart to the verses in which they are employed. Modern commentators (cf. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 148; Ingalls, The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana, p. 186, n.1), reading Abhinavagupta's and Mammaṭa's understanding of **prayojana** back into Ānandavardhana's work, generally take the **prayojana** referred to by Ānandavardhana to be some further suggested content which the figurative usage causes us to understand. In the stock example **gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ** ("A village on the Ganges"), the metonymical use of the word Ganges in the sense of "the bank of the Ganges" is taken to suggest that the village in question partakes of the properties of the river (coolness, purity, holiness, etc.), and the suggestion of these properties is taken to be the **prayojana** which justifies the metaphorical usage. There is nothing in Ānandavardhana's remarks on **prayojana** to suggest that he understands it in this way; this explanation of **prayojana** (and this interpretation of the example **gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ**) seems to originate with Mukulabhaṭṭa (cf. below, Chapter Seven, pp. 351-354 and Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā [Vidyābhavana Saṃskṛta Granthamālā 165], p. 53.).

similarly circuitous manner-- there is no obstacle to our apprehending it directly. If there were such an obstacle to our apprehending the beauty of the expression, this would constitute an aesthetic flaw (**doṣa**).[46] The **prayojana** of any figurative expression, because it is not stated directly and cannot itself be understood through figurative expression, must be conveyed by some additional semantic function, namely suggestion. Thus in all cases of **avivakṣita-vācya dhvani** there are necessarily two semantic operations, one figurative and one suggestive. In the example "like a mirror blinded by breath" (cf. above, p. 199) the word **andha** ("blind") is employed metaphorically in the sense of "clouded", "obscured". The **prayojana** for this metaphorical usage is the beauty it imparts to the verse, which is conveyed by suggestion and on the basis of which the expression is regarded as an instance of **dhvani**.[47] Thus, even where **dhvani** and figurative

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[46]As Abhinavagupta further points out, if our understanding of the **prayojana** of a figurative expression were itself arrived at through figurative expression, this second figurative operation would require a **prayojana** of its own, and an infinite regress would result-- cf. below, Chapter Nine, pp. 438-440.

[47]Exactly why it is that such a metaphorical expression is more beautiful than a direct statement is something not clearly explained here (or, to my knowledge, elsewhere in the Alaṃkāra tradition), but it is a basic and largely unquestioned principle for many Ālaṃkārikas that indirect or oblique modes of expression are, generally, to be preferred to direct ones. Cf. for example Bhāmaha 2.84, and Dhvanyāloka on 4.5 (p. 533) (cited with approval by Mahimabhatta [Vyaktiviveka, Kashi Sanskrit Series 121, p. 60]). **Vakrokti** (oblique or indirect expression) is put forward by Kuntaka as the basis of all beauty in poetic language (cf. below, Chapter Eight).

expression co-occur, they cannot be identified with one another and must be recognized as distinct semantic operations.

However, having argued in this manner for the distinction between **dhvani** and figurative expression, Ānandavardhana goes on to assert that even if the identity of the two is accepted, this will in no way invalidate his own enterprise, namely the examination of **dhvani** with all its sub-varieties and the consideration of its role in poetry.

> [**Vṛtti**:] And if it is said that "**Dhvani** is defined by figurative expression [**guṇavṛtti**] alone," then the entire class of **alaṃkāras**-- apart from this [**dhvani/guṇavṛtti**]-- would be defined by the function of denotation [**abhidhāvyāpāra**] and the uselessness of defining the **alaṃkāras** individually would follow. And, furthermore,
>
> [**Kārikā**:] If the definition of this has been made by others, then this is the very establishment of our view.
>
> [**Vṛtti**:] Or, even if the definition of **dhvani** has already been made by others, this is the very establishment of our view; since our view is that "**Dhvani** exists." And this has been established already [by those who have defined **guṇavṛtti**]-- thus we have achieved our desired object effortlessly.[48]

The identification of **dhvani** with figurative expression in no way impugns the possibility or the usefulness of Ānandavardhana's work. Ānandavardhana has shown that certain varieties of non-literal meaning (**vastu**, **alaṃkāra**, and especially **rasa**) are of central importance in the creation and appreciation of great poetry; whether they are regarded as being understood through an established mode of non-literal

[48]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 162.

signification, namely figurative expression, or through some distinct, previously unrecognized, mode of signification, namely suggestion, is ultimately of little consequence for an appreciation of their role in poetry.

Thus, if it is contended that the non-literal meanings understood by the process Ānandavardhana calls **dhvani** are in fact apprehended via the already well-known and generally accepted process of figurative expression, this should be regarded as bolstering,. rather than hindering, the Ānandavardhana's central contention-- that such meanings do exist, and that they play a central role in the aesthetic effectiveness of poetry.

The figures of speech dealt with by earlier Ālaṃkārikas (at least those which do not themselves rely on the processes of suggestion and/or figurative expression) can be defined by, and subsumed within, the primary, denotative mode of verbal expression (**abhidhā**). It does not follow from this that it is useless for Ālaṃkārikas to define and illustrate these many figures individually; these particular sub-varieties of denotation, because of their special role in poetic composition, merit individual attention. Likewise, the several varieties of **dhvani** defined and illustrated in the Dhvanyāloka, even if they are subsumed within the overarching category of figurative expression, are worthy of separate analysis, because of their central role in poetry.

Ānandavardhana's provisional acceptance of the view he at

first set out to oppose shows a certain ambivalence in his approach toward philosophically based criticism. He takes great pains to argue for the differentiation of suggestion from the figurative mode of expression already accepted by most language theorists, but seems unwilling to rely entirely on these arguments, and, despite the great effort he has made to resist the inclusion of **dhvani** within the category of figurative expression, argues that it doesn't really matter, for his purposes, whether or not it is so included. This divided and somewhat contradictory approach is repeated, as we shall see, in the discussion of the distinction of suggestion from inference (cf. below, pp. 242-243).

The discussion of figurative usage in the commentary on **kārikā** 3.33 argues for the differentiation of suggestion in general from figurative usage. Suggestion, Ānandavardhana contends, differs from figurative expression, just as it does from direct expression (cf. above, pp. 211ff), in both its nature (**rūpa**) and the semantic content (**viṣaya**) it conveys.[49]

As we have seen, one of the distinctive features of figurative expression is that it operates secondarily, depending for its functioning on some impossibility or impropriety in the primary, literal sense of the words used figuratively. When we hear the expression "A village on the Ganges" (**gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ**-- a stock example of non-metaphorical figurative usage [**lakṣaṇā**]), we realize that it is impossible

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[49]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 423ff.

for a village to be literally *on* a river, and therefore understand the word **gaṅgā** ("Ganges") to refer, metonymically, to the bank of the Ganges, rather than to the river itself. All figurative usage, both metaphorical and non-metaphorical, depends upon some such obstacle to our understanding the literal sense of the expression in question. Because the understanding of a figurative meaning from any word or phrase requires the impossibility of its literal sense, figurative meaning invariably displaces, rather than supplements, the literal meaning of the word or phrase which conveys it.

Suggestion, unlike figurative usage, does not require any obstacle in the literal sense in order to function, and therefore may convey a meaning over and above the literal sense without displacing it. Ānandavardhana explains the distinction as follows:

> In figurative expression, when a meaning indicates [**upalakṣayati**] another meaning, it is transformed so as to be identical with the indicated meaning, as in expressions such as "A village on the Ganges". In the case of suggestion, however, when a meaning reveals [**dyotayati**] another meaning, it is perceived as showing this other while still showing itself, like a lamp; as in expressions such as "Pārvatī counted the petals on her play lotus" [cf. above, p. 202].[50]

In the example of suggestion given, Pārvatī's counting of her lotus petals suggests to us that she is embarrassed by the discussion of her marriage to Śiva, and this embarrassment further suggests the **śṛṅgāra-rasa** which it is the primary object of the verse to convey. Here there is nothing at all

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[50]Ibid., p. 424.

impossible in the literal meaning-- that Pārvatī is counting lotus petals. The second meaning comes to mind not as a suitable substitute for a literal meaning which is contextually impossible or incomprehensible, but rather as an additional meaning that appears along with the first, literal, meaning of the phrase in question without displacing it. Likewise, this suggested meaning, Pārvatī's embarrassment, without itself being in any way impossible or incomprehensible, gives rise to a third "meaning"-- the **śṛṅgāra-rasa** deriving from Pārvatī's love for Śiva; here too the suggested meaning appears along with the meaning which gives rise to it, rather than displacing it.

So, the mechanism by which words, via their literal meanings, convey figurative meanings differs markedly from that by which they convey suggested meanings. The most conspicuous features of figurative expression-- namely the necessity of some obstruction to the understanding of the literal sense and the replacement, rather than supplementation, of the literal by the non-literal sense-- are both absent in the case of suggestion. It is therefore not possible to treat suggestion as identical with, or as a subtype of, figurative expression.

> If the term **lakṣaṇā**[51] is applied to cases in which one meaning indicates [**lakṣayati**] another without the awareness of itself being suppressed, then, this being the case, it would have to be accepted that figurative

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[51]Here meaning figurative usage in general, rather than specifically non-metaphorical figurative usage.

> expression itself is the primary function of words, since sentences, for the most part, reveal some meaning--consisting of the speaker's intention-- apart from what is directly expressed by them.[52]

The concept of figurative expression was devised to account for extraordinary and seemingly aberrant usage. It presupposes that words have a non-figurative sense in which they are ordinarily used, and that the use of a word in some figurative sense is thus the exception rather than the rule. If figurative expression is understood so broadly as to include what Ānandavardhana would call suggestion, it becomes a universal feature of human utterance rather than an exceptional and aberrant mode of expression. We have already seen that, for Ānandavardhana, all human (i.e. non-Vedic) sentences necessarily convey, in addition to their directly expressed meaning, the communicative intent of their speakers. If it is argued that this second, non-literal meaning is conveyed by figurative expression rather than suggestion, then the figurative use of words would be the norm, rather than an exception.[53] Suggestion, then, cannot be identified with figurative expression as it has ordinarily been understood.

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[52]Ibid., p. 424.

[53]As we have seen (cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 115-117), the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas do, in fact, argue that *all* sentence meaning (both Vedic and non-Vedic) is conveyed figuratively. It is unclear whether or not Ānandavardhana is aware of this contention. His objection seems to be based not on the logical impossibility of this view, but rather on the fact that it, counter-intuitively, deprives figurative usage of the exceptional character with which it is conventionally associated.

Having explained the distinction in nature (**rūpa**) between suggestion and figurative expression, Ānandavardhana goes on to argue that they differ as well in the semantic content (**viṣaya**) that they convey. Ānandavardhana has identified and illustrated three possible types of suggested meaning: **vastu** (narrative element), **alaṃkāra** (figure of speech), and **rasa** (aestheticized emotion). Among these, Ānandavardhana contends that no one has ever, or could ever, explain our understanding of either **rasa** or **alaṃkāra** as a kind of figurative meaning.[54]

It is true that **rasa** and **alaṃkāras** which are understood without being directly stated had never before Ānandavardhana's time been explained under the rubric of figurative expression. This resulted, however, not so much from any insurmountable theoretical difficulty in doing so,[55] but because of the general bifurcation of literary and non-literary language theory noted earlier. The theory of figurative expression had been developed by Mīmāṃsakas, grammarians, and logicians in the course of their philosophical reflection on language. It sought to account for the non-literal use of words in everyday or in Vedic discourse. **Rasa** and **alaṃkāra**, as features of poetic language exclusively, were unnoticed or ignored by non-Ālaṃkārika

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[54] Dhvanyāloka, pp. 425-6.

[55] As we shall see (below, Chapter Seven), Mukulabhaṭṭa, an early and influential opponent of the **dhvani** theory, advocates precisely the view here dismissed as impossible, explaining what Ānandavardhana would call **rasa**- and **alaṃkāra-dhvani** as instances of figurative expression.

language theorists. Ānandavardhana seems to take the silence of previous theorists of figurative language on the status of **rasa** and **alaṃkāras** not expressed directly as sufficient evidence for the impossibility of explaining them as instances of figurative meaning. He does not present any other argument to justify their exclusion from the realm of figurative expression. We shall see subsequently that this casual dismissal is, at the very least, premature.

The analysis of cases of **avivakṣita-vācya dhvani,**[56] in which figurative expression and suggestion necessarily co-occur, largely recapitulates the arguments given in the first **uddyota** (cf. above, pp. 226ff), again stressing that it is the beauty such expressions lend to the verses in which they occur which distinguishes them from everyday or conventional metaphors and which serves as the mark of their suggestiveness.

> **Avivakṣita-vācya dhvani**, although it depends upon the process of figurative expression [**guṇavṛtti**], is not identical with figurative expression. For figurative expression is seen even in the absence of suggestiveness. And suggestiveness cannot exist without some suggested meaning which is a cause of beauty in the manner previously described... But where this [figurative expression] does cause us to understand some beautiful suggested meaning, this will come about only through the introduction of suggestiveness, just as in the case of expressiveness.[57]

Our understanding of any suggested meaning is occasioned by our prior understanding of some non-suggested meaning, either

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[56]Ibid, pp. 429-436.

[57]Ibid., pp. 432-434.

directly expressed or figurative. In a case of **vivakṣita-vācya dhvani**, the co-occurrence of a suggested meaning with the directly expressed meaning that gives rise to it does not lead us to identify the two. Similarly in a case of **avivakṣita-vācya dhvani**, the co-occurrence of the suggested meaning with the figurative meaning which gives rise to it should not lead us to conclude that there is no distinction between them.

That suggestion may operate in dependence on either directly or figuratively expressed meanings is offered as a further defense of its distinctness from both direct and figurative expression.

> Because this [suggestion] depends upon both of these [direct expression and figurative expression], it cannot be said to be identical with either. For, it cannot be identical with direct expression [**vācakatva**] because in some cases it functions in dependence on figurative expression [**lakṣaṇā**]; and it cannot be identical with figurative expression, because elsewhere it is established in dependence on direct expression. Nor is it only because of its being a property of both [**ubhayadharmatvena**] that it cannot be identified with either, since it also exists as a property of sounds devoid of both direct and figurative expression. That is to say, suggestiveness having **rasa** as its content exists even in the sounds of a song; and neither direct nor figurative expressiveness is seen to belong to these in any way... And thus in verbal usage there are three modes: direct expression, figurative expression, and suggestiveness.[58]

Ānandavardhana thus claims to have established beyond doubt that the poetic phenomenon he terms **dhvani** cannot be reduced to or incorporated within either of the modes of semantic

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[58]Ibid., pp. 427-429.

operation generally accepted by philosophers of language. Since the process by which we understand, in cases of **dhvani**, meanings not literally stated cannot be adequately explained in terms of either of these well-known modes of signification, it is essential that we postulate a third, previously unrecognized, mode to account for such instances, namely **vyañjanā**.

The Differentiation of Suggestion from Inference

There is, however, a further possible objection to the introduction of **vyañjanā** as a third mode of verbal signification. One might attempt to explain our understanding of various unstated meanings in cases of **dhvani** as the outcome of a process of inference (**anumāna**), and thus avoid the necessity of positing any such additional semantic mode. Our understanding of such additional "meanings" then would not, properly speaking, result from any mode of *verbal* signification whatsoever. Rather, once we have understood the meaning (whether directly expressed or figurative[59]) of a particular verse, we arrive, by a further deductive process, at an awareness of some fact (or figure of speech [**alaṃkāra**] or aestheticized emotion [**rasa**]) which is not expressed by the words of the verse *per se*.

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[59]One might go so far as to explain even our understanding of figurative and directly expressed meanings as the result of an inferential process; the Buddhist logicians do so, and Mahimabhaṭṭa follows them in this respect (as in many others)--cf. Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., pp. 80-81, 114ff; also below, Chapter Ten, pp. 476ff, 485-486.

Ānandavardhana identifies this as the view of "those who understand reasoning" [**yuktivid**] and "who believe that the connection between words and their meanings is produced[60]" (**kṛtrimaśabdārthasaṃbandhavādin**).[61] This seems to be meant (as Abhinavagupta takes it) to refer to the views of both the Buddhist logicians and the Naiyāyikas; both believe the connections between words and their literal meanings are conventional; the Buddhists believe that these conventional associations were established by human beings, the Naiyāyikas that they were created by God).

What Ānandavardhana calls "suggestiveness" is the capacity of words to create in a hearer the awareness of something above and beyond the meaning they explicitly convey. This, the opponent contends, is nothing more nor less than their ability to lead us to draw a certain inferential conclusion.

> The suggestiveness [**vyañjakatva**] of words is their ability to cause us to understand something [**gamakatva**], and this is the property of serving as an inferential mark [**liṅgatva**]; and therefore the understanding of a suggested meaning [**vyaṅgya**] is only the understanding of an inferential conclusion [**liṅgin**]. Thus the relation between suggestive words and their suggested meanings is simply the relation between inferential marks and conclusions, nothing more. And this must certainly be accepted, since you yourself [that is, Ānandavardhana]

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[60]Rather than eternal and uncreated, as the Mīmāṃsakas believe.

[61]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., p. 444.

> have just now[62] explained that suggestiveness operates with respect to a speaker's intention [**vaktrabhiprāya**], and since the intention of a speaker is, in fact, inferred.[63]

Here, Ānandavardhana's previous effort to show that suggestion plays an essential, though undetected, role even in non-literary language is turned against him. For the most part, the sort of meanings Ānandavardhana has resorted to the theory of suggestion to account for are those which are unique to poetry (**rasas**, implied figures of speech, and so on). As previously noted, non-literary language theorists before Ānandavardhana's time, being concerned with the analysis of either everyday or Vedic language, had generally ignored such specifically poetic features of language. The question of speaker's intention (**vaktrabhiprāya**), however, had not been so ignored; conventional, non-Ālaṃkārika, language analysis would explain our understanding of this communicative intent as the result of inference[64]. Ānandavardhana attributes a hearer's apprehension of a speaker's communicative intent to the process of suggestion and, in so doing, invites the objection that this so called "suggestion" is nothing other than

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[62]In the argument for the differentiation of suggestion from direct expression-- cf. Dhvanyāloka pp. 438ff, and above pp. 216ff.

[63]Ibid., p. 448.

[64]Or possibly, for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, **arthāpatti**. In any case, the Buddhist logicians and the Naiyāyikas, the theorists to whom these objections are attributed, would reject **arthāpatti** as a distinct source of valid knowledge (**pramāṇa**) and include it entirely within the domain of inference.

inference.

Ānandavardhana's first response to this line of argument is to provisionally and hypothetically accept the inclusion of suggestion within the domain of inference, and to argue that this would in no way vitiate the central contentions of the Dhvanyāloka (just as he earlier contended that the inclusion of suggestion within the domain of figurative expression would do no real harm to his theory).

> But, even if this were the case [that suggestion is nothing more than inference], what harm would this do us? We have argued that there is a mode of verbal signification, distinct from direct and figurative expression, called suggestiveness. Even if it were as you say, there would be no damage to this thesis. Let this suggestiveness be the property of serving as an inferential mark [**liñgatva**], or something different. In any case it will be distinct from the well-known verbal modes and will be the object of the operation of words[65]-- thus there is really no disagreement between us.[66]

However, just as in Ānandavardhana's discussion of the inclusion of suggestion within figurative expression, the argument that acceptance of the opponent's view would do no real harm is coupled with a determined effort to refute this view. Immediately following the passage just quoted Ānandavardhana says, "But it is not really the case that suggestiveness is only the property of serving as an inferential mark and that the understanding of a suggested

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[65]That is to say, our understanding of the inferred meaning in such a case is a result, albeit not an immediate one, of our hearing a particular series of words.

[66]Ibid., pp. 448-449.

meaning is only the understanding of an inferential conclusion."

Ānandavardhana's defense of a domain for suggestion independent from that of inference begins with a very general analysis of the content conveyed by language.[67] That which we understand when we hear a speaker employ language is broadly divisible into two categories: that which is inferable (**anumeya**) and that which is to be communicated (**pratipādya**).

The inferable content is the speaker's expressive intent (**vivakṣā**)[68], which may be further divided into two components: the intention to produce sounds (which may be inferred simply from the fact that the speaker is an animate creature, whose observed behavior may be presumed to conform to some intention), and the intention to convey some meaning by means of these sounds (which may be inferred from the speaker's utterance of a recognizable, meaning-bearing series of sounds, i.e. particular words).

The communicated content of a speaker's utterance is the specific meaning he or she intends to convey, and may likewise be divided into two components: that which is directly

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[67]Ibid., pp. 449ff.

[68]In admitting that the speaker's intention is inferable, Ānandavardhana has of course already partly conceded the opponent's objection; his argument for suggestion as distinct from inference depends on the contention that not *all* suggested meanings are inferable.

expressed (**vācya**) and that which is suggested (**vyaṅgya**).[69] This intended meaning is not understood through a process of inference.

> This communicated content of words, of both varieties, does not by itself [**svarūpeṇa**] become apparent as an inferential conclusion, but rather [appears] by means of some other connection, whether artificial or non-artificial.[70] The fact that this meaning is the object of the speaker's intent is understood, by means of his words, as an inferential conclusion, but the form of this meaning is not.[71]

That a speaker intends to convey some meaning can be inferred, but *what* he intends to convey cannot.

If the meaning of a sentence were inferred from its words, Ānandavardhana contends, no disagreement would ever arise regarding the truth or falsity of verbal statements. If a valid inferential mark (**liṅga**) is clearly perceived, there can be no doubt regarding the reality of that which we infer from it; to take the stock example of inference in Sanskrit philosophical literature, if we see smoke rising from a hill, and infer from it the presence of fire there, no one could

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[69]Here the directly expressed content must be understood to include figurative expression as well. Ānandavardhana is somewhat inconsistent in his treatment of figurative expression, sometimes, as here, seeming to regard it as merely a specialized subvariety of direct expression (cf. also Dhvanyāloka 1.18 [p. 151]), at other times treating it as a third mode of semantic operation, distinct from both direct expression and suggestion (ibid., pp. 428-429).

[70]Artificial: i.e. created by either human or divine convention, as the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas (respectively) contend. Non-artificial: i.e. natural and eternal, as the Mīmāṃsakas contend.

[71]Ibid., p. 151.

reasonably dispute the validity of this conclusion. If words served as inferential marks for the meanings they convey, these meanings, as valid inferential conclusions, would be similarly beyond dispute.[72]

Thus, the connection between words and their communicated content must be recognized as distinct from that between inferential marks and the conclusions drawn from them. And this applies whether the communicated content is directly expressed or conveyed by suggestion.

> The suggested meaning, being implied by the capacity of the directly expressed meaning [**vācyasāmarthyākṣiptatayā**], is connected with words in the same manner as the directly expressed meaning. For the mediacy or immediacy of this connection is of no importance[73]... Thus, words operate as inferential marks with respect to a suggested meaning only when it takes the form of the speaker's intent; with respect to the meaning which is the object of this intent they

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[72]The argument does not really hold water. It is widely accepted in philosophical circles that what sentences (or, at least, non-Vedic sentences) convey is not information about the actual state of things, but about the beliefs or expressive intentions of the speakers who utter them; only by a further process of inference can we draw conclusions about the actual state of the world on the basis of linguistic reports (i.e., if the speaker is judged to be reliable, we may conclude that what he tells us is accurate)-- cf., for example, Pramāṇavārttika 1.3-4 (op. cit., pp. 2-3), Śābarabhāṣya on 1.1.2 (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 18-- cited above, p. 217), and Śālikanāthamiśra's Prakaraṇapañcikā (Benaras Hindu University Darśana Series 4, 1961), p. 264. The view that either directly expressed or suggested meanings are inferred demands only that the sentence serve as an inferential mark which allows us to validly deduce the meaning or meanings the speaker wishes to convey-- it need not be sufficient to allow us to validly deduce the truth of this intended meaning.

[73]That is, of no importance for purposes of distinguishing it from the connection between an inferential mark and the conclusion drawn from it.

> operate as toward something to be communicated [**pratipādya**].[74]

Ānandavardhana has conceded the opponent's argument in part: upon hearing any human utterance, our understanding of the speaker's intention *is* arrived at by a process of inference (although he still describes it as **vyaṅgya** ["suggested"]). Thus the domain of suggestion as Ānandavardhana has described it is partly reducible to inference-- but only partly. Apart from the single exception of the speaker's communicative intent, suggested meanings, being part of the communicated content of language, cannot be said to be inferred. And it is only the latter, non-inferable, type of suggested meaning that is important for Ānandavardhana's analysis of poetry.

Any human utterance will invariably lead its hearers to understand that its speaker wishes to communicate something, but this awareness is incidental to the communicated content of this utterance; no instance of such an inferable suggested meaning would ever merit the designation **dhvani**. Discussion of the role of suggestion in our understanding of the communicative intent of speakers in everyday, non-poetic discourse was, Ānandavardhana explains, introduced only to convince the Mīmāṃsakas that words must have some suggestive capacity in addition to, and distinct from, their ability to convey the literal meanings with which they are invariably and eternally associated. So even if it is granted that suggested

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[74]Ibid., pp. 452-453.

meaning, when it takes the form of a speaker's intent, is inferable, this will have no consequences for the analysis of suggestion as it is deliberately employed for aesthetic effect in poetry. It is **dhvani** that is of primary concern to Ānandavardhana, and in cases of **dhvani** the process of suggestion, for the reasons given above, will not be reducible to inference.[75]

Ānandavardhana's Relation to Linguistic Philosophy

Ānandavardhana's overall approach to philosophically based criticism of the theory of suggestion is unusual in several respects. We have already seen that in his encounter with general linguistic theory Ānandavardhana often proceeds somewhat tentatively. In his discussions of figurative expression and inference in their relation to suggestion he is unwilling to rely totally on the arguments he has offered in defense of the existence of suggestion as an autonomous semantic function. In both cases, he couples his defense of the autonomy of suggestion with the claim that this autonomy is not, in any case, necessary; even if one accepts that suggestion is merely a type of figurative expression or inference, the existence of **dhvani** and its central importance in poetry will not thereby be called into question. At the

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[75]The concession Ānandavardhana here makes that the speaker's intent is inferable would seem to totally undercut the argument earlier made that the Mīmāmsakas must accept **vyañjanā** in order to account for our understanding of such intent in non-Vedic language, but no notice is taken of this difficulty by either Ānandavardhana or his commentator Abhinavagupta.

conclusion of his detailed discussion of philosophical objections to the existence of suggestion he returns once again to this concessive approach:

> Even if it is stubbornly asserted that this [suggestion] is included within these [already well-known modes of signification-- direct expression, figurative expression, etc.], nevertheless, if an examination is made of **dhvani** as a particular sub-type of one of these, in order to remove disagreement and instruct people of taste [**sahṛdayas**], this should not be criticized. For merely by the definition of something in general one does not preclude the definition of specifics, when this is useful. If this were so, once existence itself was defined, the definitions of all existing things would become redundant.[76]

Ānandavardhana takes great pains to offer arguments which he feels adequately establish the autonomous existence of suggestion, but recognizes that these arguments are unlikely to prove entirely convincing to the adherents of the various existing language theories, and attempts to justify his approach to the analysis of poetic language even in the eyes of those who refuse to accept suggestion as a separate semantic function.

Ānandavardhana's defense of suggestion as a mode of expression unique to poetic language (or, at the very least, one which plays a significant role and demands analysis only in its poetic applications) requires that he consider the objections offered by adherents of various general, non-poetic, language theories, but he manages to do so without himself making a specific commitment to any general language

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[76]Ibid., p. 457.

theory. He neither clearly adheres to, either as is or in some modified form, any of the well-known language theories offered by the grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas (Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara), and logicians (Buddhist and Nyāya), nor offers his own theory of everyday, non-poetic language. He takes no stand on the major linguistic controversies of his day (e.g. on whether the connection between words and their literal meanings is natural or conventional, on whether words convey their individual meanings before or after they are construed as sentences [**abhihitānvayavāda** vs. **anvitābhidhanavāda**], etc.). Rather than attempt to articulate and defend a particular theory of language, Ānandavardhana endeavors to show that adherents of any of the major current language theories, if they wish to account for the poetic phenomena Ānandavardhana describes under the rubric of **dhvani**, must accept suggestion as a supplement to whatever semantic functions their theories already allow for. Thus he manages to argue for the general acceptance of suggestion by all language theorists while remaining aloof on those questions which divide these language theorists among themselves.

It is also important to note that while Ānandavardhana contends that adherents of all language theories must accept, in addition to the well known semantic modes of direct and figurative expression, a third mode, namely suggestion, he does not provide a detailed and specific account of the mechanism by which words convey their suggested meanings.

The specific processes by which words convey their directly expressed and figurative meanings had been analyzed in great detail by earlier linguistic philosophers. In the case of direct expression, philosophers had for many centuries debated regarding the ontological status of the connections between words and their literal, directly expressed meanings, the origin (if any) of these connections, and the processes by which new members of the linguistic community acquire an understanding of them. While the various schools of language philosophy differ widely in their views on these matters, each provides some specific account of the nature of these connections and the manner in which they come to be understood and employed by members of the linguistic community.

The exact processes by which words convey figurative meanings had been subjected to similarly intense scrutiny. The Mīmāṃsakas (whose account of the mechanism of figurative expression seems to have gained widespread acceptance) determined the necessary conditions which must apply for a word to express a particular figurative meaning: there must be some obstacle (**bādha**) to our understanding the word literally in a given context, the figurative meaning must be connected with the literal one in some way, and the figurative sense must have some useful application (**prayojana**) in the given context. They attempt to specify the types of connection which may obtain between the figurative and literal referents of a word (similarity, physical proximity, part/whole

relation, etc.).

Ānandavardhana does not attempt to give such a specific account of the necessary preconditions required for a word or group of words to convey a particular suggested sense in a particular context. His argument in defense of suggestion proceeds, rather, by process of eliminantion. If it is granted that a particular verse or expression conveys some sense above and beyond its literal one, and if our understanding of this additional sense cannot be explained by either of the well-known semantic modes (or by some extra-linguistic mental process such as inference), then some additional semantic mode must be operative in such cases. Thus, by demonstrating the impossibility of accounting for **dhvani** in terms of any of the recognized semantic modes, Ānandavardhana is able to assert the necessity of suggestion as an additional semantic function without explaining precisely *how* suggestion works.

All these aspects of the treatment of philosophical issues in the Dhvanyāloka serve to reinforce the impression that these issues are in some way peripheral to Ānandavardhana's primary concerns, and are dealt with more from necessity than from choice. Ānandavardhana's insistence that **dhvani** represented a previously unrecognized phenomenon of poetic language (rather than merely a re-description of phenomena already dealt with by earlier Ālaṃkārikas) led him to argue for the existence of a previously un-theorized realm

of meaning, the "suggested". This posed a challenge not only to orthodox Alaṃkāraśāstra, but to linguistic philosophy as well, as all existing philosophies of language claimed to account fully and adequately for the phenomena of language and none (currently, at least) allowed for the existence of suggestion.

Because up to this time the Ālaṃkārikas' analysis of poetic language had proceeded for the most part independently of the analyses of non-literary language offered by the philosophers, the agreement or disparity between their models of language and those offered by general language theorists was not seriously examined. Ānandavardhana, because he introduces concepts and analytic techiniques drawn from philosophical language analysis into the analysis of poetry and thereby to a great extent bridges the conceptual and terminological divide which had so far existed between literary and non-literary language theory, is forced to consider more carefully those respects in which his own model of language diverges from those of various theorists of non-literary language, and to defend this divergence against the objections offered or likely to be offered by these theorists.

In his treatment of these objections, however, Ānandavardhana tries to maintain a certain distance between Ālaṃkāraśāstra and the philosophy of language. He employs the techniques of philosophical language analysis in his own examination of poetry, but does so without himself attempting

to become a philosopher of language. By defending the existence of a mode of signification whose significance is limited to poetic language, and, conversely, by refusing to take any definite stand on the controversies that divide language philosophers among themselves, he keeps the domain of poetic language analysis separate from that of the analysis of everyday and Vedic language. Ānandavardhana's arguments against the theorists of non-poetic language are not designed to challenge or replace their theories of language, but to ensure that, alongside these theories, a place is secured for his own special theory of poetic language, and for suggestion, the specially poetic mode of signification which it takes as its object.

Prospectus

Ānandavardhana's arguments for suggestion as a new and distinct function of language are, for the most part, totally ignored by later philosophers of language. The one notable exception is the great Kashmiri logician Jayantabhaṭṭa (c. 900 AD). In his Nyāyamañjarī, after refuting the Mīmāṃsakas' arguments for the existence of **arthāpatti** as a means of valid knowledge distinct from inference, Jayantabhaṭṭa briefly considers, and summarily dismisses, Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**:

> And by virtue of this capacity [**sāmarthya**] of words [to lead us to infer some unspoken meaning[77]], we may also

[77]On account of which, as Jayantabhatta has just explained, the supposed examples of **arthāpatti** given by the Mīmāṃsakas can be explained as inferences (cf. Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Gaurinath Sastri, Śivakumāraśāstri Granthamālā, 1982, Vol.

> exclude that "**dhvani**" which another person, thinking himself wise, has accepted. The understanding of a prohibition arises from a command, and awareness of a command from a prohibition: "Wander confidently, Monk..."[78] "Traveller, do not enter my house..."[79] In each case, it is the capacity of words-- which indicate the form of things which are qualified by some other means of knowledge [i.e. inference]-- which functions in this way.[80] In any case, this discussion with poets is not appropriate; even learned people become confused in this difficult path of sentence meaning.[81]

For Jayantabhaṭṭa, Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** is little more than a minor variation on **arthāpatti** (which, for the Mīmāṃsakas, provides the basis for all types of figurative usage), and requires nothing new by way of refutation. The theory of **dhvani** draws his scorn, in large part, because of its source. The analysis of sentence meaning and sentence cognition poses serious problems even for dedicated philosophers, and Jayantabhaṭṭa seems to regard it as presumptuous for a mere poet to deal with such questions. The

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1, pp. 67-68).

[78]Ānandavardhana's first example of **dhvani**-- cf. above p. 128.

[79]I cannot definitely trace the source of this example; possibly a condensed paraphrase of Rudraṭa 7.41. In any case, it is meant to exemplify a common motif in single-verse compositons, in which a housewife whose husband is absent overtly sends away a traveller seeking lodging, but in such a way as to imply, covertly, that she wishes him to return in secret so they can make love.

[80]That is to say: words convey their own meanings, and under appropriate conditions these meanings allow us to infer other, unstated, meanings. Thus the words have the capacity, via an intervening process of inference, to convey meanings other than those with which they are directly associated.

[81]Ibid., pp. 76-78.

general silence of other philosophers on the question of **dhvani**, even long after it comes to be universally accepted by the Ālaṃkārikas, would seem to indicate that they share this dismissive and contemptuous attitude.

Within the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra, however, the philosophical issues dealt with by Ānandavardhana assume increasing prominence in the ensuing centuries. The question of the distinctness of suggestion from other modes of signification becomes the major point of controversy in Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra from Ānandavardhana's time to that of Mammaṭa (c. 1100 AD). Ānandavardhana's more fundamental innovation in the realm of Alaṃkāraśāstra-- the assumption that in any aesthetically coherent poem all constituent elements must be directed toward a single, overriding goal, typically the effective communication of a single, predominant **rasa**-- is, for the most part, accepted even by his harshest critics. It is the more specific question of whether **dhvani** is or is not explicable without positing suggestion as a newly discovered mode of signification that increasingly absorbs the attention of Ānandavardhana's supporters and detractors during this period.

Subsequent opposition to the introduction of suggestion proceeds largely along the lines laid down by Ānandavardhana himself. Of the three major objections to the theory of suggestion set forth in the Dhvanyāloka and briefly outlined above, two find serious adherents among the anti-**dhvani**

Ālaṃkārikas. The inclusion of "suggestion" within the domain of figurative expression is asserted by Mukulabhaṭṭa in his Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, and Mahimabhaṭṭa, in his Vyaktiviveka, argues that all supposed cases of suggestion may be explained as inferences. The argument for the inclusion of suggestion within a single, all-encompassing expressive function (**vācakatva**) has no adherents in the extant Ālaṃkāraśāstra literature, but is regularly re-examined and rejected by later Ālaṃkārikas.[82]

This increasing absorption in the philosophical issues and arguments raised by the theory of suggestion shifts the focus of attention in Alaṃkāraśāstra from the composers of poetry to its audience. Both critics and adherents of Ānandavardhana are largely in agreement about the content conveyed by poetry (both generally and in particular example verses); it is the specific cognitive process by which one understands this content that is disputed. Thus the efforts of both supporters and detractors of the theory of suggestion are directed primarily toward a careful analysis of the psychology, and even the epistemology, of poetic comprehension.

Although it is Ānandavardhana's own importation of philosophically derived models and techniques of language

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[82]Both adherents and detractors of the theory of suggestion. Cf. Locana on Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 64-67, 413-422, 438-443; Vyaktiviveka, Kashi Sanskrit Series 121, pp. 137-141; Kāvyaprakāśa, Sārasvatī Bhavana Granthamālā 46, pp. 154-158.

analysis into the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra that precipitates this shift in focus from the process of poetic composition to that of poetic comprehension, this transformation is somewhat at odds with the approach to poetic analysis he seems to strive for. We have seen that the greatest strength of Ānandavardhana's teleological model of literary aesthetics is that it provides, for the first time in the history of Alaṃkāraśāstra, a general criterion in terms of which the appropriateness of particular elements of a poem (ranging from individual phonemes to broad features of plot organization) to the whole composition of which they form a part may be judged. This creates important new possibilities in the area of literary criticism and, as we shall see in the next chapter, Ānandavardhana himself expoits these possibilities by engaging in critical analyses of existing works of Sanskrit literature in a wholly unprecedented manner. This kind of literary criticism is, for the most part, marginalized in later Alaṃkāra literature, in large part because of the transference of attention from processes of composition to processes of comprehension.

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CHAPTER SIX
THEORY AND CRITICISM IN THE DHVANYĀLOKA

Ānandavardhana's need to justify his departures from Alaṃkāraśāstra as it had so far been practiced, and particularly to provide evidence for the previously unrecognized predominance of **rasa** in poetry, leads him to adopt a more empirical approach to literary analysis, quoting and discussing the works of earlier poets far more frequently and thoroughly than any of his predecessors had done. Because his teleological mode of literary analysis requires that particular features of a poem be evaluated not simply in terms of their intrinsic beauty but in terms of their ability to contribute to the intended effect of the entire composition of which they form a part, his attention is directed, to an unprecedented degree, toward the specific contexts in which particular poetic elements are employed; that is to say, toward specific literary works.

This shift toward a more empirical and more context-dependent mode of literary analysis gives issues of literary criticism a relevance they would not have had for earlier Ālaṃkārikas, whose approach gave little or no importance to context. The goal of these Ālaṃkārikas was to identify, define and categorize those discrete and isolable elements, phonetic or semantic, which lend beauty to a verse (*any* verse) in which they are employed. These elements could be illustrated equally well with verses composed specially for this purpose or with verses drawn from existing poems. A

verse illustrating a particular figure of speech could be found in some well-known poetic work, but the source from which it was drawn could have no bearing on its aesthetic worth. If an illustration meets the defining criteria for the figure in question it will be beautiful and give pleasure to an audience, without regard to the context in which it is employed. For these theorists **alaṃkāras** and other desirable elements of poetry are valued for their intrinsic beauty, not for their ability to contribute to some unifying aesthetic goal within a work. Therefore, specific works of poetry are of little interest to them serving, at most, as a fund of potential examples.

For Ānandavardhana, however, the aesthetic value of particular formal elements depends not on their intrinsic beauty, but on their capacity to subserve the overriding aesthetic purpose of the particular work in which they are employed. Context therefore assumes a new importance in Ānandavardhana's literary analysis. The criteria by which the isolable and definable elements of poetry are judged are no longer internal to them; any phonetic or semantic feature can be properly evaluated only with regard to the purpose of the whole composition of which it forms a part. Thus for Ānandavardhana it becomes useful to examine and discuss specific literary works, in a way in which it was not useful for his predecessors, for whom the main object of Alaṃkāraśāstra was the analysis of abstracted, repeatable

elements which could add beauty to any and every composition.

Literary Criticism in the Dhvanyāloka

Although Ānandavardhana's critical remarks on existing literary works are relatively few in number, given the total absence of such remarks in earlier Alaṃkāraśāstra, they represent an important innovation and are worthy of serious attention. For Ānandavardhana, as his poetic teleology would lead us to expect, the primary, indeed the sole, basis on which elements of particular compositions can be judged is the extent to which they heighten or diminish the primary **rasas** of these compositions.

This establishment of a single, overriding criterion of aesthetic value requires a re-evaluation of the status of those rules of composition formulated by earlier aesthetic theorists, both in Alaṃkāraśāstra and in the related but separate field of Nāṭyaśāstra (dramaturgy). It can no longer be uncritically assumed that adherence to such rules is automatically necessary or desirable. It is always with reference to the standard of **rasa**-communication that an author's adherence to such principles, or failure to adhere to them, must be judged. This issue is confronted most directly in Ānandavardhana's discussion of the Veṇīsaṃhāra of Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa (c. 600-650 AD).[1]

The Veṇīsaṃhāra is a drama in six acts which presents the story of the victory of the Pāṇḍavas over the Kauravas in the

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[1]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 336-40, 363.

Mahābhārata war. Its primary **rasa** is **vīra** ("heroism"), but in the second act of the play there is an episode of **śṛṅgāra-rasa** : the Kaurava king Duryodhana overhears his wife describing to her servants an inauspicious dream in which she finds herself attracted to a mongoose (**nakula**-- also the name of one of the Pāṇḍavas) who leads her to a secluded place and undresses her. Hearing this, and not realizing that it is only a dream being described, Duryodhana flies into a jealous rage, believing his wife to be involved with the Pāṇḍava Nakula. Before he has a chance to confront his wife, her servants' remarks reveal his mistake. Relieved, he approaches his wife and calms her fears regarding the inauspicious dream, and an affectionate episode ensues between them.

Ānandavardhana regards the inclusion of this episode as a flaw which detracts from our appreciation of the **vīra-rasa** which predominates elsewhere in the work, and sees this flaw as the result of blind adherence to the rules of plot construction laid out by Bharata in the Nāṭyaśāstra, even when these contravene the requirements of **rasa**. According to Bharata, the plot of a **nāṭaka**[2] must contain five **sandhis** ("junctures"): **mukha** ("opening"), **pratimukha** ("unfolding"), **garbha** ("sprouting"), **avamarśa** ("interruption"), and **nirvahaṇa**

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[2]The most elaborate and fully developed of the ten varieties of drama Bharata describes (cf. Nāṭyaśāstra 18.10ff [Parimal Sanskrit Series 4, Vol. 2, pp. 302ff]), and the genre to which the Veṇīsaṃhāra belongs.

("conclusion").[3] For each **sandhi**, he gives a list of **sandhyaṅgas** ("parts [or subordinate elements] of the **sandhis**") which should be incorporated within it.[4] Among the **sandhyaṅgas** to be introduced during the "unfolding", Bharata (19.59) lists **vilāsa**, which he defines (19.76) as "desire for the enjoyment of love".

As Ānandavardhana sees it, Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa has introduced an erotic episode in the second act of the Veṇīsaṃhāra solely to conform to the rule given by Bharata, without regard for the primary **rasa** of his work.

> This is another primary condition required for a work to be suggestive of **rasa** etc.: that the arrangement of the **sandhis**-- namely **mukha**, **pratimukha**, **garbha**, **avamarśa**, and **nirvahaṇa**-- and their **aṅgas**-- **upakṣepa** ["commencement"] etc.-- should be made with a view toward the suggestion of **rasa**, as in the Ratnāvalī,[5] and not merely out of a desire to fulfil the requirements of **śāstra**, as in the

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[3]cf. Nāṭyaśāstra 19.37-43 (ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 23-29).

[4]Nāṭyaśāstra 19.50ff (ibid., pp. 31ff).

[5]A drama composed by the Harṣa, king of Kanauj (r. 606-47 AD) and ruler of one of the largest empires in the history of South Asia. Ānandavardhana does not demonstrate specifically the conformity of the **sandhis** and **sandhyaṅgas** in this drama to the requirements of its primary **rasa**, and even the normally thorough Abhinavagupta remarks that to do so in detail would require an inordinately lengthy discussion, but the basic point is clear: the **śṛṅgāra-rasa** which predominates is kept in view throughout the course of the play, and there is no irrelevant and digressive development of other **rasas**, as in the Veṇīsaṃhāra. We have already seen the Ratnāvalī singled out for particular praise for its insistent focus on the development of its primary **rasa** (cf. above, Chapter Four, p. 180): In the verse **uddāmotkalikāṃ**... (Ratnāvalī 2.4; "Having blossoms/*longing* which are/*is* unrestrained..."), the poet's punning comparison of a blooming creeper with a beautiful woman is praised because it foreshadows the hero's love for another woman and his wife's jealous anger, thus furthering the development of the primary **rasa**.

> Venīsamhāra, where the **sandhyañga** of the "unfolding" called vilāsa is introduced in the second act, even though it is not conformable to the development of the contextually appropriate **rasa**.[6]

The generally accepted rules of plot composition are not to be obeyed simply because they are the rules. Whenever it is necessary for the full and unobstructed development of the primary **rasa**, they must be abandoned.

Even Kālidāsa, a poet revered by Ānandavardhana and nearly all other Ālaṃkārikas, is not spared from criticism where his practice is seen to deviate from what is required for the fullest possible development of **rasa**. Ānandavardhana regards Kālidāsa's explicit description of the lovemaking of Śiva and Pārvatī in the eighth **sarga** of his Kumārasaṃbhava as vulgar and therefore ultimately detrimental to the work's

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[6]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 336-340. Abhinavagupta, apparently disturbed by Ānandavardhana's suggestion that Bharata's rules should simply be ignored, explains the problem differently. Bharata defines **vilāsa** as "desire for the enjoyment of love" (**samīhā ratibhogārthā**). According to Abhinavagupta "the words 'enjoyment of love' are used so as to imply those aesthetic factors suggestive of the basic emotion [**sthāyibhāva**] belonging to the **rasa** appropriate to the context." (Locana, pp. 340-341). **Rati** ("love") is the **sthāyibhāva** of **śṛṅgāra-rasa**, the first **rasa** described in the Nāṭyaśāstra and, in practice, the most common; Abhinavagupta understands it as meant to refer, metonymically, to any contextually appropriate **sthāyibhāva**. The **rasa** appropriate to the Venīsamhāra is **vīra**, and to fill the need for the **sandhyañga vilāsa**, the author ought to have constructed an episode to excite the basic emotion appropriate to this **rasa**, rather than one appropriate to **śṛṅgāra-rasa**, as he has done. His fault is thus not that he follows Bharata's rule where he should not, but rather that he misunderstands and misapplies the rule. Through this interpretation Abhinavagupta upholds the authority of Bharata's rules; however, there is nothing to indicate that Ānandavardana (or Bharata, for that matter) understood **vilāsa** in this way.

capacity to evoke **rasa**.

Ānandavardhana's observations on this flaw arise out of a more general discussion of character type and the appropriateness of particular actions and emotional states to particular types of character. He regards such appropriateness as an important condition for a work's ability to convey **rasa**. For Ānandavardhana character type (**prakṛti**) is divisible into three broad classes-- high, middle, and low (**uttama**, **madhyama**, and **adhama**),[7] and further into human and divine. It is important that characters be consistently treated as of one type or another.

> A **sthāyibhāva** constructed so as to consistently conform to this [character type] will become appropriate. Otherwise, if the determination [**utsāha**] etc. [i.e. the **sthāyibhāvas**] of a divine hero are portrayed by relying on purely human actions, or if those of a merely human hero are portrayed by relying on purely divine actions, they will become inappropriate. And thus, in the description of a purely human hero such as a king, if actions such as leaping across the seven oceans are portrayed, even if they are beautiful, they will certainly be devoid of **rasa**; and the reason for this is their inappropriateness.[8]

The portrayal of deeds of heroism and the of the determination and energy out of which they arise is the means by which **vīra-rasa** is conveyed, but if these deeds are not appropriately matched with the type of character who performs them they will

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[7]Here he is following Bharata, who discusses these three classes of character in the twenty-fourth chapter of <u>Nāṭyaśāstra</u> (op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 241ff). The hierarchy of high, middle and low carries both moral and class connotations.

[8]<u>Dhvanyāloka</u>, op. cit., p. 330.

not convey this **rasa** effectively. The description of a purely human character leaping over oceans is so implausible as to impair the **vīra-rasa** it is meant to enhance.

The problem with the Kumārasaṃbhava is, in Ānandavardhana's view, basically similar.[9] It is not that the explicit description of lovemaking *per se* is objectionable, but rather that the description of divine characters engaged in such actions is inappropriate and hence injurious to **rasa**.

A potential objection is raised, however, to the extension of the dichotomy between human and divine character type from the realm of heroism to that of love.

> If [as you say] an examination is somehow to be made of appropriateness to human or divine character types in the description of heroic determination [**utsāha**] etc., then let it be made; but in the case of love [**rati**] what can be the use of such an examination? For love, even for the gods, can be described only by means of conduct which is appropriate to Bhāratavarṣa [i.e. South Asia].[10]

In the case of heroism, there is a clear distinction between the actions of which gods and mere humans are capable, and this distinction makes possible inappropriateness of the kind Ānandavardhana has described. In the case of love, there is no such apparent distinction between human and divine modes of action; as we have no knowledge of any specifically divine

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[9]Ānandavardhana does not mention the Kumārasaṃbhava by name in this passage, but in an earlier portion of the text (**vṛtti** on 3.6; Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 317-318) he refers to the impropriety of the description of Pārvatī's lovemaking in the Kumārasaṃbhava and says he will explain this impropriety later-- clearly referring to this passage.

[10]Ibid., p. 332.

mode of conduct in such matters, one has no recourse but to describe the love-play of the gods in the same way one would that of humans.

Ānandavardhana concedes that there is no special mode of action appropriate to the description of divine lovemaking; this does not, however, mean that appropriateness and inappropriateness have no place in the consideration of such description. One must, indeed, describe the love-play of divine characters as one would that of human ones; in doing so, however, one should be careful to treat these divine characters as if they were human characters of the highest type (**uttama-prakṛti**).

> We do not say that there is some different appropriateness relating to divine characters. What then? The description of **śṛṅgāra** belonging even to divine characters will be beautiful if made as one would do in the case of the highest sort of heroes-- kings and so on-- in Bhāratavarṣa. Common, vulgar description of **śṛṅgāra**, in the case of kings and so on, is not found in drama; thus, it should be avoided in the case of the gods. If you say that it is only to be avoided in such cases because drama is to be enacted [**abhineya**] [rather than merely recited], and because *enactment* which has love-in-union [**saṃbhoga-śṛṅgāra**] as its subject is vulgar, we reject this: if an enactment having such a subject is vulgar, what prevents a [recited] poem having such a subject from being vulgar? Thus in any poem, whether it is to be enacted or not, the vulgar description of the sexual union of heroes of the highest type, such as kings, with heroines of the highest type, will necessarily be vulgar, just as the description of the sexual union of one's parents would be vulgar. The case is just the same for [description of sexual union] having the highest gods as its subjects.[11]

Thus, Kālidāsa's description of the lovemaking of Śiva and

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[11]Ibid., p. 332.

Pārvatī is vulgar, inappropriate for characters of the highest type, and, ultimately, detrimental to the work's capacity to convey **rasa**. That the Kumārasaṃbhava is a purely verbal product, rather than a drama to be presented visually before an audience, in no way mitigates this vulgarity. So, appropriateness of action and emotion to character type is necessary in works conveying **śṛṅgāra-rasa**, just as in those conveying **vīra-rasa**.

Even when the poet relates an existing story, rather than inventing his own, his construction of plot must be guided by the requirements of **rasa**, not simply by unthinking faithfulness to the course of the story as it is known. As a general rule, Ānandavardhana argues that poets, when drawing on histories or other existing bodies of narrative for their plots, ought not to tamper with their sources. He quotes with approval from the prologue of Yaśovarman's Rāmābhyudaya the dramatist's claim that in his play there is "not even a slight deviation in the course of the story."[12] The epics and other historical sources are themselves rich with **rasa**, and a poet should select from these sources episodes or stories which will convey a desired **rasa**.

However, whenever any element in such a story conflicts with the **rasa** the poet wishes to convey, it must be removed,

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[12]Dhvanyāloka, p. 335. The play itself is not extant. Abhinavagupta notes the source of the quotation, and the full verse is quoted by Bhoja in his Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (cf. Raghavan, Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa [Madras: Punarvasu, third ed., 1978], p. 393).

and newly invented elements must, if necessary, be added to the familiar story so as to heighten this **rasa**. Ānandavardhana offers several examples of poems in which known stories have been altered in accordance with the needs of **rasa**: the works of Kālidāsa, Sarvasena's Harivijaya, and Ānandavardhana's own Arjunacarita.[13]

Kālidāsa frequently takes liberties with his (usually epic) sources, and Ānandavardhana does not specifically indicate what changes he has in mind. Abhinavagupta, commenting on the passage, mentions Kālidāsa's description, in the Raghuvaṃśa, of the marriage Rāma's grandfather Aja and of various other exploits of Rāma's predecessors and successors which are not described in the epics. This deals only with Kālidāsa's additions to and not alterations of the stories he retells, and overlooks what is surely his most notable departure from his epic sources: the replacement, in his Abhijñānaśākuntalā, of Duṣyanta's deliberate rejection of Śakuntalā (whom he has secretly married, and who carries his unborn child), with the story of a curse which causes him to forget her.[14]

The latter two works mentioned by Ānandavardhana are not extant, and as he does not specifically explain the ways in

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[13]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 335-336.

[14]Kuntaka, in his Vakroktijīvita, discusses in detail this transformation of the epic story of Śakuntalā and Kālidāsa's reasons for introducing it (cf. Vakroktijīvita, Dharwar ed., pp. 249-251, and below, Chapter Eight, pp. 410-411).

which these poems' plots deviate from their sources, we are dependent on Abhinavagupta's comments for information on these works. "In the Harivijaya," we are told, "acts such as the theft of [Indra's] Pārijāta-tree are described as part of [Kṛṣṇa's] placating of his beloved, although not found in the histories. Likewise, in the Arjunacarita, acts such as Arjuna's conquest of the netherworld are described, although not known from the histories."[15]

Seen in the light of Ānandavardhana's **rasa**-centered poetic teleology, faithfulness to one's sources can have no independent value. Where the plot of one's source narrative effectively evokes the desired **rasa** one should adhere to it; where an addition or alteration will heighten **rasa** one should change it without compunction.

> The poet, when composing a poem, should be totally dependent [**paratantra**] on **rasa**. If he sees in his story any element not suitable for this **rasa** then he should eliminate this and independently devise some other narrative element which is suitable for this **rasa**. For, there is no use in a poet's merely rehearsing a historical plot, since this is accomplished by the

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[15]Ibid., pp. 335-336. As Ingalls notes (The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana, p. 436, n. 2) the story of Kṛṣṇa's theft of the Pārijāta *is* found in most manuscripts of the Harivaṃśa, but is absent from the Śāradā manuscripts of Kashmir as well as several of the Malayalam-script manuscripts (and is, on these grounds, excluded from the Critical Edition of the text). Abhinavagupta may be mistaken in regarding this as an innovation on the part of Sarvasena, who may have known a version of the Harivaṃśa containing this story, or, as Ingalls suggests, Sarvasena's innovation may have crept back into some versions of the Harivaṃśa; in any case, as versions of the Harivaṃśa containing this story seem to have been unknown in Kashmir, Abhinavagupta is presumably correct in taking this to be the alteration to which Ānandavardhana refers.

historical source itself.[16]

Such alteration of well-known narratives so as to more effectively convey a particular **rasa** is not merely theoretically desirable, but can be shown, by examples such as those mentioned above, to be part of the practice of actual poets.

Even a casual survey, such as we have just made, of the more prominent literary critical observations to be found in the Dhvanyāloka is sufficient to demonstrate that a radical shift has taken place in the attitude of poetic analysis toward actual poetry. Even references by name to actual works and authors are extremely rare in prior Alaṃkāra literature.[17] Critical observations of the sort Ānandavardhana makes, either positive or negative, are totally unknown before the Dhvanyāloka. Ānandavardhana's approach to literary analysis is thus far more empirically oriented than that of his predecessors; while he is certainly concerned, like them, to reach general conclusions regarding the nature and function of poetry as whole and of its constituent elements, he pays careful attention, in a way that they did not, to the application of these conclusions to the interpretation and criticism of poetry in particular cases.

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[16]Dhvanyāloka, p. 336.

[17]There are a few exceptions-- in several instances Bhāmaha names the author of an example verse or gives the title of the work from which it is drawn, and Daṇḍin (1.34) mentions Pravarasena's Setubandha by name.

This new, empirical orientation, while it allows Ānandavardhana to showcase the unprecedented analytical and critical possibilities which his teleological, **rasa**-centered model of poetry allows for, also makes apparent a major problem with this model as applied to actually existing literature: that there exists a significant body of poetry in which the communication of **rasa** simply is not the primary object of the poet. The great strength of Ānandavardhana's model of poetry is its ability to provide a general criterion for aesthetic value in literature, in terms of which particular prescriptions regarding composition may be explained and justified and existing compositions may be evaluated. As we shall see, in the case of poetry which does not have **rasa** as its telos, this explanatory and evaluative power simply disappears.

Guṇībhūtavyañgya- and Citra-kāvya

Ānandavardhana has made two major innovations in poetic theory which provide the basis for his model of poetry: he has argued for the existence in poetry of a heretofore unrecognized level of suggested (**vyañgya**) meaning distinct from its directly expressed (**vācya**) meaning, and he has introduced a Mīmāṃsā-derived, teleological method of text analysis which requires that any coherent text be directed toward a single, predominant element, to which all of its parts are ultimately subordinate. **Dhvani**, the type of poetry with which Ānandavardhana is primarily concerned, is defined

as poetry in which suggested meaning both exists and is predominant. But the two basic postulates of his poetic theory allow for three logically possible classes of poetry (taking the status of suggested meaning as the basis for classification). Poetry may or may not convey a suggested meaning in addition to its expressed sense; if it does so, this suggested sense may be subordinated to the expressed sense or may be predominant with respect to it.

Ānandavardhana accepts that these three classes are not only theoretically possible but actually represented in existing literature. The first type, in which suggested meaning both exists and is predominant, is, of course, **dhvani**. The second, in which suggested meaning is present but is subordinated to the expressed meaning, is termed **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya** ("poetry in which the suggested meaning is subordinate [**guṇībhūta**]"). The third, in which there is no suggested sense whatsoever, he calls **citra-kāvya** ("flashy poetry" or "picture-poetry"). As we have seen (above, Chapter Four, p. 132), Ānandavardhana strives to show that **rasa** has played a central role in poetry from its very origins; for him, much if not most great poetry has the communication of **rasa** as its primary object, and hence may be classified as **dhvani-kāvya**. He does not, however, go so far as to contend that *all* poetry has this as its object. He acknowledges that both **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-** and **citra-kāvya** form a part of the poetic tradition as it is known to him, and is ultimately

unwilling, despite his professed preference for **dhvani-kāvya**, to unqualifiedly dismiss either of these other types as necessarily deficient (though, as we shall see, he comes close to doing so in the case of **citra**).

Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya, unlike **dhvani**, is a negatively defined, catch-all category. A verse containing some suggested meaning may for any of a variety of reasons fail to meet Ānandavardhana's criteria for a true instance of **dhvani**, and whenever it does so it is to be considered a case of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**. The primary condition for the subordination of a suggested meaning, the one mentioned by Ānandavardhana in his definition of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**, is that the directly expressed meaning should be more beautiful than it.[18] A verse conveying a suggested meaning should also be regarded as **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya** if this suggested meaning is unclear.[19] Likewise, if the suggested meaning of a verse is explicitly referred to or mentioned, as in the following example:

> Knowing that her lover was considering what time they should meet, the clever woman closed her play lotus, giving him a hint with laughing eyes.[20]

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[18]Dhvanyāloka, p. 458. The standard of "beauty" is, of course, thoroughly subjective, and its usefulness as a criterion for distinguishing between **dhvani-** and **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya** is challenged in later Alaṃkāraśāstra, particularly by Mahimabhaṭṭa (cf. Vyaktiviveka, pp. 160-168 and below, Chapter Ten, pp. 488ff).

[19]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 281ff.

[20]Ibid., pp. 250, 461.
saṃketakālamanasaṃ viṭam jñātvā vidagdhayā/
hasannetrārpitākūtaṃ līlāpadmaṃ nimīlitam//

Here, the closing of the play lotus suggests that the woman intends to meet her lover at sunset, when the lotuses close; because the poet explicitly states that this action is meant to convey such a hint to her lover, the verse must be regarded as **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**, rather than as a true case of **dhvani**.

Similarly, where some particular intonation (**kāku**) provides a cue which helps an audience to understand the suggested meaning of a verse, the verse should be regarded as **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya** rather than **dhvani**. For example:

> Having struck at our lives and our masses of wealth by the burning of the lacquer house, by poisoned food, by entering the gambling-assembly, and having pulled at the clothes and the hair of the wife of the Pāṇḍavas, do the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra live *confidently*, while *I* am alive?[21]

The verse is spoken by Bhīmasena, second eldest of the Pāṇḍavas, angered by his older brother Yudhiṣṭhira's efforts to make peace with the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra and by hearing an actor speaking a verse he believes to be a blessing for them. There are no explicit verbal cues in the verse which indicate that the verse is intended ironically, but the context makes it perfectly clear that this is so, and in performance an actor reciting the verse would ordinarily convey this ironic

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[21]Ibid., pp. 477-8.
lākṣāgṛhānalaviṣānnasabhāpraveśaiḥ
    prāṇeṣu vittanicayeṣu ca naḥ prahṛtya/
ākṛṣya pāṇḍavavadhūparidhānakeśān
    svasthā bhavanti mayi jīvati dhārtarāṣṭrāḥ//
(Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, Veṇīsaṃhāra 1.8)
Ānandavardhana quotes only the final **pāda** of the verse ("Do the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra...?), the portion in which suggestive intonation would be employed.

intent by means of intonation. Thus the ironic intent of the verse, although it is suggested by the context and the character of the speaker, is, in performance, more explicitly indicated by the actor's use of a particular tone of voice. Just as when there is an explicit verbal reference to the suggested sense of a verse, when the intonation used in recitation indicates a suggested sense in this way, it must be regarded as an instance of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**.

Thus there are several essentially unrelated criteria by which a verse containing a suggested meaning may fail to attain the status of **dhvani** and consequently be classified as **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**.

Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya as Ānandavardhana defines it is a very broad category-- broad enough to include within it virtually all of the **alaṃkāras** whose definition and classification absorbed most of the attention of earlier Ālaṃkārikas. As we have already seen (cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 157ff), Ānandavardhana concedes that previous Ālaṃkārikas have, in the course of examining various figures of speech, dealt with all three possible varieties of suggested meaning-- **vastu** (in figures such as **samāsokti**, **paryāyokta**, etc.), **alaṃkāra** (in figures such as **rūpaka** and **sasaṃdeha**, which suggest an unstated simile), and **rasa** (in figures such as **rasavat**, **preyasvat**, etc.)-- albeit without recognizing these as instances of the general phenomenon of suggestion. He argues nevertheless that **dhvani** lies entirely outside the scope of

their poetic analyses. It is his contention that in the instances of suggestion they have dealt with the suggested meaning is invariably subordinated to the directly expressed meaning. Therefore, all such figures can be subsumed within the category of **guṇībhūtavyañgya**.

The relegation of these **alaṃkāras** to the realm of **guṇībhūtavyañgya** grew out of Ānandavardhana's need to establish the existence of **dhvani** as a type of poetry which could not be adequately explained within the existing categories of Alaṃkāraśāstra, and which consequently demanded the formulation of a new mode of poetic analysis. When, toward the end of the third **uddyota** of the Dhvanyāloka, Ānandavardhana turns to examine **guṇībhūtavyañgya** in more detail, he carries the argument further. It is not simply that there are a few selected **alaṃkāras** which can be included within the scope of **guṇībhūtavyañgya**; virtually all **alaṃkāras** can be shown, in most cases, to convey some suggested meaning, and hence to be so included.

> Like **dīpaka**, **samāsokti**, etc., other **alaṃkāras** also can be seen, for the most part, to touch on some suggested meaning, either another **alaṃkāra** or a **vastu**; since, first of all, all **alaṃkāras** can be made to contain the [suggested] **alaṃkāra atiśayokti** ("hyperbole").[22]

Ideally, all figures ought to contain some measure of hyperbole or overstatement-- it is on their deviation from the ordinary that the beauty of such modes of expression depends. This assertion of the central role of hyperbole in figurative

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[22]Ibid., pp. 464-5.

usage is not new to Ānandavardhana, and he cites Bhāmaha's remarks on **atiśayokti** in support of his position.

> "All oblique expression [**vakrokti**[23]] is just this [**atiśayokti**]; meaning is intensified [**vibhāvyate**] by this. A poet should make a great effort with respect to this-- what **alaṃkāra** can exist without it?"-- Here the meaning that should be understood is this: an **alaṃkāra** in which **atiśayokti** resides, due to the imaginative power [**pratibhā**] of the poet, will possess a high degree of beauty; any other will be a mere ornament [**alaṃkāramātra**]. Thus, because of its suitablity for incorporation in all **alaṃkāras**[24], this [**atiśayokti**] is said, by figurative non-differentiation [**abhedopacāra**], to be identical with all **alaṃkāras**.[25]

All **alaṃkāras**, when employed by an imaginative poet, can and should incorporate some element of hyperbole. This hyperbole may be explicitly stated, but will ordinarily be understood via suggestion. Whenever this is so, the **alaṃkāra** in question will be included within the scope of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya** (if the suggested hyperbole were not subordinate to the expressed figure which suggests it, this figure could not properly be considered an **alaṃkāra** at all, but would rather be regarded as an instance of **dhvani**).

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[23]Here referring not to a particular **alaṃkāra** (as in many later authors [eg. Vāmana, Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra 4.3.8; Rudraṭa, Kāvyālaṃkāra 2.14-17; Mammaṭa, Kāvyaprakāśa 9.1]), but to that indirect or out-of-the-ordinary character which is, or ought to be, common to all poetic usage.

[24]It would seem that these and the following remarks on the suggestion of **atiśayokti** by other **alaṃkāras** ought to be restricted to **arthālaṃkāras** (meaning-based figures) alone-- it is hard to see how **śabdālaṃkāras** (sound-based figures) such as alliteration (**anuprāsa**) or rhyme (**yamaka**) could ever be said to suggest the figure **atiśayokti**-- but neither Ānandavardhana nor Bhāmaha explicitly so restricts it.

[25]Ibid., pp. 467-468.

Having explained the pervasive presence of suggested hyperbole in **alaṃkāras** generally, Ānandavardhana goes on to list a wide variety of specific **alaṃkāras** which typically or necessarily convey some subordinate suggested sense, and which depend on this suggested sense for their beauty. Subordinated suggestion, on Ānandavardhana's view, plays so central a role in the operation of the **alaṃkāras** that the analysis of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya** in general can effectively substitute for the analysis of particular **alaṃkāras** as practiced by earlier Ālaṃkārikas.

> **Alaṃkāras** such as **rūpaka** [i.e. the **arthālaṃkāras**], which acquire a high degree of beauty only when they touch on some suggested element, all fall within the scope of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**. And having a subordinate suggested meaning is the general characteristic of all such [**alaṃkāras**], both those already explained [by previous Ālaṃkārikas] and those not yet explained. If this [**guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**] is defined, then they are *all* adequately defined. They cannot be accurately known by the explanation of the particular form of each one without any general definition, because they are infinite; just as words cannot be accurately known through word by word study [**pratipadapāṭha**].[26] For the permutations of language are infinite, and the **alaṃkāras** are varieties of these.[27]

The attempt to exhaustively define and categorize all figures of speech, which has heretofore served as the primary object of Alaṃkāraśāstra, is, on this view, ultimately futile.

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[26]An allusion to the **paspaśāhnika** of the Mahābhāṣya (Vrajajīvan Pracyabhāratī Granthamālā 23, Vol. 1, pp. 53-56); here Patañjali explains that the proper forms of words, because they are infinite, cannot be learnt through word by word study, and grammatical instruction must therefore be made by means of generally applicable rules (**utsarga**) and exceptions to these rules (**apavāda**).

[27]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 472-3.

There is no limit to the possible permutations of figurative usage, and thus no hope of achieving a complete taxonomy of such usage by the description of specific figures of speech. The role of subordinated suggestion in the figures is so pervasive, however, that it may serve as the defining element which underlies figurative usage in general. The characterization and analysis of this underlying, defining element can effectively take the place of the interminable and ultimately hopeless task of defining and classifying the figures one by one.

Ānandavardhana began his work by sharply demarcating the object of his own literary analysis, suggested meaning, from the object of analysis for earlier Ālaṃkārikas, directly expressed meaning in the form of particular, expressed, figures of speech (cf. Dhvanyāloka, 1.3-4[28]). However, as we have just seen, further analysis of the role and scope of suggested meaning in poetry blurs and finally overwhelms this demarcation: the theory of suggested meaning not only reveals and explains the existence of a type of poetry, **dhvani**, which had gone unrecognized by earlier literary analysts, but also makes clear, in the form of subordinated suggestion, the general, underlying principle on which figuration is based and thus produces a more satisfactory account of the figures, the primary focus of prior literary analysis, than previous Ālaṃkārikas themselves were able to provide.

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[28]Ibid., pp. 47-49.

Although Ānandavardhana consistently refers to **dhvani** and **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya** as "types" of poetry (**kāvya-prakāra** or **kāvya-viśeṣa**), it should be evident from the foregoing discussion, and from the examination of the subordination of **alaṃkāras** to **rasa** made earlier (cf. above Chapter Four, pp. 174ff), that these two "types" are not mutually exclusive and may co-occur in the same composition or even the same verse. The various **alaṃkāras**, which are all or virtually all to be regarded as subtypes of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya**, can and generally should be employed so as to heighten the capacity of a verse or a larger composition to suggest, as its primary meaning, a particular **rasa** (making it, thereby, an instance of **dhvani-kāvya**).

Ānandavardhana explicitly points out this overlapping of "types" in his discussion of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**. He is, as always, anxious to emphasize the prevalence of **dhvani**, particularly **rasa-dhvani**, in the great works of Sanskrit and Prakrit poetry, and is therefore useful for him to show how even verses and expressions conveying a subordinated suggested sense may co-occur with and assist in the process of **rasa-dhvani**.

> Even this **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**-type may again take on the form of **dhvani**, when one considers its ultimate intent--namely **rasa** etc.[29]

This can be seen clearly in the examples of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya** quoted above. The verse "Knowing that her lover was

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[29]Ibid., p. 483.

considering what time they should meet..." (**saṃketakāla-mānasaṃ**...-- cf. above, p. 273) conveys the subordinate suggested meaning that the heroine wishes to meet her lover at sundown (and thus may be considered an instance of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**), but the ultimate object of the verse is to suggest **śṛṅgāra-rasa**. Likewise, in the example "Having struck at our lives... " (**lākṣāgṛhānala**...-- cf. above, p. 274) the words of the verse, aided, in performance, by a certain intonation on the actor's part, convey, as a subordinated suggestion, that the verse is intended ironically; the ultimate purport of the verse, however, is to suggest **vīra-rasa** ("heroism") (or perhaps **raudra-rasa** ["fury"]).

In this way it can be shown that a great many examples of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya** are also cases of **rasa-dhvani** and, having the suggestion of **rasa** as their primary and overriding goal, such examples can easily be explained and evaluated via Ānandavardhana's teleological mode of literary analysis. Ānandavardhana concedes, however, that **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya** need not be, and is not invariably, directed toward **rasa-dhvani**.

> But when an expression does not have **rasa**, etc. as its ultimate purport [**tātparya**], even when it is conveyed by words containing subordinate suggested meanings, subordinated suggestion will a property of the whole.[30]

Even if the individual words or phrases of which a verse is composed contain subordinate suggested meanings and are therefore to be regarded as **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**, the verse as a

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[30] Ibid., p. 485.

whole may have **rasa** as its primary object and so be considered a case of **dhvani**; but, when such a verse does not have **rasa** as its primary object, the entire verse will be regarded as **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**. There is then some domain for **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya** independent from that of **dhvani**; many or most instances of **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya** may be **rasa**-directed and hence ultimately included within the scope of **dhvani**, but, in at least some cases, **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya** occurs without culminating in any **rasa-dhvani**. As we shall see, the existence of such poetry poses a serious problem for Ānandavardhana's poetic teleology, as, in the absence of **rasa**, there is no meaningful criterion in terms of which the aesthetic value of particular phonetic and semantic elements may be evaluated.

Apart from **dhvani-kāvya** and from **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya** (in which **rasa** and other suggested meanings occupy a subordinate role), Ānandavardhana accepts the existence of a third type of poetry, **citra-kāvya**, in which suggested meaning plays no role whatsoever. Such poetry depends solely on the beauty of its sounds and its expressed meaning for its capacity to give pleasure. Given Ānandavardhana's argument for the pervasive role of subordinated suggestion in the figures of speech dealt with by earlier Ālaṃkārikas, the range of phonetic and semantic elements which may be employed to render such poetry beautiful is quite limited; there are, however, at least a few figurative elements which are totally

devoid of suggested meaning.

> There [in **citra-kāvya**] there is a certain element of variegation of sound [**śabda-citra**] in the form of difficult rhyming [**duṣkara-yamaka**[31]] etc.; apart from this variegation of sound, there is variegation of expressed meaning [**vācya-citra**] in the form of **alaṃkāras** such as "imagining" [**utprekṣā**[32]] when they are established as the primary meaning of an expression, lacking any **rasa**-directedness and devoid of connection with any suggested sense.[33]

Ānandavardhana takes a disparaging attitude toward such poetry, which depends solely on the beauty of its sounds and surface-meanings, and describes it as "an imitation of poetry [**kāvyānukāra**]."[34]

Despite his disparaging attitude toward **citra-kāvya**, however, Ānandavardhana insists that **citra-kāvya** forms a real and significant part of poetic literature as it is known to him. He considers and decisively rejects an objection against the very possibility of poetry totally devoid of suggested meaning. The objector argues that, while it may be possible to compose poetry in which there are no suggested **vastus** or

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[31]**Yamaka** ("rhyme") may extend well beyond a single word or a few syllables-- it may extend to the juxtaposition of two or more quarter-, half-, or even whole verses which are completely homophonous but convey different meanings; those particular varieties of **yamaka** which are designated as **duṣkara** ("difficult") are illustrated in Daṇḍin's Kāvyādarśa (sometimes known as Kāvyalakṣaṇa) 3.38ff. (cf. Kāvyalakṣaṇa of Daṇḍin, Anantlal Thakur ed., Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1957, pp. 214ff).

[32]A figure which consists in the attribution to anything of properties or functions which could not possibly belong to it.

[33]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., p. 495.

[34]Ibid., p. 495.

alaṃkāras, there can exist no poetry which does not, in one way or another, suggest some **rasa**.

> There can be no poem which does not refer to some entity [**vastu**]. And every entity in the world must certainly be subservient [**aṅga**] to some **rasa** or emotional state [**bhāva**], if only as a **vibhāva**.[35] For **rasas** etc. are particular states of mind, and there is no entity which [when apprehended] does not produce some state of mind--and, if it did not produce any state of mind, such an entity would not be a proper topic for poets in any case.[36]

All poetry must certainly be about something, and the things described or referred to in a poem will necessarily generate some sort of emotional response. Any such emotional response will fall within the scope of one or another of the **rasas** or **bhāvas** (even indifference may be considered an emotional response-- one which would give rise to **śānta-rasa** ["tranquility"]). Given this, it would seem that any poem whatsoever would have to suggest some **rasa** or **rasa**-like state, and would therefore have to be classified as either **dhvani** or **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**, depending on the predominance or subordination of this **rasa** with respect to the expressed meanings which suggest it. No third category is possible, as **rasa** can never be entirely absent.

In responding to this objection Ānandavardhana turns once again to the tools of Mīmāṃsā discourse-analysis. The

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[35]A factor which prompts or heightens an emotional response-- one of the three factors (along with **anubhāvas** and **vyabhicāribhāvas**) required for the suggestion of **rasa** (cf. above, Chapter Four, p. 130).

[36]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 495-6.

existence of **citra-kāvya** is justified with reference to the Mīmāṃsā notion of **vivakṣā** ("intent to express").

> To this argument the following answer is made: True, there is no such type of poetry in which there is *no* awareness of **rasa**, etc. But, when a poet who is devoid of any intent to express **rasa**, **bhāva**, etc. composes sound- or meaning-based **alaṃkāras** then, in dependence on that expressive intent, the meaning [of the poem] is determined to be devoid of **rasa** etc. For the meaning of words in a poem is only that which becomes the object of expressive intent. And if, in such a case, even in the absence of any expressive intent on the part of the poet, any awareness of **rasa** etc. should arise by virtue of the implicative capacity [**sāmarthya**] of the expressed meaning, this awareness will be extremely weak-- having determined absence of **rasa** in this way, the scope of **citra-kāvya** may be established.[37]

Any poem (indeed any comprehensible utterance whatsoever) will refer to entities of some sort (whether real or fictitious), the entities referred to will invariably provoke some sort emotional response, and the poem in question may thus be said to be suggestive of some **rasa**, **bhāva**, or other **rasa**-like experience; however, if a poet is intent solely on the construction of **alaṃkāras** and composes totally without regard for any emotional response his composition may generate, any **rasa** or **rasa**-like experience suggested by this poem will be incidental to the poet's expressive intent and its effect on the hearer's understanding of the poem will be negligible. No poetry can ever be totally devoid of **rasa**, but such poetry, in which any suggestion of **rasa** is incidental and, as it were, accidental, may legitimately be classified as **citra-kāvya**.

While he generally looks down on **citra** as a lesser

[37]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 496-7.

variety of poetry, Ānandavardhana is ultimately unwilling to exclude it entirely from the realm of literature. He does all he can, however to restrict the scope of **citra** and emphasize its marginality to literature as a whole. He does this, first of all, by drawing a sharp distinction between the descriptive and prescriptive imperatives of literary analysis:

> This **citra** is considered by us because poets, whose speech is unconstrained [**viśṛṅkhalagiraḥ**], have been seen to compose poetry totally without regard for any ultimate purport [**tātparya**] in the form of **rasa** etc.; but for present-day poets, now that a proper establishment of the principles of poetry is being made, there should be no mode of poetry apart from **dhvani**, since the practice of poets of mature capacity will not be appealing in the absence of an ultimate purport in the form of **rasa** etc. When there is an ultimate purport in the form of **rasa** etc., there is nothing which, made subordinate to the desired **rasa**, will not attain high quality [**praguṇībhavati**].[38]

Citra-kāvya has formed part of the practice of poets in the past; such poetry forms a part of the recieved literary tradition, and the description and analysis of such poetry therefore is and will remain part of the task of Alaṃkāraśāstra. But given the properly central role of suggested meaning, especially **rasa**, in poetry (as revealed by Ānandavardhana's own literary analysis), **dhvani** is presented, prescriptively, as that mode of poetry toward which all present and future poets should aspire.

A place is retained for **citra** even in current practice but, again, it is its marginal character that is stressed.

Although this instruction in the principles of poetry is

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[38]Ibid., p. 497.

> being made for contemporary poets, beginning poets who need practice may perhaps compose **citra**; but, for those poets who have attained full development, **dhvani** alone is poetry.[39]

The composition of **citra-kāvya** may serve a useful purpose by aiding a poet in the development of skill in the construction of figures-- skill which is necessary for any poet-- but the ultimate goal of all poets should be to compose suggestive, **rasa**-directed poetry. Ultimately, then, Ānandavardhana is not willing to entirely banish **citra-kāvya** even from the practice of contemporary poets.

Thus, for Ānandavardhana, all three of the logically possible modes of poetry-- **dhvani**, **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**, and **citra**-- really exist in the practice of poets both ancient and contemporary, and he accords to all, even to **citra**, some measure of legitimacy. He does all that he can to emphasize that among these three modes **dhvani** is overwhelmingly preponderant in the works of great poets. He strives to sharply limit the independent scope of the other two modes-- in very many (though not all) cases, **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya** will overlap with, and be subordinated to, **rasa-dhvani**; **citra-kāvya**, while it may have been freely composed by poets in the past, should be practiced by contemporary poets only as a training exercise which will ultimately aid them in composing **dhvani-kāvya**. But, however limited their scope may be, Ānandavardhana does admit the existence of significant bodies

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[39]Ibid., pp. 499-500.

of poetry in which **rasa** plays either a secondary role or no role at all, and sees the analysis of these bodies of poetry, along with the analysis of **dhvani-kāvya**, as part of the function of Alaṃkāraśāstra. This admission is problematic for, as we shall see, Ānandavardhana's approach to literary analysis leaves him with little or nothing useful to say about works which do not have **rasa-dhvani** as their ultimate goal.

The Collapse of Aesthetic Criteria in the Absence of Rasa

Ānandavardhana's teleological mode of analysis requires that a literary work have an ultimate and overriding purpose, namely the suggestion of a single predominant **rasa**, toward which all the formal elements of the work, from its individual phonemes to its overall plot structure, should be subservient. Nevertheless, given his unprecedentedly empirical orientation and the close attention he pays to actual literary works, he cannot help but acknowledge that, in fact, not all works have **rasa** as their overriding goal. Ānandavardhana is not willing, as are several later Ālaṃkārikas, to insist on **rasa**-directedness as a necessary and constitutive property of poetry; he does not unqualifiedly dismiss non-**rasa**-directed works as non-poetry or defective poetry. In the absence of **rasa**-directedness, however, there is no uniform, non-arbitrary aesthetic criterion by which the employment of particular formal elements in particular contexts can be evaluated. Without **rasa** to serve as the telos of a literary work, Ānandavardhana's aesthetic theory cannot serve as a useful

guide either for poets in the composition of new works or for readers in the analysis and judgement of existing ones.

Ānandavardhana does not dwell at length on the silence of his brand of literary analysis in the face of non-**rasa**-directed literature, but does deal with it in passing. It can be seen most clearly in his long and detailed discussion of **saṃghaṭanā** (compound-density-- literally "joining together") and of the factors governing its use in particular poetic contexts.[40] We have seen (above, Chapter Four, pp. 183-186) that Ānandavardhana rejects the effort of earlier Ālaṃkārikas to account for the **guṇas** ("qualities"-- sweetness [**mādhurya**], strength [**ojas**], and clarity [**prasāda**]) as properties belonging to words and their expressed meanings; for him, **guṇas** must be regarded as properties of particular **rasas**, not of the words and meanings which suggest these **rasas**. In order to justify this view of the nature of **guṇa**, Ānandavardhana takes great care to distinguish it from the closely related notion of **saṃghaṭanā**. Ānandavardhana informs us[41] that this **saṃghaṭanā** has been defined by others as being of three types: **asamāsā** ("without compounds"), **madhyamasamāsā** ("having medium-length compounds"), and **dīrghasamāsā** ("having long compounds"). No mention of this **saṃghaṭanā** can be found in the surviving works of pre-Ānandavardhana Ālaṃkārikas, but

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[40]Dhvanyāloka 3.5-9 (op. cit., pp. 309-328).

[41]Ibid., p. 309.

based on Abhinavagupta's commentary on this passage[42] it would seem to have been propounded by Udbhaṭa (most probably in some lost portion of the Bhāmahavivaraṇa).

Udbhaṭa rejected the categorical distinction between **guṇas** and **alaṃkāras**,[43] and the concept of **saṃghaṭanā** appears to have arisen from an attempt to give a more strictly formal characterization of the features associated with particular **guṇas**, and so to re-classify them as **alaṃkāras**. Phonetic elements shown to be associated with **guṇas** can with relative ease be subsumed under the several varieties of alliteration (**anuprāsa**), but presence or absence of compounds, which plays a major role in the definition and differentiation of **guṇas**,[44] has no place among the **alaṃkāras** accepted by earlier theorists or those defined by Udbhaṭa himself in the

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[42]Ibid., p. 310.

[43]In his Kāvyaprakāśa (Oriental Research Institute Series 122, Mysore, 1977, Vol. 2, p. 213), Mammaṭa paraphrases Udbhaṭa's view as follows: "[Qualities] such as heroism operate through inherence [in a person], [ornaments] such as necklaces operate through contact: therefore [in the case of a person] let there be a difference between **guṇas** ['qualities'] and **alaṃkāras** ['ornaments']. [Qualities] such as 'strength' and [ornaments] such as alliteration [i.e. the **guṇas** and **alaṃkāras** found in poetry] both operate through inherence [in the words and meanings of a poem]: a distinction between these [can be asserted] only by blindly following [previous authors] like sheep [**gaḍḍurikāpravāheṇa**]." In his commentary on the passage, Māṇikyacandra identifies this as Udbhaṭa's view, and quotes a relevant passage from his Bhāmahavivaraṇa.

[44]Long compounds, as we have seen (above, Chapter Four, pp. 184-185), are said to endow a composition with **ojas** ("strength"); the near or total absence of compounds is thought to endow it with **mādhurya** ("sweetness").

Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha. The analysis of **saṃghaṭanā** presumably grew out of an effort to rectify this deficiency and eliminate any need for **guṇas** as a separate category.

Saṃghaṭanā is a property of the words of a poem; **guṇas** are, for Ānandavardhana, properties of **rasas** themselves, and may only metaphorically be said to belong to the words and meanings which convey these **rasas**. In order to uphold his explanation of the distinction between **guṇa** and **alaṃkāra**, Ānandavardhana must show that **guṇas** are not reducible to **saṃghaṭanā**.

Given the acknowledged role of **saṃghaṭanā** in imparting a particular **guṇa** to a composition,[45] the relationship between **guṇa** and **saṃghaṭanā** may be explained in one of three possible ways: **guṇa** and **saṃghaṭanā** may be identical, **guṇa** may depend on **saṃghaṭanā**, or **saṃghaṭanā** may depend on **guṇa**.[46] Ānandavardhana rejects the first two possibilities on the grounds that **guṇas** are inseparably associated with particular **rasas**, while the several varieties of **saṃghaṭanā** are not. This dissociation between **guṇa** and **saṃghaṭanā** can be clearly seen in the verse **Yo yaḥ śastram...** ("Anyone among the army of the Pāṇḍavas..."-- cf. above, Chapter Four, p. 185). Here the quality **ojas** ("strength") is clearly present, but does not

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[45]As in the verse **cancadbhujabhramita...** ("O queen, Bhima will bind up your hair..."-- cf. above, Chapter Four, p. 184), in which the quality **ojas** ("strength") is dependent, at least in part, on the predominance of long compounds.

[46]Dhvanyaloka, p. 310ff.

depend on any unusual density of long compounds.

Ojas is, as we have seen, a property of particular **rasas** (in the present case, **raudra** ["fury"]). Any verse which effectively conveys such a **rasa** will, by virtue of that fact alone, possess the quality **ojas**. A high density of long compounds may in some cases serve to convey such a **rasa**, and consequently to endow a verse with **ojas**, but is not a necessary condition for the production of this quality. As particular **guṇas** can be produced even in the absence of the varieties of **saṃghaṭanā** conventionally associated with them, they cannot be said to depend on **saṃghaṭanā**. Where a particular variety of **saṃghaṭanā** aids in the production of a particular quality, its role will be subordinate and hence dependent.

By demonstrating the disjunction in practice between particular qualities (e.g. **ojas**) and the particular varieties of **saṃghaṭanā** typically associated with these qualities (e.g. a high density of long compounds), Ānandavardhana is able to bolster his argument that the production of **guṇas** in a literary work ultimately depends not on the use of specifiable sets of formal language elements but rather on the suggestion of particular **rasas**. But the disjunction between **guṇa** and **saṃghaṭanā** raises an additional question: if the employment of a given variety of **saṃghaṭanā** is not (like the presence a particular **guṇa**) invariably associated with a specific **rasa** or set of **rasas**, what is it that governs, or ought to govern, the

use of particular varieties of **saṃghaṭanā** in particular contexts?

Ānandavardhana offers several factors which ought to govern a poet's use of **saṃghaṭanā**, factors which are partly dependent on **rasa** and partly not. The type of **saṃghaṭanā** to be employed in any given verse or passage should be restricted so as to be appropriate to its speaker and the expressed meaning it conveys,[47] and appropriate also to the genre of the work in which it occurs.[48] In the case of speaker and that of expressed meaning, "appropriateness" is determined largely on the basis of **rasa**; the appropriateness of particular types of **saṃghaṭanā** to particular genres has, as we shall see below, no apparent basis in **rasa**.

As a general rule, when the speaker of a verse (either the poet, or some character created or depicted by the poet) is endowed with emotion in the form of **rasa** or **bhāva**, and when this **rasa** or **bhāva** is the overriding object to which the expressed meaning of the verse is subordinate, **saṃghaṭanā** should be restricted to **asamāsā** ("without compounds") or **madhyamasamāsā** ("having medium-length compounds"). When the **rasa** in question is pathos (**karuṇa**) or love-in-separation (**vipralambha-śṛṅgāra**) it should be limited to **asamāsā** alone. These restrictions are justified as follows:

When **rasa** is the main thing to be communicated, factors

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[47]Ibid., p. 318.

[48]Ibid., p. 323.

> which obstruct or conflict with the cognition of this **rasa** are to be totally avoided. And **saṃghaṭanā** which contains long compounds [**dīrghasamāsā**], because these compounds can be interpreted in various ways, sometimes obstructs the cognition of **rasa**; thus, the excessive employment of this [**dīrghasamāsā**] is not appealing. This is especially so in the case of dramatic poetry and, apart from this, in the case of **karuṇa** or **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra**. For, because of the delicateness of these two **rasas**, if there is even a slight lack of clarity in word or meaning, the cognition of these **rasas** will be disturbed. But when some other **rasa**, such as **raudra** ["fury"] is to be communicated, **saṃghaṭanā** with medium-length compounds or sometimes, when concerned with the actions of steadfast and arrogant hero, even with long compounds will not be flawed, if employed in dependence on an expressed meaning which is suitable to the **rasa** in question and necessarily connected with the introduction of this **saṃghaṭanā**. Thus even this [**dīrghasamāsā**] is not entirely to be avoided.[49]

A high density of long compounds creates a potential for ambiguity from which the obstruction of **rasa** may result. It is consequently to be avoided generally, and particularly when one intends to suggest a **rasa** such as **karuṇa** which is especially susceptible to such obstruction. Even in the case of **rasas** such as **raudra**, which are normally thought to be fostered, rather than impaired, by a high compound-density, **dīrghasamāsā saṃghaṭanā** should be employed only where appropriateness to both speaker and expressed sense demands it.

The sort of restrictions Ānandavardhana imposes on the use of **saṃghaṭanā** in **rasa**-directed poetry should be quite familiar; they are decidedly similar to those limitations Ānandavardhana elsewhere imposes on the use of sound-based

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[49] Ibid., pp. 320-321.

figures such as alliteration (**anuprāsa**) and rhyme (**yamaka**).[50] Here, however, he explicitly considers, as he does not do in his examinations elsewhere of context-based restrictions on the use of the **alaṃkāras** and other formal poetic elements, the status of literature which does not have the evocation of **rasa** as its dominant object.

> When the poet, being the speaker, is devoid of **rasa** or **bhāva**, the **saṃghaṭanā** is unrestricted; likewise, when the speaker is a character depicted by the poet and is devoid of **rasa** or **bhāva**, the **saṃghaṭanā** is similarly unrestricted.[51]

In stark contrast to the detailed set of regulations governing the use of **saṃghaṭanā** in **rasa**-directed literature, these brief remarks reveal the total silence of Ānandavardhana's mode of literary analysis when faced with literature in which **rasa** is not predominant. The restrictions he sets forth for the use not merely of particular varieties of **saṃghaṭanā**, but of **alaṃkāras** and all other poetic elements, depend entirely on the presence of a dominant **rasa**, which serves as the telos, the overriding purpose, of a literary work. In the absence of such a telos, there is no criterion in terms of which the use of particular elements may be evaluated. If a literary work is not ultimately **rasa**-directed, there is nothing to be said, positive or negative, about the use of a particular variety of **saṃghaṭanā** (or any other poetic element) in a given context.

Ānandavardhana's close examination of the factors

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[50]Cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 174-177.

[51]Ibid., pp. 319-320.

determining the use of **saṃghaṭanā** has still more disturbing implications for his literary theory: even where **rasa** is predominant, there are factors unrelated to it which partly govern the use of **saṃghaṭanā**. In addition to the limitations on the use of **saṃghaṭanā** imposed by appropriateness to the speaker and to the expressed meaning of a given verse or passage (which, as we have seen, have their ultimate basis in **rasa**) Ānandavardhana outlines a set of genre-based restrictions on **saṃghaṭanā** which are largely independent of the requirements of **rasa**.

Ānandavardhana lists a total of eleven verse- and two prose-genres, and notes briefly the restrictions on **saṃghaṭanā** appropriate to each.

> In **muktakas**,[52] if the poet is intent on introducing **rasa** into his composition, appropriateness [of **saṃghaṭanā**] will depend on that [**rasa**]. This has been shown already.[53] Otherwise, **saṃghaṭanā** is unrestricted.... In **sandānitakas** etc.,[54] because of appropriateness to their forceful composition, **saṃghaṭanā** is only that with medium or long compounds; if they occur in larger compositions, one should conform to appropriateness as stated for that composition. But, in a **paryāyabandha**,[55] **saṃghaṭanā** is only that with no compounds or medium

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[52]Single verses which do not form part of any larger composition.

[53]I.e. in the above discussion of appropriateness to speaker and expressed meaning.

[54]**Sandānitakas**, **viśeṣakas**, **kalāpakas**, and **kulakas**-- the next four genres listed. They are syntactically connected clusters of, respectively, two, three, four, and five or more verses; they may stand alone, like **muktakas**, or form part of some larger composition.

[55]According to Abhinavagupta, a set of syntactically independent verses dealing with a single topic.

compounds; even if, sometimes, depending on appropriateness to the meaning, **saṃghaṭanā** with long compounds is also employed, **paruṣā** ["harsh"] and **grāmyā** ["rustic"] **vṛttis**[56] should be avoided. In **parikathā**,[57] **saṃghaṭanā** is unrestricted, because there is no great intent to introduce **rasa** into the composition, as it is mere plot that is presented. In **khaṇḍakathā** and **sakalakathā**,[58] which are found chiefly in Prakrit, because they consist mostly of **kulakas** and so on,[59] there is no difficulty even if long-compounded **saṃghaṭanā** is employed, but the appropriateness of **vṛtti** according to **rasa** should be adhered to. In a **mahākāvya**, if **rasa** is the ultimate purpose, appropriateness is according to **rasa**; otherwise, **saṃghaṭanā** is unrestricted.... In drama [**abhineyārtha**], however, a thoroughgoing effort to introduce **rasa** should be made.... In an **ākhyāyikā**,[60] for the most part, **saṃghaṭanā** is only medium-compounded or long-compounded, because the beauty of prose depends on its forceful composition, and because, in an **ākhyāyikā**, this forceful composition is at its most intense. But, even though prose possesses a high degree of forceful composition, in a **kathā**, appropriateness of **saṃghaṭanā** such has been spoken of for the introduction of **rasa** should be followed.[61]

This list of genre-based restrictions, however accurately it may reflect the actual practice of poets in composing works

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[56]Cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 189-190.

[57]According to Abhinavagupta, the relating of a number of stories concerned with a single **puruṣārtha** ("human aim"-- they are traditionally four: **dharma** [loosely, righteousness or good conduct], **artha** [wealth], **kāma** [physical pleasure], and **mokṣa** [spiritual liberation]).

[58]"Partial narrative" and "complete narrative", respectively.

[59]I.e., clusters of syntactically connected verses, as described above.

[60]The two main prose genres recognized in Ālaṃkāraśāstra are **ākhyāyikā** and **kathā**. The criteria for differentiting these genres are not firmly settled. Bhāmaha (1.25-29) offers several formal and content-based restrictions on the two genres, but these are challenged by Daṇḍin (1.23-30), who rejects altogether the distinction between the two genres.

[61]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 324-327.

of particular genres, is, in terms of Ānandavardhana's aesthetic theory, totally inexplicable. Even where he does give a reason for the restriction of **saṃghaṭanā** in a particular genre, the reason itself cries out for explanation, and receives none. Why should the beauty of verse-clusters, such as **sandānitakas**, and prose compositions (**ākhyāyikās** and **kathās**) depend on "forceful composition" to a greater degree than that of other genres? Why, despite this need for forceful composition, should **rasa**-based constraints on **saṃghaṭanā** remain predominant in **kathā**, but not in **ākhyāyikā**? Why should **rasa** and **rasa**-based constraints on **saṃghaṭanā** be rejected in favor of mere plot-development in **parikathā** and not in other genres? No attempt is made to provide any rationale for the aesthetic preferability of particular varieties of **saṃghaṭanā** in particular genres. What is presented seems to be nothing more than a set of purely arbitrary stipulations.

It would appear that, in this investigation of **saṃghaṭanā**, theory has given way to observation. Ānandavardhana finds that there are, in practice, certain genre conventions governing the use of **saṃghaṭanā**, and accepts these conventions as binding despite the fact that they cannot be justified or explained within the framework of his poetic teleology. This is not the only instance in which this occurs. We have already seen (cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 155-157) that, after concluding a detailed investigation of

conflict between primary and subordinate **rasas** and the means by which it may be avoided or dissolved, Ānandavardhana makes a special dispensation: those factors (**vibhāvas**, etc.) associated with **śṛṅgāra-rasa** may be employed in any poetic context, even when, by the standards he has just articulated, they conflict with the primary **rasa** of the text or passage in question. This provision seems to accord well with the actual practice of Sanskrit poetry-- **śṛṅgāra-rasa** and the factors associated with it tend to be employed pervasively, even in seemingly incongruous settings-- but is theoretically unjustifiable and stands in direct contradiction to Ānandavardhana's own analysis of conflict between **rasas**.

Ānandavardhana's close attention to the actual practice of poetry thus raises two major difficulties for his teleological model of literary aesthetics, both revealed most clearly in his analysis of the factors governing **saṃghaṭanā**. First, there exists a body of poetic work, however small, in which **rasa** is not of primary importance and may even be totally lacking. When confronted with such poetry Ānandavardhana's mode of literary analysis loses all explanatory and critical power; in the absence of a predominant **rasa** to serve as an ultimate goal, there is no standard of aesthetic value to guide poets in composing or critics in evaluating a literary work. Second, even where **rasa** is predominant, there remain certain conventions of poetic usage which have no bearing on the capacity of a work

to effectively convey its primary **rasa**. Such conventions can have no justification within the teleological framework of his literary theory, but Ānandavardhana is nonetheless unwilling to dismiss them as illegitimate or irrelevant to the composition of good poetry.

Conclusion

Thus one can discern in the Dhvanyāloka a certain tension between theory and observation. Ānandavardhana, by introducing into Alaṃkāraśāstra the teleological mode of discourse analysis developed by the Mīmāṃsakas in their analysis of Vedic texts, is able to create a coherent theory of literary aesthetics which has tremendous explanatory power. The vast array of unexplained and seemingly arbitrary rules for poetic composition advanced by previous Ālaṃkārikas is replaced by a single, overriding principle: any poem should have a single, predominant **rasa**, and the selection and arrangement of all the formal elements of this work should be done in such a way as to intensify, rather than hinder, the capacity of the work to convey this **rasa**.

Observation of actual poetic practice, however, reveals that not all poetry conforms to the expectations generated by this theory. Not all poems have a primary **rasa**, or, indeed, any **rasa** at all. Even when there is a single, primary **rasa**, the employment of particular phonetic and semantic features in particular contexts is not always unequivocally governed by the requirements of this **rasa**.

This tension could easily be resolved. One could simply endorse without reservation the critical implications which follow from this aesthetic theory. Any coherent literary work must have the evocation of a single, dominant **rasa** as its ultimate goal. Any poetic work which does not have such a goal is defective poetry or is not poetry at all, properly speaking. Poets who allow their use of particular elements in particular contexts to be guided by arbitrary genre conventions or other factors unrelated to the requirements of their primary **rasa** are committing an error, and their works will suffer aesthetically as a result.

Alternatively, one could allow oneself to be guided by one's observation of literary practice, and restrict the applicability of this teleological model of poetry accordingly. A poem may, and frequently does, have as its goal the evocation of a single predominant **rasa**, and when this is the case certain restrictions on the use of alliteration, metaphor and various other features of sound and sense ought to apply. A poet may legitimately choose, however, to direct his efforts toward something other than the evocation of **rasa**, and in such cases these restrictions will not be applicable. **Rasa** certainly plays an important role in poetry generally, but need not be all-important in all cases.

Ānandavardhana is unwilling to resolve the apparent tension between his theory and his observation of poetic practice in either of these ways. Instead, he does all that

he can to minimize the scope of this dilemma, by attempting to show that most poetry is **rasa**-directed and that most of the accepted principles of poetic composition can be explained and justified in terms of the need to effectively suggest **rasa**. Nevertheless, from Ānandavardhana's work, which exercises a decisive influence on virtually all subsequent Alaṃkāraśāstra in Kashmir, there emerge two possible courses for further investigation which are somewhat at odds with one another.

The vast majority of Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas in the ensuing centuries follow the first of the courses outlined above, supporting or at least tacitly accepting Ānandavardhana's **rasa**-centered poetic teleology and either ignoring the existence of poetry which does not conform to the expectations generated by this model or rejecting any poetry which does not so conform as necessarily defective. The attention of these Ālaṃkārikas comes to be directed almost entirely toward the theoretical issues raised by Ānandavardhana's approach to literary analysis (chiefly the question of whether this model requires the postulation of a previously unrecognized and uniquely poetic mode of signification [**vyañjanā**], as Ānandavardhana contends, or can be accounted for solely in terms of the generally recognized categories of philosophical or literary language analysis); the kind of empirically oriented analysis and critique of existing literary works which we find in the Dhvanyāloka is largely neglected in their works.

The one notable exception to this tendency in post-Ānandavardhana Alaṃkāraśāstra is Kuntaka who, in his Vakroktijīvita (cf. below, Chapter Eight), concentrates on this kind of empirically oriented literary analysis and generally ignores or sidesteps the theoretical controversies which, for his contemporaries, have become the primary focus of interest in Alaṃkāraśāstra. Among the Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas, it is only in his work that we find serious (though largely tacit) resistance to the teleological approach to poetic analysis and the concomitant insistence on **rasa**-centrality as a necessary condition of all good poetry.

Ānandavardhana's revolutionary approach to literary analysis initiated a dramatic transformation in Alaṃkāraśāstra, not merely challenging the conclusions drawn by earlier authors in the field but establishing a new understanding of what Alaṃkāraśāstra was, altering significantly the questions that could be asked regarding the nature and function of literary works and the requirements which theories of literary aesthetics were expected to meet. In the following chapters we will examine the development of Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra in the wake of this transformation.

CHAPTER SEVEN
MUKULABHAṬṬA AND PRATĪHĀRENDURĀJA

We have seen that a central element in Ānandavardhana's defense of his approach to literary analysis is his contention that the theories devised by previous analysts of both literary language and language in general cannot provide an adequate account of the ways in which poetry functions. All previous efforts at literary analysis, Ānandavardhana argues, have overlooked the existence of **dhvani**, most critically **rasa-dhvani** which, in his view, provides the basis for aesthetic coherence in literary texts. He takes great pains to demonstrate that what he calls **dhvani** has not been dealt with by earlier Ālaṃkārikas under some other name; Ānandavardhana views his **dhvani** theory not as a re-analysis or an improved treatment of aesthetic phenomena dealt with by his predecessors, but rather as an examination of phenomena which, despite their crucial role in the creation and appreciation of aesthetically effective poetry, lay entirely outside the scope of Alaṃkāraśāstra as it had so far been practiced. He further argues that the process by which this **dhvani** is understood by the readers or hearers of a poem cannot be accounted for in terms of the two modes of signification (direct and figurative expression) generally accepted by philosophers of language, and makes it necessary to postulate a third, specifically poetic, mode of signification, namely suggestion.

Ānandavardhana's treatment of **dhvani** thus presents a direct challenge to established theories of both literary

language and language in general. This attack, naturally enough, provokes a response among the adherents of these theories. The two authors whose works we will examine in this chapter are concerned to uphold the adequacy of existing linguistic and literary theory in the face of Ānandavardhana's attack. Their works are the earliest critical responses to the Dhvanyāloka which are available to us, and they reveal the extent and rapidity of the transformation in Alaṃkāraśāstra produced by Ānandavardhana's work.

Ānandavardhana's radically new approach to literary analysis raised new questions and new expectations which works on Alaṃkāraśāstra were expected to meet. Although the works of Mukulabhaṭṭa and his pupil Pratīhārendurāja represent a conservative attempt to defend established linguistic and literary theory against Ānandavardhana's charges of inadequacy, their defense of these theories takes the form of an effort to "update" them-- to elaborate or extend them so that they can be seen to account for the phenomena Ānandavardhana believes they need to account for but cannot. Their quarrel is not with Ānandavardhana's claim that the indirect, non-literal communication of narrative elements (**vastus**), figures of speech (**alaṃkāras**), and especially **rasas** plays a pivotal role in aesthetically effective poetry, but only with his contention that this non-literal communication cannot be explained within the framework of existing literary and linguistic theory and demands the acceptance of a

previously unrecognized poetic phenomenon (**dhvani**) and, concomitantly, a previously unrecognized semantic mode (**vyañjanā**). Their defense of existing theory is thus carried out within the context of a general acceptance of Ānandavardhana's model of literary aesthetics.

Mukulabhaṭṭa

Mukulabhaṭṭa identifies himself as the son of Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa.[1] Kallaṭa is known as the author of a commentary on the Spandakārika (seminal work of the Spanda ["Vibration"] school of monistic Śaivism) and, according to some, of the Spandakārikā itself. According to Kalhaṇa,[2] Kallaṭa lived during the reign of Avantivarman (r. 855-883), and was thus more or less contemporary with Ānandavardhana. Thus Mukulabhaṭṭa's work should date from the late ninth or early tenth century.

The only extant work of Mukulabhaṭṭa is his Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā ("Fundamentals of the Denotative Function") a brief examination of the modes in which words convey meaning. Mukulabhaṭṭa accepts only two such modes, direct and figurative expression; Ānandavardhana's "suggestion", in his view, falls entirely within the scope of the latter.

Mukulabhaṭṭa's work and, in particular, his critique of Ānandavardhana, while they were quite influential in tenth and

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[1]Mukulabhatta, Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, ed. Revaprasad Dvivedi, Vidyābhavana Saṃskṛta Granthamālā 165, Varanasi, 1973, p. 73.

[2]Rājataraṅgiṇī, V. 66 (Stein's ed., Vol. 3, p. 74).

eleventh century Kashmir, have been almost entirely neglected by modern scholars in the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra. Kane and De both recognize that Mukulabhaṭṭa is aware of and refers to the Dhvanyāloka and note, in passing, that he would include **dhvani** within the scope of **lakṣaṇā** (figurative expression), but neither takes the time for even a cursory survey of his arguments against Ānandavardhana.[3] Krishnamoorthy, in his otherwise thorough survey of critical response to the Dhvanyāloka,[4] takes no notice whatsoever of Mukulabhaṭṭa's opposition to Ānandavardhana's theory of suggestion. Gerow is not only unaware of Mukulabhaṭṭa's response to Ānandavardhana but suggests, anachronistically, that Ānandavardhana was influenced by Mukulabhaṭṭa's treatment of the literal and figurative modes of signification.[5] Kunjunni Raja, in his Indian Theories of Meaning, makes serious use of Mukulabhaṭṭa's work in his own treatment of **lakṣaṇā**. He recognizes that Mukulabhaṭṭa defines **lakṣaṇā** so as to include everything Ānandavardhana would call suggestion and labels him

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[3]Cf. P.V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., pp. 192, 218; S.K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. I, pp.73-4, and Vol. II, pp. 141-2, 179-80.

[4]K. Krishnamoorthy, The **Dhvanyāloka** and its Critics, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1968.

[5]Edwin Gerow, Indian Poetics, Vol. 5, Fasc. 3 in A History of Indian Literature, ed. Jan Gonda, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1977, p. 258.

as an opponent of the **dhvani** theory;[6] but here again there is no concerted effort to examine the arguments Mukulabhaṭṭa offers in support of this view.

The only serious discussion of Mukulabhaṭṭa's views I have found in the secondary literature on Alaṃkāraśāstra is in Mukund Madhav Sharma's The Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics.[7] Sharma is a thoroughgoing proponent of the **dhvani** theory and does all he can to find fault with Mukulabhaṭṭa's criticism of Ānandavardhana, reiterating those arguments advanced against him by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the Dhvanyāloka and by Mammaṭa in his Śabdavyāpāravicāra; nevertheless, he is virtually alone among modern authors in recognizing Mukulabhaṭṭa's importance as an early opponent of the Ānandavardhana's views. He regards resistance to the theory of suggestion (rightly, I believe) as Mukulabhaṭṭa's primary object in writing the Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, rather than as an incidental matter dealt with by him only in passing.

The general neglect of Mukulabhaṭṭa's work by modern scholars of Alaṃkāraśāstra is largely attributable to its somewhat problematic genre-character. The Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā does not present itself as a work of Alaṃkāraśāstra. Its stated purpose is, by means of an analysis of the primary

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[6]K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1969 [second ed.], p. 295.

[7]Mukund Madhav Sharma, The Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics, Chowkambha Sanskrit Studies, Vol. LXIII, Varanasi, 1968, pp. 224-234.

(**mukhya**) and figurative (**lākṣaṇika**) modes of verbal signification, to provide a clear understanding of language--necessary, it is argued, for the definite ascertainment (arrived at through the medium of language) of the nature of things in the world and, thereby, for the attainment of all human ends.[8] Although in concluding his work Mukulabhaṭṭa refers directly to the usefulness of a correct understanding of these modes in the composition of literature, he does not explicitly present this literary application as the primary goal of his analysis, but refers once again to the importance of such an understanding in all human endeavor.[9]

If the Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā does not clearly fall within the scope of Alaṃkāraśāstra, however, neither does it belong to any existing genre of Sanskrit philosophical literature. Mukulabhaṭṭa does not present his work as belonging to any recognized school of philosophical thought. His general views on language correspond fairly closely to those of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and he draws on Mīmāṃsā sources in his treatment of figurative language, but he tries to harmonize his semantic analyses with the views of the Grammarians and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas as well. More importantly, in providing illustrations for the various sub-varieties of figurative expression he discusses he employs examples drawn from poetry as well as from everyday (and occasionally Vedic) language.

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[8]Mukulabhaṭṭa, op. cit., p. 1.

[9]Ibid., pp. 72-73.

This concerted interest in poetic usage has no parallel in Sanskrit linguistic philosophy. Poetic references of any kind are extremely rare in Sanskrit philosophical works, and there are certainly no such works which display anything like the degree of attention Mukulabhaṭṭa devotes to the investigation of poetic expression.

Apart from his clear interest in matters of poetic usage which ordinarily fall solely within the province of Alaṃkāraśāstra, the response generated by Mukulabhaṭṭa's work in tenth and eleventh century Kashmir indicates that he was viewed, at least primarily, as an Ālaṃkārika. As already noted, both Abhinavagupta (c. 1000) and Mammaṭa (c. 1100), Ānandavardhana's most prominent followers during this period, are aware of Mukulabhaṭṭa's work and respond to his criticism of the theory of suggestion. Mammaṭa's Śabdavyāpāravicāra is both an imitation and a detailed critique of the Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, incorporating as much of its analysis of literal and figurative usage as is consistent with the **dhvani** theory (often copying Mukulabhaṭṭa's text virtually word for word) while attacking the arguments it advances for the inclusion of **dhvani** within the scope of figurative expression. In Vallabhadeva's (c. 925) commentary on Śiśupālavadha 3.32 there is an apparent reference to Mukulabhaṭṭa in which he is referred to as "one who knows **alaṃkāras** [and/or Alaṃkāraśāstra]" [**alaṃkāravid**].[10] In contrast to the careful

[10]Cf. below, p. 335.

attention it receives from later Ālaṃkārikas, Mukulabhaṭṭa's work is entirely ignored by linguistic philosophers outside the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra.

What we know of Mukulabhaṭṭa's personal connections likewise suggests that he should be viewed primarily as an Ālaṃkārika. His two known pupils both worked in the area of Alaṃkāraśāstra: Pratīhārendurāja, who wrote the earliest known commentary on Udbhaṭa's Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha, and Sahadeva, who wrote the earliest known commentary on Vāmana's Kāvyālaṃkārasūtravṛtti. Both state that they learnt the works they comment on from Mukulabhaṭṭa, and Sahadeva states further that it was Mukulabhaṭṭa who revived the study of Vāmana's work, which had apparently by his time fallen into obscurity.[11] All that we know of his intellectual life would thus seem to indicate that Alaṃkāraśāstra was his primary field of study.[12]

The Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā should thus be viewed as a

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[11]Cf. Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha of Udbhaṭa with the Laghuvṛtti of Pratīhārendurāja, ed. N.D. Banhatti, pp. 1, 92. Sahadeva, Kāvyālaṃkārasūtravṛttiṭippaṇa, p. 1 (Sahadeva's commentary has not been printed, but I was able to obtain a copy of a modern transcript of the work from P.L. Shaji, director of the Oriental Manuscript Library of the University of Kerala [Manuscript T.316]). Sahadeva informs the reader that Vāmana's work, the transmission of which had been interrupted [**bhraṣṭāmnāyam**], was restored [**samuddhṛtam**] by Mukulabhaṭṭa, who had obtained a manuscript from some source.

[12]Mukulabhaṭṭa's son Harṣaṭa, while not an Ālaṃkārika, was active in the related discipline of metrics. He is the author of a commentary on the Jayadevachandas (ed. by H.D. Velankar in Jayadāman: A Collection of Ancient Texts on Sanskrit Prosody [Haritoṣamālā 1, Bombay, 1949], pp. 1-40).

contribution to the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra, but one which departs in important ways from the mode of treatment conventional to such works. It represents, in fact, the first example of what was to become a new sub-genre of Alaṃkāraśāstra. Short works dealing with the various modes of verbal expression very much after the manner of Mukulabhaṭṭa are not uncommon in later Alaṃkāraśāstra; the best known (but by no means the only) such works are Mammaṭa's Śabdavyāpāravicāra and Appayadīkṣita's Vṛttivārttikā.[13] Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa and many of the later systematic works on Alaṃkāraśāstra devote a chapter to the same topic.

The primary objective of such works, including Mukulabhaṭṭa's, seems to be to provide an account of semantics in general, more or less in the terms of Sanskrit linguistic philosophy, which can serve as a theoretical basis for the treatment of more specifically poetic topics (Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**, as well as those matters dealt with by earlier Ālaṃkārikas-- the analysis of **alaṃkāras**, **guṇas**, etc.). Until Mukulabhaṭṭa's time, no one in the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra seems to have felt the need to provide such a systematic philosophical basis for their analysis of the distinctive features of poetic language. It is only in the wake of

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[13]Because these works generally accept Ānandavardhana's **vyañjanā** as a third semantic mode and are often, like the two examples mentioned above, composed by authors who have written other works on poetics, they have generally been seen, unlike Mukulabhatta's work, as belonging unproblematically to the field of Ālaṃkāraśāstra.

Ānandavardhana's work that the relationship between poetics and philosophical language analysis becomes a pressing problem.

It has already been noted (cf. above, Chapter Five, pp. 194ff) that, up to Ānandavardhana's time, the Ālaṃkārikas had developed their analysis of literary language for the most part independently of the analyses of language in general formulated by linguistic philosophers, and these two groups had, in fact, developed two largely distinct conceptual vocabularies in terms of which language could be discussed. By introducing philosophical techniques of language analysis, in particular the Mīmāṃsakas' teleological approach to text interpretation, into the study of poetic language, Ānandavardhana began to bridge the conceptual and terminological gap which had previously separated literary from non-literary language theory. Furthermore, Ānandavardhana's insistence that the philosophers' analysis of semantics is insufficient to fully account for poetic usage and that an additional semantic mode, **vyañjanā**, must be recognized if such usage is to be adequately explained places his theory in explicit conflict with all established schools of philosophical thought. Subsequent Ālaṃkārikas, whether they accepted or rejected Ānandavardhana's **vyañjanā**, could hardly ignore this conflict. The need to take a stand, one way or the other, on the existence of **vyañjanā** raised the question of the linguistic/philosophical basis of the concepts

and categories employed in Alaṃkāraśāstra to a prominence it had not so far held.

So, Mukulabhaṭṭa's apparent departures, in the Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, from the topics and the mode of treatment typical of earlier works on Alaṃkāraśāstra can be attributed in large part to his attempt to deal with this newly pressing question of the philosophical basis of literary analysis. Mukulabhaṭṭa's quarrel with Ānandavardhana and his defense of the adequacy of earlier philosophical theories of language even in the area of literary analysis also help explain these departures. The genre is, in this case, part of the message; given Mukulabhaṭṭa's contention that poetry can be satisfactorily explained and analyzed in terms of established general-linguistic theory, without resorting to a special theory of poetic language or postulating a specifically poetic mode of expression, it is quite understandable that his work should present itself as an analysis of language in general, rather than of poetic language in particular. The Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā treats poetic, Vedic, and everyday language in terms of a single, unified theory of signification.

Direct and Figurative Expression

For Mukulabhaṭṭa, all meanings can be divided into two broad classes: those which are understood directly through their association (whether natural or conventional) with the individual words of an utterance, and those which are arrived at indirectly through reflection on these individual word

meanings.[14] He calls meanings of the first type "primary" (**mukhya**);[15] all meanings of the latter variety he designates as "figurative" (**lākṣaṇika**). Thus, like the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas (whom he follows in most respects), Mukulabhaṭṭa allows a very wide scope to the concept of figurative usage, such that virtually any expression will have to be regarded as conveying some figurative sense.

Consider, for example, the Vedic injunction "A cow should be sacrificed" (**gaur anubandhyaḥ**). Here the word "**gauḥ**" by itself, according to the standard Mīmāṃsā view,[16] cannot refer directly to any particular, individual cow, but only to the eternal, universal class-property "cow-ness". If the word is understood only in its primary, literal meaning, however, the injunction will make no sense; one cannot sacrifice "cow-ness", but only some particular, individual cow. In order to derive a coherent meaning from the sentence, one must understand the word "**gauḥ**" to refer, figuratively, to some individual possessing the class-property in question.[17] As

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[14]Mukulabhaṭṭa's claim that the understanding of any meanings not directly expressed invariably derives from the directly expressed meanings of the words employed, rather than the words themselves closely parallels the view of such meanings later advanced by Mahimabhaṭṭa in his Vyaktiviveka (cf. below, Chapter Ten, pp. 516-518).

[15]Equivalent to what Ānandavardhana and most others call **vācya** ("[directly] expressed").

[16]Cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 70ff.

[17]Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, pp. 2-3. In support of his contention that words cannot refer directly to individuals, he cites, without attribution, the following half-verse:

nearly all sentences must similarly be understood to describe, or to enjoin action with regard to, individual entities rather than abstract, universal class-properties, figurative expression can be seen to play a vital and pervasive role in language of all sorts.[18]

It is this expansively defined and pervasive figurative mode of expression which absorbs the bulk of Mukulabhaṭṭa's attention. His treatment of the primary or direct mode of expression is quite brief and proves to be relatively uncontroversial. There are, for Mukulabhaṭṭa, four sorts of attribute with which words may be directly associated and, thereby, four sub-varieties of primary expression. There are words which express universal class-properties (**jāti-śabdas**--

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"Denotation does not reach the thing to be specified; its power is exhausted in specification" (**viśeṣyaṃ nābhidhā gacchet kṣīṇaśaktir viśeṣaṇe**)-- denotation, i.e. direct expression, cannot refer to particular entities, but can only indicate them indirectly by referring to those attributes which characterize them-- not only class-properties like cow-ness, but other repeatable properties such as color or motion. The same words, likewise unattributed, are quoted by Abhinavagupta (Locana, p. 55), Mammaṭa (Kāvyaprakāśa [Mysore: Oriental Research Institute Series 120, 1974], Vol 1., pp. 51-52, Śabdavyāpāravicāra [Delhi: Indu Prakāśan, 1977], p. 6), and several later Ālaṃkārikas. Editors and contemporary scholars of Alaṃkāraśāstra have failed to trace the source-- Kamalākarabhaṭṭa identifies the words as Kumārilabhaṭṭa's (Mīmāṃsākutūhalam, ed. Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī, Saravatībhavana Granthamālā 123, Varanasi, 1987, pp. 80-81). They cannot be found in any of his extant works; presumably they are from his lost Bṛhaṭṭīkā.

[18]Again, Mukulabhaṭṭa is echoing the view of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas-- cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 115-117.

e.g. "cow"), words which express qualities[19] (**guṇa-śabdas**--e.g. "white"), words which express actions (**kriyā-śabdas**--e.g. "[he] cooks"), and words which, through an act of will on the part of a speaker or group of speakers, are made to refer to particular individuals (**yadṛcchā-śabdas**-- i.e. proper names). This fourfold classification of words is derived ultimately from Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, which Mukulabhaṭṭa quotes in support of his view.[20]

This classification of primary signification has no relevance to the question of **vyañjanā**; Mukulabhaṭṭa deals with the topic quickly, and it seems little more than a necessary prelude to his far more elaborate discussion of figurative usage. Ānandavardhana's followers, and later Ālaṃkārikas in general, have no serious quarrel with Mukulabhaṭṭa's treatment of the matter, and it is incorporated virtually without alteration into both of Mammaṭa's works.[21]

It is to the analysis of figurative signification (**lakṣaṇā**) that Mukulabhaṭṭa applies most of his attention, and it is here that he begins to break new ground. Mukulabhaṭṭa is, in fact, the first to seriously attempt a complete and

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[19]Distinguished from class-properties in that they are incidental to and not constitutive of the entities which possess them.

[20]Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, pp. 4-5. Cf. Patañjali, Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya, Vrajajīvan Prācyabhāratī Granthamālā 23, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan, Varanasi, (reprint) 1992, Vol. I, p. 101.

[21]Kāvyaprakāśa, op. cit., pp. 66-79; Śabdavyāpāravicāra, op. cit., pp. 2-4.

systematic account of figurative usage in all its varieties. Questions of metaphorical, metonymical, or other types of figurative usage are frequently dealt with in earlier philosophical literature, but usually only as they crop up incidentally in connection with other matters.[22]

Mukulabhaṭṭa divides **lakṣaṇā** into two broad categories and, within them, a total of six subdivisions. A given instance of **lakṣaṇā** may be either **upacāra-miśrā** ("combined with superimposition"[23]) or **śuddhā** ("pure"-- i.e. free of such superimposition).[24] An example of the **śuddhā** type is the expression **gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ** ("A village on the Ganges"). Here, the word **gaṅgāyāṃ** ("on the Ganges") cannot be understood literally, as it is impossible for a village to rest *on* the actual waters of the river; we understand it to refer, metonymically, to the *bank* of the Ganges. We mentally substitute for the contextually impossible literal referent of the term a closely connected referent which fits the context. This indirect mode of reference does not, however, depend upon the ascription of any qualities of the first referent to the

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[22]For the more important discussions of figurative expression in the earlier philosophical literature, cf. Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.4.23 and 3.2.1 (with Śabara's Bhāṣya, Kumārila's Tantravārttika, and Prabhākara's Bṛhatī thereon), Nyāyasūtra 2.2.62 (with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya and Uddyotakara's Vārttika), Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini 4.1.48, Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya 2.263ff., and Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika 2.35-37.

[23]That is, the superimposition of the literal referent upon the actual (figurative) referent.

[24]Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, p. 11.

second. One referent has simply been replaced by another, without affecting our understanding of this second referent.[25]

In **upacāra-miśrā lakṣaṇā**, on the other hand, such transference of qualities does take place. In the expression "The Punjabi is a cow" (**gaur vāhīkaḥ**), the word **gauḥ** ("cow") cannot be understood literally; its juxtaposition with the word **vāhīkaḥ** requires that it be understood as referring to a Punjabi, a human being. Such figurative usage requires some connection between the literal and actual referents of the term in question and, in this instance, we understand the connection to be the possession of similar qualities.

> Here the word "cow" has its primary meaning blocked, because of the impossibility of its co-referentiality[26] with the word "Punjabi"; via the figurative indication of qualities (slow-wittedness, laziness, etc.) belonging to the Punjabi which are similar to the qualities (slow-witted-ness, laziness, etc.) belonging to a cow, [the word "cow"] is superimposed [**upacarita**] on the Punjabi, who possesses qualities (slow-wittedness, laziness, etc.) similar to the qualities (slow-wittedness, laziness, etc.) belonging to a cow.[27]

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[25]But cf. below, pp. 326-327 and 351-354.

[26]**Sāmānadhikaraṇya** -- lit. "the property of having the same substratum"; two or more words in a sentence which are syntactically parallel and are understood to refer to a single entity are said to "have the same substratum".

[27]Ibid., p. 11. This rather cumbersome description of the process by which metaphor is understood is clearly modelled on Kumārilabhaṭṭa's treatment of the topic-- cf. Tantravārttika on 1.4.23 (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97 [second ed.], Vol. 2, p. 313), and above, Chapter Three, pp. 109-110. Kumārila emphasizes the distinction between metaphorical and non-metaphorical modes of figurative expression. In the latter, the first, literal referent figuratively indicates a second directly related to it (e.g. the Ganges and its bank). In the

Such metaphorical usage does not merely cause a hearer to mentally substitute one referent (the Punjabi) for another (a cow); if it did, the expression "The Punjabi is a cow" would be a mere tautology. The word "cow" refers to the Punjabi and, in doing so, alters our understanding of the Punjabi by emphasizing his cow-like qualities. It is this alteration of the hearer's understanding of the figurative referent that distinguishes **upacāra-miśrā** from **śuddhā lakṣaṇā**.

Śuddhā lakṣaṇā is further divided into two types: **lakṣaṇa** ("indication") and **upādāna** ("inclusion"). The first of these is seen in examples such as "A village on the Ganges"; here the literal referent (the river Ganges) is replaced by a second (the bank) related to but nonetheless distinct from it. In **upādāna-lakṣaṇā** the second, figuratively understood, referent incorporates the first, literal, referent within itself. Mukulabhaṭṭa's example is the Vedic injunction "A cow should be sacrificed". Here, as already noted, the word "cow" is thought to refer literally only to the universal class-property "cow-ness"; it is only through figurative expression that it can refer to a particular, sacrificable cow. Because the figuratively understood referent (the particular cow) includes within itself the literal referent (the class-property "cow-ness", which it possesses), this is considered

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former, the relation between the literal and figurative referents is indirect; qualities belonging to the first are identified with similar qualities belonging to the second and, on the basis of this identification, the entities possessing these qualities are identified.

as a case of **upādāna-lakṣaṇā**.[28]

Mukulabhaṭṭa takes this category to include examples of what the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas call **śrutārthāpatti** ("necessary presumption [**arthāpatti**] based on what is heard")-- cf. above, Chapter Three, p. 91. The stock example of such **arthāpatti** is this: if we are told that "Fat Devadatta doesn't eat by day," we understand, without being told, "He eats at night."[29] The literal meaning of the expression makes sense only if we understand this additional unstated meaning, and this unstated meaning is understood in addition to the literal meaning of the expression rather than as a replacement for it; thus this and other such examples are, according to Mukulabhaṭṭa, to be included within the scope of **upādāna-lakṣaṇā**.

The category of **upādāna-lakṣaṇā** is of particular importance for Mukulabhaṭṭa's case against Ānandavardhana. We have seen (above, Chapter Five, pp. 226-230, 233-237) that a crucial feature of Ānandavardhana's argument for the existence of suggestion as distinct from figurative expression is his contention that in figurative expression the figurative

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[28]Ibid., p. 13. Given the persistent controversy in Sanskrit philosophical thought regarding the existence and status of universals, the example may seem problematic. A clearer case would be "Have the spears enter" (**kuntān praveśaya**). Here, as spears cannot enter on their own, the word "spears" (**kuntān**) is understood to refer to men carrying spears; the literal referent is clearly included as part of the actual, figurative referent-- the example is drawn, ultimately, from Mahābhāṣya on 4.1.48 (cf. also Mammaṭa, Śabdavyāpāravicāra, op. cit., p. 6).

[29]Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, p. 13. Cf. also Ślokavārttika, Arthāpatti 51ff.

meaning invariably supplants, rather than supplements, the literal sense of the word or phrase used figuratively. Because many examples of **dhvani**, all those classified as **vivakṣita-vācya** ("in which the expressed meaning is intended"), involve the appearance of a second meaning without the effacement of the first, they cannot, Ānandavardhana argues, be explained as instances of figurative expression. Mukulabhaṭṭa's **upādāna-lakṣaṇā**, however, allows for just such supplementation of a first meaning by a second within the domain of figurative expression, and thus goes a long way toward undermining Ānandavardhana's case for the distinctness of suggestion from figurative expression. We shall see that for Mukulabhaṭṭa all cases of **vivakṣita-vācya dhvani**, including the all-important category of **rasa-dhvani**, are to be explained as instances of this type of **lakṣaṇā**.

Upacāra-miśrā lakṣaṇā is divisible into four types: the superimposition (**upacāra**) involved in such figurative usage may be **gauṇa** (based on qualitative similarity) or **śuddha** (lacking a basis in similarity) and, in each case, this superimposition may take the form of **āropa** (superimposition proper) or **adhyavasāna** (absorption). The example of **upacāra** already given, "The Punjabi is a cow", is **gauṇa**, since it depends on the qualitative similarity between the Punjabi and a cow. An example of **śuddha upacāra** is the expression "Ghee is long-life" (**āyur ghṛtam**).[30] Here the figurative use of

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[30]<u>Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā</u>, op. cit., p. 16.

the word "long-life" to refer to ghee is based not on any similarity between these two, but rather on a relationship of cause and effect; the ingestion of ghee is thought to cause long-life, and is thus designated as long-life itself. This figurative mode of reference significantly colors the hearer's understanding of the ghee, emphasizing its life-giving properties, and should thus be considered a case of **upacāra**.

Both these examples of **upacāra** take the form of **āropa**, defined by Mukulabhaṭṭa as that "in which one thing is superimposed upon another without suppressing the difference between the thing imposed and the object of imposition."[31] In each case, the term employed figuratively is juxtaposed with another which is applied literally to the referent in question; these figurative expressions are not phrased in such a way as to efface the distinction between "the Punjabi" and "a cow", or "ghee" and "life", respectively. In cases of **adhyavasāna**, this distinction is effaced.

> Where, because the object of imposition is meant to be expressed as absorbed in the thing imposed, a denial of the nature of the object of imposition is made, there there is **adhyavasāna**.[32]

As an example of such absorption in a case of **gauṇā lakṣaṇā**, Mukulabhaṭṭa gives the use of the term **rājan** ("king") to describe anyone who wields political power. The term, it is argued, can refer literally only to members of the **kṣatriya**

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[31]Ibid., p. 18.

[32]Ibid., p. 18.

varṇas, but is used metaphorically to refer to members of other **varṇas** when they, by exercising political authority, act as **kṣatriyas** typically act.[33] Such king-like persons are figuratively referred to as "**rājan**", without the accompaniment of any literally applicable term; thus the distinction between such a person and one who might literally be designated by the term "**rājan**" (i.e. a **kṣatriya**) is suppressed. In fact, the suppression of this distinction is so thorough and so much ingrained in conventional usage that the figurative character of such expressions may not be immediately apparent; it is only through analysis that the literal and figurative applications of the term "**rājan**" can be accurately differentiated.[34]

The example given for **adhyavasāna** in a case of **śuddha upacāra** is use of the expression "the Pañcālas" to refer to the country in which the Pañcālas dwell. The word "Pañcāla" is, literally, the proper name of an ancient king. It is used figuratively (in the plural) to designate his descendants and their subjects and, by a further figurative extension, is used (still in the plural) to refer to the geographic area inhabited by these people. This mode of reference suppresses the distinction between the country and its inhabitants, and is thus a case of **adhyavasāna**; the superimposition of the two

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[33]For the argument that the word **rājan** can literally refer only to **kṣatriyas**, cf. Śābarabhāṣya and Tantravārttika on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.3.3 (op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 151-162).

[34]Ibid., p. 18.

depends on a relationship of inhabitant and inhabited, rather than qualitative similarity, and is thus a case of **śuddha upacāra**. As in the case of "**rājan**", such usage is so much a part of conventional usage that its figurative character generally goes unnoticed.[35]

Mukulabhaṭṭa groups these six varieties of **lakṣaṇā** in pairs (two **śuddhā**, two based on **āropa** and two on **adhyavasāna**) on the basis of the degree of identification between the literal and figurative referents in expressions of each type:

> Pure [**śuddhā**] **lakṣaṇā** operates with respect to [a figurative referent] which is independent [**taṭastha**], **āropa** with respect to one which is not far removed [**adūraga**], and **adhyavasāna** with respect to one which is swallowed up [**nigīrṇa**] due either to linguistic convention or to extreme closeness [**āsannataratva**].[36]

In a case of **śuddhā** ("pure") **lakṣaṇā** such as "A village on the Ganges", one understands that the village in question must stand on the bank of the Ganges rather than on the river itself. The fact that the bank is referred to metonymically by the term "Ganges" does not, however, cause us to identify the river and the bank; we continue to understand the two as entirely distinct from one another. "Since it [the Ganges] is used merely to point out [the bank], we do not understand any coloring [**uparāga**] of the bank by this particular river, because the bank is understood to be independent

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[35]Ibid., p. 18.

[36]Ibid., p. 20.

[taṭastha]."[37] Our understanding of the bank is not "colored" (i.e. effected or transformed) by its association with the Ganges.

By contrast, in a case of **āropa** ("superimposition") such as "The Punjabi is a cow", our understanding of the figurative referent of the word "cow" (i.e. the Punjabi) is definitely colored by its literal referent. The word "cow" is here used not simply to refer to the Punjabi, but precisely to emphasize his cow-like qualities; the figurative usage thus results in a partial identification between the literal and figurative referents of the word "cow". Due to such partial identification, the figurative referent is said to be "not far removed" from the literal in such cases. In cases of **adhyavasāna** ("absorption") , the distinction between the literal and figurative referents is suppressed; their identification is thus total, and the figurative referent (e.g., in the example of **rājan**, a non-**kṣatriya** ruler) is thus said to be "swallowed up" by the literal one (e.g. a king). This "swallowing up" of one referent by another may derive from conformity to conventional usage (as in the case of **rājan**), or may be used deliberately to indicate the "extreme closeness" or virtual identity of the literal and figurative referents.

The assignment of a particular example of **lakṣaṇā** to one of these three categories is not always a clear cut matter.

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[37]Ibid, p. 20.

It is the degree of identification between the literal and figurative senses of a term that determines this classification, and this degree of identification depends, at least in part, on the intention of the speaker using the figurative expression. The expression "A village on the Ganges" causes us to understand that the village actually rests on the bank of the Ganges rather than on the river itself, typically without causing us identify the Ganges with the bank in any way; it is therefore classified as **śuddhā lakṣaṇā**. However, when this expression *is* used with the intent of communicating such identification, it will have to be classified differently:

> When the bank, without its own form being suppressed, is meant to be understood as colored by this particular river because of its not being far removed from the particular river denoted by the word "Ganges" then, even in the previous example ["A village on the Ganges"], there will be superimposition [**adhyāropa**[38]] ... And when this expression is used to communicate the extreme closeness of the particular river to the village, suppressing the form of the bank so that it is swallowed up by this particular river... then there is absorption [**adhyavasāna**].[39]

So one and the same figurative expression, depending on whether or not it is meant to convey either qualitative or total identification between the literal figurative referents, may belong to any of these three categories. Our ability to determine this intention in any particular case will of course depend on context.

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[38]The terms **āropa** and **adhyāropa** are used synonymously.

[39]Ibid., pp. 20-21.

Mukulabhaṭṭa's classification allows for a total of six sub-varieties of **lakṣaṇā** (two **śuddhā**, two which depend on **āropa**, and two which depend on **adhyavasāna**). Within this taxonomy he strives to include all possible cases of non-literal expression (that is to say, any expression in which the individual words convey anything beyond the particular lexical meanings with which they are invariably associated). If he can do so successfully, Ānandavardhana's claims for **vyañjanā** as a third, specially poetic, mode of expression will collapse.

The chief difficulty associated with the analysis of **lakṣaṇā** is its variable, conditional character. A given word may, in different contexts, convey any of a wide variety of figurative senses. What are the factors that lead one to understand a particular figurative sense in a given context, and how exactly does one learn to properly use and comprehend figurative expressions? The acquisition of the capacity to use and understand words in their literal senses is a relatively straightforward process. As a child one learns, by observing the linguistic behavior of one's elders, that each word is invariably associated with a particular meaning.[40]

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[40]Even when words are used figuratively, they still convey their literal, invariably associated meanings; it is only through its connection with the literal sense of a word that any figurative sense can be understood. As Śabara says, "How can one word be used in the sense of another?... We say: via the expression of its own meaning." (Śābarabhāṣya on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.4.22; Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97, second ed., Vol. 2, p. 315-- cited by Mukulabhaṭṭa, ibid., p. 25.

Whenever the word is heard subsequently, this meaning will be understood.

Obviously, the process by which one learns to use and understand words figuratively cannot be quite so simple. First of all, figurative meanings cannot, by Mukulabhaṭṭa's own definition, be associated directly with the words that convey them; a figurative meaning is one which is understood indirectly, through its connection with the literal meaning of a word. Such a connection with the literal meaning of a word cannot, however, be regarded as a sufficient condition for one's understanding of a figurative meaning in any given instance; if this were the case, the same figurative meaning would be understood whenever the word was used.[41] Indeed, every word would convey all possible figurative meanings-- i.e. all meanings connected in any way with its literal meaning-- all the time. There must be further restrictions governing the figurative use of words.

The proper use and understanding of figurative language, Mukulabhaṭṭa argues, must, like all other aspects of linguistic usage, be learnt through the observation of the linguistic behavior of one's elders (**vṛddha-vyavahāra**).[42] Just as we observe, in the linguistic practice of our elders, that individual words are each invariably associated with a single, primary, literal meaning, we observe, similarly, that

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[41]Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, p. 24.

[42]Ibid., p. 25.

these words, occasionally and under specific circumstances, may be used to convey other meanings related to their primary senses. We can correctly use or understand a word in a particular figurative sense only if we have either seen that word itself so used or seen other, similar, words used to convey similar figurative senses under similar circumstances. Where no precedent of either kind is found, figurative usage will not be possible and, if attempted, will fail to effectively convey the desired sense.

This analysis of the role of precedent in justifying particular figurative usages produces another threefold division **lakṣaṇā**, one which Mukulabhaṭṭa justifies by citing a verse of Kumārilabhaṭṭa:

> Because of their capacity for implication, some kinds of **lakṣaṇā** are conventionalized, functioning just like direct expression; others may be created now; still others cannot be, because of their incapacity.[43]

Figurative meanings which are common and thoroughly conventional can be learnt in direct association with the words that convey them, just as literal meanings are learnt; an example is the use of the word **rājan** to refer to non-**kṣatriya** rulers.[44]

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[43]Ibid., p. 25-- cf. Tantravārttika on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 3.1.12 (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97 [second ed.], Vol. 4, p. 46).

[44]That such usage is conventional and learnt in the same manner as literal usage does not make it any the less figurative. For the Mīmāṃsakas (and presumably for Mukulabhaṭṭa) the association between words and their literal meanings is natural and not the product of arbitrary convention (either human or divine). The word **rājan** has such a natural connection only with the meaning "**kṣatriya**"; if one

To exemplify figurative usage which does not depend in this way on convention, but may be newly created by a given speaker, he quotes the following verse:

> The clouds, with cranes wheeling against them, smear the sky with dark, wet splendor; the winds contain droplets of water; the joyful cries of the friends of the clouds [i.e. the peacocks] are sweet. All right, let them be so! I am Rāma, whose heart is very hard; I can endure all! But how will Sītā survive? Alas, my queen, be strong![45]

This is the first literary example of **lakṣaṇā** cited by Mukulabhaṭṭa, and he has pointedly chosen a verse already mentioned by Ānandavardhana as an example of **dhvani**. Mukulabhaṭṭa notes and discusses three terms in the verse which are used figuratively: "smear", "friends", and "Rāma".

The first two cases are relatively uncontroversial, and neither is discussed by Ānandavardhana. The word "smear" cannot here be understood literally; the dark color of the clouds partially conceals the sky in much the same way as a viscous, smearable substance partially conceals the surface to which it is applied and, on the basis of this qualitative similarity, the clouds are said, metaphorically, to "smear" the sky. Friendship is possible only between sentient beings, so the description of the peacocks as "friends" of the clouds must likewise be understood metaphorically; peacocks wait anxiously for the rain-clouds to come and rejoice when they

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uses it in any other sense, one is speaking figuratively, whether one realizes this or not.

[45]Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, p. 27. Cf. above, Chapter Five, p. 200.

arrive and their behavior thus resembles that of friends. Our capacity to understand such metaphorical expressions is not dependent on convention; we need never have actually seen the words "smear" and "friend" used in this way to understand the desired meanings in this verse. It is enough if we have, in the linguistic practice of our elders, seen other words used to designate things qualitatively similar to their ordinary referents, when their literal meanings are for some reason inapplicable.

Mukulabhaṭṭa argues that, like "smear" and "friends", the word "Rāma" is here used figuratively. Here he directly challenges Ānandavardhana, who gives the use of the word "Rāma" in this verse as an example of **arthāntarasaṃkramita-vācya dhvani.**[46] Ānandavardhana argues that the use of the word "Rāma" in this context conveys its own meaning (the person designated by the proper name Rāma) transformed (**pariṇata**) into a set of suggested properties. The name is used not to identify the speaker (which is already known from context) but to suggest the great sufferings Rāma has endured in the past (the loss of his kingdom, exile in the forest, etc.).

Mukulabhaṭṭa is in agreement regarding the meaning ultimately conveyed here by the word "Rāma"; his objection is only to the characterization of the process by which we understand this meaning as suggestion. This process, he

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[46]Cf. Dhvanyāloka, Kashi ed., pp. 167-9.

argues, is essentially the same as that by which we understand the figurative meanings of "smear" and "friends". The word "Rāma" cannot here be understood to convey its ordinary meaning, not because the person referred to is not Rāma, but because his identity is already known. If the word were understood literally, it could serve no communicative function whatsoever; the basis for the inapplicability of the literal sense in this case differs from that in the first two examples, but it is nevertheless inapplicable, and this inapplicability remains an essential prerequisite for the conveying of any non-literal sense. This inapplicability of the literal sense makes us look for a related figurative sense which would be contextually applicable; because Rāma proclaims his own name in support of his contention that he can endure the suffering of separation from Sītā, the use of the name "Rāma" brings to mind those properties of Rāma which demonstrate his capacity to endure suffering. Thus our understanding of the so-called "suggested" meaning in this instance can be explained as simply another case of figurative expression. As in the two previous cases, we need not actually have ever seen this specific word used in this figurative sense to understand its use here. It is enough if we have seen other words used similarly. It is only by extrapolating from cases of figurative usage we have actually observed that we can, as speakers, create new figurative expressions and, as hearers, properly comprehend such newly

coined expressions.

The requirement that newly created figurative expressions must be based in this way on extrapolation from known cases limits the scope of figurative usage, and accounts for the third class of figurative expressions mentioned by Kumārila: those which, because they cannot properly convey their intended meaning, cannot be newly created by speakers. Mukulabhaṭṭa gives the following example:

> [The city of Dvārakā] which, reddening the quarters of the sky in the middle of the ocean, shining like a land of gold, divided and illuminated the water like the flame of the oblation-bearer which is the face of a stallion's beloved.[47]

The coastal city of Dvārakā [Kṛṣṇa's home] illuminates the surrounding oceans with its golden sheen and, in doing so, is compared with the legendary mare's-head fire (**vaḍavāmukhāgni**).[48] The expression by which the poet refers to this fire, "the oblation-bearer which is the face of a stallion's beloved", is regarded by Mukulabhaṭṭa as an attempt at figurative usage which goes beyond what linguistic precedent will allow for and thus fails to effectively convey its intended meaning. The fire used in the Vedic sacrifice is thought to convey burnt offerings to the gods and is thus

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[47] Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, p. 29.
madhyesamudraṃ kakubhaḥ piśaṅgīr yā kurvatī kāñcanabhūmibhāsā/
turaṅgakāntānanahavyavāhajvāleva bhittvā jalam ullalāsa//
(Māgha, Śiśupālavadha 3.32)

[48] A tremendous, undying flame, in the shape of a mare's head, which is currently submerged beneath the sea but will one day emerge to destroy the world-- for the story of its origin, cf. Mahābhārata 1.169-171 (Poona ed.).

called "oblation-bearer", a term which is commonly applied by extension to fire in general. This particular fire has a shape like that of the head of a female horse, an animal which would typically be loved by a male horse. Thus we can see, through a series of several stages, that the poet means by this expression to refer to the mare's-head fire, although it does not bear oblations and is not the actual head of a mare beloved by an actual stallion. But this mode of designation is simply too indirect and, according to Mukulabhaṭṭa, such usage is not sanctioned in established linguistic practice (such judgements, in this and other specific cases, will necessarily be somewhat subjective, but the general principle is clear enough).[49]

So, although figurative meanings need not, like literal ones, be learnt in direct association with the words that convey them and it is possible to use and understand figurative expressions not seen previously, the requirement that such new expressions be formed on the analogy of figurative usage as we have observed it in the linguistic practice of our elders (**vṛddha-vyavahāra**) places some limits

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[49]Apparently referring to Mukulabhaṭṭa's criticism, Vallabhadeva, in his commentary on this verse, notes that the use of the term "oblation-bearer which is the face of a stallion's beloved" to refer to the mare's-head fire is "beyond what is desired by those who know **alaṃkāras** [or Alaṃkāraśāstra]" (cf. <u>Śiśupālavadha</u> with the commentary of Vallabhadeva, ed. Ram Chandra Kak and Harabhatta Shastri, Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi, 1990, p. 106-- I emend the [unintelligible] printed text "**alaṃkāravidaticchayā**" to read "**alaṃkāravidatīcchayā**").

on the use of figurative language, and averts the threat of linguistic chaos mentioned earlier whereby every word would invariably, along with its fixed literal meaning, figuratively convey all possible related senses. By observation of **vṛddha-vyavahāra** we learn not only the fixed literal meanings of words, but the particular contextual conditions under which these words may be used to figuratively convey meanings related to their literal meanings in particular ways.

Conditions of Lakṣaṇā

Having established generally that our ability to successfully use and understand figurative expressions depends on, and is limited by, our observation of the use of such expressions in **vṛddha-vyavahāra**, it remains to specify the necessary conditions for figurative expression which are to be deduced from such observation. Like Ānandavardhana, and like the Mīmāṃsakas before him, Mukulabhaṭṭa believes that there are three conditions which are essential for any figurative expression: the impossibility of taking the word or phrase in question in its literal sense, some relation between the literal and the intended figurative sense, and some motive on the part of the speaker for adopting an indirect mode of expression.[50]

The first of these conditions, the impossibility of the literal sense, is understood very broadly by Mukulabhaṭṭa, and this expansive understanding of the factors which make it

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[50]Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, p. 50.

impossible to understand an expression literally plays a crucial role in his critique of Ānandavardhana. In many of the standard examples of figurative usage, the inability to interpret an expression literally results from some logical or physical impossibility-- one cannot simultaneously be a human being and a cow, so both of the terms in the expression "The Punjabi is a cow" cannot be understood literally; a village must rest on some solid surface, so the word "Ganges" in "A village on the Ganges" cannot be taken to designate its literal referent, a particular river. But we have already seen that such logical or physical impossibility is not essential. In the example discussed above, "I am Rāma, whose heart is very hard; I can endure all!", the word Rāma cannot be understood literally, not because of any logical difficulty in doing so (the speaker is, in fact, properly designated by the name "Rāma"), but because the speaker's intent in using the term will not be comprehensible if it is taken literally. The act of speech presupposes some communicative intention on the part of the speaker; here the word "Rāma", taken literally, can fulfill no such communicative intention (as the speaker's identity is already known), and it is this intentional impossibility which leads us to look for some meaning beyond the literal.

Thus, the inability to understand an expression literally need not arise from a logical impossibility in the content of the expression; any aspect of the communicative process which

cannot be properly understood if the expression is taken literally can force us to interpret an expression figuratively. For Mukulabhaṭṭa, the need to interpret an expression figuratively may arise from factors related to the speaker (**vaktṛ**), the sentence (**vākya**-- i.e. the words which make up the expression), and the directly expressed meaning (**vācya**).

The first of these three is exemplified as follows:

> Hey, neighbor-woman! Keep an eye on our house too for a while. The father of this child generally won't drink tasteless well-water, so I am going alone from here to the river where it is thick with tamāla trees; let the dense clusters of reeds with their hard, broken ends scratch my body.[51]

The unstated meaning we are to understand from this verse is that the speaker is going to the river to meet secretly with her lover; the mention of the need to fetch river-water is meant to conceal her actual intention to meet her lover, and the mention of the scratching of her body by reeds is meant to conceal the actual source of the scratches which will be made during her love-making. In each case, the false statement causes us to understand, figuratively, the truth it is meant to conceal. "This concealment," says Mukulabhaṭṭa, "is understood through reflection on the fact that the speaker is

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[51]Ibid., p. 31.
dṛṣṭiṃ he prativeśini kṣaṇam ihāpy asmadgṛhe dāsyasi
prāyo naiva śiśoḥ pitā 'sya virasāḥ kaupīr apaḥ pāsyati/
ekākiny api yāmi tad varam itaḥ srotas tamālākulam
nīrandhrā vapur ālikhantu jaraṭhacchedā nalagranthayaḥ//
(Subhāṣitaratnakośa 807-- ascribed to Vidyā)

a woman of bad character."[52] Reflection on the character of the speaker leads us to conclude that her statements are meant to conceal her real intentions and thus causes us to imagine some state of affairs these statements could plausibly meant to conceal. It is only our awareness of the bad character of the speaker (itself derived from familiarity with the conventions of Sanskrit verse) which leads us to look beyond the surface meaning for some hidden truth. There is no difficulty in understanding either the construal of the words of the sentence (**vākya**) or in the meaning they express (**vācya**) which would, in the absence of such knowledge regarding the speaker, lead us to look for any sense beyond the literal one.

The second type of impossibility which leads us to interpret an expression figuratively, that which relates to **vākya**, is illustrated by the following verse:

> "Having already obtained Śrī, why would he again produce in me the pain of churning? I cannot imagine for him,

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[52]Ibid., p. 32. How exactly do we know the speaker to be a woman of bad character? This seemingly crucial question is not dealt with at all by Mukulabhaṭṭa (nor, as far as I can determine, by other Ālaṃkārikas in their treatment of similar examples). The verse in question is not part of any larger work, so there is nothing outside of the verse itself to give us information regarding the character of the speaker. Our knowledge of the character of the speaker in such cases would seem to depend on an awareness of genre-convention. Verses describing the efforts of deceitful women (almost invariably married village-women) to arrange secret meetings with their lovers represent a substantial genre of Sanskrit and Prakrit **muktakas** (single verses). In this verse, we recognize a scenario familiar from other verses of this genre-- a married village-woman going alone to a secluded spot-- and it is our recognition of the verse as belonging to this genre that lets us understand that the speaker is a woman of bad character and leads us to look for a hidden meaning in her words.

> his mind free of lassitude, his former sleep. Why should he build a bridge again, being attended by the lords of all the islands?" The ocean, when you approach, appears to tremble, as if entertaining such doubts.[53]

The same verse was given by Ānandavardhana as an example of **alaṃkāra-dhvani**; Mukulabhaṭṭa's concern is, of course, to show that the process by which we understand **alaṃkāras** which are not directly stated is one of **lakṣaṇā**, rather than any kind of "suggestion".

In the verse quoted he finds several unstated **alaṃkāras** beyond the unstated **rūpaka** (the metaphorical identification of the king addressed in the verse with Viṣṇu) dealt with by Ānandavardhana. The movement of the ocean is identified with "trembling" (actually a property of animate creatures only), and this "trembling", because doubt is mentioned as its cause, is further identified with the shaking of the head seen in people beset by doubts. The identification of things which are not truly identical is recognized as one of the sub-types of **atiśayokti** (hyperbole), and thus both of these identifications should be seen as instances of this **alaṃkāra**. Both should be seen as instances of **lakṣaṇā** as well. In each case there is the superimposition of one thing on another, on the basis of qualitative similarity between the two, and in both cases the distinction between the thing superimposed and the object of superimposition is suppressed; both thus fall within the category of **upacāra-miśrā lakṣaṇā** which is **gauṇa**

[53]Ibid., p. 33. Cf. above, Chapter Four, p. 129.

and takes the form of **adhyavasāna** (like the case of **rājan** mentioned earlier).

The verse contains a directly expressed **alaṃkāra**, namely **utprekṣā**-- the attribution to one entity of qualities or actions properly belonging to another: in this case the statement that the ocean looks "as if [it were] entertaining such doubts". This **utprekṣā** depends on yet another unstated hyperbole, the false identification of the ocean with a sentient being capable of entertaining doubts.[54] Again, the distinction between the two is suppressed and their identification rooted in similarity, so this unstated **atiśayokti**, like the first two, may be classified as a case of **upacāra-miśrā lakṣaṇā** which is **gauṇa** and takes the form of **adhyavasāna**.

The fourth and final unstated **alaṃkāra** Mukulabhaṭṭa finds in this verse is the metaphorical identification (**rūpaka**) of the king being addressed with Viṣṇu (offered by Ānandavardhana as an example of **rūpaka-dhvani**). Each of the three "doubts" which the ocean is fancifully said to entertain involves the consideration and dismissal of the possibility that the king will "again" perform some action formerly performed by Viṣṇu-- Viṣṇu obtained his consort Śrī [the personification of royal

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[54]In support of his view that the figure **utprekṣā**, here and elsewhere, requires some element of hyperbole, Mukulabhaṭṭa (p. 34) quotes Udbhaṭa's definition of **utprekṣā** (<u>Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha</u>, 3.3 [Banhatti's ed., p. 46]), which describes the figure as "joined with hyperbole" (**atiśayānvitā**).

prosperity] by churning the ocean, he sleeps on the ocean during the interval between each cosmic dissolution and re-creation, and, incarnated as Rāma, he built a bridge across the ocean to the island of Lankā, where his wife Sītā was being held prisoner by the rākṣasa-king Rāvaṇa. These "doubts" could properly be entertained only with reference to Viṣṇu, but are here entertained with respect to a mortal king; this can be accounted for only if we understand the king to be identified (at least in the "mind" of the ocean) with Viṣṇu.

Mukulabhaṭṭa agrees with Ānandavardhana in viewing this implied identification as an unstated **rūpaka**; as usual, it is only with regard to the process by which we understand this figure that he differs. The doubts which the ocean is said to entertain are properly applicable only to Viṣṇu, but Viṣṇu is nowhere mentioned in the verse and there is no way to connect these doubts with him; this apparent inconsistency in the expressed meaning of the verse is explicable only if we understand the king to be identified with Viṣṇu. Because our understanding of this unstated **rūpaka** arises from an inconsistency in the expressed meaning of the verse, it may be explained as a case of **lakṣaṇā**. Like the three unstated **alaṃkāras** discussed earlier, this **rūpaka** is conveyed by a process of **upacāra-miśrā lakṣaṇā** which is **gauṇa** (because the identification of the king with Viṣṇu is based on their similarity) and takes the form of **adhyavasāna**.

Thus all of the unstated **alaṃkāras** found in this verse

can be explained as cases of **lakṣaṇā**. In each case, our understanding of the figuratively expressed **alaṃkāra** arises from the impossibility of intelligibly construing the words of the sentence if they are taken literally.[55] The mention of trembling and doubting in connection with the non-sentient ocean, and of the entertaining of Viṣṇu-specific doubts with respect to one who is not Viṣṇu, cannot be properly understood unless we interpret these expressions figuratively in the manner already described. Thus, the literal impossibilities which lead us to find figurative meanings in this verse are connected with the sentence (**vākya**).

The third and final type of inconsistency which may lead us to seek for some meaning beyond that which is directly expressed is that which depends on the directly expressed meaning (**vācya**) itself. Mukulabhaṭṭa gives the following example:

> The arrows of the love-god cannot be deflected; the spring-season spreads out in every direction; the moon's rays produce madness in my heart; the cuckoos are enchanting; this youthful stage of life is borne with difficulty, due to the weight of these swelling breasts. O friend! How can I now endure these five unbearable fires?[56]

Here, the unbearability of a variety of factors generally associated with the production and intensification of love

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[55]Ibid., p. 34.

[56]Ibid., p. 37.
durvārā madaneṣavo diśi diśi vyājṛmbhate mādhavo
    hṛdy unmādakarāḥ śaśāṅkarucayaś cetoharāḥ kokilāḥ/
uttuṅgastanabhāradurdharam idaṃ pratyagram aṅyad vayaḥ
    soḍhavyāḥ sakhi sāṃpratam kathaṃ amī pañcāgnayo duḥsahāḥ//

(emphasized by the metaphorical identification of these factors with fires) would be inexplicable if we did not conclude that the speaker was suffering from separation from her beloved; thus, the need to account for an apparent implausibility in the expressed meaning of the verse produces an awareness of the **rasa vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** (love in separation). Because this apparent implausibility leads us to understand a second, unstated meaning which does not displace (but, on the contrary, justifies) the directly expressed meaning, this example falls within the category of **upādāna lakṣaṇā** (cf. above, pp. 320-322).

While Mukulabhaṭṭa differs with Ānandavardhana in explaining what he would call **rasa-dhvani** as a kind of **lakṣaṇā**, his remarks on this verse indicate that he generally shares Ānandavardhana's view of the aesthetic centrality of **rasa**. "Although this **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** is only indicated figuratively, it is predominant with respect to the directly expressed meaning, by reason of its being delightful to the hearts of people of taste [**sahṛdayas**]."[57] This is the only occasion on which Mukulabhaṭṭa discusses the relative predominance of an expression's literal and non-literal meanings. The question of predominance has no real bearing on his primary task: to show that non-literal meanings, whether they are predominant or not, can be understood only through the process of **lakṣaṇā**. Nevertheless, this brief comment

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[57]Ibid., p. 38.

strongly suggests that he accepts, or at least has no quarrel with, Ānandavardhana's claims for the primary importance of **rasa** in poetry.

At least one of these three types of impossibility or surface inconsistency (relating to **vaktṛ**, **vākya**, or **vācya**) in the literal meaning of a verse or sentence must be present if we are to understand any additional, figurative meaning from it. In illustrating **lakṣaṇā** based on these three types of surface inconsistency Mukulabhaṭṭa has deliberately chosen examples which would on Ānandavardhana's theory be regarded as cases of **vastu-dhvani**, **alaṃkāra-dhvani**, and **rasa-dhvani**, respectively. It is not clear that Mukulabhaṭṭa wishes to claim that all **vastu-lakṣaṇā** depends on inconsistency related to the speaker, all **alaṃkāra-lakṣaṇā** on that related to the sentence, and all **rasa-lakṣaṇā** on that related to the expressed meaning. Nevertheless, he has shown that examples of all three types of **dhvani** discussed by Ānandavardhana can be explained as cases of **lakṣaṇā**. This is important, in that a major element of Ānandavardhana's defense of the distinction between **dhvani** and **lakṣaṇā** was his contention that no one could reasonably argue that **alaṃkāras** or **rasas** could ever be conveyed by **lakṣaṇā** (cf. above, Chapter Five, pp. 236-237).

The second of the three conditions necessary in order for any figurative expression to be properly understood is that there must be some relation between the literal meaning of the expression and the figurative sense it is meant to convey. If

any relation at all, however tenuous, were to be accepted as sufficient for figurative expression to operate, we would again be faced with a situation in which any given term could figuratively convey virtually any sense and it would be practically impossible to understand the particular figurative sense intended by any expression. It is therefore necessary to limit and specify the sorts of relation between literal and figurative senses which will allow **lakṣaṇā** to function properly. Several lists of such possible types of relation are found in earlier philosophical treatments of **lakṣaṇā**.[58]

Mukulabhaṭṭa accepts five possible types of relation, and quotes, as authority for this view, the following verse of the Mīmāṃsaka Bhartṛmitra:[59]

> **Lakṣaṇā** is considered to be of five kinds: arising from connection [**sambandha**[60]] with the denoted meaning, from similarity [**sādṛśya**], from inherence [**samavāya**], from contradiction [**vaiparītya**], and from connection with an

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[58]Cf. Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.4.23, Nyāyasūtra 2.2.62, Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini 4.1.48.

[59]This is one of only two known direct quotations from Bhartṛmitra's works (the other is in Cakradhara's commentary on Jayantabhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī [Śivakumāraśāstri Granthamālā 5, Vol. 1, p. 298]). He is known as the author of a work called Tattvaśuddhi (cf. ibid., and also Umbeka's Tātparyaṭīkā on Kumārila's Ślokavārttika [University of Madras, second ed., 1971, p. 3.]). Kumārila and Jayantabhaṭṭa both criticize his views on the nature of sound (cf. Ślokavārttika, Śabdanityatā 130-132 [ed. Svāmi Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, Varanasi, 1978, p. 540] and Nyāyamañjarī, op. cit., pp. 298 and 317), and Kumārila accuses him of having made Mīmāṃsā into a materialist philosophy (cf. Ślokavārttika, Pratijñāsūtra 10 [Univ. of Madras ed., p. 3]).

[60]Including, but not limited to, physical contact.

action [**kriyāyoga**].[61]

Lakṣaṇā based on relations of contact and similarity can be illustrated, respectively, by the familiar examples "A village on the Ganges" and "The Punjabi is a cow". In the first case, the word Ganges refers not to the river itself but to the bank adjacent to it; in the second, the word "cow" refers not to a cow but to a person thought to be qualitatively similar to a cow.

As an example of **lakṣaṇā** based on a relation of inherence, Mukulabhaṭṭa gives the expression "The umbrella-carriers are going."[62] Here the word "umbrella-carriers" (**chatrinaḥ**) is used to refer to the entire retinue of a king, even though only one of them carries the umbrella (a symbol of royal power, to be held over the king). Because there can be only one umbrella-carrier, the word, here used in the plural, cannot be understood literally; we therefore understand it to refer to the group of royal followers to which the umbrella-carrier belongs, even though the rest are umbrella-less. In **lakṣaṇā** based on contradiction, a word is used ironically to indicate the opposite of its literal meaning; for example, use

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[61]Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, p. 50. This verse, like many of Mukulabhaṭṭa's citations from Mīmāṃsā works, becomes a regular fixture of discussions of **lakṣaṇā** in later Alaṃkāraśāstra texts. It is quoted by Abhinavagupta (Locana, Kashi ed., p. 28), Mahimabhaṭṭa (Vyaktiviveka, Kashi Sanskrit Series 121, p. 119), and Sahadeva (Kāvyālaṃkārasūtraṭippaṇa, op. cit., p. 68), among others.

[62]Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, p. 54. The example is drawn from Śabara-- cf. Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya on 1.4.23 (op. cit., Vol. II, p. 326).

of the term "agreeable" (**bhadramukha**) to refer to a person known to be disagreeable.[63]

In **lakṣaṇā** based on "connection with an action" (**kriyāyoga**), as Mukulabhaṭṭa explains it, the figuratively expressed meaning is not connected directly with the literal meaning, but rather with the word or words which convey this meaning. He gives the following example:

> You are Pṛthu by reason of your good qualities, Rāma by reason of your fame; you are Nala, you are Bharata/*you are not addicted to greed*; in a great battle, you are Śatrughna/*you are a killer of enemies*; in the world, you are Janaka because of your stability/*you are the producer of stability*; since, by your great deeds, you bear the names of ancient kings, lord, why are you not Mandhātṛ/*why will you not support me*, even though you have conquered the three worlds?[64]

Here, in the expression **mahati samare śatrughnas tvam** ("In a great battle, you are Śatrughna/*you are a killer of enemies*") the king being eulogized is called by the proper name "Śatrughna", *not* because of any similarity to the person ordinarily designated by this name,[65] but because of his connection with the etymologically recoverable sense of this

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[63]Ibid., p. 56.

[64]Ibid., p. 56.
pṛthur asi guṇaiḥ kīrtyā rāmo nalo bharato bhavān
 mahati samare śatrughnas tvam kṣitau janakaḥ sthiteḥ/
iti sucaritaiḥ khyātiṃ bibhrac cirantanabhūbhṛtāṃ
 katham asi na māṃdhātā deva trilokavijayy api//
The verse is a variant of Subhāṣitaratnakośa 1417, where it is attributed to one Vīryamitra (known only from this and other poetic anthologies). Udbhaṭa quotes the verse (with the same variant reading) as an example of the figure **śleṣa** (cf. Udbhaṭa's Commentary on the Kāvyālaṃkāra of Bhāmaha, p. 37).

[65]Śatrughna was one of Rāma's younger brothers.

name. This king kills his enemies in battle, and it is on the basis of this action that he is identified with Śatrughna, whose name means "enemy-killer". Mukulabhaṭṭa's discussion of the verse is confined to the figurative use of the name Śatrughna, but he would presumably explain its punning use of the names of other kings in the same way.

Indeed, it would seem that Mukulabhaṭṭa wishes to explain all double-meaning expressions (both the **alaṃkāra śleṣa** and what Ānandavardhana would call **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani**-- cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 166-172) as instances of this type of **lakṣaṇā**. "In **lakṣaṇā** based on connection with an action the figuratively understood meaning is rooted in the power of word [**śabdaśaktimūla**], since it follows from the expressive power of the parts of the word or words [used figuratively]."[66] In any expression conveying a double meaning, the parts of the polysemic word or phrase must convey meanings apart from the literal meaning of the word or phrase as a whole. It seems odd to describe the basis of such figurative usage as "connection with an action", but if the concept of "action" (**kriyā**) is understood broadly enough to include being and/or becoming, this will pose no problem, as the second meaning understood from the parts of the polysemic word or phrase can always be considered an action-- obviously, Mukulabhaṭṭa's choice of the term **kriyāyoga** is dictated by his acceptance of

[66] Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā, p. 65.

Bhartṛmitra's typology.[67]

In addition to inconsistency in the literal meaning of an expression (related to **vaktṛ**, **vākya**, or **vācya**) and connection between this literal meaning and the intended figurative meaning (of one of the five types just mentioned), there is a third condition necessary for any expression to be understood figuratively: that there should be some motive (**prayojana**) for the adoption of a figurative mode of expression rather than a literal one.[68] This motive, according to Mukulabhaṭṭa, may be of two kinds.[69] The first type of motive is mere conformity to conventional usage (**rūḍhi**), as in the case of the word **rājan** ("king"). The word **rājan** is very frequently applied to non-kṣatriya rulers; even if one realizes that it can be literally applied only to kṣatriyas, one may, in conformity with established convention, use the word figuratively to refer to non-kṣatriyas. In such cases, conformity to convention is itself sufficient motive for resorting to figurative usage.

The second possible motive for resorting to figurative

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[67]How Bhartṛmitra himself understood the category of **lakṣaṇā** based on **kriyāyoga**, of course, we have no way of knowing.

[68]Like Ānandavardhana (and unlike the Mīmāṃsakas), Mukulabhaṭṭa understands the **prayojana** required in cases of **lakṣaṇā** as a purpose on the part of the speaker for choosing an indirect, non-literal mode of expression, rather than as a contextually useful application for the figuratively understood meaning (cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 111-112 and Chapter Five, pp. 227-230).

[69]Ibid., p. 50.

usage is the intention to communicate some special aspect of the thing figuratively described, which could not be effectively conveyed literally. In the example "I am Rāma, whose heart is very hard; I can endure all," the word "Rāma" figuratively connotes not merely Rāma's general capacity to endure suffering, but the many particular sufferings he has so far endured: the loss of his kingdom, his exile in the forest, the abduction of Sītā, and so on. To list explicitly and exhaustively all the sufferings Rāma has endured throughout his life, even if it were possible, would be tedious and aesthetically ineffective. By figurative use of the word "Rāma", the poet is able to allude, in a compact and aesthetically effective way, to the full range of sufferings Rāma has been able to endure. It is the need to convey in this succinct manner a great many aspects of Rāma's experience and character which serves as the motive for figurative usage in this case.

Mukulabhaṭṭa finds a similar motive in the familiar example of **lakṣaṇā**, "A village on the Ganges" (**gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ**). "Here, the motive for the **lakṣaṇā** is to make known that the bank possesses properties such as purity, delightfulness, etc. which are not commonly known to belong to it, and which inhere in the same locus as Ganges-ness."[70] Here Mukulabhaṭṭa appears to contradict his earlier analysis of this expression. "A village on the Ganges" was given as an

[70]Ibid., p. 53.

example of **śuddhā** ("pure") **lakṣaṇā** (cf. above, pp. 318-319); the transference of properties from the literal to the figurative referent of the term employed figuratively is precisely what such "pure" **lakṣaṇā** is meant to be pure of. If the use of the term "Ganges" to refer to the bank of the Ganges causes us to understand that certain well-known properties of the river belong to its bank as well, the expression "A village on the Ganges" cannot legitimately be regarded as a case of **śuddhā lakṣaṇā**; it involves the partial superimposition of the nature of the Ganges upon its bank and should thus be classified as a case of **upacāra-miśrā lakṣaṇā**.

We have seen (above, pp. 326-327) that, for Mukulabhaṭṭa, expressions such as "A village on the Ganges", while typically to be explained as cases of **śuddhā lakṣaṇā**, may also (if our understanding of the figurative referent is meant to be "colored" by the literal referent of the term employed figuratively) be considered as cases of **upacāra-miśrā lakṣaṇā** (based on either **āropa** ["superimposition"] or **adhyavasāna** ["absorption"]). In order save Mukulabhaṭṭa from apparent self-contradiction we may suppose that his explanation of the motive underlying the figurative usage in the expression "A village on the Ganges" should apply only when it is meant as an example of **upacāra-miśrā lakṣaṇā**. But this explanation leaves an important question unanswered: what exactly is the motive for figurative expressions such as "A village on the Ganges" when they *are* meant as examples of **śuddhā lakṣaṇā**?

Ānandavardhana discusses two separate types of figurative usage which, due to their conventional character, serve no special aesthetic function: those recognizably figurative expressions which are used in conformity with established usage (such as the use of the word "tells" in "This bed of lotus petals tells of the affliction of this emaciated woman"),[71] and those which are so thoroughly conventionalized that they are not generally recognized as figurative at all (such as the use of the word **lāvaṇya** [literally, "saltiness"] in the sense of "beauty").[72] Does Mukulabhaṭṭa mean to include both of these types under the heading of figurative expressions motivated by convention (**rūḍhi**)? All the examples he gives of conventionalized **lakṣaṇā** (**rājan**, **pañcālāḥ**, etc.) are of the second type (where a particular word is conventionally associated with a particular non-literal sense, and where the figurative character of the usage is not immediately apparent). If expressions of the first type are also accepted as cases of **lakṣaṇā** motivated by convention, "A village on the Ganges", when meant as an example of **śuddhā lakṣaṇā**, might be regarded as falling into this category; saying "on the Ganges" when one means "on the bank of the Ganges" could be seen as merely a common manner of speaking requiring no special motive apart from conformity to accepted usage.

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[71]Cf. Dhvanyāloka, p. 143 and above, Chapter Five, p. 224.

[72]Ibid., p. 146, and above, Chapter Five, p. 224-225.

Thus, the apparent self-contradiction in Mukulabhaṭṭa's analysis of the motive element in the expression "A village on the Ganges" could perhaps be explained. Mukulabhaṭṭa, however, makes no attempt to provide such an explanation and, indeed, shows no awareness of any apparent inconsistency. Here, as elsewhere, his discussion is extremely terse; one is sometimes left in the dark as to his specific understanding of particular examples of figurative usage and even certain elements of his own theory of figurative expression. His analysis of the nature of **prayojana** and its role in the process of figurative signification is certainly not as thorough or clear as one might wish.

In any case, these three factors-- the impossibility of the literal sense of an expression, a connection between its literal and intended figurative senses, and some motive for the speaker's resort to a non-literal mode of expression-- constitute the necessary preconditions for the operation of **lakṣaṇā**. We have seen that Mukulabhaṭṭa, in his discussion of these conditions and his selection of examples to illustrate their various aspects, has tried to lay the groundwork for the inclusion of Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** within the scope of **lakṣaṇā**. He has shown how even poets' communication of **alaṃkāras** and **rasas** without their being explicitly stated can be explained within the framework of **lakṣaṇā**, and has analyzed several of Ānandavardhana's own examples of **dhvani** as cases of **lakṣaṇā**. He has yet, however, to argue directly for the

inclusion of **dhvani** in **lakṣaṇā** or even to mention **dhvani** explicitly. It is to the question of the relation between figurative expression and Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** that he turns next.

The Inclusion of Dhvani in Lakṣaṇā

Most of the key points in Mukulabhaṭṭa's attack on Ānandavardhana have already been established in his discussion of the taxonomy of **lakṣaṇā** and of its necessary conditions, so when he finally turns to directly consider the question of **dhvani** he does so very succinctly. In his discussion of **upādāna-lakṣaṇā** he has established, contra Ānandavardhana, that figuratively understood meanings need not entirely supplant, and may rather supplement, the literal meanings which give rise to them. He has shown that **alaṃkāras** and **rasas**, as well as narrative elements (**vastus**), can be conveyed figuratively. He has thus already substantially undermined Ānandavardhana's arguments for the existence of suggestion as a mode of signification distinct from figurative expression.

Mukulabhaṭṭa's primary concern, in his treatment of Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**, is to show how the subdivisions of **dhvani** correspond to his own subdivisions of **lakṣaṇā**, in particular his fivefold classification of **lakṣaṇā** on the basis of the type of connection between the directly expressed and figurative senses of an expression.

> Given this connection, based on five types of relation, which we have previously described, the directly expressed sense is sometimes subjected to total displacement [**atitiraskāra**], sometimes meant to be

> expressed [**vivaksita**], and sometimes not meant to be expressed [**avivaksita**]; [this discussion is undertaken] in order to show the respective scope of these three categories which have previously been shown by the Sahṛdayas.[73]

"Sahṛdayas" is the term by which Mukulabhaṭṭa (and Pratīhārendu-rāja) refer to Ānandavardhana and his followers. We have seen (above, Chapter Five, pp. 198ff) that Ānandavardhana divides **dhvani** into two broad classes: that in which the directly expressed meaning is not literally intended (**avivakṣita-vācya**), and that in which it is literally intended but subordinated to some further suggested sense (**vivakṣitānyapara-vācya**). The first type has two sub-divisions: that in which the expressed meaning is totally displaced (**atyantatiraskṛta**) and that in which it is transformed into another meaning (**arthāntarasaṃkramita**-- what Mukulabhaṭṭa here calls **avivakṣita-vācya**).[74] It is these three classes that Mukulabhaṭṭa wishes to consider in relation to his own fivefold typology of **lakṣaṇā**.

In **lakṣaṇā** based on a relation of similarity (**sādṛśya**) or contradiction (**vaiparītya**), the directly expressed meaning will invariably be totally displaced by the figurative sense to which it gives rise. In the verse "The clouds, with cranes wheeling against them, smear the sky with dark, wet

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[73]Ibid., p. 58.

[74]Ānandavardhana's sub-division of **vivakṣitānyapara-vācya dhvani** (on the basis of the presence or absence of noticeable sequence between the expressed and suggested meanings) is of no interest for Mukulabhaṭṭa's purposes, and he ignores it here.

splendor..." (above, p. 200), the figurative use of the words "smear" and "friends" (in the expression "friends of the clouds", referring to peacocks) depends on a relation of similarity-- the partial obscuring of the sky by the clouds resembles smearing, and the joyful behavior of the peacocks at the coming of the clouds resembles that of friends. In each case, the directly expressed meaning of the word used figuratively is entirely displaced; there is no actual smearing and no actual friendship involved in the situations described. "Here, because the words 'smear' and 'friend' refer to the things with which their own meanings are compared, their own meanings are entirely unconnected with the event [described in the verse]."[75] Likewise in **lakṣaṇā** based on contradiction: when the term "agreeable" (**bhadramukha**) is ironically applied to a person known to be disagreeable, its directly expressed meaning is totally displaced-- the figuratively understood sense is precisely the opposite of the literal.[76]

In **lakṣaṇā** based on relations of connection (**saṃbandha**) or inherence (**samavāya**) the situation is somewhat more complicated. **Lakṣaṇā** based on either of these relations may be of two types, taking the form of either **upādāna** ("inclusion"), in which the figurative sense is understood in addition to the literal one without replacing it, or **lakṣaṇa**

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[75]Ibid., p. 58.

[76]Ibid., pp. 58-59.

("indication"), in which the figurative sense replaces, rather than supplements, the literal one (cf. above, pp. 320-322).

> Among these, in **lakṣaṇā** which has the form of **upādāna**, since, given the inclusion [of the figurative sense along with the literal], there is intent to express the directly expressed sense, it is said to be **vivakṣita**; in such cases the Sahṛdayas have shown, in the realm of poetry, that [the expressed meaning] is meant to be expressed while subordinated to another meaning [**vivakṣitānyapara**]. But in cases of **lakṣaṇa** the directly expressed meaning is not meant to be expressed [**avivakṣita**], because it is transformed into another meaning [**arthāntarasaṃkramita**].[77]

As an example of the **upādāna** type he gives the expression "Fat Devadatta doesn't eat by day." From this statement we understand, without being told, that Devadatta eats at night; this understanding (which is, for Mukulabhaṭṭa, a figurative meaning) supplements but does not replace the literal meaning we understand from the sentence. "Here an effect, namely fatness-- qualified by the absence of eating during the day-- is itself meant to be expressed [**vivakṣita**]; in order to justify itself it indicates its cause, namely eating at night, in a case of **lakṣaṇā** based on connection [**saṃbandha**]."[78]

His example of the **lakṣaṇa** type is "I am Rāma, whose

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[77]Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā (ed. Brahmamitra Avasthī, Delhi: Indu Prakāśana, 1977), p. 52. In his edition (p. 60) Dvivedi omits the words here translated as: "But in cases of **lakṣaṇa** the directly expressed meaning is not meant to be expressed." This reading of the text is clearly mistaken-- it makes Mukulabhaṭṭa give "transformation into another meaning" (**arthāntarasaṃkramitatva**) as a reason for regarding expressed meanings as **vivakṣita** when, by his own reasoning as well as that of Ānandavardhana, it would, on the contrary, be a reason for regarding it as **avivakṣita**.

[78]Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā (Dvivedi's ed.), p. 60.

heart is very hard." In this expression the directly expressed meaning of the word Rāma is not totally displaced-- the speaker is, in fact, Rāma-- but it is not what is meant to be conveyed by the word in this context. "Here the directly expressed meaning of the word 'Rāma', namely the son of Daśaratha, is not taken up for its own sake [**svaparatvena**], since it is transformed into other suggested[79] properties; it is therefore not meant to be expressed [**avivakṣita**], but is not totally displaced [**atyantaṃ tiraskṛtam**], since it can be in some way connected with the sentence-meaning via these suggested properties."[80] The point of the speaker's declaration that he is Rāma is not to identify himself, but to allude to the many sufferings he has so far had to endure in life and thereby indicate his capacity to endure his separation from Sītā. In this and similar cases the directly expressed meanings of the words used figuratively are neither totally displaced nor are they what is meant to be expressed by these words.

The example already given of **lakṣaṇā** based on a relation of inherence (**samavāya**), "The umbrella-carriers are going,"

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[79]Mukulabhaṭṭa's use of the term "suggested" (**vyaṅgya**) here is odd and seemingly rather careless, since he has already explained, in discussing this very example, that these properties are conveyed figuratively (**lakṣita**), and since he is currently arguing for the total inclusion of Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** within the scope of **lakṣaṇā**, eliminating the need to accept "suggestion" as a distinct mode of verbal expression.

[80]Ibid., p. 63.

can, according to Mukulabhaṭṭa, be explained either as a case of **upādāna-lakṣaṇā** or as one of **lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā**, and may thus be understood as either **vivakṣita-vācya** or **avivakṣita-vācya**, respectively. Its classification as one or the other depends on whether we take the word "umbrella-carriers" (**chatriṇaḥ**) to refer figuratively to the non-umbrella-carrying members of the king's retinue or to the retinue as a whole. "For here, when the word "umbrella-carrier" [**chatrin**], because of its plurality, indicates even those [members of the retinue] who lack umbrellas in order to justify its syntactic connection with this plurality, then, since inclusion [**upādāna**] of the umbrella-less is being made on the basis of a relation of inherence[81] [**samavāya**], the directly expressed meaning, the umbrella-carrier, is **vivakṣita**."[82] The word **chatriṇaḥ**, on this understanding, refers literally to the one person who actually does carry an umbrella and also-- because the plural suffix attached to it could not otherwise be understood-- refers figuratively to the many umbrella-less persons who make up the rest of the king's retinue.

However, "when umbrella-carrier-ness, because its connection with plurality would not otherwise make sense, is taken as applying to the group [**samudāya**] then, because it is the *group* that is meant to be expressed [**vivakṣita**], the

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[81]Since both the umbrella-carrier and his umbrella-less associates are parts of a greater whole, i.e. the retinue, their relation is said to be one of inherence.

[82]Ibid., p. 60.

directly expressed meaning [i.e. the single umbrella carrier] is not meant to be expressed [**avivakṣita**]. Even so, because he is included within the group, the umbrella carrier too can easily, via the group, be connected with the action [described by the sentence], and thus the expressed meaning is not totally displaced."[83] Thus the single example, "The umbrella-carriers are going," can be taken as an illustration of both **upādāna-** and **lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā** based on a relation of inherence. If it is understood as **upādāna**, the directly expressed meaning of the word "umbrella-carrier" will be **vivakṣita**; if understood as **lakṣaṇa**, this directly expressed meaning will be **avivakṣita**.

The fifth and final type of relation on which figurative usage may be based is "connection with an action" (**kriyāyoga**). As we have already seen, Mukulabhaṭṭa wishes to explain expressions relying on punning or *double entendre* as cases of figurative usage based on such a relation. In such punning usage the directly expressed meanings of the word or words used figuratively will sometimes be totally displaced and sometimes meant to be expressed. In the example already given of **lakṣaṇā** based on connection with an action, "In a great battle, you are Śatrughna/ *you are a killer of enemies*," the directly expressed meaning of the word **śatrughna** is meant to be expressed. "For here, the word **śatrughna**, while causing us to understand [the king's] agency in the act of killing

[83]Ibid., p. 63-64.

enemies by means of **lakṣaṇā** based on connection with an action, communicates its own meaning, i.e. the son of Daśaratha, as a standard of comparison [**upamāna**]."[84] The expression identifies the king being addressed with Śatrughna, and this identification can be understood only if the word **śatrughna** is taken to refer to both Śatrughna and the enemy-killing king. The literal referent is not replaced by the figurative one, but is rather placed in a relationship of comparison with it.

In this type of **lakṣaṇā**, total displacement of the literal sense will be possible only when the double-meaning word or phrase need not be understood to convey both its figurative and literal senses at once (as in the case of **śatrughna**); in practice this will happen only when the double-meaning word or phrase is repeated. Mukulabhaṭṭa gives as an example the expression "**puruṣaḥ puruṣaḥ**."[85] The illustration, taken out of context, is cryptic. It appears to be a citation from the following verse (quoted in full by Hemacandra):

> A hero who moves in battle, at the forefront, killing a great many enemies: that person [**puruṣa**] is like a **puruṣa** ["one who goes in front", "one who protects"].[86]

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[84]Ibid., p. 66.

[85]Ibid., p. 65.

[86]nighnann abhimukhaḥ śūro 'nekaśo bahuśaḥ parān/
saṃgrāme vicaraty eṣa puruṣaḥ puruṣo yathā//
Cf. Hemacandra, Kāvyānuśāsana, ed. Paṇḍit Śivadatta, Kāvyamālā 71, Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bobmay, 1901, p. 239. Since the words he quotes are unintelligible out of context,

Here, in order for the simile to be intelligible and non-tautologous, the second word **puruṣa** must be understood to convey not its literal meaning, "a human being", but a second, figurative meaning-- one based on its etymologically recoverable sense. The Uṇādisūtra (IV.76-77) allows for two possible derivations of the word **puruṣa**: the agentive suffix **kuṣan** applied to the verbal roots √pṝ (meaning "to fill" or "to protect") or √**pur** (meaning "to go in front") will produce the desired form.[87] The meanings "one who goes in front" and "one who protects" are both potentially applicable to a military hero such as is described in the verse; it is not clear from Mukulabhaṭṭa's remarks which he had in mind.[88] In any case, the first word **puruṣa** is meant to convey only its literal sense and the second to convey only its etymologically based figurative sense; the simile expressed in the verse depends on the comparison of these two separate meanings. The

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Mukulabhaṭṭa apparently assumes his audience will be familiar with the verse; it was very likely quoted in some earlier Alaṃkāra work known both to him and to Hemacandra (probably Udbhaṭa's Bhāmahavivaraṇa-- since the passage in which Hemacandra quotes the verse paraphrases a portion of Udbhaṭa's work; cf. Gnoli, Udbhaṭa's Commentary on the **Kāvyālaṃkāra** of Bhāmaha, op. cit., p. 21).

[87]Cf. Uṇādisūtra with the commentary of Śvetavanavāsin, (Vol. I of The Uṇādisūtras in Various Rescensions, ed. T.R. Chintamani, Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 7, Madras, 1933 [reprint Navrang, New Delhi, 1992]), pp. 155-156.

[88]Hemacandra is similarly unclear as to his understanding of the etymological sense required by the verse. He says only that (op. cit., p. 239) "The second word **puruṣa**, because it is meant to convey a suggested sense rooted in the power [of word], refers to a man of heroic acts [**avadātakarman**]."

verse involves a play on the meaning of the word **puruṣa**, but each instance of this word ultimately conveys only one meaning; the literal meaning of the second word **puruṣa** is thus totally displaced by its figurative meaning. So **lakṣaṇā** based on "connection with an action", as Mukulabhaṭṭa understands it, falls partly within the scope of Ānandavardhana's **vivakṣita-vācya** category, and partly within that of **atyantatiraskṛta-vācya**.

In his analysis of the nature and conditions of **lakṣaṇā**, Mukulabhaṭṭa has already established that examples of all the types of **dhvani** recognized by Ānandavardhana can be explained as cases of figurative usage, and thus that there is significant overlap between Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** and **lakṣaṇā**; this examination of the correspondence between Ānandavardhana's categories of **dhvani** and his own fivefold division of **lakṣaṇā** aims to go beyond this by showing that Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** can be entirely subsumed within the scope of **lakṣaṇā**. Mukulabhaṭṭa's treatment of the **dhvani** question here is brief and schematic, as he himself acknowledges:

> This matter is not fully investigated here, as a great deal would have to be said [to investigate it fully]; but it has been mentioned here in order to show, in a general way, that **dhvani**, which has been described by the Sahṛdayas as if it were something new, falls within the scope of **lakṣaṇā**. Learned people should carefully examine this [argument], and not summarily dismiss it.[89]

Given that the express purpose of the Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā is to

[89]Ibid., p. 66.

provide a concise analysis of the literal and figurative semantic modes, a thorough and full-blown attack on the **dhvani** theory (of the sort later made by Mahimabhaṭṭa) would be beyond the scope of the work. What is presented here is more the outline of a possible response to the theory of suggestion than a detailed critique of it.

Mukulabhaṭṭa's plea that readers should not casually dismiss his argument for the inclusion of **dhvani** within **lakṣaṇā** would seem to indicate that Ānandavardhana's theory of suggestion had already obtained a wide degree of acceptance (at least among Ālaṃkārikas) by this time; he apparently feels that his attack on the existence of suggestion as distinct from figurative expression may be rejected without receiving the attention it deserves.

Although Mukulabhaṭṭa's work presents an attack on Dhvanyāloka, this attack is very narrowly focussed and is in fact confined to a single point, namely Ānandavardhana's insistence that **dhvani** cannot be identified with figurative usage. He has no quarrel with other aspects of Ānandavardhana's theory: the general importance of non-literal meanings in poetry, the threefold division of such meanings (into **vastu**, **alaṃkāra**, and **rasa**), and the paramount importance of **rasa** in aesthetically effective poetry. He explicitly acknowledges the predominant role of **rasa** in producing aesthetic pleasure for the audience of a poem (cf. above, pp. 344-345), and shows, through his analysis of various example

verses, that all three types of non-literal meaning dealt with by Ānandavardhana can be conveyed by **lakṣaṇā**.

Mukulabhaṭṭa's argument with Ānandavardhana is thus carried on within a broad framework of agreement regarding the nature of poetry and the role of non-literal meaning in the production of aesthetic pleasure. His work defends the adequacy of existing philosophical theories of non-literal expression against Ānandavardhana's attack, but this "defense" takes the form of a demonstration that Ānandavardhana's teleological, **rasa**-centered model of aesthetics can be accepted and accounted for within the framework provided by these theories; that this model of aesthetics ought to be accepted and accounted for, and that any analysis of non-literal usage, in order to be accepted as valid, must be able to account for it, seems to be taken for granted. Mukulabhaṭṭa quarrels with certain aspects of Ānandavardhana's theory of poetic semantics, but apparently accepts without reservation his understanding of the tests such a theory should be required to meet and the range of phenomena it should be expected to explain.

Pratīhārendurāja

Mukulabhaṭṭa's pupil, Pratīhārendurāja, has a similar quarrel with Ānandavardhana. As with Mukulabhaṭṭa, Pratīhārendurāja's primary object is to defend earlier language theory-- in this case literary rather than philosophical-- against Ānandavardhana's charges of

inadequacy, rather than to attack Ānandavardhana's teleological, **rasa**-centered model of literary aesthetics.

Since he names Mukulabhaṭṭa (c. 875-925) as his teacher, Pratīhārendurāja's work should date from the early- to mid-tenth century. His only known work is a commentary, entitled Laghuvṛtti, on Udbhaṭa's Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha. Some scholars have argued that he should be identified with Bhaṭṭendurāja, whom Abhinavagupta names as one of his teachers in the field of Ālaṃkāraśāstra.[90] The terms Bhaṭṭa and Pratīhāra are both honorific titles, here prefixed to the same personal name, Indurāja. Abhinavagupta's works date from the late tenth and early eleventh century, so his teacher's dates would at least roughly correspond with those of Pratīhārendurāja, raising the possibilty that these two Indurājas are one and the same person. Kane, De, and Krishnamoorthy reject the identification (rightly, I think), partly on the basis of discrepancies between the views of Bhaṭṭendurāja (as reported by Abhinavagupta) and Pratīhārendurāja and partly because the honorific Bhaṭṭa is applied consistently to Abhinavagupta's teacher and not to

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[90]Cf. K.C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, Vol. 1 [second ed.], 1963, pp. 213-14; N.D. Banhatti ed., Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha of Udbhaṭa, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. LXXIX [second ed.], 1982, pp. xxiv-xxviii; Mukunda Madhava Sharma, The Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, Vol. LXIII, 1968, pp. 14-15; Anita Karan, Pratīhārendurāja's Contribution to Sanskrit Poetics, Delhi, 1988, pp. 12-15.

Udbhaṭa's commentator.[91]

Because Pratīhārendurāja's work, unlike Mukulabhaṭṭa's, falls clearly and unambiguously within the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra, his response to Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** theory has not suffered the same degree of neglect at the hands of modern scholars of Alaṃkāraśāstra. His treatment of Ānandavardhana's views has, however, provoked a certain amount confusion and even hostility among these scholars. De (History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., p. 76) and Krishnamoorthy (The **Dhvanyāloka** and its Critics, op. cit., p. 249) label him an opponent of the **dhvani** theory, while Gerow claims that he "fully accepts" it (Indian Poetics, op. cit., p. 262). Sharma finds in him a "disguised loyalty for Ānandavardhana", and argues that this, combined with his nominal defence of Udbhaṭa's views, makes it "more precise to recognize him as a bundle of confusions" (The Dhvani Theory in Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., pp. 12-13). It is true that Pratīhārendurāja is neither a wholehearted proponent nor an uncompromising critic of Ānandavardhana; however, this is hardly sufficient ground for a charge of incoherence. Like Mukulabhaṭṭa, he presents a narrowly focussed critique of a particular feature of Ānandavardhana's argument while apparently concurring with his general understanding of the

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[91]Cf. P.V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Motilal Banarsidass [fourth ed.], 1971, pp. 205-7; S.K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Firma KLM Private Ltd. [second ed.], 1960, Vol. I, pp. 74-76; K. Krishnamoorthy, The **Dhvanyāloka** and its Critics, Kavyalaya, Mysore, 1968, p. 249.

nature and function of poetry.

Pratīhārendurāja's examination of the **dhvani** question is presented as an epilogue to his commentary on Udbhaṭa's work. The problem which gives rise to the discussion is this: Udbhaṭa's work deals only with **alaṃkāras**, but Ānandavardhana and his followers have argued that the most aesthetically significant aspect of poetry is not **alaṃkāra** but **dhvani**; how can Udbhaṭa's neglect of this supposedly crucial element of poetry be explained or justified? Pratīhrendurāja's answer is a simple one: Udbhaṭa cannot be faulted for omitting the consideration of **dhvani**, because what Ānandavardhana calls **dhvani** is already included in the **alaṃkāras** as Udbhaṭa has defined them.[92]

Ānandavardhana has divided instances of **dhvani**, on the basis their suggested content, into three classes: **vastu-dhvani**, **alaṃkāra-dhvani**, and **rasa-dhvani**. Pratīhārendurāja cites examples of all three types and tries to show that each can be included within one or another of the **alaṃkāras** dealt with by Udbhaṭa. As an example of **vastu-dhvani** he gives the following verse:

> ... [Viṣṇu], who, by a forceful command in the form of a blow froṁ his discus, made the love-play of Rāhu's wives devoid of the unfettered play of embracing, so that only kissing remained [possible].[93]

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[92]Laghuvṛtti on Udbhaṭa's Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha [Banhatti's ed.], p. 85.

[93]Ibid., p. 86; cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 178-179. The choice of example seems odd; Ānandavardhana (Kashi ed., p. 225) quotes the verse as an example of the **alaṃkāra**

Here the statement of an effect, the inability of Rāhu's wives to embrace their husband, causes us to understand the unstated cause of this effect, the severing of Rāhu's head by Viṣṇu. The unstated meaning we understand from this verse is neither a **rasa** nor a figure of speech, so the verse is taken to be a case of **vastu-dhvani**. The process by which we understand this unstated meaning fits the definition Udbhaṭa has given for the **alaṃkāra paryāyokta** ("oblique statement"):

> **Paryāyokta** is that [figure] in which something is communicated in a manner which is devoid of the functioning of directly expressed meanings and directly expressive words and which consists of [implicit] understanding.[94]

The severing of Rāhu's head is not explicitly mentioned in the verse, but is nevertheless understood; thus the verse is an example of the **alaṃkāra paryāyokta** as defined by Udbhaṭa.

As we have seen (above, Chapter Four, pp. 157ff.), Ānandavardhana himself rejects the identification of **dhvani** with **alaṃkāras** which contain a suggested element. For him, such suggestive **alaṃkāras** and true cases of **dhvani** can be clearly differentiated on the basis of the relative

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paryāyokta, not **vastu-dhvani**. Elsewhere (pp. 118-19), however, Ānandavardhana himself concedes that some cases of **paryāyokta** may be included within the scope of **dhvani**, provided that the unstated meaning conveyed by such verses is their primary meaning (cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 163-164). Here the unstated meaning, Viṣṇu's decapitation of Rāhu, is the main purport of the sentence, and thus the verse ought, arguably, to be considered a case of **vastu-dhvani** by Ānandavardhana's own standards. Nonetheless, it is surprising that Pratīhārendurāja did not choose a more unambiguous example of **vastu-dhvani** for his demonstration.

[94]<u>Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha</u> 4.6 (ibid., p. 55).

predominance of their suggested and directly expressed meanings. Only if the suggested meaning of a verse is subordinate to its expressed meaning can this suggestion be called an **alaṃkāra**; if the suggested meaning is predominant, it will be taken as an instance of **dhvani**. It is true that Udbhaṭa's definition of **paryāyokta**, and definitions of such **alaṃkāras** in general, make no reference to the subordination of the unstated meanings they convey. Nevertheless, Ānandavardhana and his followers argue that the designation of these as **alaṃkāras** (lit. "ornaments") necessarily implies subordination. Ornaments, by definition, beautify something other than themselves; this, it is argued, necessarily implies their other-directed and subordinate character.

Pratīhārendurāja considers and rejects this argument for differentiating **dhvani** from Udbhaṭa's **alaṃkāras**:

> "Here [in the verse '...(Viṣṇu), who, by a forceful command...'], the understood **vastu**, because it is predominant, should appropriately be called a thing to be ornamented [**alaṃkārya**] rather than a cause of ornamentation; how then can this be called an **alaṃkāra**?" To this objection we reply: even a predominant thing, if it is a cause of beauty for the things subordinate to it, can become a means of ornamentation; in everyday experience we see statements such as "Servants are ornamented by their masters." Here too, even though the understood meaning is predominant, there is no contradiction in calling it an **alaṃkāra**, since it is a cause of beauty for the expressed meaning subordinated to it.[95]

The use of the term **alaṃkāra** itself does not necessitate subordination of the suggested to the expressed meaning, and

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[95]Ibid., p. 86.

there is no other basis on which to conclude that Udbhaṭa's definitions of **paryāyokta** and other suggestion-based **alaṃkāras** are meant to apply only to cases of subordinate suggestion. This and similar examples of **vastu-dhvani** meet Udbhaṭa's definition of **paryāyokta**, and ought thus to be regarded as examples of that **alaṃkāra**.

In the verse "[Viṣṇu], who, by a forceful command...", the expressed meaning is meant to be expressed (**vivakṣita**); cases of **vastu-dhvani** in which the expressed meaning is not meant to be expressed (**avivakṣita**) may similarly be included in the **alaṃkāras** defined by Udbhaṭa. Pratīhārendurāja considers the (by now familiar) example, "I am Rāma, whose heart is very hard; I can endure all!"[96] This example, like the previous one, conforms to the stated definition of **paryāyokta**. The word "Rāma" is used not in order to convey its own expressed meaning (as the speaker's identity is already known), but in order to bring to mind the many sufferings Rāma has endured (loss of his kingdom, exile in the forest, etc.). These sufferings are understood without being explicitly mentioned, and this use of the word "Rāma" can thus be taken as a case of **paryāyokta**. The same general principle-- understanding of what is not explicitly stated-- will apply in all cases of **vastu-dhvani**: "Thus, in other cases as well, when a **vastu** is understood, it will be called **paryāyokta**; therefore, when a **vastu** is understood, there is no

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[96]Ibid., pp. 86-87; cf. above, pp. 200 and 331.

property of poetry called '**dhvani**' which causes this understanding, apart from this [**paryāyokta**]."[97]

What Ānandavardhana calls **alaṃkāra-dhvani** can likewise be accounted for within the framework of Udbhaṭa's **alaṃkāras**. Again Pratīhārendurāja considers both **vivakṣita-vācya** and **avivakṣita-vācya** cases. For the first type he gives the following example:

> O you with the long, trembling eyes; since now, when your smiling face which fills the quarters of the sky with the splendor of your beauty is here, he does not become even slightly agitated, therefore I think this ocean is just a mass of water/ *an inert mass*.[98]

The ocean ordinarily becomes turbulent in the presence of the full moon, and the speaker's expression of surprise and disparagement at its failure to do so in the presence of a beautiful woman's face is taken to implicitly indicate the metaphorical identification (**rūpaka**) of this face with the moon. Ānandavardhana gives this verse as an example of **rūpaka-dhvani**. The unstated **alaṃkāra** is understood in addition to the directly expressed meaning of the verse, and does not supplant or displace it; it is therefore **vivakṣita-vācya**. There are two ways, Pratīhārendurāja argues, to

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[97]Ibid., p. 87.

[98]Ibid. p. 87.
lāvaṇyakāntiparipūritadiṅmukhe 'smin
 smere 'dhunā tava mukhe taralāyatākṣi/
kṣobhaṃ yad eti na manāg api tena manye
 suvyaktam eva jalarāśir iyam payodhiḥ//
Ānandavardhana gives the verse (which he identifies as his own) as an example of **rūpaka-dhvani** (cf. Dhvanyāloka 2.27 [Kashi ed., p. 261]). The verse also contains a pun on the words **jala** ("water") and **jaḍa** ("inert").

explain such cases within the framework of Udbhaṭa's **alaṃkāras**:

> An **alaṃkāra** which is understood [without being directly expressed] does not for any reason cease to be an **alaṃkāra**; thus [in this verse] there will be the **alaṃkāra rūpaka** in an understood form. Or, because here the **rūpaka** is arrived at by an indirect means of expression [paryāyoktyā], there is the **alaṃkāra paryāyokta**.[99]

Any proposition which conforms to the definition of the figure **rūpaka** is a case of that figure, whether it is directly stated or conveyed by implication; the same principle would hold for any indirectly expressed **alaṃkāra**. This indirect mode of expression is itself the defining feature of the figure **paryāyokta**, so this and similar examples can alternatively be explained as instances of this figure.

As a case of an unstated **alaṃkāra** conveyed by a verse whose directly expressed meaning is **avivakṣita**, the following example is given:

> Three people pluck the golden-flowered earth: a hero, one who has achieved learning, and one who knows how to serve.[100]

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[99]Ibid., p. 87.

[100]Ibid., p. 87.
suvarṇapuṣpāṃ pṛthivīṃ cinvanti puruṣās trayaḥ/
śūraś ca kṛtavidyaś ca yaś ca jānāti sevitum//
(Mahābhārata 5.35.64 [Poona ed.])
It is not clear that Ānandavardhana would regard this, as Pratīhārendurāja does, as a case of **alaṃkāra-dhvani**. In his discussions of **alaṃkāra-dhvani** (Dhvanyāloka 2.21 [pp. 235-47] and 2.25-27 [pp. 257-78]), Ānandavardhana deals only with **vivakṣitavācya** examples, suggesting that he does not admit **avivakṣitavācya alaṃkāra-dhvani** as a possibility. He elsewhere (cf. Dhvanyāloka, p. 137) quotes this verse as an example of **avivakṣitavācya-dhvani**, but does not discuss his interpretation of it more specifically than this. The point of the verse is that these three kinds of people achieve

The sense of the is verse that these three types of people attain success in the world. This attainment of worldly success is referred to metaphorically as "pluck[ing] the golden-flowered earth." Thus we understand from the verse an unstated simile (**upamā**) between the plucking of the golden-flowered earth and the attainment of worldly success; Pratīhārendurāja therefore takes it as an example of **avivakṣitavācya upamā-dhvani**. Such examples, he contends, can likewise be included in Udbhaṭa's **alaṃkāras**:

> Here, because plucking which has the golden-flowered earth as its object cannot be intelligibly construed with a hero, etc., there is, by virtue of similarity, figurative indication [**lakṣaṇā**] of the gaining of great wealth, which is similar to this [plucking] and thus becomes a subject of comparison [**upameya**]; by means of this **lakṣaṇā** there is seen to be [the **alaṃkāra**] **vidarśanā**, which contains a relation of standard and subject of comparison [**upamānopameyabhāva**] and which has an expressed meaning which is impossible.[101]

Udbhaṭa defines the figure **vidarśanā** ("illustration") as that "in which a connection with something, either real [**bhavan**] or unreal [**abhavan**], causes one to postulate a relation of standard and subject of comparison."[102] Here the connection of the hero, etc. with the literally impossible act of plucking the golden-flowered earth causes one to postulate a

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wealth and worldly success. This understanding obviously rests on an unstated comparison or identification of such success with "pluck[ing] the golden-flowered earth"; it is not clear, however, that this comparison itself (understood as an unstated **upamā** or **rūpaka**) should be taken as the primary suggested meaning of the verse.

[101]Ibid., pp. 87-88.

[102]Ibid., p. 66.

relation of similitude between this action and the unstated action of gaining great wealth (which is possible for these agents); thus it is an example of the figure **vidarśanā** as defined by Udbhaṭa.

What Ānandavardhana would call **alaṃkāra-dhvani** based on the power of word (**śabdaśaktimūla**) Pratīhārendurāja includes within the figure **śleṣa** ("pun"). He cites the following example:

> Honor him who is the one abode of all, imperishable/*not an abode*, the lord of thought, the supreme lord/*not the lord of thought*, Hari/*yellow*, Kṛṣṇa/*blue*, having a fourfold self/*having a capable nature*, free of karma/*inactive*, bearing the discus/ *wheel*, destroying enemies/*destroying the wheel*.[103]

Here a variety of double-meaning epithets are applied to the god Viṣṇu. If these terms are taken in their contextually appropriate senses ("imperishable", "the supreme lord", "Hari" and "Kṛṣṇa" [proper names], "having a fourfold self", "free of karma", "bearing the discus", "destroying enemies"), they will be properly applicable to Viṣṇu and the verse will convey a coherent sense. If they are taken in their alternate meanings, however, they will create a series of apparent contradictions: he is the abode of all, but he is not an abode; he both is and is not the lord of thought; he is both yellow and blue; he is both capable and inactive; he both

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[103]Ibid., p. 88.
sarvaikaśaraṇam akṣayam adhīśam īśaṃ dhiyāṃ hariṃ kṛṣṇam/
caturātmānaṃ niṣkriyam arimathanaṃ namata cakradharam//
Ānandavardhana (Dhvanyāloka, p. 246) cites the verse (which he identifies as his own) as an example **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani**.

supports and destroys a wheel. Therefore, according to Ānandavardhana, the verse suggests the **alaṃkāra virodha** ("[apparent] contradiction"), and this suggestion, depending as it does on *double entendre*, is said to be based on the power of word (**śabdaśaktimūla**).

Udbhaṭa's definition of the **alaṃkāra śleṣa**[104] requires that examples of this figure involve the "composition of multiple words which are pronounced with a single effort, or appear to be so"[105] and that these words should "produce an impression [**pratibhā**] of another **alaṃkāra**."[106] All cases of *double entendre* will meet the first condition; this example, because it brings to mind an unstated **virodha alaṃkāra**, meets the second. All cases of what Ānandavardhana would call **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani** would similarly meet Udbhaṭa's definition and so may be included in this figure. We have

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[104]Udbhaṭa's gives the name of the figure as śliṣṭa, but virtually all other Ālaṃkārikas call it śleṣa; Pratīhārendurāja uses both terms synonymously in his commentary.

[105]Udbhaṭa, like many other Ālaṃkārikas and language theorists in the Sanskrit tradition, does not admit the possibility of true polysemy; each word must have one and only one literal meaning. When a word appears to bear two or more independent literal meanings, these theorists would argue that there are in fact two or more distinct words (each having a single meaning) which happen coincidentally to be phonetically identical. For Udbhaṭa, **śleṣa** occurs when such identical words are pronounced (and their separate meanings understood) by a single utterance, or when a single word or group of words, when pronounced, calls to mind a second word or group of words which is phonetically very similar (but not absolutely identical).

[106]Ibid., p. 58.

seen (above, Chapter Four, pp. 166ff) that Ānandavardhana tries to draw a sharp distinction between **śleṣa** and **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani**, insisting that only cases of *double entendre* in which some explicit verbal cue prompts the hearer to look for a second meaning should be considered examples of the figure **śleṣa**; there is nothing in Udbhaṭa's definition of **śleṣa**, however, which would limit its scope to such cases.

Through his discussion of the previous three example verses, Pratīhārendurāja has shown that all possible types of **alaṃkāra-dhvani** may, like **vastu-dhvani**, be included within one or another of Udbhaṭa's **alaṃkāras**. Examples of **dhvani** which produce an awareness **rasas** or **rasa**-like phenomena (**bhāva**, **rasa**- and **bhāva-ābhāsa**, **rasa**- and **bhāva-praśama**, etc.-- cf. above, Chapter Two, pp. 52-58) in an audience may likewise be so included.

Pratīhārendurāja gives the following verse as an example of **rasa-dhvani**:

> When, in bed, the slender-bodied woman heard herself addressed by the wrong name, she considered turning away; she decided to begin; she almost accomplished what she had set out to do, gently drawing away one slender arm; but she was unable to draw her breasts away from her lover's chest.[107]

The verse begins with a description of factors suggestive of **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** ("love in separation")-- the woman hears

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[107]Ibid., p. 88.
yāte gotraviparyaye śrutipathaṃ śayyām anuprāptayā
    nirdhyātaṃ parivartanaṃ punar api prārabdhum aṅgīkṛtam/
bhūyas tat prakṛtaṃ kṛtaṃ ca śithilakṣiptaikadorlekhayā
    tanvaṅgyā na tu pāritaḥ stanabharaḥ kraṣṭuṃ priyasyorasaḥ//

her lover address her by another woman's name and resolves to turn away from him-- and culminates in the description of a factor suggestive of **saṃbhoga-śṛṅgāra** ("love in union")-- she finds herself unable to draw away and remains in her lover's embrace. Udbhaṭa's definition of the figure **rasavat** ("having **rasa**") requires only that **rasas** such as **śṛṅgāra** should be "clearly shown,"[108] and thus plainly applies here. Where **rasa**-like phenomena such as **bhāva**, **rasa**- or **bhāva-ābhāsa**, and **rasa**- or **bhāva-praśama** are conveyed, Udbhaṭa's definitions of the figures **preyasvat** (4.2), **ūrjasvin** (4.5), and **samāhita** (4.7) will similarly apply.[109]

Ānandavardhana's criterion for distinguishing **rasa-dhvani** (where **rasa** is predominant) from the **alaṃkāra rasavat** (where the suggested **rasa** is subordinated to some other meaning)[110] finds no support in Udbhaṭa's definition, which plainly applies wherever **rasa** is present. Ānandavardhana's claim that all types of **dhvani**, including **rasa-dhvani**, have been overlooked (rather than merely mis-analyzed) by earlier Ālaṃkārikas would require that the figure **rasavat**, as these Ālaṃkārikas understood it, be confined to instances in which

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[108]Ibid., p. 52.

[109]Ibid., p. 89 (also, cf. above, Chapter Two, pp. 52-58 and Chapter Four, p. 133). Ānandavardhana's typology of these **rasa**-like phenomena is itself based on Udbhaṭa's treatment of them in defining this group of **alaṃkāraś**, so the close parallelism between his own categorization and Udbhaṭa's is hardly surprising.

[110]Cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 172ff.

a suggested **rasa** is subordinated to some other meaning. Pratīhārendurāja rejects this interpretation: as he sees it Udbhaṭa has not dealt with subordinate **rasas** to the exclusion of predominant ones, but has simply formulated his definition of **rasavat** without regard for this distinction (thereby including examples of both types).

> "Because **rasas** and **bhāvas** are causes of the heightening of poetic beauty, are they, properly speaking, ornaments of poetry [**kāvyālaṃkāra**] or the very essence of poetry [**kāvyajīvita**]?"-- this question is not considered [by Udbhaṭa] for fear of overlengthening his work. And the nature of **rasas** and **bhāvas** is not analyzed here, because it is not relevant and because a great deal would have to be said about it.[111]

Udbhaṭa's purpose is to provide a complete catalogue of those formal and semantic features which give poetic language its beauty; whether these features are, in any given case, essential or non-essential, primary or subordinate, is a question which simply does not concern him.

So, examples of **vastu-dhvani**, **alaṃkāra-dhvani**, and **rasa-dhvani** can all be accounted for as examples of one or another of Udbhaṭa's **alaṃkāras**; there is no need to posit **dhvani** as something separate from these **alaṃkāras** (and, consequently, no grounds for accusing Udbhaṭa of failing to consider the most crucial feature of poetry in his work). The point is not that there is no such thing as **dhvani**, but rather that Ānandavardhana is mistaken in imagining that the phenomena he deals with have been overlooked by previous Ālaṃkārikas. We

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[111]Ibid., p. 54.

have seen (above, Chapter Four, pp. 122ff) that Ānandavardhana is anxious to show that his **dhvani** theory is not merely a redescription of poetic features already dealt with by his predecessors but deals with a range of phenomena which, despite their pivotal role in the creation of aesthetically effective poetry, had so far escaped the notice of poetic theorists. It is this contention of Ānandavardhana, and only this contention, which Pratīhārendurāja's analysis seeks to undermine.

Pratīhārendurāja does not challenge the possibility or usefulness of distinguishing, as Ānandavardhana does, between cases in which a suggested meaning is predominant with respect to the directly expressed meaning which accompanies it (i.e. **dhvani**) and cases in which it is subordinate (i.e. **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**); again, his point is only that examples of both types fall within the scope of Udbhaṭa's **alaṃkāras**. In fact, he explicitly accepts the existence of **dhvani**, and offers his own categorization of it.[112]

We have seen (above, Chapter Five, pp. 198ff) that Ānandavardhana presents two separate schemata on the basis of which **dhvani** may be classified; one based on the nature of its suggested content (**vastu**, **alaṃkāra**, or **rasa**), and the other on the relation between the expressed and suggested senses (**vivakṣita-vācya** and **avivakṣita-vācya**, with their respective subdivisions). Pratīhārendurāja's typology of **dhvani** is

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[112]Ibid., pp. 89-92.

basically a merging of these two classificatory schemata. He notes that the various subtypes of **dhvani** examined by Ānandavardhana are restricted as to the type of suggested meaning they may convey. In that type of **vivakṣita-vācya dhvani** which is based on the power of word (**śabdaśaktimūla**-- e.g. "Honor him who is the one abode of all...") only **alaṃkāras** may be suggested; in that type where there is no perceptible sequence between the expressed and suggested meanings (**asaṃlakṣyakrama**-- e.g. "When, in bed, the slender-bodied woman...") only **rasas** or **rasa**-like phenomena may be suggested (and all cases where **rasas** and **rasa**-like phenomena are suggested must belong to this type). In **vivakṣita-vācya dhvani** which does not belong to either of these subtypes, the suggested meaning may be either a **vastu** (as in "...[Viṣṇu], who, by a forceful command...") or an **alaṃkāra** (as in "O you with the long, trembling eyes..."), but not a **rasa**; likewise in **avivakṣita-vācya dhvani** either a **vastu** (as in "I am Rāma, whose heart is very hard...") or an **alaṃkāra** (as in "Three people pluck the golden-flowered earth...") may be suggested. Thus, by combining considerations of content and process, Pratīhārendurāja arrives at a single typology of **dhvani**, whose six subdivisions are illustrated by the six examples he has already cited in his argument for the inclusion of **dhvani** in Udbhaṭa's **alaṃkāras**.

Pratīhārendurāja not only admits the existence of **dhvani**, but also, following in Ānandavardhana's footsteps, argues for

the central importance of **rasa** in of poetry. Indeed, he goes further than Ānandavardhana is prepared to do, insisting that the evocation of **rasa** is not only the primary object of most great poetry, but is an essential property of poetry. Ānandavardhana, as we have seen (above, Chapter Six, pp. 282ff), accepts the existence of a class of poetry (**citra-kāvya**) which does not convey **rasa** at all, even as a subordinate factor. Pratīhārendurāja, by contrast, contends that all poetry must necessarily convey **rasa**. His argument for the essentiality of **rasa** is based on his analysis of the role of **guṇas** ("qualities") in poetry, an analysis which combines elements of Vāmana's and Ānandavardhana's understanding of the nature of **guṇa**.

Vāmana argued that **guṇas** (and the "styles" [**rītis**] based upon them) are the sources of poetic beauty and must necessarily exist in all poetry, in contrast to **alaṃkāras** which, while they may heighten the beauty created by these **guṇas**, are not similarly indipensible. Pratīhārendurāja likewise contends that **guṇas** are necessary and **alaṃkāras** optional in the composition of good poetry, and quotes Vāmana (Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra 3.1.1-3) in support of this view.[113]

However, like Ānandavardhana (and unlike Vāmana), he sees **guṇas** not as properties of the words and expressed meanings of a poem, properly speaking, but as properties of the **rasas**

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[113]Ibid., p. 82; cf. Vāmana, Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra, Kashi Sanskrit Series 209, pp. 82-82 and above, Chapter Four, pp. 144-146.

these words and meanings convey.[114] Verses which convey "sweet" **rasas** (such as **śṛṅgāra** or **karuṇa**) are said to possess the quality **mādhurya** ("sweetness"); those which convey **rasas** such as **raudra** ("fury") are said to possess **ojas** ("strength"). **Prasāda** ("clarity") is a quality common to all **rasas**, and verses which clearly communicate any **rasa** may be said to possess it. Pratīhārendurāja, again like Ānandavardhana, accepts only these three **guṇas** (rather than Vāmana's ten). All three are, as he understands them, invariably associated with **rasa**, so that poetry which possesses any of these **guṇas** must, by definition, convey some **rasa**. By combining Vāmana's view that **guṇas** are essential with Ānandavardhana's view that they are based on **rasa**, Pratīhārendurāja arrives at the conclusion that all poetry must necessarily convey **rasa**.[115]

It is not only in this insistence on the central role of **rasa** in poetry that Ānandavardhana's influence can be seen in Pratīhārendurāja's work. Central to Ānandavardhana's reconceptualization of the nature of poetry and the demands of poetic analysis was his importation into the realm of Alaṃkāraśāstra of a Mīmāṃsā-derived, teleogical model of textual coherence and, along with it, some of the key terms and concepts[116] developed by the Mīmāṃsakas as tools for the

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[114]Ibid., p. 81.

[115]Ibid., p. 83-84.

[116]Primary vs. subordinate meanings, **vidhi** vs. **anuvāda**, **vivakṣita-** vs. **avivakṣita-artha**, etc.

analysis of Vedic discourse. Pratīhārendurāja continues this "Mīmāṃsification" of Ālaṃkārika method and terminology by recasting many of Udbhaṭa's definitions and categories in Mīmāṃsā terms. He shows that the figure **dīpaka** ("illuminator"-- in which syntactic parallelism is used to reveal an unstated simile) is based on a kind of **anuṣaṅga.**[117] Like Vāmana before him (but unlike Udbhaṭa), he explains the figure **śleṣa** ("pun") as a kind of **tantra.**[118]

Udbhaṭa (5.11-13) mentions four possible types of blending (**saṃkara**) between figures: (1) that in which it cannot be conclusively determined which of several **alaṃkāras** is communicated by a verse, (2) that in which a single verse contains both sound-and meaning-based **alaṃkāras**, (3) that in which two or more **alaṃkāras** are conveyed by the same word, and (4) that in which the understanding of one **alaṃkāra** depends on another. Pratīhārendurāja[119] explains these four kinds of relation between **alaṃkāras** in Mīmāṃsā terms: in type (1) there is **vikalpa** ("option") between two or more mutually exclusive **alaṃkāras**,[120] in type (2) there is **vyavasthā** ("differential

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[117]Ibid., p. 16. **Anuṣaṅga** is the process through which an elliptical sentence is made comprehensible by understanding the repetition of a word or phrase from a preceding or following non-elliptical sentence-- cf. Mīmāṃsāsūtra 2.1.48.

[118]Ibid., p. 58. Cf. above, Chapter Five, pp. 196.

[119]Ibid., p. 71.

[120]For the Mīmāṃsakas, **vikalpa** must be accepted when there are two or more contradictory injunctions pertaining to the same act; for instance, if one injunction requires that the substance to be used for a particular sacrificial offering

implementation") of two **alaṃkāras** which function independently in their respective domains,[121] in type (3) there is **samuccaya** ("aggregation") of multiple **alaṃkāras**,[122] and in type (4) there is an **aṅgāṅgibhāva** ("primary/subordinate relation") between one **alaṃkāra** and another. Pratīhārendurāja's reformulation of Udbhaṭa's categories does not really add anything to his analysis of **saṃkara**, but it shows an effort to "translate" Ālaṃkārika language into Mīmāṃsā terms.

Apart from this terminological shift, the influence of Mīmāṃsā discourse analysis on Pratīhārendurāja's thought can be seen in his efforts to explain the cognitive processes involved in interpreting the **alaṃkāras** described by Udbhaṭa.

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should be rice and another requires that it should be barley--cf. Mīmāṃsāsūtra 12.3.10-15.

[121]**Vyavasthā** is the assignment of distinct roles to several elements of the sacrifice (e.g. the various ritual utensils) on the basis of their natural capacity. For example, there are several injunctions regarding the division of substances to be used for sacrifice: "One should divide with the ladle," "One should divide with the knife," "One should divide with one's hand." Although these injunctions do not specify which substances are to be divided by which of these three implements (ladle, knife, and hand), they are not to be used indiscriminately; liquid substances (e.g. ghee) should be divided with the ladle, solids (e.g. meat) with the knife, and collected but separable substances (e.g. grains) with the hand. These utensils are thus "differentially implemented" (**vyavasthita**); each functions in its own proper domain. Cf. Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.4.25 and 3.1.7-10.

[122]In Mīmāṃsā, **samuccaya** is the performance in combination of two ritual elements when there is no blocking (**bādha**) of one by the other and the two need not be viewed as exlusive alternatives (as in a case of **vikalpa**)-- cf., for example, Śābarabhāṣya on Mīmāṃsāsūtra, 10.3.23-29, 10.4.1ff, and 12.3.17.

Udbhaṭa, like all of the early Ālaṃkārikas, is relatively uninterested in processes of interpretation; the main concern of his **alaṃkāra**-analysis is to specify the necessary formal or logical constituents of the figures he describes, any sequential or other restrictions on the presentation of these constituents, and the conditions under which one or more of these constituents may be implied rather than directly stated.[123] Pratīhārendurāja accepts and defends Udbhaṭa's treatment of these topics, but pushes his own analysis in a new direction; in explaining Udbhaṭa's **alaṃkāras**, he generally offers detailed accounts of the interpretive processes through which they are understood, often in terms of the distinction (first outlined by the Mīmāṃsakas)[124] between **avāntara-vākyārtha** ("intermediate sentence meaning") and **paryavasāna** (the "completion" of the interpretive process).[125]

Ānandavardhana, by his introduction into Alaṃkāraśāstra of a Mīmāṃsā-derived understanding of the nature of texts and Mīmāṃsā-derived techniques of text analysis, began for the

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[123]As in an "elliptical simile" (**luptā upamā**-- cf. Kāvyālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha 1.17-21 [op. cit., pp. 17ff]).

[124]Cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 105-109.

[125]Cf., for example, his treatment of the figures **ākṣepa** ("denial", in which one overtly denies what one actually wishes to say-- ibid., pp. 31-34), **vyājastuti** ("disguised praise", in which a statement which is overtly a rebuke covertly conveys praise-- p. 66), **vidarśanā** ("illustration" [cf. above, pp. 375-376]-- pp. 66-67), and **upameyopamā** ("comparison with the thing compared", in which each of two things is said to resemble the other so as to suggest that no third thing is comparable with either-- pp. 71-72).

first time to seriously bridge the gap between the conceptual vocabulary of literary theory and that of philosophical language-analysis. In Pratīhārendurāja's work we can see a continuation of this process; there appears to be a concerted effort on his part to describe and analyze Udbhaṭa's **alaṃkāras** in Mīmāṃsā terms.

Conclusion

While they come at the problems raised by Ānandavardhana's work from different angles, Mukulabhaṭṭa and Pratīhārendurāja are pursuing very similar projects. Each mounts a defense of existing language theory in the face of Ānandavardhana's charges of inadequacy, while at the same time seeming to agree with Ānandavardhana's revolutionary view of the nature of poetry and of the crucial role of unstated meaning, especially **rasa**, within it. Their response to Ānandavardhana's critique of previous language theory is in a sense conservative but, given their apparent acceptance of his teleological, **rasa**-centered model of literary aesthetics, this conservative stance requires that they revise, or at least significantly elaborate, the theories of language (whether general or specifically literary) they aim to defend, so as to demonstrate that these theories can satisfactorily account for the full range of poetic phenomena dealt with by Ānandavardhana without the introduction of any such new semantic mode such as **vyañjanā** or **dhvani**.

In both Mukulabhaṭṭa's and Pratīhārendurāja's works we

see an increasing erosion of the distinction between the theory of specifically poetic language and the theory of language in general. Mukulabhaṭṭa totally rejects any such distinction, arguing that all the semantic phenomena observable in poetic language, in particular those Ānandavardhana classifies as **dhvani**, can be satifactorily explained via the already well-established process of figurative expression. For him, the ways in which poetry conveys meaning are fundamentally no different from those in which all language conveys meaning, and there is thus no need for a special theory of poetic signification.

Pratīhārendurāja does not directly challenge the differentiation of poetic from general language-theory; he steers clear of the question which most preoccupies his mentor, namely the legitimacy of Ānandavardhana's claims for **vyañjanā** as a specifically poetic mode of expression. Nevertheless, his effort to redescribe Udbhaṭa's categories in Mīmāṃsaka terms, and to outline the series of interpretive stages involved in understanding the **alaṃkāras** Udbhaṭa describes, serves in practice to facilitate the merging of Ālaṃkārika modes of description and text-analysis with those of linguistic philosophy, a trend which continues in the works of later Ālaṃkārikas.

CHAPTER EIGHT
KUNTAKA'S VAKROKTIJĪVITA

In the preceding examination of the works of Mukulabhaṭṭa and Pratīhārendurāja, we have seen that Ānandavardhana's revolutionary reconceptualization of the nature of poetry and the imperatives of poetic analysis provoked a negative response from defenders of established theories of language. We have also seen, however, that this negative response is highly selective. Only one aspect of Ānandavardhana's argument is singled out for criticism: his insistence that what he calls **dhvani** lies entirely outside the range of phenomena dealt with by earlier theorists of both language in general and poetic language in particular, and requires the acceptance of a previously unrecognized, specifically poetic, mode of signification (**vyañjanā**). Other central features of Ānandavardhana's new approach to literary analysis (the predominance of **rasa** in aesthetically effective literature, the importation into poetic analysis of a Mīmāṃsā-derived, teleological model of textual coherence along with many of the terms and concepts employed by the Mīmāṃsakas in the analysis of Vedic texts, etc.) seem for the most part to be accepted without reservation even by Ānandavardhana's critics. In their works, and in those of most subsequent Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas up to the time of Mammaṭa (c. 1100 AD), attention is focussed primarily on the linguistic/philosophical issues raised by Ānandavardhana's claims for **vyañjanā** as a distinct semantic function.

Kuntaka, the author whose work we will now turn to examine, represents the one major exception to this tendency during this period. He takes no clear stand on the question of the explicability of **dhvani** or **vyañjanā** as cases of more widely recognized semantic or cognitive functions (such as figurative expression or inference); in general, he avoids the linguistic and philosophical arguments which absorb so much of the attention of his predecessors and contemporaries.

His work, to a degree unequalled in the entire history of Alaṃkāraśāstra, concentrates on the criticism of specific literary works. In this respect, of course, he is following up on and extending Ānandavardhana's own preliminary efforts in the area of literary criticism. However, as we shall see, Kuntaka's critical efforts and his examination of the full range of techniques employed in the creation of poetry calls into question and ultimately undercuts the central pillar of Ānandavardhana's aesthetic theory, the unifocality (ideally the **rasa**-focality) of all coherent literary works. Kuntaka is the only figure in this period to seriously (albeit tacitly) challenge the teleological model of literary aesthetics devised by Ānandavardhana.

Kuntaka's Relation to Abhinavagupta

The date of the Vakroktijīvita, Kuntaka's only known work, can be fixed with certainty between the middle of the tenth century (since it quotes extensively from the works of the early tenth century dramatist Rājaśekhara) and the middle

of the eleventh (the approximate date of Mahimabhaṭṭa, who quotes it). The relative priority of Kuntaka and Abhinavagupta (c. 1000 AD) is more difficult to establish with certainty (as neither quotes or unambiguously refers to the other), and has been a focus of dispute among modern scholars.

Some, most notably S.K. De, take Abhinavagupta's failure to respond to Kuntaka's ideas as sufficient to indicate that he was unfamiliar with the Vakroktijīvita, a work which "if written before Abhinava's time, ought not to have been, from its important nature and content, thus entirely ignored by a rival theorist."[1] Others, chiefly K. Krishnamoorthy, find evidence for Kuntaka's priority; while there are no explicit references to Kuntaka or the Vakroktijīvita to be found in Abhinavagupta's works, there is a passage the Locana (his commentary on the Dhvanyāloka) and another in the Abhinavabhāratī (his commentary on Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra) that discuss the aesthetically effective use of such grammatical features as gender and number in terms which seem to echo Kuntaka's treatment of the same topics and adduce several of the same examples, strongly suggesting that he was familiar

[1]De, S.K., History of Sanskrit Poetics (Firma KLM, 1976 [second. ed.]), Vol. I, pp. 128. Presumably because he is generally less prone to offer detailed critiques of fellow Ālaṃkārikas, Kuntaka's failure to refer to Abhinavagupta is not taken to be similarly probative in setting their relative dates. Cf. also S.K. De ed., Vakroktijīvita (Firma KLM, 1961 [third ed.]), Introduction, pp. xii-xv. Kane feels the evidence is insufficient to draw any definite conclusion, but leans toward De's view (P.V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Motilal Banarsidass, 1971 [fourth ed.], pp. 235-6).

with the latter's work.[2]

To these two passages which seem to indicate Abhinavagupta's acquaintance with the Vakroktijīvita I can add a third: in his commentary on Ānandavardhana's discussion of the verse "**prāptaśrīr eṣa...**" ("Having already obtained Śrī..."-- cf. Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., p. 261 and above, Chapter Four, p. 129) he refers to and refutes the view that the **alaṃkāra** in the verse is not **rūpaka** ("metaphorical identification") as Ānandavardhana claims, but **vyatireka** ("contrast").[3] In the extant Alaṃkāra literature the only author who explains this verse as a case of **vyatireka** is Kuntaka.[4] Kuntaka himself notes that his interpretation of the verse departs from the general understanding of the verse as a suggested **rūpaka**, so it is very unlikely that he is following any previous author in labelling it a case of **vyatireka**. It seems clear, then, that Abhinavagupta's comment refers to Kuntaka's reading of the verse. This passage, along with the two adduced by Krishnamoorthy, would tend to establish a strong presumption in favor of Kuntaka's priority.

It remains to be explained, however, why Abhinavagupta, if he was aware of Kuntaka's work, should almost totally refrain, as he does, from discussing or criticizing his views,

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[2]Kuntaka, Vakroktijīvita, K. Krishnamoorthy ed. and tr. (Karnatak University, 1977), Introduction, pp. xiv-xvii.

[3]Locana on Dhvanyāloka 2.27, p. 262.

[4]Vakroktijīvita 3.48-- Krishnamoorthy's ed., pp. 221-2.

when he gives such extensive and detailed critiques of the views of other critics of Ānandavardhana's work. For Krishnamoorthy, Abhinavagupta's silence is easily explicable; Kuntaka is not (despite the claims of De and others to the contrary) an opponent of Ānandavardhana. "That Kuntaka is an anti-**dhvani** theorist is a canard of modern scholars which does not have any firm basis... Kuntaka has accepted the **dhvani** principle without any reservations, and hence Abhinavagupta saw no need to criticize him."[5] As we shall see, this argument overlooks several crucial areas of divergence between Ānandavardhana's and Kuntaka's views.

Kuntaka does not, like Mukulabhaṭṭa, Pratīhārendurāja, and others (e.g. Bhaṭṭanāyaka-- cf. below, Chapter Nine, pp. 458ff), explicitly challenge Ānandavardhana's arguments for the existence of suggestion as an independent, specifically poetic, mode of verbal expression-- he does not explicitly endorse or support them either-- indeed one can find in his work no direct reference at all to the controversy currently raging over the existence and nature of **dhvani** and its relation to recognized modes of linguistic expression. Abhinavagupta can overlook Kuntaka's work not because he is a supporter of Ānandavardhana, but rather because he simply has nothing to say one way or the other on what has become the major point of contention between Ānandavardhana's supporters and opponents.

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[5]Ibid., Introduction, pp. xvi-xvii.

Kuntaka's silence on the **dhvani** question has provoked a certain amount of dissension regarding his attitude toward Ānandavardhana's theories both among later Ālaṃkārikas and among modern scholars. Jayaratha (c. 1200), in his commentary on the Alaṃkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka (c. 1150), and Vidyādhara (c.1300), in his Ekāvalī, both place Kuntaka among those who would explain **dhvani** as a type of figurative expression (**bhakti**), and De takes the same view.[6] Krishnamoorthy decidedly rejects such an understanding of Kuntaka's position, arguing, as we have seen, that Kuntaka is fundamentally in agreement with Ānandavardhana; he finds support for this view in the remarks of Samudrabandha (c. 1300), another commentator on the Alaṃkārasarvasva, and in Mahimabhaṭṭa's contention that Kuntaka's **vakrokti** is nothing but a thinly disguised variant of Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**.[7]

The inability of these respondents, both ancient and modern, to arrive at any consensus regarding Kuntaka's appraisal of Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** theory stems from his failure to deal with the issue directly. This total avoidance of what had become the most pressing and controversial question for the Ālaṃkārikas of his day is one of the most

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[6]Cf. Ruyyaka, Alaṃkārasarvasva (with the commentary of Jayaratha), Kāvyamālā 35 (Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1982 [reprint]), p. 8; Vidyādhara, Ekāvalī (Osmania University, 1981), p. 47; De, op. cit., Vol.2, pp. 191-192.

[7]Vakroktijīvita, ed. Krishnamoorthy, op. cit., Introduction, pp. xxi-xxii, xxix-xxx. Cf. also Mahimabhatta, Vyaktiviveka (Kashi Sanskrit Series 121, Varanasi, 1982 [third ed.]), p. 142.

surprising features of Kuntaka's work, although it has been largely overlooked by these scholars in their efforts to definitively situate him on one or the other side of the **dhvani** controversy. Given the overwhelming, indeed almost exclusive, prominence of the dispute over **dhvani** among the Ālaṃkārikas of Kashmir during this period, Kuntaka's failure to confront this question certainly cannot be attributed to an oversight on his part; he has deliberately chosen to ignore the central aesthetic question of his day. Kuntaka departs from his predecessors (both Ānandavardhana and his opponents), not by offering some new analysis of the question of **dhvani** or "suggested" meaning more generally, but by attempting to marginalize the question altogether and to move the study of poetry in a different direction.

Vakrokti

Kuntaka's general label for the entire range of factors (phonemic, morphological, and semantic) which impart beauty to poetic texts is **vakrokti**-- "oblique expression". It is the "obliqueness" of poetic language, its deviation from everyday usage, that serves as the basis for its beauty. Kuntaka's analysis of poetry consists primarily of an examination of the various types of "obliqueness" employed by poets at all levels of language.

In this presentation of obliqueness of expression as the basic principle of poetic beauty, De sees an attempt to revive, in a somewhat modified form, the **alaṃkāra**-based

poetics of the pre-Ānandavardhana Ālaṃkārikas (chiefly Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa).[8] There is a certain plausibility to this view. It is from Bhāmaha's <u>Kāvyālaṃkāra</u> (2.85-86) that the term **vakrokti** is drawn. For Bhāmaha, **vakrokti** is the general principle of figuration which underlies all **alaṃkāras** (rather than the name of a particular **alaṃkāra**, as it is for Vāmana [4.3.8] and Rudraṭa [2.14-17]);[9] Kuntaka uses the term in the same way. Kuntaka draws on Bhāmaha's remarks (1.15-17) to support his argument for the co-equal role of word and meaning in the composition of good poetry.[10] His discussion of sentence-level obliqueness (**vākya-vakratā**) consists largely of a catalogue of meaning-based **alaṃkāras** fashioned very much on the model of those given by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, etc.;[11] his analysis of phoneme-level obliqueness is similarly modelled on these authors' treatment of sound-based **alaṃkāras**.[12]

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[8]Cf. S.K. De ed., <u>Vakroktijīvita</u>, op. cit., Introduction, pp. xlvi-xlvii, "... Kuntaka, as a follower of Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and the Alaṃkāra school, started a vigorous but short-lived reactionary movement which wanted to go back to the old position in a somewhat original way by an attempt to reconcile new ideas with the old;" and p. lx, "What Kuntaka really intended to do was, no doubt, systematizing [sic.] and extending the **alaṃkāra**-theory of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa and give [sic.] a longer lease of life to the already doomed Alaṃkāra school."

[9]Cf. above, Chapter Six, pp. 276-277.

[10]<u>Vakroktijīvita</u>, ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 9.

[11]Ibid., pp. 169-244.

[12]Ibid., pp. 74-82.

On the other hand, Kuntaka's treatment of **vakrokti** is, as Krishnamoorthy notes,[13] in many respects heavily influenced by Ānandavardhana's work. A great many of Ānandavardhana's example verses are re-used in Kuntaka's work. On occasion he specifically notes parallels between the types of **vakrokti** he discusses and the types of **dhvani** dealt with by Ānandavardhana.[14] His treatment of **vakrokti** at the level of the episode (**prakaraṇa**) or the complete composition (**prabandha**) is very clearly informed and inspired by Ānandavardhana's groundbreaking examination of the techniques by which poets introduce aesthetic coherence into entire compositions and his preliminary forays into the area of literary criticism.

It is difficult, then, to conclusively identify Kuntaka as either a follower of the **alaṃkāra**-based aesthetic of such pre-Ānandavardhana Ālaṃkārikas as Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa or a follower of Ānandavardhana's own **dhvani**-based mode of literary analysis. Kuntaka construes his **vakrokti** as broadly as possible, broadly enough to comprehend the **alaṃkāras** and other formal features of poetic language dealt with by the earlier

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[13]Krishnamoorthy, K., The Dhvanyāloka and Its Critics, Mysore: Kavyalaya, 1968, pp. 260, 264-5.

[14]E.g. Vakroktijīvita 2.10-12 (p. 89); here, in his discussion of that type of **paryāya-vakratā** ("obliqueness in [choice among] synonyms")-- in which the terms the poet chooses to describe his subject are crafted so as to convey, by paranomasia, a second, related sense-- Kuntaka notes that this variety of **vakrokti** is equivalent to Ānandavardhana's **śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani**.

Ālaṃkārikas as well as Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**. In doing so he, characteristically, circumvents the conflict between these two rival approaches to literary analysis, incorporating as much as he can of the insights of both Ānandavardhana and his predecessors under the all-inclusive rubric of **vakrokti**.

The term **vakrokti**, as Kuntaka employs it, designates not any particular kind of formal element or any specifiable semantic technique employed by poets, but rather can refer to any factor of any kind which gives beauty to a literary composition. **Vakrokti** comprises such a wide variety of phenomena that it would be difficult to give any precise characterization of it. And, indeed, Kuntaka does not attempt to do so; he does not provide a general definition of **vakrokti** at all, but only gives a list of sub-types.[15] Rather than attempt to divide this **vakrokti** into sub-classes on this basis of distinctions in the process by which it is conveyed (as, for instance, Ānandavardhana does in his classification of **dhvani**) Kuntaka provides a categorization of **vakrokti** based on the type of linguistic unit which manifests it. He divides **vakrokti** into six main classes: "obliqueness" (**vakratā**) operating at the level of 1) the phoneme (**varṇa**), 2) stem (**pada-pūrvārdha**[16]), 3) suffix (**pada-uttarārdha**), 4) sentence (**vākya**), 5) episode (**prakaraṇa**), and 6) composition

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[15]Ibid., p. 26.

[16]Literally, "the prior half of the word", i.e. the nominal or verbal base to which suffixes are added.

(**prabandha**).

In discussing these six classes of **vakrokti** and their various subdivisions, Kuntaka usually follows the same pattern, avoiding general definitions wherever possible and substituting a list of further subtypes or a set of examples. Such definitions as he does provide are often virtually tautologous: e.g "Obliqueness of adjectives [**viśeṣaṇa-vakratā**] is that in which the beauty of an action or active factor [**kāraka**][17] appears through the power of an adjective,"[18] or "Obliqueness of tense [**kāla-vakratā**] is that in which a tense becomes beautiful due to its extreme appropriateness."[19] This tendency to avoid substantive definitions of **vakrokti** and its sub-types seems to stem from Kuntaka's intention to keep the concept of **vakrokti** as broad and all inclusive as possible; any attempt to characterize **vakrokti** and its subtypes more precisely might result in the exclusion of some poetic techniques or devices from the scope of **vakrokti**, and Kuntaka clearly wishes to avoid such exclusion. **Vakrokti**, for him, comprises any aesthetic device employed by poets, for any purpose, at any level of language.

Kuntaka's **varṇa-vakratā**, obliqueness in the use of phonemes, is, as already noted, modelled on the class of sound-based figures (**śabdālaṃkāras**) dealt with by earlier

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[17]Cf. above, Chapter Three, p. 78.

[18]Vakroktijīvita, ed. Krishnamoorthy, op. cit., p. 96.

[19]Ibid., p. 113.

theorists. Apart from relabeling these figures as "**vakrokti**", Kuntaka has little to add to his predecessors' treatment of this topic, and his own discussion of it is quite brief. He reiterates Ānandavardhana's proscriptions against overly repetitive alliteration[20] and against the alliterative use of "harsh" sounds,[21] but, significantly, he does not, like Ānandavardhana, specifically link these prohibitions to the requirements of **rasa**.[22]

Kuntaka's discussion of obliqueness in the use of nominal or verbal stems (**pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā**) and suffixes (**pada-uttarārdha-vakratā**) is more complicated and less clearly modelled on the work of earlier Ālaṃkārikas. Under the first of these headings he discusses a wide range of devices manifested in poets' lexical choices, some involving the selection of particular lexical items for their capacity to convey some special connotation or unstated meaning above and beyond their literal senses, and some in which sheer morphological oddity seems to be valued for its own sake.

In his typology of the suggestive and connotative uses of lexical choice, Kuntaka includes several varieties which are clearly modelled on one or another of the types of suggestion dealt with in the Dhvanyāloka. His "obliqueness in the use of

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[20]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 218-19; cf. above, Chapter Four, p. 175.

[21]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., p. 303; cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 175-176.

[22]Vakroktijīvita, Krishnamoorthy's ed., pp. 78-9.

conventional terms[23]" (**rūdhi-vakratā**) corresponds very closely to Ānandavardhana's **arthāntarasaṃkramita-vācya dhvani**. Among the examples of **rūdhi-vakratā** he includes both of Ānandavardhana's examples of this type of **dhvani** (including the familiar verse "**snigdhaśyāmalakānti...**" ["The clouds, with cranes wheeling against them..."], where, in the phrase "I am Rāma", the word "Rāma" serves not to identify the speaker but to connote the great sufferings he has endured in the past).[24] It has already been observed that Kuntaka treats Ānandavardhana's **śabdaśaktimūla dhvani** as a type of **paryāya-vakratā** ("obliqueness in the use of synonyms"-- cf. above, p. 398). Kuntaka's **saṃvṛti-vakratā** ("obliqueness in the use of concealment")-- making reference to an entity or property by a pronominal or other indefinite expression (rather than designating it specifically) in order to suggest some special quality-- is dealt with by Ānandavardhana as a type of subordinated suggestion.[25]

However, Kuntaka describes other varieties of **pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā** in which the communication of unstated meaning plays no role at all. The use of forms containing augments or infixes, of compounds which contain within them nominal or participial suffixes, of verbs formed from nominal

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[23]Proper names, as well as other terms whose meanings are not etymologically derivable.

[24]Vakroktijīvita, op. cit., pp. 83-4. Cf. also Dhvanyāloka, pp. 167-170 and above, Chapter Four, pp. 200-201.

[25]Ibid., pp. 98-101. Cf. Dhvanyāloka, pp. 476-77.

stems rather than verb roots, and of other such grammatically unusual constructions are included among the subtypes of this class of **vakrokti**.[26] Kuntaka values such forms not for any special shade of meaning they impart but, seemingly, simply because they are atypical-- because their sheer oddity lends a striking quality to poetry in which they are employed.

In some varieties of **pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā** both suggestive and non-suggestive uses are included. For example, in discussing "obliqueness of gender" (**liṅga-vakratā**) Kuntaka examines three ways in which the choice of words bearing a particular grammatical gender can impart beauty to poetry. The designation of the same referent by two or more words bearing different genders will lend beauty to a verse.[27] In the case of words which may optionally bear any gender, use of the feminine form (rather than masculine or neuter) will similarly impart beauty, due to the great degree of "tenderness" thought to attach to this gender.[28] Or, words of a particular gender may impart beauty when they are peculiarly appropriate to the overall meaning expressed by a verse, as in the following example:

> O fearful one, out of pity, these creepers [f.], unable to speak, showed me, with their branches whose shoots were bent, the path by which you had been carried away by

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[26]Ibid., pp. 101-104.

[27]Ibid., p. 105.

[28]Ibid., p. 106.

the Rākṣasa.[29]

Here Rāma, returning from Laṅkā with the rescued Sītā, points out to her the path by which she was taken when seized by Rāvaṇa. The creepers, whose bent shoots showed Rāma the direction in which she had been taken, are fancifully imagined to have consciously assisted him by pointing the way she had gone. According to Kuntaka, the use of the feminine word **latā** to refer to the creepers emphasizes their sympathy for the abducted Sītā and thereby helps to explain their eagerness to assist Rāma in rescuing her, and is thus specially appropriate to the fanciful sense of the verse.

The first two types of **liṅga-vakratā** do not depend for their effectiveness on their ability to convey some unstated sense. The application of words of different gender to a single referent creates a seeming anomaly and thereby imparts a striking quality to a verse in which it is employed; preference for the feminine gender even when others are grammatically possible is based on its intrinsic "tenderness", quite apart from any capacity it may have to suggest an additional meaning. Only the third type of **liṅga-vakratā** depends for its effectiveness on the suggestive capacity of a particular gender.

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[29]Ibid., p. 107.
tvaṃ rakṣasā bhīru yato 'panītā
tam mārgam etāḥ kṛpayā latā me/
adarśayan vaktum aśaknuvantyaḥ
śākhābhir āvarjitapallavābhiḥ//
(Kālidāsa, Raghuvaṃśa 13.24)

"Obliqueness in the use of suffixes" (**pada-uttarārdha-vakratā**) similarly comprises both constructions which are valued for their intrinsically beautiful or striking quality and those which are valued for their capacity to convey unstated meanings. Among the sub-varieties of this type of **vakrokti** Kuntaka includes the use of suffixes which are appended to other suffixes (**pratyayāntara-vakratā**)[30] and the transposition of grammatical person (**puruṣa-vakratā**-- e.g. when a speaker refers to himself in the third person);[31] such usages, due, respectively, to their morphological or syntactic oddity, seemed to be desired for their intrinsically striking quality. Other sub-varieties involve the suggestive use of suffixes-- for example, "obliqueness of tense" (**kāla-vakratā**), as an example of which Kuntaka gives the following Prakrit verse:

> Everywhere the roads, even and uneven alike, movement on them getting slower and slower, will soon become impassable even to desires.[32]

Here, Kuntaka explains, a traveller separated from his beloved anticipates the impending rains which will make it impossible for him to return to her; his anticipation of their enforced

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[30]Ibid., pp. 119-20.

[31]Ibid., p. 118.

[32]Ibid., p. 114.
samavisamanivisesā samamtao mamdamamdasamcārā/
airā hohiṃṫi pahā maṇoràhāṇaṃ ṗi duĺlamgh̄ā//
(Hāla, <u>Sȧttasaī</u> 7.73)
The example is borrowed from Ānandavardhana, who quotes the same verse as an example of the suggestive use of tense-- cf. <u>Dhvanyāloka</u>, p. 356.

separation during the coming rainy season (expressed by the verb's future-tense suffix) intensifies his present longing and thus serves to heighten the **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** ("love in separation") conveyed by the verse.

As with **pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā**, some types of **pada-uttarārdha-vakratā** have both suggestive and non-suggestive uses. For example, "obliqueness of number" (**saṃkhyā-vakratā**) includes the co-referential use of words whose suffixes bear different grammatical numbers (singular, dual or plural), as well as the substitution of one grammatical number for another in order to convey an unstated meaning, as in the following verse:

> Again and again you touch her trembling glance as it shifts to the corner of her eye; you sound sweetly, hovering near her ear, as if telling something in secret; although she strikes at you with her hands, you taste her lip, the essence of pleasure: we, because we seek the truth, have failed, but you, O bee, are successful.[33]

Here the speaker (Duṣyanta), by referring to himself in the plural, emphasizes his exclusion from intimacy with Śakuntalā, thereby heightening the contrast between himself and the bee and intensifying the **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** conveyed by the verse.

Kuntaka's examination of sentence-level obliqueness (**vākya-vakratā**) deals mainly with two topics. As noted above, the bulk of this examination consists of a catalogue of meaning-based poetic figures (**arthālaṃkāras**) on the model of

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[33]Ibid., pp. 116-17; cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 177-178.

those given by Bhāmaha and the other pre-Ānandavardhana Ālaṃkārikas. However, under the heading of **vākya-vakratā** Kuntaka includes, in addition to these figures, "obliqueness of subject" (**vastu-vakratā**)-- poetic effect achieved through the selection of particular subjects for description. The aesthetic effectiveness of sentences depends not only on the mode of description employed therein (i.e. the use of particular **alaṃkāras**), but on the entities, objects, or situations one chooses to describe. The subjects of description chosen by poets may impart **vakratā** to their verses either due to their natural beauty (**svabhāva-saukumārya**),[34] or to their ability to kindle some **rasa** (**rasa-uddīpana-sāmarthya**).[35] As we shall see (below, pp. 423ff) this treatment of **rasa** as only one possible goal among others toward which poets may direct their efforts is characteristic of Kuntaka; it is an attitude which sets him apart not only from Ānandavardhana but from virtually the entire post-Dhvanyāloka Alaṃkāra tradition in Kashmir, supporters and opponents of the **dhvani**-theory alike.

Literary Criticism in the Vakroktijīvita

It is in his discussion "obliqueness" at the level of the episode and the whole composition (**prakaraṇa**- and **prabandha-vakratā**, respectively) that Kuntaka makes his most concerted efforts in the area of literary criticism. That Kuntaka's

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[34] Ibid., pp. 125ff.

[35] Ibid., pp. 141ff.

interest in the detailed analysis of specific literary works is unequalled in the entire history of Alaṃkāraśāstra has already been noted by Krishnamoorthy:

> In the whole range of Sanskrit poetical theory, we do not have anyone who can be termed a practical literary critic in the modern sense of the term except Kuntaka... None of [the earlier Ālaṃkārikas] even attempt the task of reviewing or appreciating a literary work as a whole, analyzing the various elements that work up to a unity of impression... Kuntaka indeed is the only writer who attempted this task of literary analysis, critical appreciation and appraisal from a total perspective, of almost all the major poets and playwrights in classical Sanskrit literature.[36]

Kuntaka examines a variety of techniques employed by poets to give coherence and aesthetic impact to their compositions and, in doing so, comments on the overall stucture and intent of many of the more important works of the Sanskrit poetic tradition in a way that is extremely rare in Alaṃkāraśāstra generally.

In doing so, of course, he is following Ānandavardhana's lead. As we have seen,[37] Ānandavardhana, because his teleological approach to poetic analysis required that the features of any literary work be evaluated in terms of their capacity to further the overall goal of the entire work rather than their intrinsic beauty, was led to examine and evaluate existing literary works as wholes in a way which had no precedent in Sanskrit literary theory. While Ānandavardhana's critical remarks on existing works are relatively few in

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[36]Ibid., Introduction, pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

[37]Cf. above, Chapter Six, pp. 260ff.

number, they thus represent a major innovation in the practice of Alaṃkāraśāstra. Kuntaka makes this kind of criticism of specific literary compositions as wholes a major component of his work.

As he does this it is clear that he has the example of Ānandavardhana in mind; indeed, he discusses some of the very same cases dealt with in the Dhvanyāloka. One of the varieties of **prakaraṇa-vakratā** mentioned by Kuntaka is the arrangement of the episodes of a work such that each is closely connected to those preceding and following it and irrelevant episodes are avoided; as an example of the failure to achieve such an arrangement, he gives the erotic episode between Duryodhana and his wife in Act Two of Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa's Veṇīsaṃhāra.[38] Like Ānandavardhana before him, Kuntaka contends that this episode is entirely out of keeping with the rest of the work. The play as whole deals with a massive war in which Duryodhana, his brothers, and many other relatives, friends, etc. will ultimately be killed; in such a situation, Duryodhana's jealousy of his wife and his subsequent romantic dalliance with her are nothing but a senseless digression. Again echoing Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka argues that the poet has introduced such an episode solely to conform to the rules of plot-construction given in Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, without regard for the incoherence it produces in his work.

[38]Ibid., p. 274; cf. also Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 336-40 and above, Chapter Six, pp. 260-263.

Ānandavardhana discussed the need for poets who base their plots on existing stories to alter these stories to meet the requirements of the **rasa** they wish to evoke, inventing new episodes where necessary.[39] Along with other examples of such alteration, he mentioned the works of Kālidāsa; while he did not refer to it specifically, one of the examples he presumably had in mind was the play Abhijñānaśākuntala, in which Kālidāsa explains King Duṣyanta's rejection of Śakuntalā (who carries his unborn child) by inventing the story of a curse which causes him to forget her. Kuntaka describes the invention of an episode which enhances the **rasa** of a work as another type of **prakaraṇa-vakratā**, and, as an example, discusses Kālidāsa's alteration of the epic story of Śakuntalā in composing his play.[40] Kuntaka feels that in the version of the story found in the Mahābhārata (Poona ed., 1.62-69) Duṣyanta's rejection of Śakuntalā is not sufficiently accounted for, and appears as nothing more than an act of senseless cruelty. Had Kālidāsa simply retold the story as it was known to him, the ability of the play to convey the **rasa** of love in separation (**vipralambha-śṛṅgāra**) would be impaired. By inventing the story of the curse, Kālidāsa explains Duṣyanta's failure to acknowledge Śakuntalā without making him into an unsympathetic character and is able, by portraying the

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[39]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 335-336; cf. also above, Chapter Six, pp. 267-268.

[40]Vakroktijīvita, op. cit., pp. 249-251.

great remorse and pangs of separation suffered by Duṣyanta when the curse is ended and he realizes what he has done to Śakuntalā, to greatly intensify the intended **rasa** of his play.

Prakaraṇa-vakratā, as Kuntaka explains it, comprises a variety of techniques employed by poets in the construction and arrangement of episodes in their works; some depend for their effectiveness on their ability to intensify the **rasa** of a work, others do not. Examples of the former include the invention or alteration of episodes so as to eliminate elements in one's source-narrative which detract from the intended **rasa** of one's work and the construction of a single episode in which the primary **rasa** of one's work achieves an intensity not equalled elsewhere. The first is exemplified by the curse-episode in Kālidāsa's Abhijñānaśākuntala; as illustrations of the second Kuntaka gives the following two examples.

In the fourth act of Kālidāsa's play Vikramorvaśīya, the king Purūravas, mistakenly believing that his lover, the divine Urvaśī, has deserted him in a fit of jealousy, is driven to the point of insanity by the pain of separation. The extended depiction of the king's madness conveys, with the greatest possible intensity, the **vipralambha-śṛṅgāra** which is the primary **rasa** of the work. In the eighteenth chapter of Bhāravi's Kirātārjunīya the Pāṇḍava hero Arjuna, who has gone to the Himalayas to practice austerities in the hope of acquiring divine weapons, engages in battle, alone and

unarmed, with Śiva himself and, seizing hold of the god, lifts and suspends him in midair. This spectacular feat brings to a peak the **vīra-** ("heroic") **rasa** which the work is intended to convey. In both of these cases the primary **rasa**, which has been introduced and developed elsewhere in the work, is brought to a unique pitch of intensity in a single episode; this episode thus serves as the emotional climax of the work in question.[41]

However, Kuntaka describes other varieties of **prakaraṇa-vakratā** in which **rasa** plays no role at all. It is difficult to give a general characterization of these non-**rasa**-based modes of **prakaraṇa-vakratā**; some seem to be valued for their capacity to produce coherence and unity in the plot of a work, others for their anomalous and intrinsically striking quality.

One of the types of **prakaraṇa-vakratā** Kuntaka discusses is the construction of separate episodes of a work such that they are mutually connected and one assists another.[42] For example, in the first act of Bhavabhūti's Uttararāmacarita, Rāma and his pregnant queen Sītā divert themselves by viewing paintings depicting scenes from their own lives. Sītā questions Rāma about one painting and is told that it depicts him, in his youth, acquiring the use of the divine Jṛmbhaka weapon; Rāma promises that her own children will likewise acquire the use of this weapon. Subsequently Rāma, hearing

[41]Ibid., pp. 266-8.

[42]Ibid., pp. 252-255.

that his subjects suspect that Sītā was unfaithful to him while held captive by Rāvaṇa and fearing the appearance of impropriety, reluctantly forces her into exile. She is taken in by the sage Valmīki and bears twin sons, Kuśa and Lava. Years later, Rāma undertakes the performance of the horse-sacrifice. In Act Five of the play, Lava, now a young man, encounters and does battle, single-handed, with the army guarding Rāma's sacrificial horse; in the course of the battle he disables the opposing army by means of the Jṛmbhaka weapon, an act which ultimately facilitates his recognition as Rāma's son. Bhavabhūti has used the picture-viewing episode in Act One to foreshadow and to prepare the audience for this later incident. The creation of connections between disparate episodes in this way is one kind of **prakaraṇa-vakratā**.

Another plot-related mode of **prakaraṇa-vakratā** is the construction of episodes required by genre-convention in such a way that they further the story of the work as a whole.[43] Works of particular genres are conventionally expected to contain certain standard episodes; a **mahākāvya**, for example, is expected to contain descriptions of, among other things, cities, battles, royal assemblies, sunset, moonrise, and so on.[44] Such descriptions, Kuntaka contends, ought not to be

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[43]Ibid., pp. 262ff.

[44]Lists of such episodes (varying somewhat from one another) are given by several of the early Ālamkārikas-- cf. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālamkāra 1.19ff; Daṇḍin, Kāvyādarśa 1.16ff; Rudraṭa, Kāvyālaṃkāra, 16.7ff.

treated as self-contained units, but should connect with and advance the overall plot.

For example, in the sixteeenth chapter of his Raghuvaṃśa Kālidāsa describes the play of the King Kuśa and his wives in a lake, during the hot season. The water-play of lovers is one the conventional subjects generally decribed in a **mahākāvya**; Kālidāsa, however, does not treat this description as an end in itself. While playing in the lake, Kuśa loses an armlet given him by his father Rāma. The fishermen he sends to search for the lost armlet cannot recover it, and tell the king that it must have been taken by the Nāgas[45] who live in the lake. Kuśa angrily prepares to attack the Nāgas, and the Nāga king Kumuda appears to conciliate him. His sister Kumudvatī, he says, saw the armlet falling through the water and took it. In order to placate Kuśa he returns the armlet and offers him Kumudvatī in marriage. Kuśa accepts her as his wife, and she becomes the mother of his son and heir, Atithi, whose deeds are the subject of the next chapter of Kālidāsa's poem. Kālidāsa, rather than treating the conventionally expected description of water-play as an end in itself, has used it to make a smooth transition from one phase of his story to the next.[46] This type of **prakaraṇa-vakratā**, like the previous one, is a device which serves to knit together

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[45]Divine, serpent-like beings frequently associated with bodies of water.

[46]Ibid., pp. 263-266.

the various episodes of a work and produce a coherent plot.

There are other types of **prakaraṇa-vakratā** which are motivated by the requirements of neither **rasa** nor plot-coherence. One such type is the creation of a play within a play, as in Act Three of Rājaśekhara's Bālarāmāyaṇa and Act Seven of Bhavabhūti's Uttararāmacarita.[47] The construction of a play within a play adds a new level of depth and complexity to a scene-- it is delightful for an audience to see the characters of a play themselves become an audience for yet another play. The value of such episodes, as Kuntaka explains them, does not depend on their relation to or development of the overall plot of the plays in which they are included-- they are interesting and pleasing to spectators in and of themselves.

Kuntaka's **prakaraṇa-vakratā** thus comprises a variety of compositional techniques used for a variety of ends. Like Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka pays attention, in a way earlier Ālaṃkārikas had not, to the connections and functional relationships between the components of literary works. However, unlike Ānandavardhana, he does not see these components as necessarily directed toward the communication of **rasa** or any other single, ultimate goal of the work in question. An episode may be crafted so as to heighten the **rasa** of a work, and be valued for this reason, but this is not the only basis on which the aesthetic value of an episode may

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[47]Ibid., pp. 270-272.

be judged; an episode may be functionally related to the work of which it forms a part in other ways (e.g. by contributing to the coherence or fluid development of the plot), or may be beautiful and hence valuable in and of itself.

The techniques Kuntaka discusses under the heading of **prabandha-vakratā** ("obliqueness of whole compositions") are similarly disparate in function. As with **prakaraṇa-vakratā**, several of the varieties of **prabandha-vakratā** are **rasa**-based. One such is the substitution of another primary **rasa** for the primary **rasa** of one's narrative source.[48] For example: Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa's Veṇīsaṃhāra retells the central story of the Mahābhārata. The primary **rasa** of the Mahābhārata is **śānta** ("quiescence");[49] by depicting the overwhelming devastation of the war, the distress of the Pāṇḍavas even in the face of victory, and the decline and death of the Pāṇḍavas and of Kṛṣṇa and his kinsmen, the Mahābhārata produces a distaste for all worldly accomplishments and a desire for liberation from **saṃsāra**. However, rather than retain this **śānta rasa** in his own work, Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa has made **vīra** ("heroism") his primary **rasa**; his play emphasizes the valour of the Pāṇḍavas in conquering their foes and culminates with their triumphant

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[48]Ibid., pp. 275-6.

[49]Kuntaka follows Ānandavardhana in his interpretation of the Sanskrit epics; the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa are each designed to convey a single primary **rasa**, **śānta** in the former case and **karuṇa** ("pathos") in the latter. Cf. Vakroktijīvita, p. 276; Dhvanyāloka, Kashi ed., pp. 529-33; and above, Chapter Four, p. 132.

success. Works in which the hero is ultimately successful, Kuntaka argues, will generally be more pleasing, as well as edifying, to their audiences. Seeing the Pāṇḍavas persevere in the face of adversity and ultimately succeed in their aims will inspire spectators to do likewise. Thus Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa's choice of **vīra** rather than **śānta** as the main **rasa** in his work has a salutary effect, and constitutes a kind of **prabandha-vakratā**.

Another **rasa**-based mode of **prabandha-vakratā**, closely related to the first, is the telling of only a portion of a known story, in order to avoid elements elsewhere in the story which would contradict the **rasa** one wishes to convey.[50] Bhāravi's Kirātārjunīya, for example, retells only a small part of the story of the Mahābhārata. It begins with the Pāṇḍavas, during their forest exile, considering means by which they can defeat the Kauravas and win back their kingdom. Arjuna resolves to go alone to the Himalayas to practice austerities in order to acquire the divine weapons they will need to conquer the Kauravas. He there encounters the god Śiva, disguised as a tribal hunter (**kirāta**), who provokes a fight with him. Arjuna, alone and unarmed, does battle with the god; Śiva reveals himself and, pleased with Arjuna's ability, grants him the weapons he seeks. Rather than continue the story up to the point where the Pāṇḍavas achieve their ultimate goal, the defeat of the Kauravas, Bhāravi

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[50] Vakroktijīvita, pp. 276-8.

concludes his work at this point.

In the <u>Mahābhārata</u>, during the subsequent war between the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas, Arjuna in many cases resorts to underhanded means to defeat his opponents: e.g. in killing his great uncle Bhīṣma he shields himself from attack by placing himself behind Śikhaṇḍin (whom Bhīṣma has sworn never to attack); he surreptitiously severs the arm of Bhūriśravas while he is engaged in single combat with another warrior; he beheads his greatest rival Karṇa as he struggles to remove his chariot wheel from the mud in which it has become stuck. Had Bhāravi continued his story up to the point of the Pāṇḍavas' victory, he would have had to deal with these morally problematic actions on the part of his hero, and the **vīra-rasa** he wished to convey in his work would have been impaired as a result. By ending his story where he does, Bhāravi is able to foreshadow the final victory of the Pāṇḍavas-- if Arjuna can, alone and unarmed, successfully do battle with Śiva himself, he will surely be able, armed with his newly won weapons, to defeat the Kauravas-- without having to describe those later actions of Arjuna which would be detrimental to the **rasa** of his work.

Kuntaka discusses other varieties of **prabandha-vakratā** which are not designed to foster the unbroken development of **rasa**, and may even require a break in this development. One such type is the introduction into one's work of a second plot which is seemingly unrelated to the first but which ultimately

assists in its development.[51] The action of a narrative ought, ordinarily, to progress toward a single goal; the introduction of a second, irrelevant, goal will produce a break in the development of the main plot (and any **rasa** conveyed by it) but, if it ultimately feeds back into the main plot, will add a desirable element of **vakrokti** to a work. In the first chapter of Māgha's poem Śiśupālavadha ("The Killing of Śiśupāla"), the divine sage Nārada comes to see Kṛṣṇa and asks him, on behalf of all the gods, to destroy his own cousin Śiśupāla, who, we are told, is the latest incarnation of the **asura** Hiraṇyakaśipu (earlier reborn as Rāvaṇa), and Kṛṣṇa promises that he will do so. When Nārada has gone, however, Kṛṣṇa does not set out to attack Śiśupāla in fulfillment of his promise, but chooses rather to attend the **rājasūya** sacrifice of his ally Yudhiṣṭhira; this would appear to a diversion from his ultimate goal but, in fact, during the sacrifice Śiśupāla (also in attendance) challenges Kṛṣṇa's right to the honors Yudhiṣṭhira confers on him and a fight ensues between the two, in which Śiśupāla is killed. What appeared to be a digression was in fact the means of bringing the plot to fruition, and this apparent digression creates an interesting and appealing convolution in the development of the narrative.

Another variety of **prabandha-vakratā**, one bearing neither on **rasa** nor on plot development, is the selection of an artful

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[51]Ibid., pp. 278-79.

and interesting name for a composition.[52] Names which simply and straightforwardly describe the main action of the works they designate-- e.g. Hayagrīvavadha ("The Killing of Hayagrīva"), Pāṇḍavābhyudaya ("The Triumph of the Pāṇḍavas", Rāmacarita ("The Acts of Rāma")-- add nothing at all to the appeal of these works. Titles which hint at the content of their works, rather than simply state them outright, give a certain additional beauty to these works-- e.g. Abhijñānaśākuntala ("Of Recognition and Śakuntalā") or Mudrārākṣasa ("Rākṣasa and the Signet Ring").

Kuntaka's examination of the poetically effective construction of episodes and compositions and the literary-critical observations which emerge from it, while clearly modelled on Ānandavardhana's efforts in the same area, are somewhat less restricted in scope. For Ānandavardhana, the only principle which can guide poets in molding their works into aesthetically coherent wholes, and hence the only basis on which these works can be meaningfully evaluated, is the direction of all the elements of a work toward the communication of a single primary **rasa**. For Kuntaka, the effective communication of a primary **rasa** is one goal toward which the construction and arrangement of episodes and whole compositions may be usefully directed, but not the only such goal. He examines many of the compositional techniques used by poets to enhance the capacity of their works to convey

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[52]Ibid., p. 281.

rasa, but also examines many other techniques directed toward other ends. **Rasa** certainly plays a major role in the creation of great literature, but it is not the only end towards which poets may meaningfully direct their efforts.

The Retreat from Theory

This unwillingness to restrictively prescribe a fixed goal for poets in the construction of their works is characteristic of Kuntaka's general approach to literary analysis; throughout his work Kuntaka repeatedly emphasizes both the open-endedness of his classification of **vakrokti** and the multiplicity of aesthetic purposes which the various types of **vakrokti** he discusses may serve.

One of the most interesting and unusual aspects of Kuntaka's work is that it makes no attempt to provide an exhaustive typology of the literary features it deals with. In his introductory discussion of **vakrokti** he remarks as follows:

> These several major types of obliqueness [**vakratā**] are shown by way of example; thousands of others are possible. Thus, people of taste [**sahṛdayas**] should imagine these for themselves, in the tradition of great poets.[53]

It is not possible, he argues, to restrict **vakrokti** to any fixed number of types; **vakrokti** arises through the imaginative capacity (**pratibhā**) of the poet, and, "because imaginative capacity is endless, no limit is possible [for the types of

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[53]Ibid., p. 35.

vakrokti]."[54] He frequently makes the same point in his examination of the various subdivisions of **vakrokti**. At the end of his discussion of **pada-uttarārdha-vakratā** ("obliqueness of suffixes") he tells his readers that they should imagine other varieties of such **vakratā** for themselves and characterize them by means of definitions similar to those he has given.[55] Having concluded his survey of various modes of **pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā** ("obliqueness of stems"), he says "This is only a general outline [**diñ-mātra**] of this [**pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā**]; the rest is to be seen in practice."[56] In discussing both **rūdhi-vakratā** ("obliqueness of conventional terms") and **upacāra-vakratā** ("obliqueness of metaphor"), Kuntaka notes that many varieties of such **vakratā** are possible beyond those he specifically discusses, and he invites readers to imagine other varieties for themselves (**svayam utprekṣaṇīyam**).[57]

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[54]Ibid., p. 36.

[55]Ibid., p. 121-122.

[56]Ibid., p. 113.

[57]Ibid., pp. 85, 94-5. It is important to distinguish this invitation for readers to imagine new types of the phenomenon under discussion from the far more common practice of inviting readers to supply their own examples for a given list of types. When Ālaṃkārikas are discussing a figure or other literary feature which they analyze into a great many sub-varieties, they frequently, rather than provide examples-verses to illustrate each type, simply state that "one should supply examples for oneself" (**svayam udāharaṇīyam**). What Kuntaka asks of his readers is quite different; readers are not simply to find examples for types already listed but to move beyond the author's list of types altogether, thus making the category under discussion an open-ended one.

Kuntaka, by leaving his categories open-ended and allowing for the existence of types and sub-types of **vakrokti** beyond those he himself discusses, abandons any pretense of giving a complete and systematic account of **vakrokti**-- indeed, he indicates that such an account would be impossible. **Vakrokti** is the product of the poet's imaginitive capacity, which operates without limits; it cannot be restricted to a fixed list of possible types, however extensive. **Vakrokti** manifests itself at all levels of language, from the phoneme to the whole composition; one can find and examine a great many of its manifestations at any of these levels, but one can never hope to produce a complete description and typology of all its possible forms. The most one can do (and what Kuntaka tries to do) is to provide a general survey of the more common and notable forms of **vakrokti** to be found in existing literary works.

Kuntaka is not only reluctant to restrict the manifestations of poetic expression to a specific (and therefore limited) list of types; he also refuses to restrict the uses to which such expression may be put by insisting that the elements of a literary work serve a single goal. For Ānandavardhana, as we have seen, all the elements of a literary work ought ideally to be (and in the best works typically are) ultimately directed toward a single goal: the communication of a single, primary **rasa**. Ānandavardhana's earliest critics, Mukulabhaṭṭa and Pratīhārendurāja, while

they differ with him in other respects, seem to accept this ideal of **rasa**-directedness without reservation. As we shall see, later participants in the **dhvani** controversy (Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Abhinavagupta, Mahimabhaṭṭa) are even more determined in their insistence that all literature have **rasa** as its ultimate goal. Kuntaka, however, is not willing to insist on **rasa** as the primary goal of poetry. For him, the effective communication **rasa** is an important goal toward which the construction and arrangement of the various elements of poetic language may be directed, but it is always presented as one possible goal among others.

We have already seen that Kuntaka's treatment of **prakaraṇa**- and **prabandha-vakratā** deals with a variety of compositional techniques, of which some serve to enhance **rasa** and some serve other, non-**rasa**-related, ends. Elsewhere in his work Kuntaka frequently refers to **rasa** as one among several ends toward which the various elements of poetic language may be directed. The meanings to be employed in poetry, he says, should be "only those by which some natural greatness (**svabhāva-mahattā**) or subservience to the nourishing of **rasa** is manifested."[58] In discussing **vastu-vakratā** ("obliqueness of subject") Kuntaka states that the subjects of description chosen by poets are of two kinds, those in which the nature (**svabhāva**) of the thing described is predominant

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[58]Ibid., p. 17.

and those in which **rasa** is predominant.[59] **Alaṃkāras** should be avoided in verses where the subject of description is such that either its natural beauty (**svabhāva-saukumārya**) or the development of **rasa** would be impaired by excessive ornamentation.[60] In Kuntaka's work, **rasa** and "natural beauty" are not always paired in this way, but when the two are paired they are invariably presented as equally valid alternatives: there is never any indication that one is to be preferred to or given priority over the other.

To this pair of goals to be pursued in composing poetry, ornamentation (**alaṃkāra**) is often added as a third alternative. Kuntaka sums up his survey of **viśeṣaṇa-vakratā** ("obliqueness of adjective") with the general recommendation that poets employ adjectives "which by their own power endow **rasa**, **svabhāva**, and **alaṃkāra** with extraordinary splendour."[61] While discussing poetic skill (**kavi-kauśala**) he observes that "the cause of [a poem's] capacity to delight connoisseurs is its great excellence of development [**paripoṣa**] in the description of the natural beauty of things, or in the revealing of some **rasa**, such as **śṛṅgāra**, or in the creation of strikingness [**vicchitti**] by the arrangement of various ornaments,"[62] and that poetic skill introduces into these

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[59]Ibid., p. 143.

[60]Ibid., p. 126.

[61]Ibid., p. 98.

[62]Ibid., p. 134.

three elements-- **rasa**, **svabhāva**, and **alaṃkāra**-- an element of novelty which makes them pleasing to people of taste.[63] In his examination of the figure **atiśayokti** ("hyperbole")[64] he states that through the action of this figure **rasa**, **svabhāva**, and **alaṃkāra** develop a high degree of **vakratā**.[65] As with **rasa** and **svabhāva** alone, these three are always stated as alternatives without priority given to any one over the others.

Thus **rasa** is for Kuntaka neither the necessary nor even the preferred goal toward which the selection and arrangement of the elements of a poem should be directed. Certainly poets can and often do make the conveying of **rasa** the primary goal of their works and allow this goal to guide their selection of figures, subjects of description and so on; but **rasa** always remains, for Kuntaka, only one of several possible goals which may guide this selection. It is in this refusal to insist on the central role in effective poetry of either suggested meaning generally or **rasa** in particular that Kuntaka's approach to poetic analysis most clearly differs from that of Ānandavardhana.

Along with this rejection of Ānandavardhana's teleological, **rasa**-centered aesthetics, Kuntaka's work shows

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[63]Ibid., pp. 134, 137.

[64]Which, as we saw earlier, Bhāmaha regards as the basic principle underlying all poetic ornamentation; cf. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṃkāra 2.85 and above, Chapter Six, pp. 276-277.

[65]Ibid., p. 193.

a general lack of concern with the relations of sub- and superordination between poetic elements which absorbed so much of Ānandavardhana's attention. Although many of the techniques for conveying unstated meanings dealt with by Ānandavardhana are discussed as varieties of **vakrokti**, what was for Ānandavardhana the most crucial distinction to be borne in mind when dealing with such meanings-- that between unstated meanings which are predominant with respect to the directly expressed meanings which suggest them, and those which are subordinate-- is completely ignored; in Kuntaka's analysis of such meanings there is no analogue to Ānandavardhana's division between **dhvani-** and **guṇībhūtavyañgya-kāvya**.

Kuntaka's mode of literary analysis operates very much at an empirical level; he declines to attempt a complete and systematic theoretical account of either the means or the ends of literary expression. He discusses, under the general rubric of **vakrokti** a wide and disparate variety of techniques, operating at all levels of language, which poets use to make their works beautiful and pleasing, but he repeatedly points out that those he mentions are only examples and that there are many more such techniques apart from those he specifically examines. He examines several of the goals poets can and do aim to accomplish by the use of figures and other elements of poetic language, but is unwilling to restrict poets to any single paramount goal and provides no principles which could

serve to guide poets in their choice among these possible goals. If Kuntaka's analysis of **vakrokti** can be described as a "theory" of poetics at all, it is one so flexible and so open ended as to be virtually devoid of substantive content; it is less a general theory of poetic beauty than a loose framework within which a wide array of particular, often largely unrelated, poetic devices may be discussed.

It would seem, then, that De (cf. above, pp. 396-397) is basically right to see in Kuntaka's work an attempt to revive the formalist aesthetic of the earlier Ālaṃkārikas which had been supplanted by Ānandavardhana's poetic teleology. His work, like theirs, offers a catalogue of discrete, isolable elements which enhance the beauty of literary compositions in which they are included, rather than a general and comprehensive theory of literary aesthetics of the kind offered by Ānandavardhana.

Conclusion

Kuntaka is the only major figure among the post-Ānandavardhana Ālaṃkārikas of Kashmir to significantly depart from the **rasa**-centered, teleological model of literary aesthetics developed in the Dhvanyāloka. He refuses to accept the limitations Ānandavardhana's unified aesthetic theory would impose on the creative liberty of poets; but rather than attempt to replace this theory with another, superior one, he simply provides a (non-exhaustive) survey of various devices and techniques, operating at all levels of language, which

poets may incorporate into their compositions with any of a number of aesthetic purposes in mind. Thus he sidesteps, rather than explicitly attacks, the teleological approach to literary interpretation.

Similarly, he sidesteps what has by this time become the most pressing and divisive question in the Kashmiri Alaṃkāra tradition-- is it necessary, in order to explain the semantics of poetic language, to postulate a new, specifically poetic mode of signification (Ānandavardhana's suggestion), or can the facts of poetic expression be satisfactorily accounted for via the same semantic processes found in everyday, non-poetic, language? Kuntaka takes no stand on this question one way or the other. As already noted (above, pp. 395-396), later Ālaṃkārikas and modern scholars alike have attempted to discern Kuntaka's views on this question, and have been unable to reach any consensus regarding them-- he simply has nothing to say in this matter.

Thus Kuntaka is an exceptional figure in several crucial respects. Despite their vehement disagreements with one another there develops among the Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas of this period a general framework of agreement regarding the basic function of poetry (to convey **rasa**) and also regarding the proper role of Alaṃkāraśāstra (to provide a rigorous, philosophically defensible account of the processes by which poetic meaning, including **rasa**, is communicated). Kuntaka alone stands entirely outside this framework. He departs from

the conventional understanding of the purpose of poetry and the purpose of Ālaṃkāraśāstra as well.

Consequently his work, whatever its intrinsic merits, is largely irrelevant to what have by his time become the primary concerns of the Ālaṃkārikas of Kashmir and is therefore largely ignored by later figures in the field. It is this that accounts for Abhinavagupta's failure to deal substantively with Kuntaka's views in his commentaries on the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, as well as the general neglect of the *Vakroktijīvita* in later Alaṃkāra literature.

CHAPTER NINE
ABHINAVAGUPTA

The challenge posed to existing theories of language by Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka generated great controversy among the Ālaṃkārikas of Kashmir, and his theory of suggestion became the major point of contention among his successors; nearly all later Ālaṃkārikas clearly position themselves as either adherents or opponents of this theory. The earliest extant work which defends Ānandavardhana's view of suggested meaning is the Locana, Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Dhvanyāloka.[1]

Abhinavagupta, apart from his contributions to literary and dramatic theory, wrote many works on Kashmir Śaiva philosophy and tantra and several Śaivite stotras;[2] as he

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[1]It is not the earliest such work; in the Locana Abhinavagupta refers frequently (and usually disparagingly) to the Candrikā, an earlier commentary on Ānandavardhana's work (for a collection of these references, cf. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971 [fourth ed.], p. 207). The work is also referred to by Mahimabhatta (Vyaktiviveka 1.5) and Ruyyaka (in his commentary thereon).

[2]The most comprehensive study of Abhinavagupta's life and works is K.C Pandey's massive Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1963 [second ed.]). This work remains the best available source for general information on Abhinavagupta, but, as Ingalls has noticed (cf. The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana, p. 33), the chronology of his works given by Pandey is seriously flawed. Misled by a false reading in the 1891 Nirnaya Sagar Press edition of the Dhvanyāloka (p. 19), Pandey supposes that Abhinavagupta refers in the Locana to his own Tantrāloka (the reference is actually to Ānandavardhana's Tattvāloka-- cf. Dhvanyāloka, Kashi ed., p. 67), and therefore believes that the Tantrāloka and those of his own works which Abhinavagupta refers to therein must predate the composition of the Locana. In the absence of this supposed reference, the chronology of Abhinavagupta's works remains uncertain.

himself gives the dates of composition for several of these works, the period of his literary activity can easily be fixed. His Kramastotra is dated A.D. 990-91, his Bhairavastotra A.D. 992-93, and his Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛtivimarśinī A.D. 1014-15;[3] while the dates of the Locana and the Abhinavabhāratī (his commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra) cannot be fixed exactly, they must certainly have been composed in the latter decades of the tenth century or the earlier decades of the eleventh.

Abhinavagupta's determined efforts to refute those objections raised against the theory of **dhvani** and his elaborate analysis of the nature of **rasa** (cf. below, pp. 455ff) proved to be very influential among later followers of Ānandavardhana (Mammaṭa in particular). He has generally been accorded the highest possible praise by modern scholars of Alaṃkāraśāstra. Kane describes his commentaries on the Dhvanyāloka and the Nāṭyaśāstra as "monuments of learning, critical insight, literary grace and style".[4] De calls them "remarkable" and observes that "his erudition, reputation and influence as a great scholar and philosophical writer of his generation, no doubt, added weight to his championship of [Ānandavardhana's] theory, and contributed a great deal to its

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[3]Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., p. 242; De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 112.

[4]Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., pp. 238-9.

ultimate exclusive acceptance in later Poetics."[5] Krishnamoorthy describes him as "much more than a mere commentator explaining the difficulties of text; he is an original thinker, representing the whole theory in fuller and more comprehensive form."[6]

This last comment is particularly interesting, as it seems to indicate that Abhinavagupta may be regarded as a better exponent of Ānandavardhana's theory than Ānandavardhana himself. There is at least an element of truth in this implication; he is certainly more self-assured than Ānandavardhana in his defense of **dhvani**, and, as we shall see, is willing to carry the implications of Ānandavardhana's teleological, **rasa**-centered model of literary aesthetics to their logical conclusion where Ānandavardhana himself hesitated to do so.

Ānandavardhana, as we have already seen, is sometimes rather tentative in his confrontation with rival language theorists. He takes great pains to demonstrate that **dhvani** cannot be subsumed under the recognized semantic function of figurative signification (**guṇavṛtti** or **lakṣaṇā**) or explained as a kind of inference. But, in both cases, he seems unwilling to rely fully on the effectiveness of his own arguments and claims that, for his purposes, it doesn't really

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[5]De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 110 and Vol. II, p. 176.

[6]Krishnamoorthy, The **Dhvanyāloka** and its Critics (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1968), p. 217.

matter whether or not **dhvani** is reducible to figurative signification or inference (cf. above, Chapter Five, pp. 230-232, 242, 247-248). He tries to show why adherents of each of the major language theories advanced by the philosophers ought to accept the existence of suggestion as a distinct semantic function, but carefully avoids taking a definite stand on any of the issues which divide these philosophers among themselves; he offers no general language theory of his own, but hopes to show that his analysis of poetic meaning can co-exist comfortably with any of the major existing theories. He does all that he can to highlight the vital role of **rasa** in poetry and to show that the most effective literary works are those which have as their overriding goal the conveying of a single primary **rasa**, but nevertheless is ultimately unwilling to insist on **rasa**-centrality in poetry or to condemn all non-**rasa**-directed poetry as sub-standard. Perhaps the most striking difference of Abhinavagupta's approach from that of Ānandavardhana is the total absence of this cautious, concessive, and circumspect attitude.

Abhinavagupta's Divergence from Ānandavardhana

Unlike Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta does not leave his reader in the dark as to his views on the major linguistic controversies of his day. In his exhaustive comments on Ānandavardhana's arguments for the existence of suggested meaning (1.4)[7] and for the distinction of **dhvani** from

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[7]Dhvanyāloka, Kashi ed., pp. 48-84.

figurative expression (1.14-19),[8] he sets forth a definite and specific account of the process of verbal cognition.

For Abhinavagupta this process may be divided into four phases (**kakṣyās**), corresponding to the four semantic functions he recognizes. The first phase is that of denotation (**abhidhā**), which he explains as follows:

> The function of denotation operates with respect to word meanings, which consist of universals [**sāmānya**]. For denotation is the power of conveying meanings in dependence on convention [**samaya**], and convention exists only with respect to this [universal], not with respect to the particular [**viśeṣa**], because particulars are infinite and because a word would deviate from any one particular.[9]

On hearing a sentence we at first understand, by **abhidhā**, only the separate meanings of the individual words; the understanding of a single coherent sentence meaning arises only subsequently. These individual word meanings are

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[8]Ibid., pp. 141-164.

[9]Ibid., p. 56. Here (and elsewhere) Abhinavagupta's theory of linguistic cognition combines elements of both Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya models. Like the Naiyāyikas, he believes the association of words with their denoted meanings to be conventional (rather than natural, as the Mīmāṃsakas assert). However, he follows the Mīmāṃsakas in insisting that words can denote only universals (whereas the Naiyāyikas believe that a word denotes a particular as qualified by a universal). His arguments against accepting particulars as word meanings are the standard ones offered by the Mīmāṃsakas: we could never learn to associate the word "cow" with all particular cows (since their number is limitless); on the other hand, if we learnt to associate it only with one or more particular cows known to us, we would not understand (as we do) when it was used to refer to other, unfamiliar, cows. The facts of usage can be accounted for only if we assume the meaning of the word "cow" to be that which all cows (and only cows) have in common, namely the universal property "cow-ness"-- cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 71ff.

invariably abstract, repeatable universals rather than particulars.

The semantic function operative in the second phase of verbal cognition which allows separate words to convey a unified sentence meaning Abhinavagupta calls **tātparya-śakti** ("the power [to convey] overall purport").[10] This unified sentence meaning, unlike the individual word meanings which give rise to it, is particular rather than universal:

> After this [denotation], **tātparya-śakti** operates with respect to the sentence meaning, in which [the individual word meanings] are construed with one another and which has the form of a particular, in accordance with the principle that "universals, because they could not otherwise be established, cause one to understand the particular."[11]

Individual words can denote only universals, but language is, at least typically, used to refer to and describe particulars. If one is told to "Bring the cow," one cannot bring the universal "cow-ness", but only some particular cow; the need to combine the separate word meanings into a single intelligible sentence meaning forces us to understand that a

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[10]The first to argue for the existence of **tātparya-śakti** seems to have been Jayantabhaṭṭa (cf. Nyāyamañjarī [Varanasi: Śivakumāraśāstri-Granthamālā 5, 1983], Vol. II, pp. 156, 158-161). Jayantabhaṭṭa's **tātparya-śakti** serves essentially the same role as does **lakṣaṇā** in Kumārilabhaṭṭa's theory of sentence meaning (cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 115-117); through this innovation Jayantabhaṭṭa is able to justify the general intuition that **lakṣaṇā** is an anomalous mode of expression (rather than one common to all sentences), albeit at the expense of a certain degree of theoretical economy (he is forced to postulate three semantic functions, while Kumārila can get by with only two).

[11]Ibid., pp. 56-7. The quotation is from Kumārila's Ślokavārttika (Arthāpatti-pariccheda 70cd).

particular cow and a particular act of bringing are intended. The same principle applies to all sentences; the universals denoted by the individual words, by mutually qualifying and specifying one another, are able to refer to a particular action or situation. It this capacity of mutual specification that Abhinavagupta (and Jayantabhaṭṭa) call **tātparya-śakti**.

The third phase of linguistic cognition is that at which figurative signification (**lakṣaṇā**) takes place. It is only after the operation of **tātparya-śakti**, Abhinavagupta argues, that **lakṣaṇā** becomes a possibility. We resort to the device of figurative interpretation only when the attempt at literal interpretation fails; if the words of a sentence, taken literally, are unable to convey a coherent sentence meaning via **tātparya-śakti**, we try to find coherence by taking one or more of these words figuratively. For example:

> "The boy is a lion" [**siṃho māṇavakaḥ**]-- here, after the appearance of an obstruction to that construal introduced by **tātparya-śakti** which entered during the second phase, a third function, called **lakṣaṇā**, appears, distinct from **abhidhā** and **tātparya-śakti** and capable of removing this obstruction.[12]

Tātparya-śakti and the grammar of Sanskrit demand that we take the terms "boy" and "lion" as co-referential, yet we know that there can be no referent which meets both specifications. Because we know that no one thing can be both a boy and a lion, we must take one or the other of these two terms figuratively-- context will ultimately determine which. If

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[12]Ibid., pp. 58-9.

the expression is used to refer to a boy (as it is typically understood to do), we will understand from it not that the boy *is* a lion, but that he possesses certain lion-like qualities (bravery, ferocity, etc.).

It is only in the fourth phase of verbal cognition, after these three semantic functions have done their work, that suggestion (**vyañjanā** or **dhvanana**) comes into play.

> That power to reveal meanings which is rooted in the understanding of the meanings produced by these three functions and is assisted by the imaginative capacity of the interpreter (which has been prepared[13] by awareness of these meanings) is the suggestive function.[14]

This fourth semantic power, Abhinavagupta insists, cannot be reduced to or identified with the third, **lakṣaṇā**. Those who would include suggestion within **lakṣaṇā** (here Abhinavagupta surely has Mukulabhaṭṭa in mind) admit that there are three conditions which must hold if **lakṣaṇā** is to take place: there must be some obstacle precluding a literal interpretation of a word or phrase, there must be some connection between the literal and the intended figurative meaning of this word or phrase, and there must be some motive (**prayojana**) on the speaker's part for employing a figurative rather than a literal mode of expression.[15]

We need not depend on the expression itself to make us

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[13]**pavitrita**-- literally "purified".

[14]Ibid., pp. 62-3.

[15]Ibid., pp. 59ff. Also cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 111-112 and Chapter Seven, pp. 336ff.

aware of the first two conditions; when we hear the expression "A village on the Ganges" (**gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ**), we know from our own experience that a village cannot actually be built *on* a river, and also that every river has adjacent to it a bank (on which a village could be built). The third condition required for **lakṣaṇā**, the **prayojana** (e.g. the speaker's wish to indicate the purity of the village through its close association with the holy Ganges), cannot, Abhinavagupta argues, be known in a similarly extra-linguistic manner; the expression itself must somehow convey this intention to us. The **prayojana** which motivates a particular case of figurative expression cannot itself be conveyed by a further operation figurative expression: if this were so, the second figurative expression would require its own **prayojana**, demanding yet another operation of figurative expression and yet another **prayojana**-- an infinite regress would result, and the expression would thereby fail to convey its intended meaning. Our understanding of the **prayojana** of a figurative expression can be explained only if we allow for an additional semantic function capable of conveying it (one which does not depend on the same conditions)-- namely, suggestion. It cannot be tenably maintained that **dhvani** is a kind of **lakṣaṇā**, since **lakṣaṇā** itself cannot be adequately explained unless one allows for the existence of suggestion as a distinct semantic function.

Thus there are, for Abhinavagupta, four semantic

functions and, correspondingly, four successive phases of verbal cognition. By presenting the reader with this detailed account of the process by which language conveys meaning, Abhinavagupta not only goes far beyond the apparent intentions of the author he is commenting on-- Ānandavardhana, as we saw (above, Chapter Five, pp. 248ff), declines to offer a general language theory of his own, striving rather to show why the existence of suggestion should be accepted by adherents of all the major language theories then current, without himself taking a stand on the major issues which divide these theorists from one another-- but flatly contradicts what Ānandavardhana does have to say about the workings of language. Ānandavardhana knows and says nothing of the second of Abhinavagupta's four functions, **tātparya-śakti**: it is first mentioned, as far as we know, by Jayantabhaṭṭa, who post-dates him. Furthermore, Ānandavardhana explicitly states that there are *three* semantic modes: direct expression, figurative expression, and suggestion.[16] Abhinavagupta seems untroubled by the contradiction between Ānandavardhana's view and his own, and remains silent on this point.

This is far from the only area in which Abhinavagupta diverges from Ānandavardhana's own statements and apparent intentions in commenting on his work. Ānandavardhana's work, as we have seen, drew a great deal of criticism from defenders of existing poetic and linguistic theories; the task

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[16]Ibid., p. 429.

Abhinavagupta sets for himself in his commentary on the Dhvanyāloka is not only to explain the text as fully as possible but to defend it in the face of the many objections raised against it. In the course of this defense he sometimes seems to be trying to save Ānandavardhana from himself: resorting to strained and far-fetched interpretations to justify apparently confusing or contradictory statements or arguments made by Ānandavardhana, and downplaying or ignoring Ānandavardhana's arguments where they seem inadequate and substituting his own.

Sometimes it is merely a seemingly careless formulation on Ānandavardhana's part which Abhinavagupta feels a need to justify. For example, in Ānandavardhana's definition of **dhvani** there is an apparent grammatical error:

> That type of poetry in which either a meaning or a word, subordinating itself or its own meaning [respectively], suggest [sic.] that [non-expressed] meaning is called "**dhvani**" by wise people.[17]

The subject of the relative clause "either a meaning *or* a word" ought to require a verb in the singular, yet Ānandavardhana has used the dual form **vyañktaḥ** ("[these two] suggest"); the error was apparently criticized by Bhaṭṭanāyaka[18], and Mahimabhaṭṭa provides an extensive criticism of both Ānandavardhana's formulation and

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[17]Ibid., p. 103.

[18]Cf. Locana, op. cit., p. 104.

Abhinavagupta's attempted defense of it.[19]

Rather than simply admit that Ānandavardhana is guilty of a small error in phrasing, Abhinavagupta provides an explanation which he sees as justifying the apparently aberrant usage. Word and (expressed) meaning, he argues, always co-operate in the communication of suggested meaning. In some types of **dhvani** suggestion will depend primarily on meaning while in others word will be the predominant suggestive factor; nevertheless word (in cases of the first type) and meaning (in cases of the second) will always play some role in the process of suggestion, albeit in a subordinate capacity. The primacy of either meaning or word in any particular case of **dhvani** justifies the disjunctive phrasing of the subject ("either a meaning or a word"), while the fact that both must always operate in any case justifies the use of a dual verb.[20] The interpretation is extremely strained; whether or not the contention that word and meaning always co-operate in suggestion is a valid one, there is no indication here or elsewhere in the Dhvanyāloka that Ānandavardhana holds this view.

A similar case may be found in Abhinavagupta's explanation of **kārikā** 1.2. Ānandavardhana, introducing the distinction between directly expressed and understood (i.e. suggested) meaning, makes the following statement:

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[19]Vyaktiviveka, Kashi Sanskrit Series 121, pp. 94-6.

[20]Ibid., p. 104.

> That meaning, honored by connoisseurs, which is established as the soul of poetry, is regarded as having two types [**bhedau**], called "expressed" [**vācya**] and "understood" [**pratīyamāna**].[21]

Ānandavardhana's description of meaning, in both its expressed and suggested varieties, as "the soul of poetry" is troubling, given his repeated statements elsewhere that **dhvani** alone is the soul of poetry.[22]

Again, rather than allow that Ānandavardhana has spoken somewhat carelessly, Abhinavagupta tries to justify the text as written through a rather convoluted interpretation of the **kārikā**:

> The term "poetry" is not applied merely by virtue of meaning, since it is not applied to everyday or Vedic utterances; therefore he says "honored by connoisseurs". This single meaning [i.e. that which is honored by connoisseurs] is analyzed by discerning people into two components. For, if the nature of meaning is the same [in everyday and Vedic language and in poetry], why should connoisseurs honor only one particular type? There must be some difference [in poetic meaning]. That difference is the understood portion which, since it is the basis of its differentiation, is established by discerning people as the soul [of poetry]. But some, their minds confused by its intertwining with directly expressed meaning, dispute the separate existence of this [understood meaning], just as materialists dispute the separate existence of the soul. Therefore, having begun by using the word "meaning" [**artha**] in the singular and having referred, by the adjective "honored by connoisseurs" [**sahṛdaya-ślāghya**] to the reason [for its differentiation from everyday and Vedic meaning], he

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[21]Ibid., pp. 42-43.

[22]It is not clear if this seeming misstatement, like the one just discussed, was criticized by other writers before Abhinavagupta's time. Mahimabhaṭṭa was later to attack Ānandavardhana's statement as both false and inconsistent with his own remarks elsewhere in the Dhvanyāloka (cf. Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., p. 94). Cf. also Ingalls, The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana, op. cit., p. 75.

> says, by way of analysis, that this [meaning] has two types, i.e. parts [aṃśau] -- not that these two are both "souls" of poetry.[23]

Considered as a unity, without a view toward dividing it into parts, meaning in general may be regarded (by the undiscriminating) as the soul of poetry. However, by describing this meaning as "honored by connoisseurs", Ānandavardhana subtly indicates that it is more specifically the suggested component of meaning that is to be so regarded; it is the role of suggested meaning in poetry which makes connoisseurs partial to it, and thus it is the suggested component which motivates the use of the term "soul". Thus, there is no real conflict with Ānandavardhana's statements elsewhere-- here too he is really saying, albeit less straitforwardly than he usually does, that suggested meaning *alone* is the soul of poetry. Here, as in the case discussed previously, Abhinavagupta, in his effort to defend Ānandavardhana's phrasing, ends up by reading a great deal more into Ānandavardhana's meaning than his own words would seem to warrant.

Such cases of commentarial excess, arising as they do from mere difficulties in the wording of Ānandavardhana's text, might be dismissed as of relatively minor importance.[24] There are, however, other, more significant points on which

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[23]Ibid., pp. 43-45.

[24]Although they do sometimes have significant doctrinal consequences-- e.g Abhinavagupta's view that word and meaning co-operate in all cases of suggestion.

Abhinavagupta deviates from Ānandavardhana's apparent intentions in explaining and defending his **dhvani** theory. Ānandavardhana, for example, states that there is no need to defend his theory against the potential objections of the grammarians: since the concept of **dhvani** (he claims) is itself drawn from the grammarians' own analysis of language, how could there possibly be any conflict between his theory and theirs?[25] Abhinavagupta realizes that this will not do; the grammarians, given their belief in the indivisible, metaphysical unity of sentences and sentence meanings, cannot accept the multiplicity of semantic functions called for by Ānandavardhana's theory. Therefore, the potential objections of the grammarians must be considered and refuted.

As Abhinavagupta sees it, all the arguments Ānandavardhana raises against the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas' objections to the theory of suggestion (cf. above, Chapter Five, pp. 207ff.) are equally applicable to those the grammarians might raise. While the Prābhākaras do not, like the grammarians, regard the sentence as an indivisible unity, they do argue that words, acting collectively, directly convey whole sentence meanings,[26] and that there is therefore no need to postulate multiple semantic operations to explain

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[25]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 443-4; cf. also pp. 132-3 and above, Chapter Five, p. 207.

[26]Rather than conveying a set of individual, unconnected word-meanings which are combined into a unified sentence meaning by a subsequent mental process, as the Bhāṭṭa's would argue-- cf. above, Chapter Three, p. 116.

linguistic cognition. In several instances Abhinavagupta points out that the objections of the grammarians against the existence of suggestion are essentially the same as those raised by the Prābhākaras, and can be undermined by the very same arguments.[27] Here Abhinavagupta's defense of suggestion conflicts directly with Ānandavardhana's own assertion that conflict between his own language theory and that of the grammarians cannot arise and need not be considered as a potential threat to the **dhvani** theory.

In his discussion of the differentiation of suggestion from **lakṣaṇā** (figurative expression), Abhinavagupta again departs in important ways from Ānandavardhana's own arguments in defense of his theory. As we have seen, Abhinavagupta, in presenting his own theory of linguistic cognition, relies primarily on the threat of infinite regress in fending off the objections of those who would identify suggestion with **lakṣaṇā**-- it is generally agreed that **lakṣaṇā** can take place only when the hearer recognizes some motive (**prayojana**) on the speaker's part for resorting to a non-literal mode of expression: if this **prayojana** were itself conveyed by a second operation of **lakṣaṇā**, then this second **lakṣaṇā** would require its own **prayojana**, requiring yet another **lakṣaṇā**, and on and on. Therefore, **lakṣaṇā** itself is explicable only if one accepts an additional semantic function (i.e. suggestion) capable of conveying the **prayojana** required for **lakṣaṇā**. This

[27] Locana, pp. 67, 415-16.

argument is nowhere made by Ānandavardhana, but Abhinavagupta relies on it almost exclusively in challenging those who would subsume suggestion within **lakṣaṇā** and, in the process, substantially undermines some of Ānandavardhana's own arguments for the differentiation of these two semantic functions.

Ānandavardhana argues that any attempt to identify **lakṣaṇā** with **dhvani** will be undermined by the twin flaws of over-extension (**ativyāpti**) and under-extension (**avyāpti**); that is to say, that there are cases of **lakṣaṇā** which cannot be regarded as examples of **dhvani** and cases of **dhvani** in which **lakṣaṇā** plays no role.[28] There are many common, everyday kinds of figurative expression which, even when employed in poetry, contribute no special beauty and cannot be regarded as examples of **dhvani**. For example:

> Wilted on both ends by contact with her swelling breasts and hips; fresh in between, not having made contact with the middle of her body; disarranged by the flailing movements of her creeper-like arms-- this bed of lotus petals tells [**vadati**] of the affliction of this emaciated woman.[29]

Here the word **vadati** ("tells") is used figuratively-- the bed does not actually speak, but reveals the desparate state of the woman who has lain there-- but this figurative usage is merely an everyday manner of speaking. Ānandavardhana argues that this and other such everyday figurative expressions

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[28]Cf. Dhvanyāloka, pp. 142-52.

[29]Ibid., p. 143-- cf. above, Chapter Five, p. 224.

cannot be regarded as instances of **dhvani**, and ultimately denies that there is any suggested content (even of the subordinate variety) in such expressions.[30]

As Abhinavagupta recognizes, the claim that no suggestion takes place, even in such poetically uninteresting cases of figurative expression, creates a problem. Ānandavardhana accepts the view that **lakṣaṇā** always requires some **prayojana**,[31] and argues that this **prayojana** can only be conveyed by suggestion.[32] If this is so then suggestion will exist wherever there is **lakṣaṇā**, even in such everyday, aesthetically insignificant cases as Ānandavardhana is here discussing. Abhinavagupta resolves the apparent contradiction by explaining that Ānandavardhana does not really mean that there is *no* suggestion at all in **lakṣaṇā** of this sort: "Because [in such cases of **lakṣaṇā**] the **prayojana** is not regarded as important, suggestion has nothing useful to do--this is [Ānandavardhana's] idea."[33] On this explanation, Ānandavardhana does not really deny that suggestion exists in such cases, but merely dismisses it as insignificant and

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[30]Ibid., pp. 142-5, 426.

[31]Except for purely conventionalized, "dead" metaphors, such as the use of the word **lāvanya** (literally "saltiness") in the sense of "beauty" or "charm" (cf. above, Chapter Five, p. 208)-- in such cases a particular figurative sense becomes so closely and invariably associated with a word that it becomes, for all practical purposes, the primary meaning of the word.

[32]Cf. Dhvanyāloka, pp. 148-50 and above, Chapter Five, pp. 226-230.

[33]Locana, p. 142.

unworthy of consideration.

Explaining the example discussed above, Abhinavagupta says:

> In the metaphorical expression "[The bed of lotus petals] tells", the **prayojana** is the understanding that [the bed] clearly reveals [the woman's condition]. If this were stated explicitly and without concealment, what loss of beauty would there be? Or, when it is communicated in a concealed manner [as it is here], what additional beauty is produced? It is with just this in mind that he [Ānandavardhana] will later say "A word, functioning suggestively, will fall within the scope of the term **dhvani** when it reveals some beauty which could not be conveyed by any other mode of expression" [1.15-- p. 146].[34]

The figurative usage of the word "tells" does suggest a **prayojana**, the clarity with which the bed evinces the lovelorn state of its former occupant, but this suggestion plays no aesthetically significant role-- one might equally well have stated explicitly that the bed clearly reveals this. As Ānandavardhana's own remark indicates, it is the unimportance of suggestion, not its total absence, which excludes such figurative usage from the realm of **dhvani**.

Ānandavardhana's argument for the under-extensiveness (**avyāpti**) of **lakṣaṇā** with respect to **dhvani** is similarly curtailed and adjusted by Abhinavagupta. Ānandavardhana asserts unambiguously that there can be no **lakṣaṇā** involved in any of those cases of **dhvani** classified as **vivakṣita-vācya** ("in which the directly expressed meaning is intended

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[34]Ibid., pp. 143-4.

literally");[35] in such cases of **dhvani**, as their name would imply, the directly expressed meaning of the word or phrase which gives rise to the suggested meaning is not set aside or displaced, as it would be in a case of **lakṣaṇā**. Abhinavagupta, however, is not prepared to accept this claim without significant qualification.

As his first example of **vivakṣita-vācya dhvani** Ānandavardhana gives the following verse:

> What was the name of the austerity he performed, and on what mountain, and for how long, that he, this little parrot, bites a bimba-fruit as red as your lip, young woman?[36]

Ānandavardhana does not himself explain his understanding of the verse, but the idea seems to be this-- here the great beauty and desirability of the lip of the woman addressed is suggested; if even the privilege of tasting a fruit which resembles this lip can be won only by the practice of unimaginably long and arduous austerity, the kissing of the lip itself must be considered a great privilege indeed. As it is not impossible to understand the speaker's question literally, the literal meaning of the verse is not displaced, but merely supplemented by this additional suggested sense, and the verse may thus be considered a case of **vivakṣita-vācya**

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[35]Dhvanyāloka, pp. 151-2.

[36]Dhvanyāloka, p. 138.
śikhariṇi kva nu nāma kiyac ciraṃ kimabhidhānam asāv akarot tapaḥ/
taruṇi yena tavādharapāṭalam daśati bimbaphalam śukaśāvakaḥ//
(Dharmakīrti-- Subhāṣitaratnakośa 439)

dhvani.

Commenting on this verse Abhinavagupta at first supports what appears to be Ānandavardhana's understanding of the verse, but then relinquishes this position and concedes that even here there is **lakṣaṇā**:

> Here there are only three semantic operations--denotation, **tātparya**, and suggestion-- since **lakṣaṇā**, the third,[37] cannot take place at an intermediate stage, due to the absence of [its necessary preconditions, i.e.] the blocking of the primary meaning, etc. Or, let us grant that there is **lakṣaṇā** based on similarity[38] at an intermediate stage-- since there is a blocking of the primary meaning, due to the implausibility of this particular question being asked without any reason. Nevertheless, the **prayojana** of this [**lakṣaṇā**] can only be suggested, and will enter in the fourth phase. In the previous case,[39] **lakṣaṇā** is the main factor assisting in the suggestive operation, but here denotation and **tātparya-śakti** [are the main factors]; because the understanding of the suggested meaning arises from the beauty of the sentence meaning [rather than specifically from the metaphorical identification of the speaker and the parrot], the function of **lakṣaṇā** assists only slightly. But in the case of that suggested meaning which is understood without apparent sequence [**asaṃlakṣyakrama**-- i.e. the **śṛṅgāra-rasa** suggested by the verse] there is not even a glimmer of **lakṣaṇā**, precisely because of the lack of apparent sequence, as we shall explain later.[40] So, in this second type [of **dhvani**, i.e. **vivakṣita-vācya**] as well, there are four semantic functions.[41]

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[37]That is, the third in sequence of the four semantic functions admitted by Abhinavagupta-- cf. above, pp. 434ff.

[38]I.e. the similarity of the speaker, who hopes to kiss the woman's lip, with the parrot eating the bimba-fruit.

[39]I.e. the example of **avivakṣita-vācya dhvani** which Ānandavardhana has just given and with which this verse is being contrasted; the example is the verse "**suvarṇapuṣpāṃ pṛthivīṃ**..." (cf. above, Chapter Seven, pp. 374-375).

[40]Cf. Locana, pp. 154ff.

[41]Locana, p. 140.

As we have seen (above, Chapter Seven, pp. 336ff), Mukulabhaṭṭa, as part of his effort to show that all the varieties of **dhvani** discussed by Ānandavardhana may be explained as cases of **lakṣaṇā**, construes as broadly as possible the "impossibility" of literal meaning required for **lakṣaṇā** to take place; no logical contradiction is required--if an expression, understood literally, would serve no useful communicative function, or would be incommensurable with the character or presumed intention of the speaker who uses it, this is enough to cause us to reject this literal meaning and look for a suitable figurative sense. Abhinavagupta, obviously sensitive to this expansive understanding of the kind of obstacles to literal meaning which may prompt figurative interpretation, grants that there is **lakṣaṇā** even in this verse: as the speaker's questioning his lover about the parrot, understood literally, would be pointless and absurd, one must assume that he means to communicate something further, namely, by implicitly identifying his own situation with that of the parrot, to compliment his beloved on the beauty of her lip and indicate his own desire. The presence of **lakṣaṇā** even here does not threaten the case for the separate existence of suggestion: **lakṣaṇā** requires a **prayojana**, and this **prayojana**, for the reasons already given, can only be suggested.

Thus, even in a case of **vivakṣita-vācya dhvani**, where Ānandavardhana clearly wishes to exclude it, Abhinavagupta

acknowleges the presence of **lakṣaṇā**. His argument is similar to that offered in his discussion of the role of suggestion in non-poetic figurative usage: when Ānandavardhana says that there is no **lakṣaṇā** involved in **vivakṣita-vācya dhvani**, he does not really mean that **lakṣaṇā** is entirely absent in such cases, only that it plays a relatively unimportant role. It is only in the suggestion of **rasa** and **rasa**-like states (**bhāva**, **rasābhāsa**, etc.) that Abhinavagupta totally disallows any role for **lakṣaṇā**.

Thus we see that Abhinavagupta substantially undermines Ānandavardhana's arguments for the over-extension and under-extension of **lakṣaṇā** with respect to **dhvani**, instead relying primarily on an argument of his own to prove the distinction between suggestion and **lakṣaṇā**-- that the **prayojana** required by **lakṣaṇā** could not itself be conveyed by **lakṣaṇā** without creating an infinite regress, and must therefore be conveyed by a distinct semantic function, namely suggestion.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta's Theory of Rasa

Abhinavagupta's most significant departure from Ānandavardhana is his unqualified insistence on the pre-eminence of **rasa**, and **rasa** alone, in all poetry. As we have seen (above, Chapter Six, pp. 271ff), Ānandavardhana, while he tries to show that **rasa** is generally the predominant object of great poetry, and while his teleological mode of poetic analysis is fully applicable only to **rasa**-directed poetry, is ultimately unwilling to insist that all poetry must have **rasa**

as its overriding purpose. He allows for the existence of poetry in which suggested meaning, including **rasa**, is of secondary importance (**guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya**) and in which such meaning plays no role at all (**citra-kāvya**). Abhinavagupta, by contrast, has no qualms about insisting on the effective communication of **rasa** as the essential and pre-eminent goal of all poetry.[42]

Ānandavardhana proclaims that **dhvani** is the "soul" of poetry; this includes not only **rasa-dhvani**, but **vastu-** and **alaṃkāra-dhvani** as well. Abhinavagupta is frequently at pains to show that, in spite of Ānandavardhana's application of this label to **dhvani** in general, it is really **rasa-dhvani** alone that is the soul of poetry. "This **rasa-dhvani**," he says, "is truly **dhvani**-- this alone is, strictly speaking, the soul [of poetry]".[43] He explains Ānandavardhana's inclusion of **vastu-** and **alaṃkāra-dhvani** as follows:

> **Rasa** alone is really the soul. But, **vastu-** and **alaṃkāra-dhvani** always culminate in **rasa** and are thereby elevated above the directly expressed meaning-- it is with this idea that he makes the general statement, "**Dhvani** is the

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[42]Abhinavagupta's divergence from Ānandavardhana in this area has been frequently noted by modern scholars; cf. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit, Vol. 2, p. 177-- "Having realized the importance of Rasa in poetry, Abhinava, however, went a step further than the Dhvanikāra [i.e. the author of the **kārikā** portion of the Dhvanyāloka, supposed by De to be different from Ānandavardhana] and Ānandavardhana in boldly setting it up as the only essence or aesthetic foundation of poetry"; cf. also Krishnamoorthy, The Dhvanyāloka and its Critics, op. cit., p. 221.

[43]Locana, op. cit., p. 52. Similar pronouncements abound in the Locana-- cf. pp. 39, 175, 461, 473, 484-5, 538.

soul of poetry."[44]

Even in cases where a particular **rasa** plays a subordinate role (e.g. in the **alaṃkāra rasavat**-- cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 172ff), it must always ultimately subserve some other **rasa**:

> When **rasas** etc. are ornaments [**alaṃkāras**], the situation will be just the same as when similes and so on are ornaments; there must necessarily be something else which is ornamented. And even if this [thing ornamented] is a mere narrative element [**vastu-mātra**], this itself, because it will end by becoming a **vibhāva** etc.,[45] will have **rasa** etc. as its ultimate purport. Thus in every case **rasa-dhvani** alone is the soul [of poetry].[46]

For Abhinavagupta **rasa**-directedness is not merely a prevalent feature of much or most great poetry (as it is for Ānandavardhana), but is an essential and constitutive feature of all poetry.

Abhinavagupta not only insists on the centrality of **rasa** in poetry far more confidently and unambiguously than Ānandavardhana was prepared to do; he also provides a far more detailed analysis of the nature of **rasa** than can be found anywhere in Ānandavardhana's work. Ānandavardhana concerns himself largely with the epistemology of **rasa**: What are the semantic processes by which the words of a poem cause us to understand a particular **rasa**? How do the specific formal features of poetic language enhance or detract from this

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[44]Ibid., p. 85.

[45]I.e. one of the aesthetic factors (**vibhāvas**, **anubhāvas**, and **vyabhicāri-bhāvas**) suggestive of **rasa**-- cf. above, Chapter Four, p. 130.

[46]<u>Locana</u>, p. 197.

awareness in particular contexts? About the ontology of **rasa** he has virtually nothing to say; despite the crucial role of **rasa** in his model of literary aesthetics, Ānandavardhana never specifically tells us what **rasa** is.

Abhinavagupta, by contrast, considers at great length the question of the specific nature and psychology of **rasa**. His most elaborate exploration of this question occurs in his commentary on Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra,[47] and a briefer treatment of the same issues is found in the Locana;[48] Mammaṭa includes a summary of Abhinavagupta's discussion in his Kāvyaprakāśa,[49] and this in turn becomes the basis for most later Ālaṃkārikas' remarks on the nature of **rasa**. Drawing primarily on the tradition of dramaturgy (Nāṭyaśāstra) rather than Alaṃkāraśāstra, he examines in succession the views of **rasa** offered by four earlier theorists: Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, and Bhaṭṭatauta (his own teacher, whose view of **rasa** he accepts as his own).[50]

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[47]Abhinavabhāratī on Nāṭyaśāstra 6.31 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series XXXVI [second ed.], pp. 272-86); this passage of Abhinavagupta's commentary has been separately edited and translated by Raniero Gnoli under the title, The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta (Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Rome, 1956).

[48]On Dhvanyāloka 2.4; op. cit., pp. 180-90.

[49]Mammaṭa, Kāvyaprakāśa 4.28ff. (ed. Rāmagovinda Śukla, Sarasvatībhavana Granthamālā 46 [Varanasi, 1990], pp. 59-71.

[50]No works by any of these authors survive. Lollaṭa was the author of a commentary on the Spandakārikā-- composed either by Kallata (Mukulabhatta's father) or his teacher Vasugupta-- and therefore can be dated no earlier than the mid- to late ninth century. Śaṅkuka is mentioned by Kalhaṇa

Lollaṭa, we are told, held that **rasa** is merely an intensification of a persistent emotional state (**sthāyibhāva**)--e.g. **śṛṅgāra-rasa** is a highly intensified form of love (**rati**). This **rasa** exists in the character portrayed in a drama, and also in the actor, by virtue of his power of concentration (**anusaṃdhāna**).[51] According to Abhinavagupta this was also the view of the "ancients" (**ciraṃtanas**); he cites several remarks from Daṇḍin's Kāvyādarśa (2.181, 183) which reflect a similar understanding of **rasa**.[52]

Śankuka believed **rasa** to be inferred by the audience to exist in the actor.[53] The **vibhāvas**, **anubhāvas**, and **vyabhicārabhāvas** which gives rise to **rasa** (cf. above, Chapter

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(Rājataraṅgiṇī 4.705) as the author of a poem, Bhuvanābhyudaya, describing the civil war in which Ajitāpīḍa was deposed from the throne of Kashmir (AD 850-51), and was thus probably more or less contemporary with Lollaṭa, whose view of **rasa** he criticizes. Both wrote commentaries on Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, frequently alluded to by Abhinavagupta in his own commentary on the same work. Bhaṭṭanāyaka may possibly be the same as the "Nāyaka" mentioned by Kalhaṇa (4.159) as a contemporary of King Śaṃkaravarman (r. AD 883-902). In any case, he must be later than Śaṅkuka and earlier than Bhaṭṭatauta-- late ninth to mid-tenth century. He was the author of the Hṛdayadarpaṇa (or Sahṛdayadarpaṇa), a work attacking Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** theory. Bhaṭṭatauta was the author of the Kāvyakautuka, on which Abhinavagupta wrote a commentary (both works are lost).

[51]Abhinavabhāratī, op. cit., p. 272; cf. also Locana, p. 184.

[52]Ingalls suggests, rightly I think, that Ānandavardhana's view of **rasa** was basically the same (cf. The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana, Introduction, pp. 16-19. As Abhinavagupta's own remarks indicate, this appears to have been the general view of **rasa** among the early Ālaṃkārikas, and Ānandavardhana's silence on the question would seem to indicate acquiesence.

[53]Abhinavabhāratī, pp. 172ff.

Four, p. 130) are imitations of the causes, effects, and associated mental states (respectively) which are connected with particular emotions in real life; witnessing the depiction of these factors, one infers the existence in the actor of the appropriate emotional state. One does not imagine these imitated factors or the mental states inferred from them to be real, but neither does one see them as delusory. Drama demands a distinct mode of awareness, one which Śaṅkuka compares to our awareness of a picture of a horse: we recognize what we see as a horse, without falsely imagining it to be a real horse.[54]

Bhaṭṭanāyaka rejects both of these views of **rasa** as inadequate in that they fail to explain the emotional response of the audience to plays and poems which convey **rasa**.[55] We do not respond to the poetic or dramatic depiction of particular emotional states as we would upon encountering them in the real world. If **śṛṅgāra-rasa** were an emotional state actually produced or inferred by us to exist in the character portrayed or in an actor, we would, on witnessing a private love scene, experience not disinterested enjoyment but embarrassment, disgust, envy, etc. (just as we would on witnessing such a scene in real life). If the **rasas** generated by a play or poem were perceived merely as emotional states belonging to others, they would not involve us emotionally as

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[54]Abhinavabhāratī, p. 276; also Locana, p. 186.

[55]Abhinavabhāratī, pp. 276ff.; Locana, pp. 180ff.

they do, but would leave us indifferent. On the other hand, if we, through a process of identification, experienced these emotions as our own, our responses would still be inexplicable. Audiences are delighted even by works conveying **rasas** such as **karuṇa** ("pathos"); if we experienced the emotions of the characters as our own, such works would produce only pain and audiences would avoid them.

Ānandavardhana's claim that **rasa** is suggested, according to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, will suffer from the same difficulties as Lollaṭa's and Śaṅkuka's theories. Is this "suggested" **rasa** experienced as one's own, or as belonging to some other? In either case, our affective responses to drama and poetry will be inexplicable, for the reasons stated above.[56]

Rasa, then, must be an experience distinct both from witnessing or inferring an emotion to exist in another and from experiencing it oneself. For Bhaṭṭanāyaka, the essential and distinctive feature of **rasa** is precisely that it transcends the dichotomy between self and other. The emotional states of the characters presented in a play or poem, along with those factors (**vibhāvas**, **anubhāvas**, and **vyabhicāribhāvas**) associated with them, undergo a process of generalization (**sādhāraṇīkaraṇa**); we apprehend them neither as pertaining to ourselves nor as pertaining to others, but stripped of all personal associations. It is this generalized, de-personalized emotional experience which is

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[56]Abhinavabhāratī, p. 276.

called **rasa**. Thus we respond to these **rasas** neither as indifferent bystanders nor as if we were personally affected (e.g. actually suffering when suffering is depicted), but with a kind of depersonalized enjoyment (**bhoga**) which Bhaṭṭanāyaka likens to consciousness of the supreme **brahman**.[57]

For Bhaṭṭanāyaka production of this **rasa**-experience is the essential and defining element of poetry. According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka there are three separate operations involved in poetic expression. The first is direct expression (**abhidhā**), which it shares in common with other forms of discourse.[58] The second he calls **bhāvakatva** ("activation", or "bringing into being"), his term for the generalization of **vibhāvas**, etc. which produces **rasa**. The third is **bhogakṛttva**, the production of pleasure in an audience by means of **rasa**.[59] The latter two operations are specific to poetic language, and serve to differentiate it from other varieties of language. Thus **rasa** is not only an important and desirable feature to be employed in poetry, it is itself constitutive-- it is what makes poetry poetry.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka's **bhāvakatva**, as has been noted

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[57]Abhinavabhāratī, p. 277; Locana, p. 183.

[58]**Abhidhā** must here be construed broadly enough to include figurative usage and any other modes of non-literal expression which are not specifically poetic.

[59]Locana, pp. 182.

previously,[60] is formulated on the analogy of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas' **śabda-bhāvanā**;[61] both terms refer to what language *does*, over and above what it says. But there is a crucial difference between the two, one which again emphasizes the distinction between poetic and non-poetic language. For the Mīmāṃsakas, **śabda-bhāvanā** is the power of language to induce its hearer to undertake a particular action (e.g. sacrifice); Bhaṭṭanāyaka's **bhāvakatva** does not lead those who hear a poem to perform a particular action, but rather creates in them a particular kind of pleasurable experience. The understanding one derives from ordinary language is a means to an end; it provides information on the basis of which particular courses of action will be deemed favorable or unfavorable. Thus all such language serves, directly or indirectly, to urge one to undertake or refrain from particular acts.[62] Poetic language is special in that the awareness we derive from it is directly pleasurable and is therefore an end in and of itself. The enjoyment stemming

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[60]Cf. Ingalls, The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana, op. cit., Introduction, pp. 35-6; also Sivaprasad Bhattacharya, "Three Lost Masterpieces of the Alamkāra Śāstra" [Prācyavāṇī, Calcutta, 1944], reprinted in Studies in Indian Poetics, [Calcutta: Firma KLM Private Ltd., 1981], p. 43.

[61]"Verbal" **bhāvanā**-- as opposed to **artha-bhāvanā**, the "bringing into being" of a particular result by means of sacrificial action.

[62]This is generally acknowledged even by those who are not, like the Mīmāmsakas, primarily concerned with the explicitly injunctive language of the Vedas; cf., for example, the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika 3.93ff. (op. cit., pp. 217ff).

from this **rasa**-experience is the primary obect of poetry; any practical or moral instruction derived from such works is secondary.[63]

Bhaṭṭanāyaka criticizes Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** theory, and Abhinavagupta therefore treats him as an opponent, but most of the central and innovative features of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's **rasa** theory are incorporated in Abhinavagupta's own analysis of **rasa**.[64] As we have already seen, he agrees with Bhaṭṭanāyaka in taking **rasa** (and **rasa** alone) to be the necessary and defining feature of poetic language. He takes Bhaṭṭanāyaka's critique of Lollaṭa's and Śaṅkuka's analyses of **rasa** as valid and follows him in taking the generalization (**sādharaṇīkaraṇa**) of **rasa** and its determinants as the crucial feature which distinguishes **rasa** from real-world emotional experience and accounts for the pleasurable character of the **rasa**-experience.[65] He accepts Bhaṭṭanāyaka's likening of the experience of **rasa** to the experience of the supreme **brahman**.[66] He argues that poetry does impart moral and practical instruction, but agrees with Bhaṭṭanāyaka in making

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[63]Locana, p. 183.

[64]As Ingalls observes: "One might say... that Abhinava has taken over most of the new ideas of Bhattanāyaka but trimmed them here and there so that they may fit into the terminology and the general view of Ānanda."-- The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana, Introduction, p. 37.

[65]Abhinavabhāratī, pp. 279, 285-6.

[66]Locana, p. 190.

pleasure the primary and distinctive goal of poetry.[67]

By contrast, Abhinavagupta's areas of disagreement with Bhaṭṭanāyaka are quite limited. His major objection to Bhaṭṭnāyaka's **rasa**-theory concerns Bhaṭṭanāyaka's insistence that the process by which poetry generates the **rasa**-experience cannot properly be described as **vyañjanā** ("suggestion" or "manifestation"[68]), as Ānandavardhana would have it. As Abhinavagupta sees it, **rasas** already exist in potential form (**śakti-rūpa**) in aesthetically sensitive persons and are only manifested (**vyakta** or **abhivyakta**) by poetry or drama. These latent emotional states are the product of traces (**vāsanā**) left by experiences from previous lives.[69] The function of poetry or drama is to remove those obstacles (**vighnas**) which prevent us from experiencing these latent states.[70] One of these obstacles is the awareness of particular limitations of place and time pertaining to oneself or another; thus Bhaṭṭanāyaka's "generalization" is part of the very process of "manifestation" or "suggestion" which he rejects. What

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[67]Locana, pp. 40-41, 190.

[68]Cf. above, Chapter Five, p. 204.

[69]Bhaṭṭanāyaka rejects this view, arguing that if it were so there would be no basis, even in the experience of our past lives, for identification with the deeds and emotional experiences of superhuman or divine heroes such as Rāma (Abhinavabhāratī, p. 276, Locana, p. 181). Abhinavagupta denies this: our past-life experiences are without beginning and hence infinitely variable-- he quotes a passage from the Yogasūtra [4.9-10] in support of this view (Locana, pp. 187-8).

[70]Abhinavabhāratī, pp. 280ff.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka calls **bhāvakatva** and **bhogīkaraṇa** are in fact nothing apart from this process of suggestion (**vyañjanā**, **dhvanana**).[71]

Despite Abhinavagupta's positioning himself as a critic of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, the two are quite close in their views on the nature of poetry and on the role of **rasa** in poetry; indeed, in certain key respects Abhinavagupta's views are closer to Bhaṭṭanāyaka's than to those of Ānandavardhana, whom he professes to follow. Ānandavardhana declares his threefold (**vastu-**, **alaṃkāra-**, and **rasa-**) **dhvani** to be "the soul of poetry"; Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta both part from this characterization and make **rasa** alone the pre-eminent and essential feature of poetic language-- Bhaṭṭanāyaka by rejecting Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** and substituting his own **bhāvakatva** (like **dhvani**, **bhāvakatva** is a semantic funtion specific to poetic language, but one whose sole object is to convey **rasa**), Abhinavagupta by re-interpreting Ānandavardhana's remarks in an effort to show that he really meant (despite his own statements to the contrary) to make **rasa-dhvani** alone "the soul of poetry". Although his teleological analysis of poetry would seem to demand it,

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[71]Locana, p. 188. If it is the latent pre-existence of **rasas** in the hearers of a poem which justifies the description the process by which they are brought to experience as "suggestion" (**vyañjanā**), how are we to explain the "suggestion" of **vastus** and **alaṃkāras**, which cannot be said to pre-exist in this way? Abhinavagupta (who, as we have already seen, marginalizes **vastu-** and **alaṃkāra-dhvani** and raises **rasa-dhvani** to a position of exclusive predominance) does not deal with the question.

Ānandavardhana was ultimately unwilling to make the predominance (or even the presence) of **rasa** a *necessary* feature of poetry. Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta, however, make **rasa** an essential feature, indeed the constitutive feature, of poetic language-- **rasa** is not merely a highly desirable element of poetry or one which generally plays a predominant role in the best poetry (as it is for Ānandavardhana); it is what makes poetry poetry, what differentiates it from other forms of discourse. Both argue that the primary object of poetry is to produce pleasure directly in its hearers and that it can do so only by conveying **rasa**; thus for them **rasa** is *necessarily* the overriding goal of all poetic language.

The Special Status of Aesthetic Language

For Abhinavagupta, poetic language differs from ordinary language not only in its ultimate function, but in its nature. He makes much of the extraordinary (**alaukika**) character of the **rasa**-experience and of the processes by which poetic language produces this experience. Ānandavardhana and Bhaṭṭnāyaka both allow for the existence of semantic modes which are specifically poetic;[72] Abhinavagupta lays even greater stress on the unique character of poetic expression and, as we shall see, concludes, on the basis of this unique character, that

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[72]Or, at any rate, semantic modes which assume a unique significance in poetic language. Ānandavardhana argues for the existence of suggestion even in ordinary language, but claims that it is only in poetry that it assumes an important communicative role (cf. above, Chapter Five, pp. 218-221).

poetic language need not be subject to the same requirements for sentential coherence that are applied to ordinary language.

In discussing the means by which the various aesthetic factors (**vibhāvas**, etc.) give rise to **rasa**, Abhinavagupta makes it clear that this process has no parallels outside the realm of poetry, and that the absence of such parallels should be regarded as an asset rather than a flaw in his theory of **rasa**.

> Objector: Do the **vibhāvas** and so on act with respect to this [**rasa**] as informative [**jñāpaka**] or productive [**kāraka**] causes?[73] Reply: They are neither informative nor productive causes; they are serviceable to the enjoyment [of **rasa**] [**carvaṇopayogin**].[74] Objector: But where else do we see this [type of causality]? Reply: It is precisely because it is not seen [elsewhere] that we call it "extraordinary".[75]

Elsewhere he describes the absence of any non-poetic parallel for the process which leads to the **rasa**-experience as an "ornament" [**bhūṣaṇa**] of his theory.[76] The *sui generis* character of this process should not be raised as an objection against this theory of **rasa**; it is an asset precisely because it serves to make clear the special and extraordinary status of **rasa**.

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[73]I.e. do the **vibhāvas** etc. make one aware of (already existing) **rasa**, or do they produce **rasa** where it did not exist before.

[74]Through the process of "generalization" discussed above (pp. 458-460).

[75]Locana, p. 158.

[76]Abhinavabhāratī, p. 285.

Because of the unique nature and function of poetic (i.e. **rasa**-directed) language, those semantic principles and restrictions arrived at through the analysis of everyday or Vedic language do not necessarily apply to it. One of the central semantic principles developed by the Mīmāṃsakas is the requirement that any sentence express a single, unified meaning; any sentence which fails to do so (or any interpretation of a Vedic sentence which would make this sentence fail to do so) will suffer from the flaw of **vākya-bheda** ("splitting the sentence"-- cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 85ff). Responding to the contention that a sentence communicating **rasa** along with its directly expressed meaning[77] would suffer from **vākya-bheda**, Abhinavagupta argues that **vākya-bheda**, while it must be avoided in **śāstras**, does not, in the context of poetry, constitute a flaw at all.[78]

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[77]Rather than as a second meaning which subsequently displaces the directly expressed meaning (as happens in the case of figurative expression).

[78]Locana, pp. 159-60. Abhinavagupta's treatment of this objection differs markedly from Ānandavardhana's response to the very same charge (cf. Dhvanyāloka, pp. 421-2 and above, Chapter Five, pp. 214-216). Ānandavardhana nevers questions the applicability of **vākya-bheda** or other Mīmāṃsā principles of text analysis to poetic language. He argues that sentences conveying **rasa** do communicate a unitary meaning. **Rasa** will always be either superordinate (in **dhvani**) or subordinate (in **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya**) with respect to the expressed meaning which gives rise to it; either the directly expressed meaning (in the latter case) or the **rasa** (in the former) will be the predominant meaning toward which the sentence is ultimately directed. This integration of the various elements of meaning in a single purposive framework is all that is required for "unity of sentence-meaning" as the Mīmāṃsakas understand it; thus there is no **vākya-bheda** in such sentences.

If a **śāstric** sentence did not convey a single, definite meaning, we could have no faith in any information or instruction derived from it, and it is for this reason that **vākya-bheda** is considered a defect. Because poetry is not meant to convey particular information about the world or to motivate its hearers to particular actions, it does not require this sort of unified meaning and hence is not subject to this flaw.

> [The understanding derived from poetry] is not like that derived from **śāstra**, e.g. "I am enjoined in this action, I should do this", or "I have already achieved this goal",[79] because in these cases [one's understanding] is ordinary [**laukika**] in that it is directed toward things to be done in the future; but here [i.e. in poetry] the savoring of the **vibhāvas** and so on arises, like a magical flower, having its essence at that very moment, and not connected with earlier or later times.[80]

The value of the understanding derived from poetic language is not contingent on anything outside of itself. All that is required of poetic language is that it give pleasure (as it will do if it conveys **rasa**); the meaning derived from it need not correspond to any extra-poetic reality for its effectiveness, and hence poetic language is not subject to the same requirement for sentential coherence or the same need for verification as śāstric language. "These [poetic] sentences do not require validity so as to motivate [hearers] by communicating a true meaning (as do sentences enjoining sacrifices such as the **agniṣṭoma**), because they culminate only

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[79]And hence need not act further in this matter.

[80]Locana, p. 160.

in pleasure."[81] Thus poetic language, because its value does not reside in practical utility, need not be subject to the same rules applied to other forms of discourse.

While much of Abhinavagupta's **rasa**-theory and the arguments he offers against the anti-**dhvani** theorists prove to be tremendously influential, this attempt to exempt poetic language from Mīmāṃsā-derived strictures on textual coherence is not followed up by later Ālaṃkārikas. As we shall see, the application of Mīmāṃsā-derived interpretive principles to the analysis and appraisal of poetic language, initiated by Ānandavardhana, is continued and expanded by the later Ālaṃkārikas.

Conclusion

In the course of his commentary on the Dhvanyāloka, Abhinavagupta departs in many important respects from the stated views of Ānandavardhana; but in doing so he often seems to carry the implications of Ānandavardhana's theory through to their logical conclusion in a way Ānandavardhana himself was reluctant to do. Ānandavardhana, while his teleological model of textual coherence and the critical principles he develops from it would seem to demand it, was not prepared to insist on **rasa**-directedness as an essential feature of all poetry; Abhinavagupta has no qualms about doing so.

As we have seen, Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory provoked a great deal of criticism, and Abhinavagupta expends a great

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[81]Ibid., p. 455.

deal of effort in attempting to fend off these attacks. Yet, in doing so, he often substantially diverges from Ānandavardhana's own views, curtailing or neglecting Ānandavardhana's arguments where he finds them to be problematic and substituting arguments of his own. In formulating his **rasa**-theory Abhinavagupta draws at least as much on the work of the anti-**dhvani** theorist Bhaṭṭanāyaka as on Ānandavardhana's own views on **rasa**. In this rapprochement between Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta we see the beginning of a general consensus-- one which cuts across the lines of the **dhvani** controversy-- regarding the essentiality of **rasa** as the paramount goal of *all* poetic language. This consensus is also reflected in the views of Ānandavardhana's next major critic, Mahimabhaṭṭa, whose work will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER TEN
MAHIMABHAṬṬA'S VYAKTIVIVEKA

The most elaborate and strident, and also the last, major attack on Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory is that offered by Mahimabhaṭṭa in his Vyaktiviveka ("An Analysis of Suggestion"). Like Mukulabhaṭṭa before him, Mahimabhaṭṭa challenges Ānandavardhana's claims for the existence of suggestion (**vyañjanā**) as a mode of expression unique to poetry and necessarily distinct from those semantic processes dealt with by earlier philosophers and language theorists. For Mahimabhaṭṭa, what Ānandavardhana would call suggestion (and, indeed, non-literal expression generally) can be satifactorily explained only as a kind of inference (a criticism which, as we have seen, Ānandavardhana himself anticipated and strove to refute-- cf. above, Chapter Five, pp. 239ff).

Mahimabhaṭṭa knows and quotes both Kuntaka's Vakroktijīvita and Abhinavagupta's Locana;[1] Mammaṭa (c. 1100 AD) is clearly familiar with his work.[2] Thus, the Vyaktiviveka must have been composed some time during the

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[1]Mahimabhaṭṭa, Vyaktiviveka, ed. Revaprasad Dvivedi, Kashi Sanskrit Series 121, Varanasi 1981 [third ed.], pp. 96, 142, 284.

[2]At the end of the fifth **ullāsa** of his Kāvyaprakāśa, Mammata responds briefly to Mahimabhaṭṭa's argument for the identification of suggestion with inference-- cf. Kāvyaprakāśa (ed. N.S. Veṅkaṭanāthācarya, Oriental Research Institute Series 120, University of Mysore, 1974) Vol. I, pp. 474-81. Mammaṭa's examination of poetic flaws in the seventh **ullāsa** often draws very heavily on Mahimabhaṭṭa's treatment of the same topics-- cf., for example, ibid., Vol. II, pp. 50-61 [compare Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., pp. 196ff.], and pp. 105-117 [compare Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., pp. 287ff].

eleventh century. The Vyaktiviveka is divided into three chapters called **vimarśas**. The first **vimarśa** offers a detailed critique of Ānandavardhana's definition of **dhvani** and of the theory of suggestion. The second **vimarśa** consists of an extensive analysis of aesthetic flaws (**doṣas**)-- the relation of this seeming digression to the overall project of the work will be considered below (pp. 493ff). The third **vimarśa** examines individually Ānandavardhana's examples of **dhvani**, demonstrating in each case that the meanings Ānandavardhana describes as suggested can be arrived at only through a process of inference.[3]

In developing his theory of poetic inference, and in many other areas besides, Mahimabhaṭṭa relies very heavily on the ideas of the great seventh-century Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti. In his edition of the Vyaktiviveka Revaprasad Dvivedi identifies one citation from Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika,[4] and C. Rajendran finds two more,[5] but the full extent of Mahimabhaṭṭa's indebtedness to Dharmakīrti has not been noted. His work is littered with quotations from all of Dharmakīrti's major works, and the views so quoted are

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[3]A fairly good general survey of Mahimabhatta's views and arguments is C. Rajendran's A Study of Mahimabhatta's **Vyaktiviveka** (Published by Dr. C Rajendran, Feroke, 1991); more detailed examinations of selected topics dealt with in the Vyaktiviveka may be found in Amiya Kumar Chakravorty's Studies in Mahimabhaṭṭa (Calcutta University, 1975).

[4]Vyaktiviveka, ed. R. Dvivedi (Kashi Sanskrit Series 121, Varanasi, 1982 [third ed.]), p. 77.

[5]Rajendran, op. cit., p. 48.

invariably treated as absolutely authoritative.[6] It is not clear whether or not Mahimabhaṭṭa was himself a Buddhist,[7] but he was, in any case, a thoroughgoing follower of Dharmakīrti in matters of logic.

The Vyaktiviveka has not received anything like the attention it deserves from modern scholars of Alaṃkāraśāstra, probably at least in part because of its author's explicit hostility to the widely favored **dhvani** theory of Ānandavardhana. While it is generally conceded that

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[6]The citations I have so far identified are as follows--Pramāṇavārttika 2.57 (Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., p. 76), 3.26 (p. 80), 3.27 (p. 69), and 3.191-2 (p. 469); Nyāyabindu 2.3 (p. 81), 2.34 (p. 465), 2.38 (p. 466), 2.39 (p. 53), and 3.1 (p. 67); he quotes from the Pramāṇaviniścaya on p. 81 (cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "New Sanskrit Fragments of Pramāṇaviniścaya, First Chapter," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens XVI, 1972, p. 201), on p. 76 (cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam," Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse Sitzungsberichte 287, Band 4, 1973, p. 25), and p. 316 (cf. E.M. Stern, "Additional Fragments of Pramāṇaviniścaya I-II," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens XXXV, 1991, p. 153); he quotes from the Vādanyāya on p. 333 (cf. Vādanyāya, Bauddha Bhāratī Series 8, Varanasi, 1972, p. 106) and p. 43 (cf. ibid., p. 109).

[7]K.C. Pandey finds indications of Kashmir Śaiva affiliation in Mahimabhaṭṭa's work (cf. his "Kashmir Śaiva tendencies of Mahimabhaṭṭa," Bharatiya Vidya, Vol XI, pp. 187ff; also Rajendran, op. cit., pp. 47-51). His commentator Ruyyaka, however, certainly believes Mahimabhaṭṭa to be a Buddhist; he frequently accounts for Mahimabhaṭṭa's remarks by pointing out that they represent the "Buddhist view" (**saugatadṛś, saugataprakriyā**) on a particular question (cf. Vyaktiviveka, op. cit, pp. 48, 279, 339, 376), and often cites Dharmakīrti's works himself in explaining Mahimabhaṭṭa's standpoint (ibid., p. 48 [cf. Svopajñavṛtti on Pramāṇavārttika 3.1], p. 62 [Pramāṇavārttika 3.263], and p. 339 [Pramāṇavārttika 4.128]. Bhaṭṭagopāla, a pre-fifteenth century commentator on Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa, describes Mahimabhaṭṭa as a Buddhist (cf. Rajendran, p. 48).

Mahimabhaṭṭa's work displays great logical acumen and polemical skill, the significance of his contribution to Sanskrit poetic theory is often downplayed. According to S.K. De, for example,

> Mahimabhaṭṭa's work is undoubtedly a masterpiece of scholastic argumentation, exhibiting much fastidious criticism and great learning of a miscellaneous kind; but its avowed object is polemical and it does not pretend to set up a new system... A fine product of a scholastic age, he cannot yet look beyond the pettiness of immediate issues; and whatever might be the value of his peculiar proposition, he hardly ever adds to its limited interest any independent treatment of the larger problems of Poetics.[8]

Krishnamoorthy observes that, "In depth of perception, clearness of exposition and vastness of erudition, Mahimabhaṭṭa very nearly approaches Ānandavardhana himself. The Vyaktiviveka excels in the art of subtle dialectics and hyper-critical polemics and has hardly had a parallel in the whole range of Sanskrit criticism."[9] Nevertheless, he labels Mahimabhaṭṭa "a mere carping critic."[10]

This dismissive attitude toward Mahimabhaṭṭa's work underrates his continuing importance in the Alaṃkāra tradition. While it is true that his identification of **dhvani** with inference finds no followers among subsequent Ālaṃkārikas, his arguments remain an important reference-point

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[8]De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 199-200.

[9]K. Krishnamoorthy, The **Dhvanyāloka** and its Critics (Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1968), p. 296.

[10]Ibid., p. 249.

for later **dhvani**-theorists, and the need to respond to them effectively is keenly felt even by much later Ālaṃkārikas.[11] His elaborate analysis of poetic flaws is extremely influential, and large portions of it are adopted wholesale by later authors. Despite the ultimate triumph of the **dhvani**-theory against which he struggles, Mahimabhaṭṭa clearly remains a tremendously important figure in the tradition of Alaṃkāraśāstra.

Suggestion and Inference

As already noted, the central thesis of the Vyaktiviveka is that what Ānandavardhana calls suggestion is nothing but a kind of inference; in every case of "suggestion" the directly expressed meaning of a passage, in concert with relevant contextual factors, serves as the inferential mark (**hetu** or **liṅga**) which allows us to infer some additional, unstated meaning. It is important to stress that, apart from this one major point of contention, there is very little fundamental difference between Mahimabhaṭṭa's understanding of the nature of poetry and Ānandavardhana's. Like Ānandavardhana, Mahimabhaṭṭa asserts the crucial role of unstated meaning in poetic language, accepts three types of unstated meaning (**vastu**, **alaṃkāra**, and **rasa**), adopts a teleological, **rasa**-centered model of literary aesthetics, and takes the ability of any feature of a work to contribute to the work's overall

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[11]Cf., for example, Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja's (seventeenth century) Rasagaṅgādhara (ed. Kedāranātha Ojhā, Sarasvatī Bhavana Granthamālā 113, Varanasi, 1977), Vol. I, pp. 47-49.

rasa as the sole criterion by which to judge its aesthetic value. Mahimabhaṭṭa himself explicitly points out the limited scope of his quarrel with Ānandavardhana: "Suggestion is the life-breath of **dhvani**; thus this alone is analyzed here. Regarding the rest, there is for the most part no disagreement [between Ānandavardhana and myself]."[12] Indeed, as we shall see, Mahimabhaṭṭa not only accepts Ānandavardhana's **rasa**-centered poetic teleology but, like Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta, carries its logic even farther than Ānandavardhana was prepared to do by insisting on **rasa**-directedness as a necessary feature of *all* poetry.

Mahimabhaṭṭa's argument against the existence of suggestion as something distinct from inference rests most fundamentally on his Dharmakīrtian epistemological principles. For Dharmakīrti there are only two kinds of knowable entities: unconceptualized sense-particulars (**svalakṣaṇa**), and generalized concepts (**sāmānyalakṣaṇa**, **kalpanā**)-- and, correspondingly, only two means of valid knowledge: perception (**pratyakṣa**), which apprehends sense-particulars, and inference (**anumāna**), which is the source of all generalized conceptual knowledge. Thus all valid knowledge which is not immediately and purely perceptual can only be the product of a process of inference; all other means of valid knowledge which have been proposed by rival epistemologists (e.g. **upamāna** ["comparison"], **śabda** ["verbal testimony"], or **arthāpatti**

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[12]Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., p. 511. Cf. also p. 111.

["necessary presumption"]) must, insofar as they are valid, be included within the scope of inference, as they all deal with generalized conceptual knowledge.

Mahimabhaṭṭa reprises this classic argument in order to show that Ānandavardhana's suggestion can be nothing but a kind of inference:

> For the understanding of one thing from another is not possible without inference; and [other means of knowledge such as] **upamāna**, etc. are included in that [inference]. As they say, "When one thing is seen, the conception [**kalpanā**] of another is [generally] not appropriate, because overextension would result.[13] But this will be possible if there is an invariable connection of this [other thing with the thing percieved]. For this [percieved thing], its nature being invariably connected in this way, will make one aware of another which is established to be thus [invariably connected]. And the cognition of a thing by means of a general concept connected with it *is* inference-- thus there are only two means of knowledge."[14] And the understanding of another [unstated] meaning from an expressed meaning is not possible without the recollection of an invariable connection [between the two], because otherwise there

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[13]I.e. upon percieving any entity, one might cognize any other (unpercieved) thing. There would be no restriction at all on one's knowledge: any or all possible conclusions could legitimately be drawn from any perceptual awareness whatsoever.

[14]I.e. perception and inference (the latter being the only legitimate means by which knowledge of what is not immediately percieved may be arrived at). The quotation is from Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya (cf. Steinkellner 1972, op. cit., p. 201). Unfortunately, this quotation has become somewhat garbled: In the sentence beginning "For this [percieved thing]..." the word meaning "its nature being invariably connected" (**pratibaddhasvabhāvaḥ**) is omitted and the word "this" (**sa**) is replaced by "not" (**na**), distorting the meaning to the point of unintelligibility; the passage is quoted correctly (with minor variants) in Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyabhūṣaṇa (Varanasi: Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśana-pratiṣṭhāna, 1968, p. 381) and closely paraphrased in Vācaspatimiśra's Nyāyavārttikatāparyaṭīkā (Varanasi: Kashi Sanskrit Series 24, 1925, p. 158).

> would arise the dilemma that any meaning at all could be understood from this [expressed meaning].[15]

We can understand from an utterance a meaning not explicitly stated only if this meaning is necessarily associated with the meaning that is directly stated (otherwise there will be no restriction on the meanings which may so be understood and no definite meaning will emerge from any utterance); deducing one thing from another on the basis of necessary association is nothing but inference. Thus Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** (along with all forms of non-literal expression) can only be a kind of inference.

To undermine Ānandavardhana's claim that **dhvani** is based not on inference but on **vyañjanā** ("suggestion", "manifestation"-- cf. above, Chapter Five, p. 204), Mahimabhaṭṭa subjects to detailed analysis the notion of **vyañjanā** as it has been applied outside the realm of poetry and concludes that the process of non-literal expression Ānandavardhana describes as **vyañjanā** cannot properly be so designated. Mahimabhaṭṭa offers the following definition of **vyañjanā**:[16] "The appearance of a thing revealed [**prakāśamāna**], whether real or not, together with its revealer [**prakāśaka**], when this [revealer] does not depend [for its functioning] on the recollection of some connection [with the

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[15]Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., pp. 81-83.

[16]The term Mahimabhatta uses here is actually **abhivyakti**; throughout the Vyaktiviveka he uses the cognate terms **vyakti**, **abhivyakti**, and **vyañjanā** interchangeably to refer to Ānandavardhana's **vyañjanā**.

thing revealed]."[17]

This definition covers a variety of phenomena. One type is the manifestation, due to some cause, of something which had previously existed only in a latent, imperceptible form, e.g. the appearance of curds in milk.[18] Another is the revelation of some object by the light of a lamp; when a lamp is lit in a darkened room the lamp itself and any nearby objects previously obscured by darkness will become visible simultaneously. It is this second type which Ānandavardhana sees as operative in poetry containing **dhvani**; he explicitly says that the relationship between suggestive words and meanings and the suggested senses they convey is analogous to that between a lamp and a pot which is illumined by it.[19]

In addition to these phenomena which meet his definition of **vyañjanā**, however, Mahimabhaṭṭa examines others which have sometimes been described as types of **vyañjanā** but which do not fulfill this definition-- those in which the supposed suggestive factor depends on a remembered connection with the thing it reveals; for example, the awareness of a cow produced either by a picture or other representation of a cow or by the

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[17]Ibid., p. 80.

[18]At least according to the Sāmkhya theory of **satkāryavāda**, which holds that before they become apparent all effects (e.g. the curds) pre-exist latently in their causes (e.g. the milk); Mahimabhaṭṭa himself notes that some would regard this as the production of curds from milk, rather than the "manifestation" of curds which already existed, latently, in the milk (ibid., p. 80).

[19]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 420-21.

word "cow". In such cases, the desired awareness can come about only if one recalls the previously experienced association of a particular arrangement of shapes and colors or a particular set of sounds with the object being represented or denoted. For the reasons already discussed, Mahimabhaṭṭa regards any situation in which an awareness arises in dependence on such a remembered connection as a case of inference. Thus such phenomena cannot properly be regarded as cases of **vyañjanā**, and Mahimabhaṭṭa accordingly formulates his definition so as to exclude them.

However, Ānandavardhana himself does not regard poetic suggestion as functioning like these latter cases of supposed **vyañjanā**. As already noted, he sees the **vyañjanā** which takes place in poetic expression as analogous to the case of the lamp and the pot, which Mahimabhaṭṭa himself accepts as a type of **vyañjanā**. Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that the analogy cannot hold: when the light of a lamp reveals both itself and a nearby pot, the two become apparent *simultaneously*, while such simultaneity (which, as we have seen, he regards as essential feature of true **vyañjanā**) is not possible between directly expressed and unstated meanings. As Mahimabhaṭṭa notes, Ānandavardhana himself argues that a hearer's awareness of directly expressed and suggested meanings is necessarily sequential, even if this sequence is sometimes (as in **rasa**-

dhvani) too brief to be noticeable.[20] Our understanding of the unstated meaning of an expression cannot arise simultaneously with our understanding of the expressed meaning, because the former depends on the latter as its cause; only *after* we have understood the expressed meaning can any additional, unstated meaning be recognized.

Even if one were to amend the stated definition of **vyañjanā** to remove the requirement for simultaneity, difficulties would remain. Altering the definition in this way would allow one to designate the process by which expressed meanings give rise to unexpressed ones as **vyañjanā**, but it would also, by the same token, require that all cases of inference be so designated.[21] To take the stock example of inference: when one sees smoke rising from a mountain and (subsequently) concludes that there must be fire there, the smoke would have to be said to "suggest" or "manifest" the fire. This would run counter to all established usage and cognitive theory, and would totally eliminate any possibility of distinguishing between inference and **vyañjanā**.

The use of the term "suggested" (**vyaṅgya**) by Ānandavardhana and others to describe certain poetic meanings which are not directly expressed is acceptable, but only if (contra Ānandavardhana) one understands the term to be

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[20]Ibid., p. 85. Cf. Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 404-414 and above, Chapter Four, pp. 134-136.

[21]Ibid., p. 86.

employed metaphorically.[22] The inference of an unstated meaning from a stated one may sometimes (i.e. in the case of **rasa**) come about so rapidly that our awareness of the two *appears* to be simultaneous, and in this respect resembles a genuine case of **vyañjanā**. This apparent simultaneity may lead us to describe the second, unstated meaning as "suggested" (**vyañgya**). But, as Ānandavardhana himself argues, this simultaneity can only be apparent; it is for this reason that he describes **rasa-dhvani** as "that in which the sequence [between the expressed and suggested meanings] is not noticed" (**asaṃlakṣyakrama**). Therefore, the characterization of the unstated meaning in such cases as "suggested" can be accepted only if it is understood metaphorically. And even this metaphorical application of the term "suggested" will be acceptable only in the case of Ānandavardhana's **rasa-dhvani**; in **vastu-** and **alaṃkāra-dhvani** there is not even apparent simultaneity between the expressed and inferred senses, and there is therefore no basis for any such metaphorical usage.[23]

Mahimabhaṭṭa's contention that all such unstated meanings are inferred, rather than "suggested" can be sustained only if he can show that some valid inferential mark (**liñga**) is present wherever the understanding of such an additional

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[22]Ibid., pp. 59ff, 78, 113.

[23]Ibid., p. 61.

meaning occurs.[24] Here, once again, Mahimabhaṭṭa finds fodder for his argument in Ānandavardhana's own analysis of suggested meaning. In his own argument for the existence of suggestion as a semantic function distinct from direct expression, Ānandavardhana makes the following observation:

> The expressive capacity of a particular word is its fixed essence [**ātmā**], since it is seen to be invariably connected with that word beginning from the time that we learn it. But this [suggestiveness] is not fixed, since it depends on particular conditions. For this will be understood through the limitation imposed by factors such as context, and otherwise [i.e. in the absence of such factors] will not be understood.[25]

Mahimabhaṭṭa quotes this passage with approval. Our understanding of any additional meaning beyond what is directly expressed by a word depends not on the word itself (otherwise it would be understood whenever the word was used) but on a complex set of contextual factors in connection with the directly expressed meaning of the word (and is thus

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[24]Later critics of Mahimabhaṭṭa's views, beginning with Mammaṭa, make this the focal point of their attacks. In true cases of suggestion, it is argued, there is no *necessary* association (**avinābhāva**) between the expressed and suggested senses. The relation between the two will be variable (**anaikāntika**), and the expressed sense cannot therefore be considered a valid inferential mark with respect to this second unstated meaning. Sensitive readers will understand the poet's intended meaning even though it is not deducible by strict canons of logic from the directly expressed meaning of a verse (cf. Mammaṭa, Kāvyaprakāśa, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 474-81). Kunjunni Rāja, reading the later responses of the tradition back into the Dhvanyāloka, misleadingly presents this argument as Ānandavardhana's own (Indian Theories of Meaning, Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1963, p. 291).

[25]Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., pp. 436-437; quoted in Vyaktiviveka, op. cit, p. 148. Also cf. above, Chapter Five, p. 212.

understood only occasionally and under certain specifiable conditions).

It is this entire set (**sāmagrī**) of contextual and semantic factors which serves as the inferential mark that will allow us to understand a particular unstated meaning in any given case.[26] If this set of factors is sufficiently determinative to allow us to understand a particular unstated meaning when and only when a poet means for us to do so, it will be necessarily connected with this intended meaning and may thus be regarded as a valid inferential mark; if it is not sufficiently determinative, the intended meaning of the verse in question will be unclear (and the verse will hence be faulty). Thus, no verse (or any other expression) will be able to effectively convey any meaning not directly expressed unless its directly expressed meaning, together with any relevant contextual factors, constitutes a valid inferential mark necessarily associated with that unstated meaning. In the third **vimarśa** of the Vyaktiviveka[27] Mahimabhaṭṭa examines in great detail many of Ānandavardhana's examples of **dhvani**, attempting in each case to specify the complete set of textual and other factors which allows a reader to infer the unstated meaning which Ānandavardhana believes to be "suggested".

Mahimabhaṭṭa's claims for the inclusion of

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[26]Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., pp. 146-149; cf. also pp. 176, 504, and 510-511.

[27]Ibid., pp. 463ff.

Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** within the scope of inference, as they form the central thesis of his work, have attracted the most attention from modern scholars of Alaṃkāraśāstra. It has been far less frequently[28] noted that he *also* argues for the inclusion of **dhvani** within the scope of figurative signification.[29] He mocks Ānandavardhana's arguments for the differentiation between **dhvani** and figurative signification, incorporating into his own work the verses of the Dhvanyāloka in which Ānandavardhana argues for this distinction but altering them slightly such that their meaning is inverted and they present an argument for the identity of **dhvani** and figurative signification.[30] What Ānandavardhana calls **dhvani** is, in fact, nothing but figurative usage.

Mahimabhaṭṭa's critique of **dhvani** is thus actually quite similar to that already offered by Mukulabhaṭṭa; both hold that the process by which we understand unstated meanings in cases of Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** and the semantic and contextual conditions required for this understanding are no different from those found in cases of figurative signification. The only fundamental difference in their analyses stems from the old argument between the Mīmāṃsakas

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[28]Though occasionally; cf. Krishnamoorthy, The Dhvanyāloka and its Critics, op. cit., pp. 286-87 and Rajendran, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

[29]Cf. Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., pp. 114ff, 174, 178.

[30]Ibid., pp. 123-4; cf. Dhvanyāloka 1.14 (op. cit., pp. 141-2), 1.16 (p. 146), 1.17 (p. 148), and 1.18 (p. 151).

and the logicians (both Buddhist and Naiyāyika) over the existence of **arthāpatti** (necessary presumption) as a means of valid knowledge distinct from inference.[31] For Mukulabhaṭṭa, as for the Mīmāṃsakas, our understanding of figurative usage depends on a kind of **arthāpatti**: when a word or phrase, understood literally, would render an expression incoherent or unintelligible, we are forced to seek for some figurative interpretation which will make the expression as a whole intelligible.

However, Mahimabhaṭṭa, as we have already seen, follows the Buddhist logicians in arguing that **arthāpatti**, along with all other proposed means of knowledge apart from direct perception, must necessarily, insofar as they are valid means of knowledge, be subsumed within the domain of inference. Thus, for him, figurative signification itself, because of its basis in **arthāpatti**, can be satisfactorily explained only as a kind of inference.[32] Nevertheless, these two critics of the **dhvani**-theory are united on several key points-- that words can convey meanings other than their literal ones only under certain specifiable conditions, that these conditions are none other than those already dealt with by theorists of non-poetic language under the framework of figurative signification, and that there is consequently no justification for positing a new mode of expression, **vyañjanā**, in order to

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[31]Cf. above, Chapter Three, p. 91.

[32]Vyaktiviveka, p. 118.

explain the semantics of poetic language-- and it is these points which form the core of the anti-**dhvani** position. Mahimabhaṭṭa follows Mukulabhaṭṭa in insisting that poetic language is fundamentally no different from extra-poetic language and operates according to the same principles. Indeed he develops this idea much more fully than Mukulabhaṭṭa; as we shall see, Mahimabhaṭṭa's detailed exposition of poetic defects is shaped primarily by his attempt to rigorously apply within the realm of poetry standards of coherence and acceptable usage first developed in the analysis of non-poetic language.

The Essentiality of Rasa-predominance

As already noted, Mahimabhaṭṭa, despite his determined assault on Ānandavardhana's theory of poetic semantics, adopts quite enthusiastically many other major elements of Ānandavardhana's approach to literary analysis, particularly his focus on **rasa** as the overall goal toward which all other elements of a poem ought (at least ideally) to be directed. For Mahimabhaṭṭa, as for Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta, **rasa** is not merely a highly desirable element to be introduced in poetry or one generally to be found in the best poems; it is the necessary and constitutive goal of all poetry. For him, poetry is poetry only insofar as it effectively conveys **rasa**. "That activity of a poet," he says, "which consists of the joining together of **vibhāvas**, etc., and which is necessarily associated with the manifestation of **rasa**, is called 'poetry'

(**kāvya**)";[33] and elsewhere, "The composition of **vibhāvas**, etc. *alone* is the activity of the poet, nothing else."[34]

Mahimabhaṭṭa's understanding of the general nature of poetic flaws is developed in accordance with this unambiguously **rasa**-centered account of the function of poetry. For Mahimabhaṭṭa, a flaw in a poetic composition is any element which obstructs in any way the development of **rasa**. "The common characteristic of these [flaws] is that they produce some obstacle to the understanding of the intended [**vivakṣita**] **rasa**, etc."[35] Thus the unobstructed communication of **rasa** to an audience is for him the sole aesthetic value; the acceptibility of any element of any poem can be measured only in terms of its capacity to further this ultimate goal.

This insistence on **rasa** as the sole *raison d'etre* of any poem, as Mahimabhaṭṭa recognizes, totally undermines Ānandavardhana's tripartite classification of poetry. Ānandavardhana, it will be recalled, allows for three varieties of poetry: **dhvani-kāvya** (in which suggested meaning is predominant), **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya** (in which suggested meaning is present, but plays a subordinate role), and **citra-**

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[33] Vyaktiviveka, p. 101.

[34] Ibid., p. 142.

[35] Ibid., p. 182; cf. also p. 255. The "etc." refers to other **rasa**-like elements, e.g **bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa;** cf. above, Chapter Two, pp. 52-58.

kāvya (in which there is no suggested meaning whatsoever).[36] But if, as Mahimabhaṭṭa argues, **rasa**-- a type of "suggested" (really inferred) meaning-- is necessarily and by definition the ultimate goal of all poetry, then all poetry whatsoever will belong to the first of Ānandavardhana's three categories. For this reason, Mahimabhaṭṭa attacks Ānandavardhana's description of **dhvani** as a type (**viśeṣa**) of poetry.[37] It is not a "type", it is poetry itself; any poetry which does not belong to this "type" will not, properly speaking, be poetry at all. Thus it is not possible to classify poetry on the basis of the presence or absence, or the predominance or subordination, of "suggested" meaning.

Apart from his insistence that all poetry have **rasa** as its ultimate goal (and therefore belong to the first of Ānandavardhana's three types), Mahimabhaṭṭa finds altogether objectionable Ānandavardhana's division of suggested/inferred meanings into predominant and subordinate varieties. For one thing, he contends that there can be no motive for attempting to draw such a distinction. Unless there is a general distinction in beauty between verses in which suggested/inferred meaning is subordinate and those in which it predominates (and Ānandavardhana himself does not claim that there is one), there is no point in drawing any categorical distinction between the two. Mahimabhaṭṭa

[36]Cf. above, Chapter Six, pp. 271ff.

[37]Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., pp. 98-107.

compares Ānandavardhana's own examples of predominant and subordinate suggestion of **vastu**, **alaṃkāra**, and **rasa**, and argues that the latter are no less beautiful than the former.[38] It is the *presence* of suggested/inferred meaning, not its (supposed) predominance or subordination, which is the crucial determinant of poetic beauty. Thus the distinction between predominant and subordinate suggestion is not aesthetically significant and Ānandavardhana's categorical division of **dhvani** from **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya** consequently serves no useful function.

Beyond this, however, Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that, in fact, unstated meanings are *never* subordinate to the expressed meanings from which they are inferred.[39] When an expressed meaning causes us to understand a further, unstated meaning, it is serving as a means to an end and is therefore necessarily and by definition subordinate to this end. In such cases, the expressed meaning acts as an inferential mark (**liṅga**) and, like any other such mark, is important not for its own sake but for the further information (i.e. the "suggested" meaning) it allows us to deduce.

This is true even in cases where Ānandavardhana claims that the directly expressed meaning of a verse is predominant:

> That predominance which is said to belong to this [expressed meaning] in some cases, e.g. in [**alaṃkāras**] such as **samāsokti**, can exist only with respect to its

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[38]Ibid., pp. 161-168.

[39]Ibid., pp. 9-14.

> contextuality [**prākaranikatva**] not with respect to the understood meaning [to which it gives rise]. For example: "The moon, becoming red/*passionate*, touched the face of the night, with its twinkling stars/*trembling eyes*, so that her [the night's] cloak of darkness was condensed/*bunched up* [**samasta**] and fell away in the east/*in front* unnoticed by her, because of her own redness/*passion*."-- Here [according to Ānandavardhana] the expressed meaning alone is predominant and is only accompanied by the understood meaning, "since night and the moon alone, on which the behavior of female and male protagonists have been superimposed, are the meaning of the sentence." But, because this [expressed meaning] is an inferential mark with respect to that [understood meaning], there is no departure from subordination.[40]

In calling the expressed meaning predominant in cases such as these, Ānandavardhana is really confusing two different kinds of predominance. In the verse quoted the directly expressed meaning is the contextually relevant one-- the actual referents of the verse are the night and the moon, which the poet only implicitly identifies with a pair of lovers-- and may, in this sense, be called "predominant". But nevertheless, the point of the verse is precisely to communicate this second, implicit meaning (without which it would nothing but a banal account of an everyday event). The explicit description of the night and the moon is crafted in such a way as to allow us to infer the identification of these two with a pair of lovers; it thus serves as a means to this end, i.e. as an inferential mark, and is therefore, despite its immediate contextual relevance, subordinate to the unstated meaning we infer from it.

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[40]Ibid., p. 11. Cf. also Dhvanyāloka, Kashi ed., pp. 109-11 and above, Chapter Four, pp. 160-161.

The inferable meaning a verse or a passage conveys, whatever its relation to the narrative context or the literal referentiality of the work in question, will always be *aesthetically* predominant. It is the presence of inferable meaning generally,[41] and of **rasa** in particular, which is the fundamental basis of poetic beauty-- indeed, which is itself constitutive of poetry. It is thus never possible to speak of such meaning as subordinate to the directly expressed meaning which gives rise to it. The communication of inferable meaning, especially **rasa**, is the whole point of poetry, and such meaning is thus necessarily predominant.

We can see that there develops among the Ālaṃkārikas of tenth and eleventh century Kashmir a general consensus regarding the essentiality of **rasa**-directedness in all poetry.[42] It is a consensus which cuts across the lines of the major aesthetic controversy of the period: Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa, two of the most outspoken critics of Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory, and Abhinavagupta, its most celebrated defender, are at one in this matter. In defending his teleological approach to literary analysis, Ānandavardhana

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[41]Ibid., p. 160. Like Abhinavagupta (cf. above, Chapter Nine, pp. 454-455), Mahimabhaṭṭa allows the "suggestion" of **vastus** and **alaṃkāras** a major rôle in poetry, but only insofar as it is understood that they must *always* culminate in the communication of **rasa** (by themselves serving as **vibhāvas**, etc.)-- cf. Vyaktiviveka, p. 104. For both, it is ultimately always **rasa** and **rasa** alone that is primary.

[42]The one noteworthy exception being Kuntaka, for whom **rasa** is only one of several possible and equally valid aesthetic objectives-- cf. above, Chapter Eight, pp. 423-426.

tried to show that the best of existing poetry is, for the most part, **rasa**-directed but, mindful of the diversity prevailing in literary practice, allowed for the existence of poetry in which suggested meaning (including **rasa**) is subordinate or even wholly absent. These later authors make no such allowance; for them all poetry must, by definition, have the communication of **rasa** as its ultimate objective. They are, in the end, more adamant in their defense of Ānandavardhana's **rasa**-centered poetic teleology than was Ānandavardhana himself.

Mahimabhaṭṭa's Analysis of Poetic Flaws

The second **vimarśa** of the Vyaktiviveka appears to be nothing but an immense digression from the stated objective of his work, namely the proof that what Ānandavardhana calls suggestion is nothing other than inference. The first **vimarśa** offers a detailed critique of Ānandavardhana's definition of **dhvani**, and of the notion of suggestion generally, demonstrating that **dhvani** can be explained only as a kind of inference. The third gives a detailed examination of Ānandavardhana's examples of **dhvani**, showing in each case the inferential process by which the allegedly "suggested" meaning is understood. The second **vimarśa** (which comprises more than half of the entire Vyaktiviveka) consists of a detailed and sophisticated analysis of poetic flaws. The matters discussed therein have, for the most part, no obvious bearing on Mahimabhaṭṭa's critique of **dhvani**. It is almost as if a

second, unrelated work were inserted into the middle of his attack on Ānandavardhana. Mahimabhaṭṭa himself acknowledges the digressive character of this section of his work; at the conclusion of the second **vimarśa** he says, apparently referring to the entire discussion of poetic flaws, "enough of this extensive treatment of matters unrelated to the topic at hand."[43]

Whatever Mahimabhaṭṭa's motive may have been in including this elaborate discussion of poetic flaws in work avowedly devoted to the destruction of the Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory, his analysis of these flaws is connected in important ways with his view of the nature and function of poetry as developed in the other portions of his work, and is worthy of far more serious consideration than it has generally received.

As already noted, Mahimabhaṭṭa's understanding of the

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[43]"**alam aprastutavastuvistareṇa**"; ibid., p. 262. Later interpreters of the Vyaktiviveka have, not surprisingly, had a hard time trying to discern the purpose of this enormous digression. After completing his analysis of aesthetic flaws, Mahimabhatta briefly (pp. 456-461) examines the first verse of Ānandavardhana's Dhvanlyāloka and finds there several of the flaws he has just discussed; it has often been suggested, though Mahimabhaṭṭa gives no indication to this effect, that this critique of Ānandavardhana's verse is itself the sole *raison d'etre* of the second **vimarśa**. Ruyyaka says as much in his opening commentary on the second **vimarśa**, and, presumably following his lead, several modern scholars of Alamkāraśāstra have taken it as fact that this is the sole object of the second **vimarśa** (which they therefore rather cavalierly dismiss as of minimal significance-- cf. Krishnamoorthy, The Dhvanyāloka and its Critics, op. cit., p. 271 and Gerow, Indian Poetics, op. cit., p. 269). The argument is not really tenable, as only a few of the many types of aesthetic flaw dealt with by Mahimabhaṭṭa are found in Ānandavardhana's verse; the vast preponderance of what is discussed in the second **vimarśa** has no bearing on the critique of this verse.

general nature of poetic flaws is tied to his claim that **rasa** must be the ultimate goal of all poetry. Since the object of all poetic language is to communicate **rasa** as effectively as possible, any element of a poem which limits or impairs, in any way, the poem's ability to convey **rasa** will be regarded as a flaw to be avoided by the poet. Mahimabhaṭṭa divides these flaws into two general classes: those which are intrinsic (**antaraṅga**) and those which are extrinsic (**bahiraṅga**).[44] The first are factors which directly impair the intended **rasa**, e.g. the mention of **vibhāvas** or other aesthetic factors which contradict this **rasa**. Mahimabhaṭṭa states that flaws of this type have been dealt with by previous authors,[45] and therefore declines to examine them in detail. To the second class belong those grammatical or semantic features which obscure the poet's intended meaning and thereby indirectly impede the communication of **rasa**, and it is these which Mahimabhaṭṭa analyzes in detail.

Mahimabhaṭṭa divides these "extrinsic" flaws into five major classes: **vidheyāvimarśa** ("non-consideration of what is predicated"), **prakrama-bheda** ("breaking of an initial pattern"), **krama-bheda** ("breaking of sequence"), **paunaruktya** ("redundancy"), and **vācyāvacana** ("not stating what should be

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[44]Ibid., pp. 179-182.

[45]Apparently referring to Ānandavardhana himself, particularly the to discussion of **rasa-virodhins** (factors contradictory to **rasa**) in <u>Dhvanyāloka</u> 3.17-28 (Kashi ed., pp. 360-397). Again we see that in many areas Ānandavardhana's views are treated as authoritative even by his critics.

stated"). The first, **vidheyāvimarśa**, occurs when a poet fails to make clear the subject/predicate relation (**vidhi/anuvāda bhāva**[46]) obtaining within a verse. Mahimabhaṭṭa discusses three varieties of **vidheyāvimarśa**, all of which he finds to be exemplified in a single verse:

> That excitement which every lion has with respect to a wretched elephant or a piece of cloud is only a bit of playfulness determined by its nature. So, where can one who is non-excited even in the presence of the elephants of the directions[47] and the massing of the doomsday clouds, the lion of [the goddess] Ambikā,[48] find a high degree of exhilaration?[49]

The first type of **vidheyāvimarśa** Mahimabhaṭṭa deals with involves the inappropriate use of term negation in preference to sentential negation or vice versa.[50] In the above verse the use of negative compound "non-excited" (**a-saṃrabdhavān**) is inappropriate. The denial of any excitement on the lion's part ought to be the predicate (**vidhi**) of the entire clause;

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[46]Cf. above, Chapter Three, pp. 86ff.

[47]The divine elephants who are thought to hold up the sky, one of which is positioned at each of the four cardinal directions.

[48]I.e. that lion who acts as the vehicle (**vāhana**) of the goddess.

[49]Ibid., p. 184.
saṃrambhaḥ karikīṭameghaśakaloddeśena siṃhasya yaḥ
sarvasyaiva sa jātimātraniyato hevākaleśaḥ kila/
ityāśādviradakṣayāmbudaghaṭābandhe 'pyasaṃrabdhavān
yo 'sau kutra camatkṛter atiśayaṃ yātvambikākesarī//

The authorship of the verse is unknown, but it is also cited by Kuntaka (<u>Vakroktijīvita</u>, Krishnamoorthy's ed., p. 16).

[50]Ibid., pp. 185-195.

the excitedness itself is only the subject (**anuvāda**) whose absence is predicated.[51] But here the negation is relegated to a subordinate role, serving as a qualifying element within a nominal compound. What the clause as stated predicates is not the *absence* of excitedness but rather the *presence* of non-excitedness. The poet ought to have said "not excited" (**na saṃrabdhavān**)-- when the negation is expressed by a separate word, rather than a subordinate element of a compound, it can be taken as the predicate of the clause, as the poet apparently meant it to be taken.

Obviously Mahimabhaṭṭa doesn't mean to claim that the poet's intended meaning is unintelligible. Here, and elsewhere in his analysis of flaws, his method rests on the assumption that it is possible to see what a poet meant to say even when the poet has expressed himself poorly. Context and other factors will allow us, on reflection, to understand the intended meaning. Mahimabhaṭṭa's "flaws" do not create an absolute barrier to understanding; they constitute an obstacle to the process of comprehension (and thereby indirectly detract from **rasa**), but this obstacle is not insurmountable. If it were, aesthetic criticism of the kind Mahimabhaṭṭa is practicing here would not be possible.

The second type of **vidheyāvimarśa** stems from the failure to properly connect relative and correlative clauses.[52]

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[51]Ibid., p. 188.

[52]Ibid., pp. 196ff.

According to Sanskrit grammatical theory the relative pronoun **yat** ("who, which") and the correlative pronoun **tat** ("that") are inevitably associated with one another; whenever one of these words is used it creates an expectation for the other which must be satisfied if the expression in which it occurs is to be satisfactorily understood. Again, this is a question of subject/predicate relations.

> "When one begins by the use of either **yat** or **tat**, it is appropriate to conclude by use of the other, which will refer back to that, since these words as well are desired to have subjective [**anuvādya**] and predicative [**vidheya**] senses [respectively] and since between these two there is always a mutual expectancy."[53]

Therefore every correlative pronoun must be connected with a relative pronoun (either expressed or implied), and vice versa.

In the verse quoted above, the relative pronoun ("...*who* is non-excited...") is used without a corresponding correlative.[54] After a careful analysis of the conditions under which either **yat** or **tat** can be implied rather than used explicitly (pp. 196-204), Mahimabhaṭṭa concludes that such

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[53]Ibid., p. 196.

[54]It might be argued that the demonstrative **asau** ("the" or "that") here takes the place of the correlative. Mahimabhaṭṭa argues (pp. 206-209) that this view is untenable; **asau** and **tat** cannot be seen as synonymous, and therefore the former cannot, like the latter, satisfy the syntactic expectation generated by the use of the word **yat**. If they were truly synonymous, then **asau** would likewise have to be connected with a relative whenever it is used, and the words **asau** and **tat** could never be used together in the same clause (as they would be redundant)-- it can be shown by numerous examples that neither of these conditions holds in practice.

conditions to not hold here. Therefore the poet's failure to use a form of **tat** in the clause, "So where can... the lion of [the goddess] Ambikā find a high degree of exhilaration," constitutes an aesthetic flaw. The correlation between the two clauses is not clearly expressed, and the **vidhi/anuvāda bhāva** between them is therefore obscured.

The third type of **vidheyāvimarśa** involves the inappropriate use of compounds. As a general rule, Mahimabhaṭṭa argues, elements of an expression which are to be predicated ought not to be used as subordinate parts of a nominal or adverbial compound.

> All these compounds contain two elements, a qualifier [**viśeṣaṇa**] and a qualificand [**viśeṣya**]; however, when the qualifying portion, because it produces aesthetic appeal in the sentence meaning by lending some special quality to its referent [**āśraya**], is intended as primary, and [thereby] attains the status of predicate, and the other [i.e. the qualificand] is subordinated becoming, as it were, the subject of predication, then it is not an appropriate case for the use of a compound. For, in a compound, the relation of primacy and subordination between these two is eclipsed.[55]

The incorporation of qualifier and qualificand in a compound obscures the primary/subordinate relation between these two, and the **vidhi/anuvāda bhāva** which depends upon it. The obscuring of this relation ultimately spoils the ability of the expression to convey its intended **rasa**, and it is for this reason that it is to be considered a poetic flaw.[56] Having articulated this general principle, Mahimabhaṭṭa proceeds to

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[55]Ibid., p. 229; cf. also pp. 264-265.

[56]Ibid., p. 255.

give an exhaustive analysis of its application, examining all types of compound allowed for by Sanskrit grammar, citing numerous examples from existing literature in which poets have used these compounds inappropriately and juxtaposing them with counterexamples in which poets have appropriately refrained from the use of compounds where the clear expression of **vidhi/anuvāda bhāva** demands it.[57]

In the verse quoted above, the phrase "the lion of [the goddess] Ambikā" is expressed by a single compound (**ambikā-kesarī**). By the standard just articulated, the joining of **ambikā** and **kesarī** in a compound is a defect in the verse.[58] The lion's association with Ambikā is not merely an indicidental identifying mark; it is precisely this divine association that sets this lion above all others and accounts for its failure to be moved even by extraordinary sources of excitement. Thus the word "Ambikā" is predicative and is of primary importance. Compounding it with the word "lion" masks the intended **vidhi/anuvāda bhāva** between the two words and thus constitutes an aesthetic flaw.[59] Mahimabhaṭṭa composes a revised version of the same verse which eliminates all three of these types of **vidheyāvimarśa**.[60]

The second class of aesthetic flaw Mahimabhaṭṭa deals

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[57]Ibid., pp. 230-276.

[58]Ibid., pp. 277ff.

[59]Ibid., p. 280.

[60]Ibid., p. 282.

with he calls **prakrama-bheda** ("breaking of an initial pattern").[61] Like **vidheyāvimarśa**, this flaw too consists of the damaging of subject/predicate relations within an expression and culminates in the impairment of **rasa**.[62] It occurs when a poet begins by using a particular lexical item or grammatical construction and, later in the same verse or passage, employs a different lexical item or grammatical construction to refer to the same entity or serve the same syntactic role. Such deviation produces a kind of "stumbling" (**pariskhalana**) in the hearer's process of comprehension. Pattern breaking in lexical choice is illustrated as follows:

> "I have promised that I will never speak to you again if I do not bring you [to see your lover]...[63] And, because of my no longer talking with you, my strength will vanish and I will no longer be able to sustain my life."[64]
>
> Here, although "speak" [**bhāṣati**] and "talk" [**lapati**] both, without distinction, have the meaning of conversing, when this thing is initially expressed by use of the word "speak", then it is appropriate to continue by using the very same [word], and no other. For it is accepted that this kind of verbal appropriateness, called "not breaking an initial pattern", consists of a sort of

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[61]Ibid., pp. 287-322.

[62]Ibid., pp. 287, 310-311.

[63]The speaker, acting as messenger for a friend's rejected lover, is trying to convince her friend to give up her anger and return to him.

[64]satatam anabhibhāṣanam mayā te
paripaṇitaṃ bhavatīm anānayantyā/...

gatadhṛtir avalambitum batāsūn
analam anālapanād aham bhavatyāḥ/
(Māgha, Śiśupālavadha 7.9ab and 7.10ab)

vidhi/anuvāda bhāva.[65]

The second of the two sentences provides further information related to the same non-speaking mentioned in the first. The use of a different word for speaking in the second sentence obscures, if only very briefly, the intended identity between the two. Even though there is ultimately no difference in meaning between "speaking" and "talking", the terminological shift produces the impression of a distinction where none is intended. Such lexical substitutions are therefore to be avoided.

The same principle applies in the selection of grammatical forms. For example:

> One woman, scattered with dust, with the beauty of her moonlike face obscured, resembled the sky; others, their beauty gone and their hearts agitated, burned within like the surrounding regions [of the earth]; some, like the winds, wandered in all directions; some [were] trembling like the earth; in this way, when the kings set out, the women revealed in advance that ill-fortune which was to follow.[66]

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[65]Ibid., p. 288.

[66]Ibid., pp. 299-300.
kācit kīrṇā rajobhir divam anuvidadhe bhinnavaktrendulakṣmīr
aśrīkāḥ kāścid antar diśa iva dadhire dāham udbhrāntasattvāḥ/
bhremur vātyā ivānyāḥ pratipadam aparā bhūmivat kampamānāḥ
prasthāne pārthivānām aśivam iti puro bhāvi nāryaḥ śaśaṃsuḥ//
(Māgha, Śiśupālavadha 15.102)

The verse describes the distress of the soldiers' wives as the army of Śiśupāla and his allies sets out to do battle with Kṛṣṇa. The darkening of the sky, the appearance of forest-fires in surrounding areas, the blowing of strong winds, and the trembling of the earth are all omens of ill-fortune; the actions of these women resemble these omens, and

Here, the actions of the first three groups of women are expressed by finite verbs in the perfect tense; that of the fourth, those who were "trembling like the earth", is expressed by the present participle **kampamānā**. The use of the participial form rather than a perfect tense verb breaks the pattern established by the first three clauses. The shift to a different grammatical form gives the appearance of a semantic distinction even though none is intended by the poet.[67] Semantic parallelism demands morphological parallelism. Similar examples are adduced to illustrate the importance of maintaining established patterns in the use of pronouns, case, gender, number, etc.

Mahimabhaṭṭa's third aesthetic flaw is **krama-bheda** ("breaking of sequence").[68] This flaw is not, like the first two, linked with the Mīmāṃsā concept of **vidhi/anuvāda bhāva**. It does, however, hinge on the strict application of extra-poetic restrictions on language use within the domain of poetry. Since in Sanskrit so much grammatical information is conveyed by inflection, word order tends to be relatively free. There are however many words and grammatical

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thus they themselves foretell disaster for the departing army.

[67]Where such a distiction *is* intended, a shift of grammatical form will not constitute a flaw-- indeed it is a positive requirement. For instance, when one of a series of stated actions is primary and the others are subordinate, the primary action should be expressed by a finite verb and the others by participial or other nominal forms; cf. Vyaktiviveka, pp. 269-272.

[68]Ibid., pp. 323ff.

constructions which demand a restricted word order. For example, many indeclinable particles must be used immediately adjacent to the words they qualify. As Mahimabhaṭṭa explains:

> [Particles] such as **ca** ["and"] are modifiers... which must not be separated from the words they qualify. Thus these [particles] are able to make a qualification only of those words to which they are immediately proximate. The occasional use of these that is made out of sequence is unacceptable. For, when these words are inappropriately positioned, they exercise their influence on some other, unintended meaning, and the confusion of the contextually appropriate meaning follows from this. Or, if, even though they are out of sequence, a connection with their intended meanings is deduced, then the comprehension of the contextually appropriate meaning will be obstructed, and consequently the savoring of **rasa** which depends on this will likewise be obstructed.[69]

Poets, largely due to metrical considerations, often overlook restrictions of this kind in composing their verses, and it is such lapses that Mahimabhaṭṭa criticizes under the heading of **krama-bheda**. For example,

> [Two things have now become lamentable by seeking union with the skull-bearer (i.e. Śiva):] Both that splendid digit of the moon, and you [i.e. Pārvatī], a lotus to the eyes of this world.[70]

Here the word "and" (**ca**) should imediately follow the word "you" (**tvam**), as it correlates this with the "digit" mentioned earlier; however, the poet has placed it after the word

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[69]Ibid., p. 156. These remarks are made earlier, in the first **vimarśa**, but they allude to Mahimabhaṭṭa's later discussion of **krama-bheda**.

[70]Ibid., p. 328.
[dvayaṃ gataṃ saṃprati śocanīyatāṃ samāgamaprārthanayā kapālinaḥ/]
kalā ca sā kāntimatī kalāvatas tvam asya lokasya ca netrakaumudī//
(Kālidāsa, Kumārasaṃbhava 5.71)

"world" (**lokasya**), thus violating the sequential restriction on the use of **ca** and producing, at least momentarily, a meaning which is unintended.[71] So, despite its frequent occurrence in actual practice, the loosening or ignoring of the ordinary rules of word order in the context of poetry cannot be regarded as acceptable. Violations of sequential rules in poetry produce confusion, just as they would in everyday usage, and consequently impair a poem's capacity to accomplish its ultimate purpose, the conveying of **rasa**.

The fourth type of aesthetic flaw examined with by Mahimabhaṭṭa is **paunaruktya** ("redundancy").[72] Mahimabhaṭṭa is certainly not the first literary theorist to deal with the problem of redundancy in poetry. Several of the early Ālaṃkārikas (e.g. Bhāmaha 4.12-16, Daṇḍin 3.135-138, Vāmana 2.2.11-19) mention a poetic defect they call **ekārtha** ("having a single meaning"), in which a word or phrase expresses a meaning already stated and hence serves no useful purpose. What distinguishes Mahimabhaṭṭa from the earlier Alaṃkāra tradition in this matter is not the insistence that poets must avoid redundant expressions, but rather the tremendous rigor with which he applies this critical principle. Redundancy, for him, is not limited to mere verbal repetition or the

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[71]Most of the types of **krama-bheda** similarly involve the misplacement of indeclinable particles, but other sequential rules are dealt with as well; e.g, one should not refer to something by a demonstrative pronoun without having first referred to it by a noun. Cf. ibid, pp. 323-326.

[72]Ibid., pp. 333-387.

juxtaposition of synonymous expressions: it applies to all cases in which a poet states explicitly what could otherwise have been understood implicitly.

Mahimabhaṭṭa, again citing plentiful examples from existing literary works, demonstrates numerous situations in which the use of particular stems, suffixes, words, or even whole sentences adds nothing at all to the meanings of the verses or passages in which they occur. Many common expressions are, by this standard, redundant. E.g. one should never call a person "one who has a confused mind" (**mūḍhacetana**, **mūḍhadhī**), as one can simply call him or her "confused" (**mūḍha**)-- it goes without saying that confusion is always a property of the mind and nothing else;[73] one should not speak of a "feeling of suffering" (**duḥkhānubhava**)-- it is understood that suffering is, by its very nature, a feeling.[74]

By the rigorous application of this kind of analysis, Mahimabhaṭṭa is able to show that certain passages consist almost entirely of such semantically useless filler. For example:

> "... [who] cuts the necks of his evil enemies with the extremely fierce blows with the front edge of the drawn, sharpened sword [he] held in [his] hand."[75]

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[73]Ibid., p. 373.

[74]Ibid., p. 375.

[75]karakalitaniśātotkhātakhaḍgāgradhārā-
    dṛḍhataravinipātacchinnaduṣṭārikaṇṭhaḥ/

> Here nine words are worthless. The four qualifers of "sword" [i.e. "hand" (**kara**), "held" (**kalita**), "sharpened" (**niśāta**), and "drawn" (**utkhāta**)] are redundant, since they are by nature invariably associated with this [i.e. a sword] whenever it is used. And the mention of the "edge" [**dhārā**], qualified by "front" [**agra**], is redundant, since whenever the sword is meant as an instrument, the understanding of this ["front edge"] will be arrived at merely through appropriateness. And the "blows" [**vinipāta**], qualified by "extremely fierce" [**dṛḍhatara**], which are mentioned here as the means [of cutting], and the evilness of the enemies as well, are redundant, since they are understood by implication. Therefore, "... [who] cuts the necks of enemies with a sword" [**khaḍga-chinna-ari-kaṇṭha**]-- these four words alone are the essence here; everything else is largely worthless and culminates only in the filling out the meter, not in any distinction of meaning.[76]

The use of any word or words whose omission would make no difference in the final meaning understood from a verse is redundant and hence flawed.

Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas since Ānandavardhana's time, both pro- and anti-**dhvani**, had generally emphasized the central significance of unstated meaning in great poetry. Mahimabhaṭṭa erects this general preference for unstated meaning into an absolute rule: wherever a meaning can be understood implicitly it is redundant to state it outright. This rule applies even in the selection of **alaṃkāras**; one figure should be chosen over another if it implies more and says less explicitly. Where possible, one should employ the figure **rūpaka** ("metaphorical identification") rather than **upamā** ("simile"); the former figure implies similitude between

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[76]Ibid., p. 377.

the things identified, without stating it outright.[77] By the same token, the figure **samāsokti** ("condensed expression")[78] is to be preferred to either **upamā** or **rūpaka**.[79] In **samāsokti** even the standard of comparison (**upamāna**) is not stated explicitly; the adjectives or other qualifiers applied to one thing are crafted so as to imply its similarity to another. In constructing **alaṃkāras**, as in all other aspects of composition, the poet must strive to maximize the implicit content of his work.

The fifth and last type of poetic flaw examined by Mahimabhaṭṭa is what he calls **vācya-avacana** ("not saying what should be said").[80] As its name would suggest, this is something of a generic, catch-all category-- one which would seem to overlap, at least partly, with the previous four. Under the heading of **vācya-avacana** Mahimabhaṭṭa deals with a series of disparate topics too numerous to discuss here individually.[81] However, one particular variety of **vācya-avacana**-- the one to which Mahimabhaṭṭa himself devotes the most attention-- is of particular interest, as it leads into

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[77]Ibid., pp. 350ff.

[78]Cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 160-161.

[79]Ibid., pp. 358ff.

[80]Ibid., pp. 387-455. According to Mahimabhatta, this class of flaws includes, by implication, examples of **avācya-vacana** ("saying what should not be said")-- cf. pp. 436ff.

[81]E.g. failure to use pronouns where appropriate (pp. 387ff), errors in choice of **alamkāras** (pp. 391ff), improper formulation of similes (pp. 426ff).

a specific critique of Ānandavardhana's **śabdaśaktimūla dhvani**.

Punning and the Expressive Power of Words

A substantial portion of Mahimabhaṭṭa's discussion of **vācya-avacana** is devoted to an examination of the poetic flaws produced by improperly constructed puns.[82] The mere presence of a series of sounds capable of bearing more than one possible meaning is not sufficient to create a viable pun (**śleṣa**); there are further conditions which must be met if a single set of sounds is to effectively convey multiple meanings within a single sentence. Again, the argument rests fundamentally on the assumption that poetic language must play by the same rules as non-poetic language; poetry, even paronomastic poetry, is not exempt from the ordinary requirements sentential coherence.

As an example of an attempted pun which fails to achieve such coherence, Mahimabhaṭṭa offers the following:

> Even a little bit of misfortune [**vipal-lavo 'pi**], ceaselessly spinkled with the water of tears/*sprinkled with water ceaselessly brought*, grows a thousandfold, like a tree *even without a creeper* [**vi-pallavo 'pi**].[83]

Here the poet has attempted to use a single set of sounds

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[82]Ibid., pp. 399-425. This passage is not, as Chakravorty (op. cit., pp. 132-133) mistakenly asserts, a philosophically motivated attack on the use of puns in general. It is, rather, an examination of the conditions which must apply if the multiple meanings expressed by a set of words used punningly are to be integrated into a single, coherent sentence-meaning.

[83]Ibid., p. 406. anavaratanayanasalilasicyamānas tarur iva vipallavo 'pi sahasradā prarohati.

(**vipallavo**) to express both the subject of comparison ("a little bit of misfortune") and a qualification of the standard of comparison ("without a creeper"-- describing the tree). **Vipallavo** could bear either of these meanings, but cannot here effectively convey both without producing a "splitting of the sentence" (**vākya-bheda**). If it were taken in both senses, the sentence as a whole would convey two quite separate meanings: "A little bit of misfortune is like a tree, and this tree is without a creeper."[84] By attempting to use one of the major terms of the punning comparison itself punningly, the author has destroyed the propositional unity of his sentence.

By way of contrast, Mahimabhaṭṭa offers an example of a pun which successfully maintains sentential coherence:

> But [a word] which expresses a secondary meaning, not a primary one, even when its meaning has been used [once], may repeat [**āvartate**-- i.e. may express a second meaning], when there is some cause [**nibandhana**].[85] For example:
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> "...[Mount Mandara] whose slope becomes beautiful, like the daughter of king Janaka [i.e. Sītā], by having radiant **aṅkolla**-shoots/*by having the crying Lava in her*

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[84]Ibid., p. 410. Note that the terms in which Mahimabhaṭṭa describes this **vākya-bheda** closely parallel those employed in Śabara's seminal discussion of **vākya-bheda** in the Vājapeyādhikaraṇa (cf. above, Chapter Three, p. 86). In his commentary on the passage (p. 411), Ruyyaka quotes a remark on **vākya-bheda** from Kumārila's Ślokavārttika (Nimittasūtra 9) in support of Mahimabhaṭṭa's argument.

[85]I.e. some explicit verbal cue which prompts the search for a double meaning. Here Mahimabhaṭṭa adopts a term first employed by Ānandavardhana in his own analysis of **śleṣa**-- cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 169-170.

radiant lap."[86]

In this example the two major terms of the comparison, the mountain slope and Sītā, are each expressed by a term which is not itself used punningly. The word "like" (**iva**) is the **nibandhana**, the verbal cue which leads to the understanding of the double meaning. It leads us to construe the compound **bhāsvadañkollapallavatayā** as a qualifier of both the mountain-slope and Sītā, and this construal will be intelligible only if we interpret the compound differently in connection with each qualificand: the slope has "**añkolla**-shoots" (**añkolla-pallava**) which are "shining" (**bhāsvad**), while Sītā has in her "shining lap" (**bhāsvad-añka**) her infant son the "crying" (**ullapat**) Lava (**lava**).[87] Thus the proper understanding of the simile, expressed by the word **iva**, requires that **bhasvadañkolla-pallavatayā** be interpreted paronomastically. Syntactically, however, this pun-based simile is constructed like any other simile: two elements are shown to resemble one another through their association with a single qualifier. Thus the verse, despite its use of paronomasia, forms a single, coherent proposition. Furthermore, there is no question of "suggestion" operating in such a verse; a single

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[86]Ibid., p. 407.
sānusthitir janakarājasūteva bhāsvadañkollapallavatayā śriyam eti yasya//
(Ratnākara, Haravijaya 4.23cd)

[87]The rules of Sanskrit euphony (**saṃdhi**) account for the sound changes which occur when these words are pronounced in sequence-- **añka** + **ullapat** + **lava** becomes **añkollapal-lava**.

qualifier, connected with two different qualificands, directly expresses two different meanings.

The need to maintain sentential unity imposes two major requirements on all puns: the word or words which are to convey a double meaning must be "anchored" by syntactic connection with one or more terms which are not themselves used punningly, and there must be some **nibandhana**, some explicit verbal cue which makes a punning interpretation necessary. Where these conditions are not met, *double entendre* will not be possible. It is Mahimabhaṭṭa's insistence on these two features, particularly the latter, as necessary preconditions for all *double entendre* which leads him to deny absolutely the possibility of what Ānandavardhana calls **śabdaśaktimūla dhvani**.

Ānandavardhana and Mahimabhaṭṭa are largely in agreement regarding the nature of the figure **śleṣa**-- both argue that wherever this figure occurs there will be some verbal cue which prompts the search for a double meaning, and that both meanings conveyed by such an expression will be directly expressed. It is regarding the possibility of *double entendre* in the absence of such a verbal cue that they differ. For Ānandvardhana, a set of sounds capable of bearing more than one meaning, used without such an explicit verbal cue, once they have expressed a single, contextually relevant meaning, will suggest, rather than directly express, a second meaning--

a case of **śabdaśaktimūla dhvani**;[88] for Mahimabhaṭṭa, there will be only a failed attempt to compose the figure **śleṣa**.

Mahimabhaṭṭa attempts to show that, by the standards he has articulated in his analysis of **śleṣa**, examples of what Ānandavardhana calls **śabdaśaktimūla dhvani** cannot effectively and coherently convey a double meaning at all. He considers the following verse, one of Ānandavardhana's examples of this type of **dhvani**:

> Giving joy to creatures/*to their offspring* by their water/*milk* released without difficulty at appropriate times, spreading out in all directions at the beginning of the day and withdrawing/*coming together* when the day ends-- may the rays/*cows* of the bright-rayed sun, [which are] ships for crossing the ocean of fear of existence arising from long suffering, produce limitless joy for you pure ones.[89]

The verse is understood to refer explicitly to the rays of the sun (which are thought to extract water from the earth through evaporation, later to return it in the form of rain). But the word for "rays" used here (**gāvaḥ**) also means "cows", and the terms used to describe the rays, differently interpreted, could also be applied to cows (who give milk to their offspring, and who disperse in the morning and return home at night). According to Ānandavardhana, even though there is

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[88]Cf. above, Chapter Four, pp. 170-172.

[89]Ibid., pp. 425, 478ff. Cf. <u>Dhvanyāloka</u>, op. cit., p. 244.
dattānandāḥ prajānām samucitasamayāklistasrstaih payobhih
pūrvāhṇe viprakīrṇā diśi diśi viramaty ahni saṃhārabhājaḥ/
dīptāṃśor dīrghaduḥkhaprabhavabhavabhayodanvaduttāranāvo
gāvo vaḥ pāvanānāṃ param aparimitāṃ prītim utpādayantu//
(Mayūra, <u>Sūryaśataka</u> 9)

nothing in the explicit meaning of the verse which requires a punning interpretation, the use of the word gāvaḥ and and of descriptive terms which may apply to cows as well as rays creates a suggested simile between the rays of the sun and a group of cows.

Mahimabhaṭṭa argues, however, that the verse, as the poet has constructed it, cannot convey this intended *double entendre*. It violates both of the requirements already discussed: the two terms of the punning comparison (the rays and the cows) are themselves meant to be expressed by a single term (gāvaḥ), itself used punningly, and there is no explicit indicator of comparison (such as the word "like") which would cause the hearer to construe the stated qualifiers with both referents and thereby require a punning interpretation. The explicit meaning of the verse (referring to the sun's rays) makes sense in itself, and there is nothing which calls for a second, unstated meaning (relating to cows), and, in any case, nothing to connect this supposed second meaning with the first, explicit, one. This is not to say that one cannot see that the poet meant to convey a double meaning in this verse--Mahimabhaṭṭa's critique, here as elsewhere in his discussion of poetic flaws, presupposes that one can discern the poet's intention even where it has not been effectively carried out. One can certainly see that the poet has carefully selected a set of words which could refer to both rays and cows, but, as the verse has been constructed, there is no way both meanings

of this set of words can be combined in a single, coherent propositional structure-- and hence, no possibility of **ekavākyatā** (cf. above, Chapter Three, p. 76). The verse as a whole could convey either of two possible meanings, but cannot convey both simultaneously; it must be seen either as a statement about rays or as a statement about cows, but not as a simile comparing one with the other. By failing to designate the two terms of the intended comparison by separate words, and by failing to supply an explicit indicator of the comparison, the poet has made it impossible for his verse to effectively convey its intended double meaning.[90]

Other cases of Ānandavardhana's **śabdaśaktimūla dhvani** are attacked on similar grounds.[91] In a few of Ānandavardhana's examples of **śabdaśaktimūla dhvani** Mahimabhaṭṭa finds that there is, in fact, an explicit verbal cue, a **nibandhana**, which allows for a *double entendre*. These can be accepteded as true cases of the figure **śleṣa** (not of **dhvani**).[92] But, where no such **nibandhana** can be found, no *double entendre* is possible; if the conditions necessary for creating the figure **śleṣa** are not met, there can be no double meaning at all. Thus, there is no scope at all for Ānandavardhana's **śabdaśaktimūla dhvani**, a mode of *double entendre* which supposedly operates only in

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[90]Ibid., p. 425.

[91]Ibid., pp. 478ff.

[92]Ibid., p. 401 (cf. Dhvanyāloka, op. cit., p. 241) and p. 420 (cf. Dhvanyāloka, p. 245).

the absence of such conditions.

This is one of the comparatively rare instances in which the theoretical dispute between Ānandavardhana and his critics results in a difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of actual verses. The arguments between pro- and anti-**dhvani** theorists are almost wholly concerned with the process, rather than the outcome, of verbal cognition. There is, in general, widespread agreement regarding the unstated meanings ultimately conveyed by particular verses; the question around which controversy revolves is, How are these meanings conveyed (by suggestion, by figurative expression, by inference, etc.)? Here, however, Mahimabhaṭṭa is challenging not merely Ānandavardhana's explanation of the process by which the verses given as examples of **śabdaśaktimūla dhvani** convey their meanings, but his account of what these meanings are. For Mahimabhaṭṭa, these verses simply do not convey the double meanings Ānandavardhana believes them to convey (although the poets who composed them evidently meant that they should do so).

Mahimabhaṭṭa's attack on **śabdaśaktimūla dhvani** ties into a broader argument he makes regarding the nature of verbal expression. In opposition to Ānandavardhana and others who would argue that implied or unstated meanings are conveyed by one or more "powers" (**śaktis**) of words apart from their capacity of direct expression, Mahimabhaṭṭa contends that words have one and only one expressive power-- that of

denotation or direct expression (**abhidhā**). If words had the capacity to convey figurative and "suggested" meanings, in addition to their own denoted meanings, there would be no way to explain the sequence in which these meanings are invariably arrived at; one always comes to understand the implied or "suggested" meaning of an expression only after one has understood its directly expressed meaning. If direct expression, figurative expression and suggestion were all functions of words, then all would operate simultaneously as soon as the words themselves were heard-- there would be nothing to account for the delayed operation of the latter two.[93] Because the understanding of unstated meanings always follows upon the understanding of directly expressed meanings, it must be these directly expressed meanings, rather than the words which convey them, which produce an awareness of these additional, unstated meanings. And, for reasons already discussed (above, pp. 476-478), directly expressed meanings may lead to the understanding of further, unstated meanings only through a process of inference. So, word and meaning each have one and only one expressive capacity: "Word has one expressive capacity-- denotation [**abhidhā**]; meaning too has only one-- its acting as an inferential mark [**liṅga**]."[94] Words can express only those individual, denoted meanings with

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[93]Just as fire, which has the capacity both to burn and to shed light, does both simultaneously-- cf. Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

[94]Ibid., p. 111.

which they are conventionally associated. Thus all talk of multiple "verbal functions" (**śabdavyāpāras**) is fundamentally misguided.[95]

Conclusion

Despite his general adherence to the views of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, Mahimabhaṭṭa's understanding of the process of linguistic comprehension and of the requirements of textual coherence closely mirrors that of the Mīmāṃsakas in many respects. For him, as for them, words can, by themselves, convey only the individual meanings invariably associated with them; it is these individual word meanings, considered in relation to one another and to the context in which they are employed, which, by a subsequent mental process, produce an awareness of any further meanings to be understood from a text. Textual coherence consists in the direct or indirect subordination of all elements of a text to a single ultimate goal-- in the case of poetry, this goal must *always* be the effective communication of **rasa**. The elements of such a functionally unified text are connected to one another through subject/predicate relations (**vidhi/anuvāda bhāva**), and authors must therefore strive to convey these relations with maximal clarity. The propositional unity of sentences (**ekavākyatā**) is condition of coherence in poetic texts, as in non-poetic ones.

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[95]Mahimabhaṭṭa reiterates the point tirelessly-- cf. ibid., pp. 16, 26, 140-141, 178, 478.

So, while Mahimabhaṭṭa challenges one central element of Ānandavardhana's poetics-- his insistence that **dhvani** cannot be accounted for by existing semantic theory and requires the acceptance of "suggestion" as a previously unrecognized, specifically poetic, mode of verbal expression-- in other respects, he consolidates and further extends Ānandavardhana's theoretical and methodological innovations. The application of Mīmāṃsā interpretive concepts and tools to literary analysis, begun by Ānandavardhana and carried further in the works of Mukulabhaṭṭa and Pratīhārendurāja, reaches new heights in Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka. Ānandavardhana's preference for functionally unified, **rasa**-directed poetry becomes, for Mahimabhaṭṭa, an absolute requirement-- all literary works must have the effective communication of **rasa** as their ultimate, overriding goal.

While Mahimabhaṭṭa's argument for the inclusion of **dhvani** within the scope of inference finds no followers among subsequent Ālaṃkārikas, other elements of his work, particularly the criteria for propositional clarity and coherence developed in the course of his analysis of poetic flaws, are enthusiastically adopted by the later **dhvani**-theorists.[96] Mahimabhaṭṭa's rigorous effort to apply to

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[96]Mammaṭa incorporates Mahimabhatta's **vidheyāvimarśa**, **prakrama-bheda**, **krama-bheda** and **paunaruktya** in his own treatment of poetic flaws, explaining them in very similar terms and often adopting the very same examples and suggested emendations employed in the Vyaktiviveka-- cf. Kāvyaprakāśa (ed. N.S. Venkatanathacarya, Oriental Research Institute Series 122, University of Mysore, 1977) Vol. II, pp. 50-61,

poetic language the same standards of sentential and textual coherence developed for the analysis of non-poetic language (chiefly in the Mīmāṃsakas' interpretation of the Veda) continues to exert a powerful influence on later authors, even though his denial of a specifically poetic mode of signification is rejected.

105-117, and 123-4. Hemacandra's Kāvyānuśāsana, Vidyānātha's Pratāparudrīya, and Viśvanātha's Sāhityadarpaṇa follow the Kāvyaprakāśa in this respect. The entire discussion of poetic flaws in Vidyādhara's Ekāvalī is modelled on Mahimabhaṭṭa's treatment, adopting the same categories of flaw found in the Vyaktiviveka.

EPILOGUE

With Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka, the controversy over Ānandavardhana's **dhvani**-theory is effectively at an end. The next major work of Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra is Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa (c. 1100 AD). Mammaṭa accepts the central role of Ānandavardhana's **dhvani** in poetry, argues for the existence of suggestion (**vyañjanā**) as a distinct mode of verbal expression, and adopts Ānandavardhana's tripartite classification of poetry (into **dhvani-**, **guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-**, and **citra-kāvya**); while he draws on the works of many earlier theorists in formulating his system of poetics, Mammaṭa is unambiguously a follower of Ānandavardhana. The Kāvyaprakāśa proves to be an extraordinarily influential work, and spawns many imitators. While later Ālaṃkārikas disagree with Mammaṭa and with one another on many matters of detail, nearly all accept Mammaṭa's treatment of the basic issues of Alaṃkāraśāstra as essentially valid.[1] After Mammaṭa, the existence of **dhvani** and **vyañjanā** are treated as settled facts. The "scientific revolution" which began with Ānandavardhana's work is at an end, and a new period of "normal science" ensues.

Yet, while the central tenets of Ānandavardhana's poetic and semantic theory gain virtually universal acceptance among

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[1]Although a few alternative traditions (most notably that pioneered by Bhoja-- cf. above, Chapter One, p. 3) persist outside of Kashmir for some time before Alaṃkāraśāstra along the lines of Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa gains acceptance throughout the subcontinent.

the post-Mammaṭa Ālaṃkārikas, the approach these later theorists take to literary analysis is strikingly at odds with what Ānandavardhana himself seems to have to envisioned as the proper role for Alaṃkāraśāstra. Criticism of existing literary works as functionally unified wholes is wholly neglected; discussion focuses almost entirely on the operation of **dhvani** and other literary features at the level of the individual verse. **Rasa**-directedness is widely accepted as an ideal, but little or no attention is devoted to examining the concrete techniques by which individual verses may be effectively integrated into larger order textual units which convey a single predominant **rasa**. These Ālaṃkārikas are mainly interested in providing a precise account of the semantic processes involved in poetic expression, along with an exhaustive and logically ordered taxonomy of the subvarieties of these processes and of the elements which may be conveyed by them; attempts to evaluate the aesthetic effectiveness of existing works, and to formulate principles which might guide future poets in composing aesthetically effective works-- both of which played a major role in the Dhvanyāloka-- are marginalized. Ānandavardhana's work initiated a major transformation in the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra, but the ultimate results of this transformation are far from what Ānandavardhana himself seems to have intended.

In conclusion, let us briefly reexamine the main points

of the account given here of the revolution in Kashmiri Alaṃkāraśāstra initiated by Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka. Ānandavardhana radically alters the basic theoretical and methodological presuppositions of poetic theory by applying to the analysis of poetic language a teleological approach to textual interpretation modelled on that of the Mīmāṃsakas; unity of purpose is taken to be the defining feature of coherence in poetic texts, and the effective communication of a single, predominant **rasa** is taken to be the ultimate purpose toward which all formal elements of a poetic work ought to be-- and, at least typically, are-- directed. The particularistic, formalist aesthetic of the earlier Ālaṃkārikas is displaced by a new view of literary analysis which requires that the specific formal features of poetic works be evaluated not merely on the basis of their intrinsic beauty, but in terms of their contextual appropriateness-- their ability to help or hinder the intended **rasa** of the passage or work in which they are employed. The adoption of this Mīmāṃsā-derived understanding of texts as hierarchically ordered, functionally unified wholes solves what had become a pressing problem for the early Ālaṃkārikas: the status of **rasa** in poetry and its relation to other poetic elements (such as **alaṃkāras** and **guṇas**). **Rasa** is not included within the categories of formal elements dealt with by the early Ālaṃkārikas; rather, the communication of **rasa** is the goal which **alaṃkāras** and other formal features of poetic language

ought ultimately to subserve.

By systematically applying concepts and methods drawn from extra-poetic language theory to the analysis of poetic language, Ānandavardhana begins to bridge a terminological and conceptual divide which had so far separated poetic theory and linguistic philosophy. From this time forth, it comes to be seen as necessary for Ālaṃkārikas to give a precise and philosophically defensible account of the semantic processes by which poetic language conveys its meanings. Anxious to defend himself against the charge that he is merely redescribing phenomena dealt with by earlier theorists, Ānandavardhana argues that **rasa** and the other varieties of unstated meaning (**vastu** and **alaṃkāra**) he deals with under the rubric of **dhvani** are conveyed by a semantic process so far unrecognized by either Ālaṃkārikas or philosophers of language-- what he calls **vyañjanā** ("suggestion" or "manifestation"). The claim to have discovered a new mode of verbal expression, however, places Ānandavardhana in direct conflict with all established schools of linguistic theory; he is forced to expend a great deal of effort defending himself against the objections of Mīmāṃsakas, grammarians, Naiyāyikas and Buddhist logicians to the notion of **vyañjanā**, and the question of the existence or non-existence of **vyañjanā** becomes the major point of controversy among the Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas in the ensuing centuries.

Ānandavardhana's adoption of a **rasa**-centered,

teleological model of textual coherence opens up new possibilities in the area of literary criticism; it requires that the aesthetic value of individual poetic elements be judged in terms of their ability to enhance that **rasa** which is the overall goal of the work in which they are employed, and thereby gives the analysis of whole literary compositions a relevance it did not hold for earlier Ālaṃkārikas. Nevertheless, the careful attention to existing literary works prompted by this new critical orientation creates problems for Ānandavardhana. While many celebrated poetic works can be shown to be **rasa**-centered, there are others which clearly are not so. Ānandavardhana recognizes three possible classes of poetry-- **dhvani** (in which suggested meaning is predominant), **guṇībhūtavyañgya** (in which suggested meaning, including **rasa**, is subordinate), and **citra** (in which there is no suggested meaning whatsoever)-- and, while his poetic teleology would seem to require that all poetry (having suggested **rasa** as its ultimate goal) should belong to the first class, Ānandavardhana is ultimately unwilling to dismiss either **guṇībhutavyañgya**- or **citra-kāvya** as necessarily deficient. There is a certain unresolved tension between theory and observation evident in Ānandavardhana's treatment of these latter two types of poetry-- a tension which his successors tend to resolve either by emphasizing the theory-driven demand for **rasa**-centrality and rejecting non-**rasa**-directed literature as defective or (in Kuntaka's case) by dismissing the demand

for **rasa**-centrality and striving for a sympathetic appreciation of **rasa**-directed and non-**rasa**-directed literature alike.

While certain key elements of Ānandavardhana's poetic theory-- especially his claims for **vyañjanā** as previously unrecognized and specifically poetic mode of expression-- prove to be extremenly controversial, his work produces a sudden and radical transformation in Kashmiri Ālaṃkāraśāstra which deeply affects all its practitioners; even those who present themselves as critics of the **dhvani**-theory are, in many important respects, following in Ānandavardhana's footsteps. Mukulabhaṭṭa and his pupil Pratīhārendurāja strive to defend existing linguistic and poetic theory against Ānandavardhana's charges of inadequacy, yet, in the course of doing so, both end up modifying and elaborating the earlier theories they defend so as to derive from them a satisfactory account of the phenomena Ānandavardhana finds to be of central importance in poetry.[2] Both admit the crucial role of unstated meaning in poetry, and adopt Ānandavardhana's threefold categorization of such meaning (into **vastu**, **alaṃkāra**, and **rasa**); and both appear to concur in the most important element of Ānandavardhana's revaluation of poetics--

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[2]Kuhn finds the same phenomenon to be common in periods of scientific revolution. Faced with the impressive discoveries produced by adherents of a new scientific theory, defenders of established theory can and often do extend and modify their own theories so as to adequately account for these discoveries (cf. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, op. cit., pp. 71, 78 and 156-7).

his understanding the communication of **rasa** as the ultimate goal toward which poetic works are, or ought to be, directed. By implication, it is for them Ānandavardhana's work that shows what is most valuable in poetry and that sets the standard for what a poetic theory must be expected to explain.

In spite of the intense controversy regarding the existence of Ānandavardhana's "suggestion", the **rasa**-centered model of aesthetic effectiveness he introduces gains instant and near-universal acceptance among the Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas. The one major exception to this general acceptance is Kuntaka, but, in light of the almost total neglect of his work by later Ālaṃkārikas, he may be regarded as an exception that proves the rule. While Kuntaka regards **rasa** as an element of major importance in literature, the communication of **rasa** is always, for him, only one among several possible and equally valid aesthetic goals a poet may seek to achieve in his work. He rejects Ānandavardhana's teleological approach to poetic analysis, and avoids the heated disputes over interpretive processes raised in connection with it. His work, whatever its intrinsic merits, is largely irrelevant to what have become for his contemporaries the central questions of poetic theory, and, seemingly as a consequence, he receives little or no attention from later Ālaṃkārikas.

Ānandavardhana's **rasa**-centered poetic teleology is not only generally accepted by later Ālaṃkārikas: its implications are carried much farther than Ānandavardhana himself was

prepared to take them. As we have seen, while Ānandavardhana sees **rasa**-directedness as a common feature of great poetic works, and recommends that future poets employ it in their own compositions, he is ultimately unwilling to insist on it as an *essential* requirement for *all* poetry; he recognizes that there are works in which **rasa** is subordinate or altogether absent, and is not prepared to summarily dismiss all such works as defective. In tenth and eleventh century Kashmir a consensus begins to develop that **rasa**-directedness is indeed an essential property of all poetic works-- is, in fact, the defining and constitutive property of poetry. This consensus cuts across other lines of controversy: Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa, two of Ānandavardhana's most determined critics, and Abhinavagupta, his most celebrated defender, all hold this view.

Along with a Mīmāṃsā-derived understanding of texts as hierarchically ordered, functionally unified wholes, Ānandavardhana brings into play in his poetic theory some of the key interpretive concepts developed by the Mīmāṃsakas in their interpretation of the Vedas. In his work, the distinctions between primary and subordinate meanings, between intended (**vivakṣita**) and unintended (**avivakṣita**) meanings, and between subject (**anuvāda**) and predicate (**vidhi**), suddenly take on a major importance in the analysis of poetic language-- an importance which they continue to bear in the works of Ānandavardhana's sucessors. Both Mukulabhaṭṭa and

Pratīhārendurāja expand the role of Mīmāṃsā techniques and concepts in poetic theory. Mukulabhaṭṭa asserts the identity of the process by which poetic language conveys unstated meanings with that by which non-poetic language conveys such meanings-- the process of figurative expression [**lakṣaṇā**], already fully explained by the Mīmāṃsakas. Pratīhārendurāja reinterprets many of Udbhaṭa's definitions and categories in Mīmāṃsā terms, and explains the cognitive process involved in the interpretation of many of Udbhaṭa's **alaṃkāras** in terms of the Mīmāṃsā-derived concepts of intermediate and final sentence meaning (**avāntara-vākyārtha** and **paryavasāna**).

This systematic application of Mīmāṃsā concepts and methods to the analysis of literary language is, for the most part, embraced and extended by the later Kashmiri Ālaṃkārikas. Kuntaka, again, is a major exception; he resists the trend toward viewing literary texts through the lens of Mīmāṃsā interpretive theory. But, again, the near total neglect of Kuntaka by his contemporaries and successors reveals the basic irrelevance of his work to the problems of poetic analysis as they are understood by the Ālaṃkārikas of tenth and eleventh century Kashmir. Abhinavagupta, arguing for the extraordinary (**alaukika**) status of poetic language, attempts to exempt it from the requirements of propositional coherence imposed by Mīmāṃsā theory, but this attempt comes to naught. The application of Mīmāṃsā-derived standards of sentential coherence to poetry continues unabated in the works of

Mahimabhaṭṭa, Mammaṭa and, following him, most of the later Ālaṃkārikas.

The most important features of Ānandavardhana's revolutionary poetic theory-- his adoption of a Mīmāṃsā-derived, teleological model of textual coherence, his arguments for the existence of suggestion as a distinct and specially poetic mode of expression, and his application of Mīmāṃsā interpretive concepts and methods to the analysis of literary texts-- ultimately gain general acceptance, and serve as the basis for most later work in the field of Alaṃkāraśāstra. Yet, somewhat ironically, the growing importance of Mīmāṃsā-based textual analysis gradually shifts the role of Alaṃkāraśāstra away from what it was for Ānandavardhana. Attention comes to be more and more focussed on providing a precise explanation of the cognitive processes by which poetic meaning is understood. Those tasks which Ānandavardhana seemed to regard as the most pressing business of Alaṃkāraśāstra-- the use of teleological, **rasa**-based analysis as a tool for literary criticism, and the outlining of principles to guide poets in composing **rasa**-directed works-- are for the most part pushed aside by the increasing concern with the analysis of interpretive processes.

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